Lecture 3 — Minor Doubts on the Dissolution of Friendship

A question comes up: should or should not friendship be dissolved when people no longer remain the same? [1785]

It is not surprising that friendship is broken off between people who are friends for utility or pleasure when these advantages no longer exist. Since the friendship was based on utility and pleasure that have ceased, it is reasonable for the friendship to cease. [1786]

But someone will justly complain of a friend who loves for gain or pleasure but pretends to love for virtue. As we remarked in the beginning, many differences arise when people are not friends in the way they think they are. If, then, a person deceives himself in thinking he is being loved for virtue—the other doing nothing of the sort—he has only himself to blame. But if he is deceived by the pretense of the other, he can blame the deceiver even more justly than he could blame counterfeiters, because the wrongdoing is against a more precious good. [1787]

If, however, a person is accepted as good but later becomes bad, and this is apparent, should he still be loved? [1789]

It is quite impossible, for not everything should be loved but only good. Nor is it reasonable to be a lover of evil, or to become like an evil man; and we have indicated that like makes friends with like. [1790]

Should the friendship then be broken off immediately? [1791]

This should not always be done, but only when friends are confirmed in evil. If they will accept guidance, we are even more bound to help them morally than we should be to assist them financially; for this is more noble and more proper to friendship. But when a man breaks off such a friendship, he does nothing unreasonable; he was not a friend to such a person, and consequently withdraws from the friendship of one who has changed and cannot be regenerated. [1792]

If, however, one friend remains the same but the other becomes better so that a greater difference in virtue exists between them, should the more advanced cultivate the other? [1793]

No. He cannot. This becomes evident especially among friends of the remote past, such as in friendships begun in childhood. For, if one remains a child mentally and the other becomes very talented, they will have no way of being friends, since they do not find satisfaction or delight or pain in the same things; they do not even share them with one another. And without this sharing, friendship is impossible. But we have already treated these questions. [1794]

Is a person, then, to behave toward him no differently than if he had not been a friend? [1795]

He should remember the former intimacy, and as we think a man ought to act more kindly toward friends than strangers, so he should make some concessions to former friends by reason of past friendship, provided that the separation was not due to extreme wickedness. [1796]

1785. A question comes up. After the Philosopher has investigated the questions pertaining to the preservation of friendship, he now treats the questions dealing with its dissolution.

He discusses this point under two headings.

First, he inquires when a friendship should be dissolved.

Second, at is a person then (1165b31; [1795]), he shows how a person should behave toward a friend after the dissolution of friendship.

He treats the first point from two aspects.

First, he examines the dissolution of friendship for those who have changed from their former status.

Second, at if, however, one (1165b23; [1793]), he examines the dissolution of friendship for those who remain in the same status.

He handles the first point in a threefold manner.

First, he proposes the doubt.

Second, at **it is not surprising **(1165b1; [1786]), he offers a solution for friendship based on utility and pleasure.

Third, at if, however, a person (1165b13; [1789]), for friendship based on virtue.

He says first that a question comes up: should or should not friendship be dissolved for those who do not remain in the same state in which they were friends?

1786. Then, at it is not surprising (1165b1), he solves the doubt so far as it concerns useful or pleasurable friendship.

First, he shows in what manner these friendships are destroyed.

Second, at but someone will (1165b4; [1787), he explains how just complaints may arise in them.

He observes first that it is not surprising for friendship to be broken up between people who are friends for utility or pleasure when the advantages no longer exist. The reason is that, in these friendships men love pleasure and utility, and not the persons for themselves. Hence, when utility or pleasure ceases, it is understandable that friendship should cease.

1787. At but someone will (1165b4), he shows how complaints may justly arise in these friendships. He remarks that someone will fairly complain of a friend who loves for gain or pleasure but pretends to love for virtue. We stated in the beginning of this treatise that there are several varieties of friendship. Hence, it is possible that some are not friends in the way they think they are—that is, according to the same kind of friendship—such as if they are friends for utility and think they are friends for the sake of virtue. In this case, if a man believes he is loved for virtue and deceives himself—the one who loves him contributing nothing to the deception—he ought to blame himself.

1788. But when a person is deceived by the pretense of the other, he can accuse the deceiver even more justly than he could counterfeiters, for the malice of a person pretending virtue consists in an act against a more precious good. Certainly, virtue is more precious than money. So people counterfeiting virtue are more wicked than those who forge money.

1789. Next, at if, however, a person (1165b13), he answers the question as it concerns friendship based on virtue.

First, he shows that this friendship should be broken off between those who do not remain virtuous;

second, at should the friendship (1165b17; [1791]), how it is to be broken off.

He treats the first point from two aspects.

First, he repeats the question. If we should admit a person to our friendship as a good man and he later becomes so bad that his wickedness is obvious, should we still love him?

1790. Second, at it is quite (1165b14), he answers the question again, making two comments.

First, it is impossible for the evildoer, whose wickedness is evident, to be loved by a virtuous man who cannot love everything, but only the honorable good.

Second, it is unreasonable to love a man who has become evil; it is neither useful nor fitting, since a person should not love evil or become like a perverse man and this might follow if friendship were preserved with an evil man. We have indicated in book 8 [1654] that like makes friends with like; thus, it is impossible to maintain friendship with an evil person without becoming somewhat like him in evil.

1791. At should the friendship (1165b17), he shows how this friendship should be broken off.

First, he asks the question: should a person immediately dissolve a friendship with a man who has become bad?

1792. Second, at this should not always (1165b18), he answers the question, replying that we should not immediately break off friendship with such all persons, but only with those who are incurable owing to their excessive wickedness (that is, cannot be returned readily to the path of virtue). But, if some would accept guidance so they could come back to a virtuous status, they ought to be given more assistance to regain good morals than for lost possessions, since virtue is more noble and more proper to friendship than money. And when someone breaks off friendship with one who has become bad, he does not seem to do anything unreasonable, because he was not a friend to a vicious person, but to a virtuous one. Consequently, a friend reasonably withdraws from the friendship with a man who his changed from his previous condition and cannot he regenerated.

1793. Next, at if, however, one (1165b23), he treats the dissolution of friendship.

First, he raises the question. One friend may remain in his former condition but the other becomes more virtuous, and thus a great difference in virtue may exist between the two. Hence, the question arises whether the person who has advanced in virtue ought to treat as a friend the other who has made no advance.

1794. Second, at no, he cannot (1165b24), he solves the question, observing that it is impossible for the one who is advancing in virtue to continue friendship with him who is standing still. This is especially apparent among friends of the remote past, such as in friendships begun in childhood. For, if one remains a child mentally while the other becomes very talented, they cannot go on being friends, since they do not have the same tastes, nor are they delighted and pained by the same things. And without this, it is impossible to preserve friendship, which requires most of all that friends live together. But they cannot live with one another unless they are pleased, delighted, and distressed by the same objects. These questions have been discussed already in book 8 [1607–23].

1795. Then, at is a person, then (1165b31), he investigates how someone ought to behave toward a friend after the dissolution of the friendship.

First, he asks the question whether, after severing the friendship, a person should no longer behave on rather friendly terms, just as if he had not been a friend in the past.

1796. Next, at he should (1165b32), he answers the question in this way. A man should remember a former intimacy, as we think he should act more kindly toward friends than toward strangers. So, too, because of a past friendship, a man ought to act more kindly toward persons who were once his friends, except in the one case where separation from the friend was due to his excessive wickedness. For then a man should show no marks of friendliness to another whose friendship he has terminated.