Article 10 — Whether the rational soul is created in or apart from the body

The tenth point of inquiry is whether the rational soul is created in or apart from the body. (Parallel texts: ST I.90.4; I.91.4, ad 3, ad 5; I.118.3; SCG II.83‒84; Compendium theologiae, ch. 93; In II Sent. 17.2.2.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it is created apart from the body. For things belonging to the same species come into being in the same way. Now, our souls belong to the same species as Adam’s, and Adam’s soul was created apart from his body and at the same time as the angels, according to Augustine. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 7.24–25, 27 (PL 34:368–70).) Therefore, other human souls are also created apart from their bodies.

Obj. 2: A whole is imperfect if it lacks one of the parts required for its perfection. Now, rational souls pertain to the perfection of the universe more than even corporeal substances, since an intellectual substance is nobler than a corporeal substance. If, then, rational souls were not all created from the beginning, but are created day by day when their bodies are generated, it follows that the universe is imperfect through lacking its noblest parts, and this seemingly is incongruous. Therefore, rational souls were created from the beginning apart from their bodies.

Obj. 3: It savors of a theatrical display that the universe should be destroyed when it attains to its ultimate perfection. Now, the world will come to an end when the begetting of men ceases, and then the universe will have reached the utmost height of its perfection, if souls are created at the same time as their bodies are begotten; therefore, in that case, the divine governance that rules the world will be like a play, which seems absurd.

Obj. 4: You will say perhaps that there is no reason why the perfection of the universe should not lack something in point of numbers, seeing that it is complete in respect of all its species.

On the contrary, as the species of things, considered in themselves, enjoy a certain perpetuity, they pertain to the essential perfection of the universe, insofar as they are intended through themselves by the Author of the universe. The individuals, however, that do not have a perpetual being pertain to a certain accidental perfection of the universe, insofar as they are not intended through themselves, but for the conservation of the species. Now, rational souls, not only in their species but also in each individual, enjoy perpetuity. Therefore, if rational souls were all lacking at the beginning, the universe was imperfect, as if some species of the universe had been wanting.

Obj. 5: Macrobius (Macrobius Theodosius was a 5th-century AD Roman grammarian and rhetorician, who wrote the Commentary on Cicero’s Dream of Scipio (Cicero, Republic 6.9).) assigned, in On the Dream of Scipio, two gates to heaven, one for the gods and one for souls, in Cancer and in Capricorn, through one of which souls came down to earth. (Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream of Scipio 1.12.) But it would not be so unless souls were created in heaven apart from their bodies. Therefore, souls were created apart from their bodies.

Obj. 6: An efficient cause precedes its effect in time. Now, the soul is the efficient cause of the body, as is said in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 415b11, 22–27.) Therefore, it exists before the body and is not created in the body.

Obj. 7: It is stated in On the Spirit and the Soul (This is a psychology treatise (PL 40:779–892), which a certain Clairvaux monk, Alcherius (Alcher of Clairvaux) wrote ca. 1161 AD, with collected texts from the great works of Augustine.) that, before its union with the body, the soul has irascibility and concupiscibility. (Augustine, De spiritu et anima 13 (PL 40:788–89).) But these cannot be in the soul before it exists. Therefore, the soul exists before its union with the body and consequently is not created in the body.

Obj. 8: The substance of the rational soul is not measured by time, since it is above time, as is said in The Book of Causes, (The Book of Causes, Proposition 2.) nor is it measured by eternity, because this belongs to God alone. Again, it is stated in The Book of Causes that the soul is beneath eternity; therefore like the angels it is measured by aeviternity, and thus the duration of angels and souls has the same measure. (The Book of Causes, Proposition 2.) Consequently, since the angels were created at the beginning of the world, it seems that souls were created then also and not in their bodies.

Obj. 9: In aeviternity, there is no before and after, else it would not differ from time, as some think. Now, if angels were created before souls, or one soul after another, there would be a before and after in aeviternity, since this is the measure of the soul’s duration, as stated above. Therefore, souls must all have been created together with the angels.

Obj. 10: Unity of place indicates a unity of nature; therefore also, there are different places of bodies diverse in nature. But angels and souls agree in nature, since they are spiritual and intellectual substances. Therefore, souls, like the angels, were created in the empyrean heaven and not in bodies.

Obj. 11: The more subtle a substance is, the higher place is appropriate to it; thus, the place of fire is higher than that of air or water. Now, the soul is a much simpler substance than a body. Therefore, it seems that it was created above all bodies and not in the body.

Obj. 12: A thing reaches its ultimate perfection insofar as it is in its proper place, for it cannot be outside its proper place except through a certain violence. Now, the ultimate perfection of the soul is in its heavenly home. Therefore, this is the place befitting its nature, and so it would seem that it was created there.

Obj. 13: It is written: God rested on the seventh day from all the work which he had done (Gen 2:2), through which we are given to understand that God ceased then from creating anything new. But this would not be the case if souls are still being created. Therefore, souls are not created in their respective bodies, but were created outside their body at the beginning.

Obj. 14: The work of creation preceded the work of increase. But this would not be the case if souls are being created when bodies are being propagated. Therefore, souls were created before bodies.

Obj. 15: God does all things according to justice. Now, justice requires that diverse and unequal awards should not be made save to those who are found to be unequal in merit. Now, we find that men from their birth are subject to many inequalities of soul: in some, the body to which a soul is united is well adapted to the soul’s actions, in others the body is ill-adapted to them; some are born of unbelievers, others of believers and are saved through receiving the sacraments. Therefore, it would seem that there preceded in souls an inequality of merits and consequently that souls existed before bodies.

Obj. 16: Things that are united in their beginning would seem to depend on each other as to their being. But the soul is independent of the body as to its being, which is shown by the fact that it remains when the body has ceased to be. Therefore, neither does it begin to exist together with the body.

Obj. 17: Things that hinder each other are not naturally united. Now, the soul is hindered in its own action by the body, for the corruptible body is a load upon the soul (Wis 9:15). Therefore, the soul is not naturally united to the body, and thus it would seem that before its union with the body it existed apart therefrom.

On the contrary (1), it is stated in the book Of Church Doctrine that souls were not created together with other intellectual creatures. (Gennadius of Marseilles, Book of Ecclesiastical Dogmas 14 (PL 58:984).)

Furthermore (2), Gregory of Nyssa says that it is reprehensible to hold either opinion, whether of those who foolishly assert a previous existence of souls in a certain state and order becoming to them, or of those who maintain that our souls are created after our bodies. (Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making of Man 29 (PG 44:232–39).)

Furthermore (3), Jerome says, in The Creed of the Faith: we condemn the error of those who hold that souls sinned or lived in heaven before being united to bodies. (Jerome, Explanation of the Creed 2; this text is now ascribed to Pelagius, in Expositione fidei ad Damasum.)

Furthermore (4), the proper act is evolved in its proper matter. Now, the soul is the proper act of the body. Therefore, it is created in the body.

I answer that, as we have stated above, some held the opinion that souls were all created together apart from their bodies, (Q. 3, a. 9.) and that this is false we shall now proceed to show by four arguments.

The first of which is that things, when created by God, were in their own natural perfection. For the perfect naturally precedes the imperfect, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.2, 268a20–b10.) and Boethius says that nature originates in perfect things. (Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy 3.9, pros. 10 (Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum [CSEL] 67:63; PL 63:763–69).) Now, the soul apart from the body does not have the perfection of its nature, because it is not through its very self the complete species of a nature, but a part of human nature; otherwise soul and body would not together form one thing save accidentally. Therefore, the human soul was not created before its body.

Now, all those who held that souls exist outside bodies before being united to them, supposed them to be perfect natures, and that the natural perfection of the soul is not that it be united to its body, and that it is united to it accidentally, as a man to his clothes. Thus, Plato said that a man is not made of soul and body but is a soul making use of a body. Therefore, all those who held souls to be created apart from bodies believed in the transmigration of souls, namely, that a soul after casting off one body is united to another body, even as a man changes from one set of clothes to another.

The second argument is given by Avicenna. (Avicenna, On the Soul 2.1.) Seeing that the soul is not composed of matter and form, there could be no distinction between one soul and another except according to a formal difference, if souls differ from one another only according to their very selves. Now, a formal difference implies difference of species. And numerical distinction within the same species arises from a material distinction, and this cannot apply to the soul as regards the nature from which it comes to be, but only as regards the matter in which it comes to be.

Consequently, there cannot be many human souls of the same species and distinct numerically unless from their very beginning they are united to bodies, such that their distinction arises in some way from their union to the body as from a material principle, although that distinction comes from God as from their efficient principle. Now, if human souls were created apart from their bodies, because there would have been no material principle to distinguish them, they would have differed in species, like all separate substances, which according to the philosophers differ in species.

The third argument is that the human rational soul is not in substance distinct from the sensible and vegetative soul, as was shown above; moreover, the origin of the vegetative and sensitive soul cannot occur except in a body, since they are acts of certain parts of the body. Therefore, neither can the rational soul, so far as is congruent with its nature, be created except in the body, yet without prejudice to the divine power.

The fourth argument is that if the rational soul were created apart from the body, and there possessed the completion of its own natural being, it is impossible to assign a fitting cause of its union to the body. For it cannot be said that it united itself to bodies by its own proper motion, since we see it is not in the soul’s power to abandon the body, which it would be, were it united to the body by its own will. Moreover, if souls were created wholly separate, it cannot be explained how union with the body would have enticed the will of the separated soul.

Nor can it be said that, after an interval of years, the soul acquired a natural desire for adherence to a body, and that such a union is caused by an activity of nature. For things that are done according to nature at certain intervals of time are traced back to the celestial movement as to their cause, since that movement is the measure of the spaces of time. But souls separated from bodies cannot be subject to the movements of heavenly bodies.

Likewise, it cannot be said that they were bound to bodies by God, if they were previously created by him without bodies. For if it be alleged that he did so to perfect them, there would have been no reason why they were created without bodies. On the other hand, if he did this to punish them, so that souls were thrust into bodies as into prisons, as Origen asserted, on account of sins committed, (Cf. Origen of Alexandria (ca. 185–ca. 253 AD), On First Principles, bk. 1, ch. 7, para. 5.) it would follow that the establishment of natures composed of spiritual and corporal substances was accidental and not according to God’s original intention; and this is contrary to the statement of Genesis 1:31: God saw all the things that he had made and they were very good, from which we gather that it was through God’s goodness and not on account of the wickedness of any creature whatsoever that those good works were done.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine in The Literal Interpretation of Genesis, and especially in his work On the Origin of the Soul, speaks as inquiring rather than asserting, as he himself declares. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis (PL 34:245–486); On the Soul and Its Origin (PL 44:475–548).)

Reply Obj. 2: The universe in its beginning was perfect as regards species and not as regards all individuals—or it was as regards the causes of natural things from which afterwards other things could be propagated, not as regards all their effects. And though rational souls do not come to be from natural causes, the bodies into which they are infused by God as being connatural with them, do come to be through the action of nature.

Reply Obj. 3: In a play one does not seek something else because of the play. But in the movement by which God moves corporeal creatures, something is sought because of that very movement, namely, the complete number of the elect, and when that is reached the movement will cease, although not the substance of the world.

Reply Obj. 4: The multitude of souls pertains to the ultimate essential perfection of the universe, but not to its first, since the entire transformation of mundane bodies is ordered in some way to the multiplication of souls; and this requires a multiplication of bodies, as we have proved above in the body of the article.

Reply Obj. 5: The Platonists maintained that the nature of souls is complete in itself, and that they are united to bodies accidentally; therefore, they also affirmed the transmigration of souls from one body to another. Especially were they led to hold this opinion because they held that human souls are immortal, and that generation never stops. Hence, in order to avoid an infinite number of souls, they imagined a kind of circle, such that souls, after leaving a body, were subsequently reunited to them. Macrobius expresses himself in accordance with this opinion, which is false; and consequently, on this point, his authority cannot be admitted.

Reply Obj. 6: The Philosopher does not state that the soul is the efficient cause of the body, but the cause whence the body’s movements originate, insofar as it is the principle of locomotion, growth, and other like movements in the body, as he himself explains in the same passage. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 415b11, 22–27.)

Reply Obj. 7: The meaning of the authority quoted is that irascibility and concupiscibility are in the soul before its union with the body by a priority of nature, not one of time; for the soul does not derive this from the body, but rather the body from the soul.

Reply Obj. 8: The soul is measured by time according to the being whereby it is united to the body, although considered as a certain spiritual substance, it is measured by aeviternity. But it does not follow that it began to be measured by aeviternity when the angels did as well.

Reply Obj. 9: Although there is no before and after in aeviternity as regards the things it measures, nothing prevents one thing from participating in aeviternity before another.

Reply Obj. 10: Although the angel and the soul agree in intellectual nature, they differ in that the angel is a nature complete in itself, so he could be created through himself; but the soul, through having the perfection of its own nature in its being united with the body, required that it be created, not in heaven, but in that body whose perfection it is.

Reply Obj. 11: Although the soul is in itself more simple than any body, it is nevertheless the form and perfection of a body composed of elements, and to which a middle place is due, and together with this body, it must be created here.

Reply Obj. 12: The first perfection of the soul regards its own natural being, which perfection consists in the soul’s union with the body; therefore, in its beginning, it needed to be created in the place of the body. However, its ultimate perfection regards that which it has in common with other intellectual substances, and this perfection will be given to it in heaven.

Reply Obj. 13: Souls that are created now, although they are new creatures numerically, yet they are old according to their own species; for they already existed in the works of the six days in those who were like them in species, namely, in the souls of our first parents.

Reply Obj. 14: It was fitting for the work of creation by which the principles of nature were established to precede the work of propagation, but the creation of souls is not a work of that kind.

Reply Obj. 15: It belongs to justice to render what is due; therefore, it is contrary to justice if unequal things are given to equal persons when debts are being paid, but not when things are being given gratuitously, as when souls are created. We may also reply that this diversity does not arise from a diversity of merit in souls but from a diversity of dispositions in bodies; therefore, Plato said that forms are infused by God according to the deserts of matter. (Plato, Laws 10, 884a–910d.)

Reply Obj. 16: Although the soul depends on the body for its beginning, in order to begin its existence in the perfection of its own nature, nevertheless it does not depend on the body for its end, because it acquires existence in the body as a subsistent reality; whence when the body is destroyed, it still remains in its own being, though not in the completion of its nature, which it has in its union with the body.

Reply Obj. 17: It is not the nature of the body but its corruption that is a load upon the soul, as the text itself declares.