Article 14 — Whether it is possible for that which differs essentially from God to have existed always

The fourteenth point of inquiry is whether it is possible for that which differs essentially from God to have existed always. (Parallel texts: ST I.46.1; In II Sent. 1.1.5; SCG II.31.)

Obj. 1: And it would seem possible. For the cause that produces the whole substance of a thing has not less power over its effect than the cause that produces the form alone. Now, if the cause that produces the form alone is eternal, it can produce it from eternity; thus, the brilliance produced and diffused by fire is coexistent with it and would be coeternal if the fire were eternal, according to Augustine. (Augustine, On the Trinity 6.1 (PL 42:923).) Much more reason then is there why God, who produces the whole substance of a thing, should be able to produce a coeternal effect.

Obj. 2: It will be said perhaps that this is incongruous because it would make a creature equal to the Creator in duration.

On the contrary, a duration that is not wholly simultaneous but successive cannot be equal to one that is wholly simultaneous. Now, if the world had always been, its duration would not have been wholly simultaneous, since it would have been measured by time according to Boethius in The Consolation of Philosophy. (Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy 5.6 (CSEL 67:122–27; PL 63:858).) Therefore, a creature would not be equal to God in duration.

Obj. 3: As a divine person proceeds from God without movement, so does a creature. Now, a divine person can be coeternal with God, from whom he proceeds. Therefore, a creature can be likewise.

Obj. 4: That which always is in the same state can always do the same thing. Now, God is in the same state from eternity. Therefore, from eternity he can do the same thing, and consequently, if he has produced a creature at any time, he could do so from eternity.

Obj. 5: You will say that the above argument applies to one acting by nature but not to one acting by will.

On the contrary, God’s power is not nullified by his will. Now, if he did not act by his will it would follow that he produced the creature from eternity. Therefore, even given that he works by his will, it does not remove the possibility of his having created from eternity.

Obj. 6: If God produced a creature at a certain time or instant, and if his power does not increase, he could also have produced the creature at a previous time or instant, and for the same reason, before that, and so on, to infinity. Therefore, he could have produced it from eternity.

Obj. 7: God can do more than the human intellect can understand; therefore, it is said: no word shall be impossible with God (Luke 1:37). Now, the Platonists understood God to have made something that had always existed. Thus, Augustine says: Plato, writing about the world and of the gods made by God in the world, asserts most explicitly that they came into existence and had a beginning; yet they will not have an end, and he states that through the all-powerful will of their maker they will live forever. In explaining, however, what he meant by ‘beginning,’ the Platonists affirm that he meant the beginning not of time but of their formation. For, they say, even as if a foot had pressed on the dust from eternity, there would always have been the footprint underneath, which no one would doubt to have been made by the walker, so the world always existed and he who made it always existed, and yet it was made. (Augustine, City of God 10.31 (PL 41:311–12).) Therefore, God could make something that always was.

Obj. 8: God can do in a creature whatever is not inconsistent with the account of a created thing; otherwise he would not be omnipotent. Now, it is not inconsistent with the account of a created thing, considered as made, that it should always have existed; otherwise, to say that creatures always existed would be the same as to say that they were not made, which is clearly false. For Augustine distinguishes two opinions, one asserting that the world always existed in such wise that it was not made by God, the other stating that the world always was and that nevertheless God made it. (Augustine, City of God 11.4, 10.31 (PL 41:319–20, 311–12).) Therefore, God can do this such that something made by him should always have been.

Obj. 9: Just as nature can produce its effect immediately, so also can a voluntary agent if unhindered. Now, God is a voluntary agent that cannot be hindered. Therefore, the creatures brought into being by his will could be produced from eternity, as with the Son, who proceeds from the Father naturally.

On the contrary (1), Augustine says: seeing that the nature of the Trinity is altogether incommunicable, it is so exclusively eternal that nothing can be coeternal with it. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 8.23 (PL 34:389–90).)

Furthermore (2), Damascene says: that which is brought into being from non-being by its very nature is incapable of being coeternal with one who has no beginning and is eternal. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 1.8 (PG 94:814).) Now, the creature is brought from non-being into being. Therefore, it cannot have always existed.

Furthermore (3), whatsoever is eternal is unchangeable. But a creature cannot be unchangeable, because were it left to itself, it would fall back into nothingness. Therefore, it cannot be eternal.

Furthermore (4), nothing that depends on another is necessary, nor consequently eternal, since all that is eternal is necessary. Now, that which is made depends on another. Therefore, nothing made can be eternal.

Furthermore (5), if God could make a creature from eternity, he did produce it from eternity; for according to the Philosopher, in eternal things there is no difference between what can be and what is. (Aristotle, Physics 3.4, 203b28–29.) Now, it is against faith to say that creatures were made from eternity. Therefore, it is also against faith to say that they could be.

Furthermore (6), a wise man’s will does not delay to do what he intends, if he can, unless for some reason. But no reason can be given why God made the world then and not before or from eternity, if it could be made from eternity. Therefore, seemingly it could not.

Furthermore (7), if creatures were made, they were made either from nothing or from something. They were not made from something, since this would either be part of the divine essence (which is impossible) or it would be something else, and if this were not made, there would be something besides God not made by him, and this has been proved to be false, (Q. 3, a. 5.) and if it too were made from something else, we should either go infinity (which is impossible), or we should come to something made from nothing. Now, it is impossible for that which is made from nothing to have always been. Therefore, it is impossible for a creature to have always existed.

Furthermore (8), it belongs to the account of the eternal not to have a beginning, while it belongs to the account of a creature to have a beginning. Therefore, no creature can be eternal.

Furthermore (9), a creature is measured either by time or by aeviternity. But time and aeviternity differ from eternity. Therefore, a creature cannot be eternal.

Furthermore (10), if a thing be created, it must be possible to assign an instant wherein it was created. Now, before that instant it did not exist. Therefore, we must conclude that creatures did not always exist.

I answer that according to the Philosopher, a thing is called “possible” sometimes in reference to a power, sometimes in reference to no power. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.12, 1020a1–4.) If in reference to a power, this power may be active or passive: in reference to an active power, as when we say that it is possible for a builder to build; in reference to a passive power, as when we say that it is possible for the wood to burn.

Sometimes, however, a thing is said to be possible not in reference to a power but either metaphorically, as in geometry a line is said to be potentially rational (which we may pass over for the present), or absolutely, that is, when the terms of a proposition are in no way mutually contradictory, whereas we have the impossible when they exclude each other.

Thus, the impossible is spoken of in a converse way, when they do exclude each other; for example, simultaneous affirmation and negation is said to be impossible, not in reference to an agent or patient, but because it is impossible in itself, as being repugnant to its very self.

If, then, we consider the statement that something substantially distinct from God has always existed, it cannot be described as impossible in itself as though it were repugnant to its very self; for to be from another is not repugnant with always existing, as we have proved above, (Q. 3, a. 13.) except when the one proceeds from the other by movement, of which there can be no question in the procession of things from God. And when we add substantially distinct, this again involves no repugnance, absolutely speaking, with having always existed.

However, if we take the possible spoken of in reference to an active power, then God does not lack the power to produce from eternity an essence distinct from himself.

On the other hand, if we refer to a passive power, then given the truth of the Catholic faith, it cannot be said that something essentially distinct from God can proceed from him and yet have always existed. For the Catholic faith supposes that all things other than God at some time did not exist. Now, as it is impossible for a thing never to have existed, if it be granted that at some time it has been, so is it impossible for a thing to have always existed, if it be granted that at some time it did not exist. Therefore, some say that this is possible on the part of God creating, but not on the part of an essence proceeding from God, because our faith teaches the contrary.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the question from the point of view of the power of the maker, but not from that of the thing made, which is supposed not to have existed at some time.

Reply Obj. 2: Even if creatures had always existed they would not be equal to God simply speaking, but insofar as they imitate him. There is nothing unreasonable in this, and so the objection has but little force.

Reply Obj. 3: In the divine person, there is nothing that is supposed not to have existed at some time, as there is in every essence other than God.

Reply Obj. 4: This argument considers the power of the maker, which indeed is not diminished by his will except insofar as it was by the decree of the divine will that creatures did not always exist.

Reply Obj. 5: This suffices for the reply to the fifth objection.

Reply Obj. 6: If it be stated that creatures existed before any given time, the position of the faith is safeguarded because it is stated that nothing except God existed always, but it is not safeguarded if we say that creatures have always existed; hence, the comparison fails. It must also be noted that the argument is lacking in form. For God is able to make any creature better, yet he cannot make a creature of infinite goodness, because infinite goodness is incompatible with the account of being created, whereas determinate goodness is not, however great it be.

It must also be observed that when we say that God could have made the world sooner than he did, if this priority be referred to the power of the maker, the statement is undoubtedly true; for he had from eternity the power to do this, and eternity precedes the time of the creation. If, however, it be referred to the being of the thing made, as though before the instant wherein the world was created there were a real time wherein the world could have been made, it is evident that then the statement is false, since before the world there was no movement, and consequently no time. Yet, it is possible to imagine a time anterior to the world, just as we can imagine a height and dimensions outside the heavens, in the way that we can say that God could make the heavens higher and that he could have created them sooner; for he could have made time longer and height higher.

Reply Obj. 7: The Platonists did understand this, but they were not guided by the truth of the faith, since it was unknown to them.

Reply Obj. 8: This argument proves nothing more than that to be made and to always exist are not incompatible considered in themselves; whence it considers that which is possible absolutely.

Reply Obj. 9: This argument considers possibility in reference to an active power.

Whereas the arguments on the contrary side would seem to conclude that it is not possible from any point of view, we must now proceed to answer them as well.

Reply Sed Contra 1: According to Boethius, in The Consolation of Philosophy, even if the world had always existed, it would not be coeternal with God, because its duration would not be wholly simultaneous, which is essential to eternity. For eternity is the simultaneously whole and perfect possession of interminable life. (Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy 5.6 (CSEL 67:122–27; PL 63:858).) Now, the succession of time is caused by movement, as is clear from the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Physics 4.11, 220a24.) Hence, whatsoever is subject to change, even if it always exist, cannot be eternal; this is why Augustine says that no creature can be coeternal with the unchangeable nature of the Trinity. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 8.23 (PL 34:389–90).)

Reply Sed Contra 2: Damascene speaks on the supposition of the Catholic faith; this is clear from his saying: that which is brought into being from nothingness, etc. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 1.8 (PG 94:814).)

Reply Sed Contra 3: Changeableness by its very account excludes eternity but not an infinite duration.

Reply Sed Contra 4: It is true that what depends on another can never exist unless it be upheld by that whence it proceeds, yet if the latter always existed, the former also existed always.

Reply Sed Contra 5: From the fact that God was able to do a thing, it does not follow that he did it, because he acts by his will and not by a natural necessity. And where it is said that in eternal things there is no difference between what can be and what is, this refers to passive and not to active power. For a passive power not joined to its act is a principle of corruption, and therefore, repugnant to eternity; whereas it is not prejudicial to an active power that its effect be not actually in existence, especially if the active power be a voluntary cause. For the effect is not the perfection of an active power in the same way as the form is of a passive power.

Reply Sed Contra 6: Our intellect is unable to fathom the reason surrounding the production of the first creatures, because it cannot comprehend that art which is the sole reason why the creatures in question were such as they were. Hence, just as no man can present the reason why the heavens are so great and not greater, so neither can a reason can be given as to why the world was not made sooner, although both came within the scope of the divine power.

Reply Sed Contra 7: The first creatures were produced not from something but from nothing. Not, however, from the mode of their production but from the teaching of the faith do we gather that they were non-existent before they were brought into being. For one meaning of the aforesaid assertion that a creature is made from nothing can be, according to Anselm, that it is not made from something, such that the negation includes the preposition and is not included by it, and thus the negation denies the order implied by the preposition, while the preposition itself does not imply order to nothing. (Anselm of Canterbury, Monologion 8 (PL 158:155–57).) If, on the other hand, order to nothing is affirmed and the preposition includes the negation, it still does not follow that at some time the creature was nothing. For one might say with Avicenna that nonexistence preceded the existence of a thing not by duration but by nature; (Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing 4.1.) since, namely, were it left to itself, it would be nothing, and it has existence solely from another. For that which a thing is competent to have of itself is naturally prior to that which it is not adapted to have save from another.

Reply Sed Contra 8: It belongs to the account of eternity to have no beginning of duration, while it belongs to the account of a created thing to have a beginning of its origin but not of duration, unless we take creation according to the teaching of the faith.

Reply Sed Contra 9: Aeviternity and time differ from eternity, not only by the account of the principle of duration, but also by the account of succession. For time in itself is successive, while succession is annexed to aeviternity inasmuch as eternal substances are in a certain respect changeable, though they are unchangeable in a certain respect, insofar as they are measured by aeviternity. On the other hand, eternity contains no succession nor is succession annexed to it.

Reply Sed Contra 10: God’s activity whereby he brings things into being must not be understand as the activity of a craftsman who makes a box and then leaves it, because God continues to infuse being, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 4.12, 8.12 (PL 34:303–6, 382–83).) Hence, it does not follow that we must assign an instant wherein things were brought into being, before which they did not exist, except on account of the teaching of the faith.