Article 3 — Whether creation is something real in the creature

The third point of inquiry is whether creation is something real in the creature, and if so, what is it? (Parallel texts: ST I.45.3; SCG II.18; In I Sent. 40.1.1, ad 1.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that it is not anything real in the creature. For as stated in The Book of Causes, whatever is received into a thing is in it according to the mode of the recipient. (The Book of Causes, Proposition 10.) Now, the creative action of God is received simply speaking in non-being, since God makes something from nothing by creating it. Therefore, creation places nothing real in the creature.

Obj. 2: All that is in the nature of things is either the Creator or a creature. But creation is not the Creator, since then it would be eternal. Nor is it a creature, since then it would be created by another creation, and this creation again would need to be created by yet another creation, and so on to infinity. Therefore, creation is not something in the nature of things.

Obj. 3: Everything that exists is either substance or accident. But creation is not a substance, for it is neither matter, nor form, nor composite, as can easily be shown. Nor is it an accident, for an accident is subsequent to its subject, while creation is naturally prior to the thing created, since it presupposes no subject. Therefore, creation is nothing in the nature of things.

Obj. 4: As generation is to the thing generated, so is creation to the thing created. But the thing generated is not the subject of generation but rather its terminus; its subject is prime matter, as is said in On Generation and Corruption. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.10, 319b6–320a5; 1.2, 314b27.) Neither, therefore, is the thing created the subject of the creation. Nor can it be said that its subject is some matter, since the thing created is not created from any matter. Therefore, creation has no subject, and hence it is not an accident. And it is certain that it is not a substance. Therefore, it is nothing within the nature of things.

Obj. 5: If creation is something within the nature of things, since it is not a change (as was said above), (See q. 3, a. 2.) it would seem most likely that it is a relation. But it is not a relation, since it cannot be contained within any species of relation. For being simply speaking is neither the subject of nor equal to non-being simply speaking, from which a relation arises. Therefore, creation is something in the nature of things.

Obj. 6: If creation brings in a relation of the created being to God, from whom it has existence, because such relation would always remain in the creature—not only when the latter begins to be but as long as it exists—something would be continuously created. This seems absurd. Hence, creation is not a relation, and the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 7: Every relation that really exists in things derives from something different than that relation itself: for instance, equality from quantity and likeness from quality. If, then, creation be a relation really existing in the creature, it must differ from that from which the relation derives. Yet this is what is received through creation. Therefore it follows that creation itself is not received through creation, and consequently that it is something uncreated, which is impossible.

Obj. 8: Every change is traced back to the genus in which it terminates. For instance, alteration is to quality, increase to quantity. For this reason it is stated in Physics 3 (Aristotle, Physics 3.1, 201a7.) that there are as many species of movement as there are species of being. But creation terminates in substance, and yet it cannot be said that it is in the genus of substance, as was proved above. (See q. 3, a. 3, obj. 3.) Therefore, it seems that it is nothing real.

On the contrary (1), if creation is not something real, nothing is really created. Now, this is clearly false. Therefore, creation is something in the nature of things.

Furthermore (2), God is Lord of the creature because he brought it into being by creating it. Now, lordship is a relation really existing in the creature. Much more, therefore, is creation.

I answer that some have said that creation is something in the nature of things between the Creator and the creature. And since a mean is neither of the extremes, it followed that creation would be neither the Creator nor the creature. But the masters judged this to be erroneous, since every reality that in any way exists has its existence only from God and in this way is a creature.

Therefore, others have said that creation itself does not posit anything real on the part of the creature. But this would also seem incongruous. For in all those things that are referred the one to the other in some respect, of which the one depends on the other but not vice versa, one finds a real relation in the one that is dependent, but in the other there is only a relation according to reason; this is clear in knowledge and the thing known, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a26–b11.) Now, the creature by its very name is referred to the Creator; moreover, the creature depends on the Creator, and not vice versa. Therefore, the relation by which the creature is referred to the Creator must be real; but in God there is only a relation according to reason. The Master says this expressly in Sentences I. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 30, ch. 1 (PL 192:602–3).)

We must, accordingly, say that “creation” may be taken actively or passively. Taken actively, it denotes God’s action, which is his essence, together with a relation to the creature; this is not a real relation but only a relation according to reason. But taken passively, since creation is not properly speaking a change (as we have already said), it must be said to be something not in the genus of passion but rather in the genus of relation.

This is clear as follows. In every true change and movement, one finds two processes. One is from one terminus of movement to the other (for instance, from whiteness to blackness); the other is from the agent to the patient (for instance, from the maker to the thing made). These processes, however, do not stand in the same way in the movement itself and in the terminus of the movement. For in the movement itself, the thing moved is receding from one terminus of the movement and approaching the other, which does not apply when the terminus has been reached; this is clear in something moved from whiteness to blackness, for at the very terminus of the movement it no longer approaches to blackness, but begins to be black.

Likewise, during the movement itself, the patient or thing made is being changed by the agent, but when it is at the terminus of the movement, it is no longer being changed by the agent but the thing made acquires a certain relation to the agent, inasmuch as it has its being from it and is in some way like it. Thus, at the terminus of human generation the offspring acquires sonship.

Now, creation (as was stated above) cannot be taken as the movement that is before the terminus of movement, but rather as in the thing brought about. (See q. 3, a. 2.) Therefore, creation itself does not indicate an approach to being, nor a change effected by the Creator, but merely a beginning of existence and a relation to the Creator from whom the creature has its being. Consequently, creation is really nothing but a certain relation to the Creator together with a newness of existing.

Reply Obj. 1: In creation, the recipient of the divine action is not non-being but that which is created, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: “Creation,” taken actively, signifies the divine action along with a certain relation that is understood, and thus, it is uncreated. But taken passively, as stated above, it is really a certain relation signified through the mode of a change with the account of implied newness or beginning. Now, this relation is a certain creature, taking “creature” in a broad sense for anything that comes from God. Nor is it necessary to proceed to infinity, since the relation of creation is not referred to God by some other real relation but by its very self. For no relation is related by another relation, as Avicenna says. (Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing 3.10.) If, however, we take “creature” in a stricter sense only for that which subsists (which properly speaking comes to be and is created, just as properly speaking it has being), then the aforesaid relation is not something created but rather is concreated, just as properly speaking it is not a being but something inherent. The same applies to all accidents.

Reply Obj. 3: This relation is an accident and, considered in its own existence, inasmuch as it inheres in a subject, is posterior to the thing created. In the same way, an accident, both in the intellect and in nature, is posterior to its subject, although it is not an accident such as is caused by the principles of its subject. If, however, we consider it according to its own account, insofar as the aforesaid relation arises from the action of the agent, then it is, in a certain way, prior to its subject, as the divine act itself is its proximate cause.

Reply Obj. 4: In generation, there is both a change and a relation by which the thing generated is referred to the generator. Considered as change, its subject itself is not the thing generated but its matter; but considered as implying a relation, its subject is the very thing generated. But in creation there is a relation but not a change, properly speaking, as already stated. (Q. 3, a. 2.) Hence, the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 5: This relation is not to be understood as of a being to a non-being, for such a relation cannot be real, as Avicenna says, but as of the created being to its Creator. (Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing 3.6, 3.10.) Therefore, it is clear that it is a relation of supposition.

Reply Obj. 6: Creation indicates the aforesaid relation together with newness of existing. Hence it does not follow that whenever a thing exists, it is being created, even though it is always being referred to God. Yet, it would not be incongruous to say that just as the air, as long as it is luminous, is being illuminated by the sun, so too a creature, as long as it has existence, is coming to be from God, as Augustine says in The Literal Interpretation of Genesis. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 8.12 (PL 34:382–83).) But this is only a distinction of words, inasmuch as “creation” may be understood with the newness or without.

Reply Obj. 7: That from which creation’s relation chiefly derives is the subsisting reality, from which creation’s very relation, which is itself a creature, differs; and it differs from it not principally but secondarily (as it were), as something concreated.

Reply Obj. 8: Movement is traced back to the genus of its terminus insofar as it proceeds from potency to act; for in the movement itself, the terminus of the movement is in potency, and potency and act are traced back to the same genus. But in creation there is no going from potency to act; therefore, the comparison fails.