Article 1 — Whether God can create something out of nothing

And the first point of inquiry is whether God can create something out of nothing. (Parallel texts: ST I.45.2; SCG II.16; In II Sent. 1.1.2; Compendium theologiae, ch. 69; Commentary on Physics, bk. 8, lect. 2.)

Obj. 1: It seems that he cannot. For God cannot act in opposition to a common conception of the mind; for instance, he cannot make a whole to be not greater than its part. Now, according to Aristotle, it was a common conception of the thought of philosophers that nothing comes to be from nothing. (Aristotle, Physics 1.4, 187a29–34; 1.8, 191a24–b30.) Therefore, God cannot make something out of nothing.

Obj. 2: Whatever comes to be was possible before it existed, for if it could not be, it could not come to be; for nothing changes to what is impossible. Now, the potency by virtue of which a thing can exist can only be within some subject, unless perhaps it be itself a subject; for an accident cannot exist without a subject. Therefore, everything that comes to be, comes to be from matter or a subject. Therefore, it is impossible that something come to be out of nothing.

Obj. 3: An infinite distance cannot be crossed. But there is an infinite distance between non-being simply and being; this is clear from the fact that the less a potency is disposed to actuality, the further is it removed from act, such that if there be no potency at all, the distance will be infinite. Therefore, it is impossible for a thing to come into being from non-being simply.

Obj. 4: The Philosopher says that things utterly dissimilar do not act on one another; for an agent and a patient must agree in genus and matter. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.7, 318a1–21; 1.19, 323b33; 1.20, 324b7–8.) Now, non-being simply speaking and God agree in nothing. Therefore, God cannot act on non-being simply speaking, and consequently, he cannot make something out of nothing.

Obj. 5: But it was said that the foregoing argument applies to an agent whose action is distinct from its own substance, and an action that must be received in some subject.

On the contrary, Avicenna says that if heat were deprived of matter, it would act of itself without matter, and yet its action would not be its own substance. (Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing 9.2; cf. Liber de Philosophia Prima, sive, Scientia Divina 9.5.) Therefore, the fact that God’s action is his own substance is not a reason for his not needing matter.

Obj. 6: We can draw no conclusion from nothing; this is a certain becoming of reason. But the being of reason follows the being of nature. Therefore, neither can anything in nature come to be from nothing.

Obj. 7: If a thing is made from nothing, this preposition “from” connotes either a cause or an order. But it seems that if it connotes a cause, it will be either the efficient or the material cause. But “nothing” cannot be the efficient cause of a being, nor can it be the matter, so as regards the point at issue, “from” does not denote a cause. Nor can it denote order, because as Boethius says, there is no order between being relative to non-being. (This may be a reference to Boethius’s Hebdomads, Axiom 4, line 35 (PL 64:1311).) Therefore, in no sense can a thing come to be from nothing.

Obj. 8: According to the Philosopher, an active power is a principle of changing into another as other. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.12, 1019a15–20.) Now, there is no power in God save that which is active. Therefore, it requires some subject of the change; consequently, it cannot make a thing out of nothing.

Obj. 9: Diversity is found within realities insofar as one reality is more perfect than another. Now, the cause of this diversity is not on the part of God, since he is one and simple. Therefore, we must assign matter as the cause of this diversity. Consequently, we must hold that things were made from matter and not from nothing.

Obj. 10: That which is made from nothing has existence after non-existence. Consequently, it is possible to conceive a last instant in which it did not exist, from which it ceases not to be, and another instant in which it first exists, from which it begins to be. Now, these instants are either one and the same or they are distinct. If the same, it follows that two contradictories exist in the same instant; if distinct, then, since there is an intervening time between two instants, it follows that there is a mean between affirmation and negation; for it cannot be said that it does not exist after the last instant in which it was not, nor that it exists before the first instant in which it was. But both these things are impossible—namely, that contradictories be simultaneous, and that they have a mean. Therefore, a thing cannot come to be from nothing.

Obj. 11: That which is made necessarily comes to be at some time, and what is created is created at some time. Hence, what is created comes to be and is made either simultaneously or not simultaneously. But it cannot be said that it was not simultaneous, since the creature does not exist before it is made. Therefore if its coming to be is before its having been made, it will be the subject of the making, and this is against the account of creation. On the other hand, if its coming to be and its having been made are simultaneous, it follows that at the same time it is coming to be and not coming to be, since in non-transient things, what was made exists, yet what comes to be does not exist. But this is impossible. Therefore, it is impossible for a thing to come to be from nothing or be created.

Obj. 12: Every agent produces its like, and every agent acts according as it is in act. Therefore, nothing comes to be but what is in act. But prime matter is not in act. Therefore, it cannot come to be, especially by God, who is pure act. Hence, whatever things come to be, come to be from preexisting matter and not from nothing.

Obj. 13: Whatever God makes, he fashions according to an idea, just as an artisan produces works of art according to artificial forms. Now, there is no idea of prime matter in God, because an idea is a form and the likeness of what it represents; but since prime matter is understood according to its own essence to be without every form, no form can be a likeness of it. Therefore, prime matter cannot be made by God; thus, the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 14: The same thing cannot be a principle both of perfection and of imperfection. Now, imperfection is found in things because some realities have greater capacity than others, and this can only be the case because of the imperfection of the lower things. Since, then, God is the principle of perfection, we must trace the imperfection to some other principle. But this can only be matter. Therefore, things must have been made from some matter and not from nothing.

Obj. 15: If something comes to be from nothing, it comes to be from it either as from a subject, like a statue from bronze, or as from its opposite, as a shape from something shapeless, or as from these two combined, as a statue from shapeless bronze.

But a thing cannot come to be from nothing as from its subject, since non-being cannot be the matter of a being. Nor as from the composite, since then the non-being would be transformed into a being (as shapeless bronze is transformed into a bronze figure), so that there would have to be something common to the being and the non-being, which is impossible. Nor again as from its opposite, since non-existence simply speaking differs more from a being than do two beings of diverse genera, one of which does not come to be from another (for instance, a shape does not become a color, except perhaps accidentally). Therefore, by no means can a thing come to be from nothing.

Obj. 16: Whatever is accidental is traced back to what is essential. But something comes to be accidentally from its opposite but essentially from its subject; for example, a statue comes to be accidentally from the shapeless but essentially from bronze, since to be shapeless is accidental to the bronze. If, then, something comes to be from nothing, this will be accidentally. And thus, it must come to be essentially from some subject and, therefore, not from nothing.

Obj. 17: The maker gives being to that which is made. If, then, God makes a thing out of nothing, he gives being to that thing. Hence, either there is something that receives being, or there is nothing. If nothing, then nothing receives being by that action of God’s, and thus, nothing is made thereby. And if there is something that receives being, this something will be distinct from that which is from God, since the recipient is distinct from that which is received. Therefore, God makes a thing from something already existing and not from nothing.

On the contrary (1), in Genesis 1:1, in the beginning God created heaven and earth, a Gloss taken from Bede says that to create is to make something from nothing. (Bede the Venerable (ca. 673–735 AD); see Glossa ordinaria 1, 3–6, at Genesis 1:1 (PL 113:69).) Therefore, God can make something from nothing.

Furthermore (2), Avicenna says that an agent who happens to act requires matter to act upon. (Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing 7.2.) But God does not happen to act; indeed, his action is his own substance. Therefore, he requires no matter to act upon and, consequently, can make a thing from nothing.

Furthermore (3), God’s power is greater than that of nature. Now, the power of nature makes things from those which were in potency. Therefore, God’s power does something more and makes things out of nothing.

I answer that we must hold firmly that God can and does make something from nothing.

In order to make this evident, we must observe that every agent acts insofar as it is in act. Therefore, action must be attributed to an agent according to the measure in which to be in act belongs to it.

Now, a particular reality is in act in a particular manner, and this in two ways.

First, by comparison with itself. For its own entire substance is not act, since such realities are composed of matter and form. And hence it is that a natural thing acts not in respect of its entire self but in respect of its form, whereby it is in act.

Second, in comparison with things that are in act. For in no natural thing are included the acts and perfections of all the things that are in act; rather, each of them has an act determined to one genus and one species; this is why none of them is able to effect being as being but only this being as this being, determined to this or that species. For an agent makes something like itself.

Therefore, a natural agent produces a being not simply speaking but a being preexisting and determined to this or that—for example, to the species of fire or whiteness, or something of the sort. And on account of this, the natural agent acts by moving something; and consequently it requires matter, which is the subject of change or movement, and therefore it cannot make a thing out of nothing.

On the other hand, God himself is wholly act: both in comparison with himself, since he is pure act without any admixture of potency; and in comparison with the things that are in act, because in him is the source of all beings. Therefore, by his own action he produces the whole subsistent being, without anything presupposed, inasmuch as he is the principle of the whole of existence, and in respect of his whole self. For this reason he can make a thing from nothing; and this action of his is called “creation.”

Hence, it is stated in The Book of Causes (The Book of Causes, at least insofar as it now exists, is a certain pseudo-Aristotelian work translated by Gerard Cremonsa (1187 AD) from Arabic into Latin verse. Certain theorems are derived from the Elements of Theology of Proclus (410–485 AD). Thomas Aquinas appears to have been the first to notice that The Book of Causes was not a work of Aristotle, but rather, a modification of Proclus.) that to exist is by creation, but to live and the like are by a forming. For the causations of absolute being are traced back to the first universal cause; but the causation of other things, which are added to existence or by which existence is specified, pertains to secondary causes, which act by a forming, as it were, on the supposition of the effect of the universal cause. (The Book of Causes, Proposition 18.) This is also why no reality gives existence except insofar as it partakes of the divine might. For this reason, it is also said in The Book of Causes that a noble soul, insofar as it gives existence, has a divine activity. (The Book of Causes, Proposition 3.)

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher says that it is a common conception or opinion of the students of nature that nothing comes to be from nothing because the natural agent, which they considered, does not act except by movement. (Aristotle, Physics 1.4, 187a29; 1.8, 191b13–17.) Consequently, there must be a subject of movement or change; but this, as we have stated, is not required for a supernatural agent.

Reply Obj. 2: Before the world was, it was possible for the world to be, but it does not follow that there preexisted any matter on which the potential would be founded. For it is stated in Metaphysics 5 (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.12, 1019a15–32, 1019b28–32.) that sometimes a thing is called “possible” not in respect of some potency, but because it involves no contradiction of terms, in which sense the possible is opposed to the impossible. Accordingly, it is said that before the world was, it was possible for the world to come to be, because the statement involved no contradiction between subject and predicate. We may also reply that it was possible by reason of the active potency of the agent, but not on account of any passive potency of matter. The Philosopher uses this argument in treating of natural generations against the Platonists, who maintained that separate forms are the principles of natural generation. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.13, 1038b1–1039a22.)

Reply Obj. 3: Between a being and non-being simply speaking, there always is an infinite distance in a certain sense, but not always in the same way. Sometimes it is infinite on both sides, as when we compare non-existence with the divine existence, which is infinite, as if one compares infinite whiteness with an infinite blackness. But sometimes it is finite on one side only, as when we compare non-existence simply speaking with created existence, which is finite, as if one compares infinite blackness with a finite whiteness. Accordingly, then, from non-existence, it is impossible to pass to an existence that is infinite, but it is possible to pass to an existence that is finite, inasmuch as the distance from non-existence to that sort of existence is bounded on the one side, although there is no passage properly speaking. For so it is in continuous movements, through which one part passes after another. But there can be no such passage for the infinite.

Reply Obj. 4: When a thing comes to be from nothing, non-existence (that is, nothing) does not stand as a patient, except accidentally, but rather stands as the opposite relative to the thing coming to be through the action. Nor again in natural things does the opposite stand as the patient, except accidentally, but rather the subject is the patient.

Reply Obj. 5: If heat were deprived of matter, it would indeed act without that matter which is a requisite on the part of the agent, but not without that matter which is required on the part of the patient.

Reply Obj. 6: In the acts of reason, to conclude is like being moved in the acts of nature, because in reaching a conclusion reason discourses from one thing to another. Therefore, as all natural movement is from something, so also is every conclusion of reason. And as the understanding of principles, which is the principle of things to be concluded, is not from something as a conclusion, so too creation, which is the principle of all movement, is not from something else.

Reply Obj. 7: A thing is said to come to be from nothing in two ways, as Anselm says in his Monologion. (Anselm of Canterbury, Monologion 5, 8 (PL 158:150, 155–57).) For the negative implied in the word “nothing” can negate the preposition “from,” or it may be included under that preposition.

If it bears directly on the preposition, there are two senses. One is that the negation bears on the whole, such that not only the preposition but also the verb is negated, as if one were to say that something does not come to be from nothing because it does not come to be, just as it could be said of a silent man that he speaks of nothing. In this sense, we may say of God that he comes to be from nothing: because he utterly does not come to be, but this manner of speaking is not customary.

In another sense, the verb remains affirmed, but the negative bears on the preposition only. And then we say that a thing comes to be from nothing because it does indeed come to be, but there is no preexisting thing from which it comes to be, just as we say that someone grieves for nothing because he has no cause for grieving. It is in this sense that a thing is said to come to be from nothing by creation.

If, however, the preposition includes the negation, then again, this has two senses: one true, one false.

It is false if the preposition connotes causality (since in no way can a non-being be the cause of a being).

But it is true if it implies mere order, so that something comes to be from nothing because it comes to be after there was nothing, and this is true of creation.

The statement of Boethius that there is no order between a non-being and a being should be understood of an order of determinate proportion or an order that is a real relation; such order, says Avicenna, cannot be between a being and a non-being. (Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing 3.10.)

Reply Obj. 8: This definition is understood of a natural active power.

Reply Obj. 9: God does not produce things from necessity of nature, but from the order of his own wisdom. Hence, it does not follow that diversity among things arises from their matter, but from the ordering of divine wisdom, which established diverse natures for the completion of the universe.

Reply Obj. 10: When a thing comes to be from nothing, the being of what comes to be is first in an instant, and its non-being is not in that instant nor in anything real, but only in something imaginary. For as outside the universe there is not a real but only an imaginary dimension, in respect of which we may say that God is able to make something outside the universe or just so far from the universe, so too, before the beginning of the world there was no real time, but only an imaginary time; in this it is possible to imagine some instant in which was the last non-being. Nor does it follow that there must have been a time between those two instants, since true time is not continuous with imaginary time.

Reply Obj. 11: That which comes to be from nothing simultaneously comes to be and has come to be; and the same applies to all instantaneous changes, for the air is illuminated and has been illuminated at the same time. For in such things, having come to be is itself called “coming to be,” insofar as it exists in the first instant in which it has come to be. Or it may also be replied that a thing which comes to be from nothing is said to come to be when it has been made not according to movement, which is from one terminus to another, but according to an outflow from the agent into the thing made. For these two things are to be found in natural generation: namely, transition from one terminus to another and the outflow from the agent into the thing made; but of these, the latter alone has a place in creation.

Reply Obj. 12: Properly speaking, neither matter nor form nor accident is said to come to be; rather, what comes to be is the subsisting reality. For, since coming to be terminates in being, coming to be belongs properly to that to which being belongs through itself, namely, to a subsistent reality. Therefore, neither matter nor form nor accident is said, properly speaking, to be “created,” but rather to be “concreated.” But a subsistent reality, whatever it may be, is properly said to be “created.” Yet if the force is not stressed in this way, we may reply that prime matter has a likeness to God insofar as it has a share of being. For just as a stone, as a being, is like God (although it has no intelligence, as God has), so prime matter, insofar as it is a being (and yet not as an actual being), is like God. For being is in a certain way common to potency and act.

Reply Obj. 13: The reply to this objection follows from this, for properly speaking there is no idea of matter but only of the composite, since the idea is the form by which something is made. Yet we may say that there is a certain idea of matter insofar as matter in some way imitates the divine essence.

Reply Obj. 14: If one of two creatures be of greater dignity than the other, it does not follow that the less worthy is imperfect; for imperfection designates a lack of something that it is naturally apt to have or should have. Hence, in glory, although one saint exceeds another, none will be imperfect. Nevertheless, if there be some imperfection in creatures, it is not necessary that it be from God or matter, but it may be due to the fact that the creature is from nothing.

Reply Obj. 15: Something is said to come to be from nothing as from an opposite according to one of the senses explained above. Yet it does not follow that a being of one genus can come to be from a being of another genus—for instance, a shape from a color; for being and non-being cannot be together, whereas color and shape can be together. But that from which something comes to be should be incompatible with what comes to be, as is said in Physics 1, (Aristotle, Physics 1.2–9, 184b15–192b5; cf. 3.2–3, 202a2–b9.) because it is not possible that they be together.

Reply Obj. 16: If “from” names causality, something does not come to be from its opposite except accidentally—that is, by reason of the subject. If, however, it names the order, a thing comes to be from its opposite even essentially. Hence privation is even said to be the principle of a thing’s becoming, but not of its being. It is in this sense, as stated above, (Q. 3, a. 1, resp.) that a thing is said to come to be from nothing.

Reply Obj. 17: God at the same time gives being and produces that which receives being; thus, it does not follow that he acts based on something preexisting.