Lecture 4 — The Acts or Effects of Friendship

Kindly acts done for friends, and the determining factors in friendship, seem to be derived from a man’s attitude toward himself. [1797]

A friend is defined as one who wills and does what is good (or apparently good) for the sake of his friend. [1798]

He is likewise defined as one who wills that his friend exist and live for the friend’s sake. Mothers feel this toward their children, and former friends toward one another after a quarrel. [1799]

Finally, the friend is defined as one who lives with another and has the same tastes or shares the same sorrows and joys with his friend. This, too, happens especially with mothers. Now, friendship will be defined by some one of these characteristics. [1800]

Each of these is the standard of the virtuous man in relation to himself, and of other men in relation to themselves inasmuch as they consider themselves virtuous. [1802]

As we have pointed out, virtue and the virtuous man seem to be a standard for everyone. [1803]

For he is consistent with himself, always desiring the same things with his whole soul; he wishes for himself both genuine and apparent goods, and produces them. Indeed, it is the mark of a good man to take pains to achieve the good, and he does this for himself, that is, for the sake of the intellectual part that seems to be a man’s real self. [1804]

Likewise, he desires his own life and preservation, and especially that of his thinking faculty. For, existence is a good to a virtuous man and everyone wishes what is good for him. No one would choose to have everything that exists at the price of becoming someone else. God even now possesses the good, but he always is what he is at any time. And it seems that the thinking part of man is the man himself, or at least the most important part. [1806]

Such a man wishes to converse with himself. He does this with pleasure, for memory of past triumphs is sweet, and hope for the future is encouraging. Besides, his mind is filled with topics for contemplation. [1808]

He keenly feels his own sorrows and joys, for the same thing is painful or pleasant to his whole being, and not one thing to one part and another to another. To tell the truth, he has few regrets. Therefore, each of these characteristics is attributable to the virtuous man himself. [1809]

However, he feels toward his friend as toward himself, for a friend is another self. Consequently, friendship seems to consist in any of these characteristics, and people who have them are friends. [1811]

But whether a person has friendship for himself is a question that must be dismissed for the present. Friendship seems to exist inasmuch as there are two or more having the characteristics mentioned; and if the friendship excels, it is similar to the love of a man for himself. [1812]

The attributes discussed seem to belong to the greater part of mankind who, though wicked, apparently have a share of them insofar as they are satisfied with themselves and think themselves virtuous. But none of the thoroughly perverse or wicked either actually have these attributes or appear to have them; even the lesser evildoers hardly have them. [1813]

They differ, though, from one another in desiring one pleasure and wishing for another; they are like the incontinent who choose harmful pleasures instead of those that they really think are good for them. Again, others from faintheartedness or laziness avoid doing what they are convinced is in their best interests. [1814]

But those who commit many cruel deeds and are hated for their wickedness seek to avoid living, and take their own life. [1815]

Wicked people, therefore, seek association with their own kind; they cannot stand themselves, being mindful of many unpleasant deeds in the past and believing that, if alone, they will do the same in the future. But, when in the company of others, they are disposed to forget. Thus, they do not experience friendship for themselves, having nothing in them worth loving. [1816]

People of this sort neither rejoice nor grieve with themselves, for their soul is at the same time delighted and distressed when abstaining from certain pleasures. Thus, it is drawn this way and that as if by conflicting forces. [1817]

If it is impossible to grieve and rejoice at the same time, it is still true that a person can regret after a little while that he indulged in pleasures and wish that he had not acquired a taste for them. In fact, a bad man is filled with remorse. It seems, then, that the evil person is not amicably inclined even toward himself, for he has nothing lovable about him. [1818]

If to be in such a state is wretched, a man ought to shun evil with great ardor and make every effort to be virtuous. In this way, he will acquire friendship for himself and will become a friend of another. [1819]

1797. Kindly acts done for friends. After the Philosopher has defined the preservation and dissolution of friendship, he now treats its effects.

First, he indicates the effects of friendship.

Second, at goodwill resembles (1166b30; [1820]), he describes them.

He discusses the first point in a threefold manner.

First, he lists the effects of friendship.

Second, at each of these (1166a10; [1802]), he shows how good men are disposed toward them.

Third, he shows how bad men are disposed towards them, at the attributes discussed (1166b2; [1813]).

He treats the first point under two aspects.

First, he describes the origin of the effects or acts of friendship.

Second, at a friend is defined (1166a2; [1798]), he lists these effects or acts.

He says first that the kindnesses and friendly acts that are done by a man for a friend and are the determining factors in friendship seem to have their origin in his attitudes toward himself. Thus, it seems that one person is a friend of another if he acts the same way for a friend as he might for himself.

1798. Next, at a friend is defined (1166a2), he lists the works of friendship, which are three.

One consists in the voluntary offering of benefits. He observes that people consider someone a friend who wills and does what is good or apparently good for the sake of his friend. He says wills and does because one without the other is not enough for friendship. In fact, the good deed does not seem to be friendly if a person unwillingly benefits another or neglects to do his will by action. He says what is good or apparently good because now and then someone, for friendship, gives another presents he thinks good for the other, though they are not. He says for the sake of his friend because, if a man were voluntarily to give benefits to another not, as it were, intending the other’s good, but his own (such as when an owner feeds a horse because he derives profit for himself), he does not seem to be a friend of that person, but of himself.

1799. The second work, which he describes at likewise as one who wills (1166a4), is proper to goodwill. He remarks that a friend wills his friend to be and to live for his friend’s sake and not for his own, as would be the case were he to seek only personal gain from him. Mothers feel this way toward their children, namely, will their existence and life. Friends, too, have a similar feeling toward one another when a misunderstanding occurs in their friendship. Even though they do not want to live together on friendly terms because of the misunderstanding, at least they wish their friends to exist and live.

1800. The third work is described at as one who lives (1166a6), and is proper to concord. This can be considered in reference to three characteristics.

The first refers to exterior association;

the second to discrimination;

the third to the emotional states that always end in joy or sorrow.

Hence, he observes that people call someone a friend who has close contact with another (the first characteristic), has the same tastes (the second), and shares sorrows and joys (the third). These are also noticed in mothers with respect to their children.

1801. He adds, by way of summary, so to speak, that friendship is defined by some one of these characteristics, for people think there is friendship in men having any one of these qualities.

1802. Then, at each of these (1166a10), he shows how good men are constituted in this matter.

First, he shows how a virtuous person refers these effects to himself;

second, at however, he feels (1166a30; [1811]), how he refers them to someone else;

third, at but whether a person (1166a33; [1812]), he raises a question.

He considers the first point under three aspects.

First, he proposes his intention.

Second, at as we have pointed out (1166a12; [1803]), he gives his reason for his previous remark.

Third, at for he is consistent (1166a13; [1804]), he clarifies his principal proposition.

He says first that all these characteristics belong to a virtuous man in relation to himself, and they belong to other men who are not virtuous in relation to themselves, at least inasmuch as they think they are virtuous.

1803. At as we have pointed out (1166a12), he gives his reason for what is referred to under the second heading. Every man, in fact, does friendly acts for himself insofar as he considers himself virtuous, since virtue and the good man seem to be a standard for everyone. For, what is the perfect being in any order of reality must be considered a measure in that order, because all other things are judged more or less perfect according as they approach or recede from what is most perfect. Consequently, since virtue is the proper perfection of man and the virtuous man is perfect in the human species, this should be taken as the measure in all man’s affairs.

1804. Next, at for he is consistent (1166a13), he clarifies his principal proposition.

First, he shows that the virtuous man himself suitably has what is proper to beneficence;

second, what is proper to goodwill, at likewise, he desires (1166a17; [1806]);

third, what is proper to concord, at such a man (1166a23; [1808]).

He says first that the virtuous man desires for himself both genuine and apparent goods, for these latter are identical with genuine goods for him; the reason is that he wishes the goods of virtue, the real good of man. Nor is this desire ineffective in him, but he produces these goods for himself because it is a mark of a good man to labor for the achievement of good.

1805. We said in book 1 [222] and book 2 [307, 307] that virtue makes its possessor good and his work good. And the virtuous person wants this and acts for himself, that is, for the sake of the intellectual element that is foremost in man. Indeed, everything seems to be especially what is foremost in it. But the virtuous man strives always to do what is reasonable. It is evident, then, that he always wishes for himself the absolute good.

1806. Then, at likewise, he desires (1166a17), he shows that the virtuous man himself suitably has what belongs to goodwill. The Philosopher remarks that the virtuous man especially wishes himself life and conservation in being chiefly for that part of the soul where wisdom resides. If a man is virtuous, he must want what is good for him because everyone desires good things for himself. But the good of a virtuous man is that he be virtuous.

1807. However, if a man were to become something else—for instance, if he were transformed into a stone or an ass, as the fables relate—he would not trouble himself about whether he had all good things in his transformed state. For that reason, everyone wishes himself to exist so that his identity is preserved. But the being that remains identical in his existence is God; he does not wish himself some good he does not now possess, but possesses perfect good in himself. He always is what he is at any time, since he is unchangeable. Now we are like God most of all by our intellect, which is incorruptible and unchangeable. Therefore, every man’s existence is thought of in terms of his intellect. Hence, a virtuous man who lives entirely according to his intellect and reason especially wishes himself to exist and to live. He also wishes himself to exist and live according to what is permanent in him. On the other hand, a person who wishes himself to exist and live chiefly in terms of his body, which is subject to change, does not really wish to be and to live.

1808. At such a man (1166a23), he shows how a virtuous man appropriately has in himself what is proper to concord.

He does this first in regard to companionship, remarking that the virtuous man wishes most of all to converse with himself by turning to his soul and meditating alone.

He does this with pleasure:

first, regarding the memory of past events, since the recollection of former triumphs is sweet to him;

second, regarding hope for the future, for he anticipates success and this is pleasant to him;

third, regarding present knowledge, for his mind is filled with reflections, that is, true and useful deliberations.

1809. Second, at he keenly (1166a27), Aristotle shows that the virtuous man is at peace with his own passions. He keenly feels his own sorrows and joys, since the same thing is painful or pleasant to his whole being (that is, both the sensitive and intellectual part), and not one thing to one part and another to another. The reason is that his sensitive power is subject to reason to such an extent that it obeys reason’s prompting, or at least does not resist. For the virtuous man is not led by the passions of the sensitive part in such a way that, when passion subsides, he must repent of having acted against reason. Rather, he always acts according to reason and does not readily have regrets. Thus, he is at peace with himself.

1810. He concludes by way of epilogue that the characteristics discussed are appropriate to a virtuous man in relation to himself.

1811. Next, at however, he feels (1166a30), he shows how a virtuous man should adapt these characteristics to his friend. Aristotle notes that a virtuous man is disposed to his friend as to himself because a friend is, so to speak, another self by affection; that is, a person feels for a friend what he feels for himself. Consequently, it seems that friendship consists in any of these characteristics that people experience toward themselves and that those are real friends who have these characteristics.

1812. Then, at but whether a person (1166a33), he raises a question: does a man have friendship toward himself? He observes that this question must be postponed, since it is a semantic problem rather than a real one. Friendship seems to exist among any persons who possess two or three of the characteristics mentioned. And when the friendship for others excels, it is similar to the love a man has for himself. Consequently, someone wishing to prove his friendship for another is accustomed to say, “I love you as myself.” Hence, it does not really make any difference whether the word friendship is applied to self, because the reality of friendship abundantly belongs to a man in regard to himself.

1813. At the attributes discussed (1166b2), he shows how bad men are disposed toward these works of friendship.

First, he shows that these works cannot belong to evil men.

Second, at if to be in such (1166b26; [1819]), he deduces a corollary from the discussion.

He treats the first point from two aspects.

First, he proposes his intention.

Second, at they differ, though (1166b7; [1814]), he explains his proposition.

He says first that these works of friendship seem to belong to many in respect to themselves in spite of the fact that they are evil men. However, we must understand that the more they share in these works of friendship for themselves, the more they are satisfied with themselves and think they are virtuous. But those who are completely perverse or wicked neither resort to these works nor seem to live together, and scarcely any evil man finds such behavior agreeable to him. Indeed, there are few evil men who think they are virtuous or who are unaware of their wickedness.

1814. Next, at they differ, though (1166b7), he explains his proposition.

First, he shows that bad men are not suitable to have the work of friendship belonging to beneficence;

second, nor that belonging to goodwill, at but those who (1166b11; [1815]);

third, nor that belonging to concord, at wicked people, therefore (1166b13; [1816]).

He remarks first that bad men are at odds with themselves because they desire some pleasures agreeing with their sensitive appetite at the same time that they wish others agreeing with their reason. Such is obviously the case with the incontinent, who want harmful pleasures instead of those they reasonably judge good. Others, from faintheartedness and laziness, neglect to do what they know is good. Thus, they are doubly lacking in beneficence toward themselves:

in one way, so far as they do what is harmful;

in the other, so far as they shun what is beneficial.

1815. Then, at but those who (1166b11), he shows that they are not suitable to have the work that belongs to goodwill. He observes that criminals who have perpetrated many frightful deeds—such that their very personalities are hated by men—do not want to exist or live. But life becomes a burden for them because they know that they are offensive. And they actually so flee from life that they sometimes do away with themselves.

1816. At wicked people, therefore (1166b13), he shows that evil men are not suitable to have the work that belongs to concord.

He does this first regarding companionship. Evil men cannot converse with themselves by turning to their soul, but they seek to associate with others by speaking and cooperating with them in external words and works. They act in this way because, when thinking alone about themselves, they remember many distressing evils they committed in the past and they are convinced they will do the same in the future, which is painful to them. But, when they are in company, they forget their wrongdoings in the distraction of external activities. So, since they have nothing in themselves worth loving, they feel no love for themselves.

1817. Second, at people of this sort (1166b18), he explains that they cannot find internal peace with their passions. He observes that people of this sort are not conscious of their own joys and sorrows. In fact, their soul struggles against itself, for the sensitive part resists the reason. On the one hand, it grieves when withdrawing from pleasures because of evil that dominates it and causes distress in the sensitive part; on the other hand, it rejoices according to reason that judges that evil pleasures are to be avoided. In this way, one part of the soul draws an evil man one way, but the other part draws him the opposite way, just as if his soul were rent into conflicting drives and fought with itself.

1818. Third, at if it is impossible (1166b22), he eliminates a doubt. Someone might contend that it is impossible for an evil person to grieve and rejoice at the same time about the same matter; and it is true so far as the two experiences are concerned, although each can be caused at the same time in different parts of the soul. He maintains, then, that, if a wicked man cannot be pained and pleased at the same time, nevertheless, shortly after the gratification, he is saddened that he was delighted a moment ago and wishes he had not indulged in such pleasures. Indeed, evil men are filled with remorse because, after the impulse of evil or passion that caused the wickedness subsides, their reason tells them they did wrong and they are remorseful. It is obvious, then, that evil men are not inclined to friendship for themselves, for they have nothing in them worthy of friendship.

1819. At if to be in such (1166b26), he concludes from the premises that, if it is so extremely wretched to live without friendship for oneself, we ought to shun evil with increased ardor, and make every effort to become virtuous. For, in this way, a person will have friendship for himself and be capable of becoming a friend to others.