Article 17 — Whether the world has always existed

The seventeenth point of inquiry is whether the world has always existed. (Parallel texts: ST I.46.1; SCG II.31; Quodlibet III, q. 14, a. 2; Commentary on Physics, bk. 8, lect. 1‒3; Compendium theologiae, ch. 98; Commentary on Metaphysics, bk. 12, lect. 2; Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, bk. 1, lect. 6, 29; In II Sent. 1.1.5.)

Obj. 1: And it would seem that it has. For a thing never fails in that which is proper to it. Now, according to Dionysius, it is proper to the divine goodness to call to the communication of itself the things that exist, (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy 4.1 (PG 3:178).) and this was done by the creation. Since, then, the divine goodness always was, it would seem that it has always brought creatures into being, and that consequently, the world has always existed.

Obj. 2: God does not refuse a creature that which it is capable of having according to its nature. Now, there are creatures whose nature is capable of having existed always, for instance, the heavens. Therefore, it seems that it was granted to the heavens to have existed always. But given that the heavens existed, we must allow that other creatures existed, as the Philosopher proves in On the Heavens 2. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.3, 286a3–b9.) Therefore, it would appear that the world has always existed. The middle premise is proved as follows: what is incorruptible has the power to exist always, since were it to have the power to be only for a certain fixed time, it would not exist always, and therefore, would not be incorruptible. Now, the heavens are incorruptible, and consequently, are capable of existing always.

Obj. 3: It will be replied that the heavens are not incorruptible simply speaking, since they would fall away into nothingness if the power of God did not preserve them in being.

On the contrary, we must not conclude that something is possible or contingent from the fact that its destruction follows from the destruction of its consequence; for it is necessary that man is an animal, and yet its destruction does follow on the destruction of this consequence, that man is a substance. Therefore, it seems that we must not conclude that the heavens are corruptible from the fact that they would cease to exist on the supposition that God withdrew his sustaining power from creatures.

Obj. 4: As Avicenna proves in his Metaphysics, every effect in comparison with its cause is necessary, since, if given the cause, the effect does not follow of necessity, yet even when the cause is present, it will be possible for the effect to be or not be. (Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing 9.4; see also 4.1, 6.2, 9.1.) Now, that which is in potency does not become actual except through something actual; whence besides the aforesaid cause, another cause will be needed to make the effect emerge from potency into act, whereby it was possible for it to be or not, on the presupposition of its cause. Therefore, it follows that given a sufficient cause the effect follows of necessity. Now, God is the sufficient cause of the world. Therefore, since God always was, so also was the world.

Obj. 5: Whatsoever preceded time is eternal, for aeviternity did not precede time, but began with time. Now, the world was before time, since it was created in the first instant of time, which clearly was before time, for it is written: in the beginning God created heaven and earth, where a Gloss notes, that is, in the beginning of time (Gen 1:1). (Glossa interlinearis, at Genesis 1:1 (in Glossa ordinaria 1, 3–4).) Therefore, the world existed from eternity.

Obj. 6: That which remains unchanged always produces the same effect, unless it be hindered. Now God is always the same, according to Psalm 102:27: you are the same. (Douay-Rheims: Ps. 101:28.) Since, then, God cannot be hindered in his action, on account of the infinity of his power, it would seem that he always produces the same effect. And thus, as he produced the world at some time, it would seem that he always produced it from eternity.

Obj. 7: Just as man necessarily wills his own happiness, so too God necessarily wills his own goodness and whatsoever pertains to it. Now, it belongs to God’s goodness to bring creatures into being. Therefore, God wills this of necessity, and seemingly willed to do so from eternity, just as from eternity he willed his own goodness.

Obj. 8: It may be said that it pertains to God’s goodness to bring creatures into being, but not to bring them into being from eternity.

On the contrary, it belongs to a greater liberality to give quickly than to do so tardily, and the liberality of the divine goodness is infinite. Therefore, it seems that he gave being to creatures from eternity.

Obj. 9: Augustine says: in you to be able is to will, and to will is to do. (Augustine, Confessions 8.9, 7.4 (PL 32:828–29, 735–36).) Now, God from eternity willed to create the world; otherwise, he would have changed, if the will to create came to him anew. Since, then, there is no inability in God, it would seem that he created the world from eternity.

Obj. 10: If the world did not always exist, before it existed it was either possible for it to exist or it was not possible. If it was not possible, its existence was impossible, and consequently, it was necessary for it not to exist; and thus, it would never have been brought into being. But if it was possible for it to be, there was some potency in respect thereof, and consequently, a subject or matter, since potency can be only in a subject. But if there was matter, there was also form, since matter cannot be entirely devoid of form. Therefore, there was a body composed of matter and form, and consequently, the entire universe.

Obj. 11: Whatsoever becomes actual after being capable of coming into being is brought from potency to actuality. Therefore, if before the world actually existed it was possible for it to come to be, we must infer that the world was brought from potency to actuality, and consequently, that matter preceded and was eternal, so that we come to the same conclusion as before.

Obj. 12: An agent that begins to act anew moves from potency to actuality; and this cannot belong to God, who is utterly immovable. Therefore, it would seem that he did not begin anew to act, but that he created the world from eternity.

Obj. 13: If a voluntary agent begins to do what he already willed but has not done yet, we must suppose that something is inducing him to do it now that did not induce him before, something that is in some way stirring him to action. But it cannot be said that before the world existed there was something besides God that newly induced him to act. Since, then, from eternity he willed to create the world (otherwise, something new would have occurred to his will), it would seem that he made the world from eternity.

Obj. 14: Further, nothing besides God’s goodness moves the divine will to act. Now, the divine goodness is always the same. Therefore, God’s will also is always oriented toward the production of creatures, and thus, he produced them from eternity.

Obj. 15: That which exists always in its beginning and always in its end never begins and never ceases, because each thing exists after its own beginning and before its own end. Now, time exists always in its beginning and end; for nothing of time exists except the instant, which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore, time never begins nor ends but exists always; and consequently, movement always exists as well, and the mobile, and even, the whole world, since there is no time without movement, nor movement without the mobile, nor the mobile without a world.

Obj. 16: It will be said perhaps that the first instant of time is not the end of a past nor the last beginning of the future.

On the contrary, the now of time is always considered as flowing, wherein it differs from the now of eternity. But that which flows from one thing to another. Consequently, every now flows from a previous to a later now, and there cannot be a first or last now.

Obj. 17: Movement follows the mobile, and time follows movement. Now, the first mobile, since it is circular, has neither beginning nor end, for it is not possible to indicate the actual beginning or end of a circle. Therefore, neither time nor movement has a beginning, and the same conclusion follows as above.

Obj. 18: It will be said that, although a circular body itself has no beginning of its magnitude, it does have a beginning of its duration.

On the contrary, duration of movement follows the measure of magnitude because, according to the Philosopher, however great is the magnitude, so great is the motion, and so great is the time. (Aristotle, Physics 4.2, 209a31–210a13.) Hence, if there be no beginning of the magnitude of a circular body, neither will there be a beginning of the magnitude of the movement or of the time, and consequently, there will be no beginning of their duration, since their duration, especially that of time, is their magnitude.

Obj. 19: God is the cause of realities through his own knowledge, and knowledge is spoken of in relation to the thing knowable. Since, then, relatives are by nature simultaneous, and God’s knowledge is eternal, it would seem that realities that exist were produced by him from eternity.

Obj. 20: God precedes the world either in the order of nature only or by duration. If only in the order of nature, as a cause precedes its synchronous effect, it would seem that creatures must have existed, like God, from eternity. And if he preceded the world in duration, there must have been a duration prior to the duration of the world, one that stood to the duration of the world as before stands to after. But a duration that stands as before and after is a time. Therefore, the world was preceded by time, and consequently, by movement and the mobile, and we come to the same conclusion as before.

Obj. 21: Augustine says: I dare not assert that God was not Lord from eternity. (Augustine, On the Trinity 5.16 (PL 42:921–22).) Now, so long as he was Lord he had creatures for his subjects. Therefore, we must not assert that creatures are not from eternity.

Obj. 22: God was able to create the world before he created it, else he were lacking in power. Likewise, he knew that he could produce it, else he were ignorant. And it also seems that he willed it, else he were envious. Therefore, it would seem that he did not begin to create creatures anew.

Obj. 23: Whatsoever is finite can be communicated to a creature. Now, eternity is something finite, otherwise nothing could extend beyond it, and yet it is written: the Lord shall reign for eternity and beyond (Exod 15:18). Therefore, one would infer that a creature is capable of being eternal, and that it was becoming to the divine goodness to produce a creature from eternity.

Obj. 24: Whatsoever has a beginning has a measure of its duration. Now, time cannot have any measure of its own duration: for it cannot be measured by eternity, since then it would have existed always; nor by aeviternity, since then it would last forever; nor by time, since nothing is its own measure. Therefore, time had no beginning, and consequently, neither had movable things, nor the world.

Obj. 25: If time had a beginning, this was either in a time or in an instant. It did not begin in an instant, for in an instant there is not yet time; nor did it begin in time, for in that case no time would precede the terminus of time, since nothing belonging to a thing exists before the thing begins to exist. Consequently, time had no beginning and the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 26: God from eternity was the cause of things; otherwise, we should have to say that he was at first their cause in potency and afterwards their cause in act, so that there would be something prior that would reduce him from potency to act, and this is impossible. Now, nothing is a cause unless it has an effect. Therefore, the world was created by God from eternity.

Obj. 27: The true and being are convertible, and many truths are eternal, such as that man is not an ass, and that the world was to be, and many similar things. Therefore, it would seem that many beings are from eternity, and not God alone.

Obj. 28: But it may be said that all these are true by the first Truth, which is God.

On the contrary, the truth of the proposition “the world will exist” differs from the truth of “man is not an ass”; for granted (though it is impossible) that the one is false, the other remains true. But the first Truth cannot alter. Therefore, these propositions are not true by the first Truth.

Obj. 29: According to the Philosopher, in the Categories, a statement is true or false insofar as the reality is so or not so. (Aristotle, Categories 5, 4a34–36, 4b7–15.) If, then, many propositions are true from eternity, it would seem that the realities signified by them have existed from eternity.

Obj. 30: With God to speak and to make are the same, according to Psalm 148:5, he spoke and they were made. Now, God spoke from eternity; otherwise, the Son who is the Father’s Word would not be coeternal with the Father. Therefore, God’s work is eternal and the world was made from eternity.

On the contrary (1), it is said in the words of divine Wisdom: the depths were not as yet and I was already conceived, neither had the fountains of waters as yet sprung out. The mountains with their huge bulk had not as yet been established, before the hills was I brought forth. He had not yet made the earth, nor the rivers, nor the poles of the world (Prov 8:24). Therefore, the poles of the world, the rivers, and the earth did not always exist.

Furthermore (2), according to Priscian, (Priscian of Lydia was one of the last of the Neoplatonist philosophers, who lived around the end of the 6th century AD; only two of his works are still extant, among them, his commentary on Theophrastus’s On Sense-Perception.) the younger in time are more perspicacious in intellect. But perspicacity is not infinite; therefore, the time during which perspicacity increases was not infinite, and consequently, neither is the world.

Furthermore (3), it is written: with inundation the ground little by little is washed away (Job 14:19). Now, the earth is not infinite. Therefore, if time were infinite, the earth would by now have been wholly washed away, and this is clearly false.

Furthermore (4), it is evident that God naturally preceded the world as a cause precedes its effect. But in God duration and nature are the same; therefore, God preceded the world by duration, and thus, the world did not always exist.

I answer that we must not hesitate to hold that, as the Catholic faith teaches, the world has not always existed. Nor can this be adequately disproved by any physical demonstration.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that, as we have shown in a previous question, (See q. 1, a. 4, and also q. 3, a. 15.) in God’s works we cannot assign a necessity on the part of the material cause, nor on the part of the active power of the agent, nor on the part of the ultimate end, but only on the part of the form that is the end of the activity, since if the form be presupposed, it is requisite that things be such as to be fit for that form.

Consequently, we must speak of the production of one particular creature otherwise than of the emanation of the whole universe from God. For when we speak of the production of an individual creature, it is possible to gather the reason why it is such, either from some other creature or at least from the order of the universe, to which every creature is ordered, as a part to the form of the whole. But when we speak of the whole universe’s coming into being, we cannot find any other creature as being the reason why the universe is such and such. Therefore, since neither on the part of the divine power, which is infinite, nor of the divine goodness, which does not need things, can a reason be assigned for the particular disposition of the universe, this reason must be drawn from the simple will of the Creator, so that if it be asked why the heavens are of such and such a size, no other reason can be given except that their maker willed it so.

For this reason too, as Rabbi Moses says, Holy Scripture exhorts men to consider the heavenly bodies, since we gather from their disposition most of all how all things are subject to the will and providence of a Creator. (Cf. Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed 3.23.) For no reason can be given for why this star is this far from that one, or for any other dispositions that we observe in the heavens, save the ordinance of divine wisdom; therefore, it is written: lift up your eyes on high and see who has created these things (Isa 40:26).

Nor does it matter if someone say that the quantity in question results from the nature of the heavens or heavenly bodies, just as some determinate quantity is established for all things by nature; for just as the divine power is not confined to this rather than to that quantity, so is it not confined to a nature that requires one particular quantity rather than to a nature that requires another quantity. Consequently, it makes no difference, whether it be a question of quantity or of nature, although we grant that the nature of the heavens is not indifferent to any quantity in particular, and that there is no inherent possibility of the heavens having any other quantity than that which they have.

But this cannot be said of time or the duration of time. For time, like place, is external to a thing; therefore, although there is no possibility in the heavens with respect to another quantity or accident inhering from within, yet is there a possibility with regard to its place and position, since the heavens have a local movement; and also with regard to time, since time ever succeeds time, just as there is succession in movement and in where. Therefore, it cannot be said that neither the time nor the where result from the heavens’ nature, as was said of its quantity. It is clear, then, that the appointment of a determinate quantity of duration for the universe depends on the simple will of God, just as does the appointment of its determinate quantity of dimension. Consequently, we cannot come to a necessary conclusion about the duration of the universe, such as to prove demonstratively thereby that the world has always existed.

Some, however, through failing to observe that the universe came forth from God, were forced into erring about the beginning of the world. For some, like the earliest students of nature, setting aside the agent cause and asserting only a matter created by nothing, and which was the cause of all things, necessarily had to say that matter had always existed. For, seeing that nothing brings itself from non-existence into being, that which begins to exist must be caused by something else. And these asserted: either that the world was always in continual existence, because they recognized none but natural agents, which are determined to one thing, due to which it was necessary that the same effect always follows; or that the world had an interrupted existence, just as Democritus held the world, or rather worlds, to be in a continual state of composition and dissolution due to chance, on account of the chance movements of atoms. (Democritus, Diels-Kranz 68A37, 57.)

Since, however, it seemed incongruous that all the congruities and utilities existing in natural things should be due to chance, whereas they are found to occur either always or for the most part, and seeing that nevertheless this would follow if there were no other cause but matter—and especially since some effects are found for which the causality of matter is insufficient—therefore others posited an agent cause; for example, Anaxagoras posited an intellect and Empedocles posited friendship and strife. (Anaxagoras, Diels-Kranz 59B12–13; Empedocles, Diels-Kranz, 31B17, 21, 22, 26, 35.) Yet, they did not hold these to be the agent causes of the universe, but instead they likened them to other particular agents, whose activity consists in the transformation of matter from one thing into another. Consequently, it was necessary for them to say that matter is eternal, insofar as it does not have a cause of its own existence, but that the world had a beginning; for every effect of a cause which acts by movement follows its cause in duration, since such effect does not exist as at the end of the movement, which end is preceded by the initial movement, coexistent with which is the agent that initiates the movement.

Aristotle, in fact, observing that if it be said that the cause establishing the world acted by movement, it would follow that one would have to proceed to infinity, since every movement must be preceded by another movement, maintained that the world has always existed. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.2, 8.5; Physics 8.1.) He argued not from the position that the world comes forth from God, but from the position that an agent begins to act through a movement, which belongs to a particular cause and not a universal cause. Therefore, in order to prove the eternity of the world, he based his own arguments on movement and the immobility of the prime mover; and consequently, if we consider them carefully, his arguments are seen to be like those of one who is arguing against a position; this is also why at the commencement of Physics 8, (Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 250b25–251a8.) having introduced the question of the eternity of movement, he begins by citing the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles, his object being to argue against them.

Those who came after Aristotle, however, considering that the whole universe came forth from God through his own will and not by movement, endeavored to prove the eternity of the world from the fact that the will does not wait to do what it intends, except on account of some new occurrence or change, at least one that is necessary to imagine in the succession of time, when one wills to do this now and not sooner.

Yet, these fell into an error like that of the ones mentioned before. For they considered the first agent as like an agent that exercises its activity in time even though it acts through its will. Such an agent is not the cause of time itself but presupposes it, whereas God is the cause even of time itself. For time itself is included in the universe of the things made by God; and therefore, seeing that we are speaking about the being of the universe coming forth from God, one should not think that he made it then and not sooner. For this consideration presupposes a time before the making, one that is not subject to the making.

But, if we consider the production of the universe of created things, among which even time itself is included, we must consider why such a measure was affixed to such a time, and not why he did this at such a time. However, the fixing of the measure to time depends on the simple will of God, who willed that the world should not have always been, but should have a beginning at some point, just as he also willed the heavens to be neither greater nor smaller than they are.

Reply Obj. 1: It is proper to divine goodness to bring things into being by means of the will, of which it is the object. Consequently, it does not follow that whenever the divine goodness existed, things would be brought into being, but rather that this would be according to the plan of the divine will.

Reply Obj. 2: The heavenly body, being incorruptible, is capable of always being, but no capability, whether of being or of operating, regards the past, but only the present or the future; for no one has power over his past actions, since he cannot cause to have been done that which he has not done, but he does have the power to do it now or in the future. Consequently, the capability in the heavens of existing always regards not the past but the future.

Reply Obj. 3: The fact that the heavens would return into nothingness if God ceased to uphold them does not make them corruptible, simply speaking. Seeing, however, that God’s preservation of the creature in being depends on God’s unchangeableness, not on natural necessity (in which case it could be said that it is necessary absolutely), since it is necessary solely on the supposition that God wills and has unchangeably decreed that preservation, it may be granted that the heavens are corruptible in a certain respect, that is, with this condition: if God were not to uphold them.

Reply Obj. 4: Every effect carries a necessary relationship to its efficient cause, whether the cause is natural or voluntary. But we have already proved that God is the cause of the world not by a necessity of his nature but by his will; (Q. 3, a. 15.) therefore, it was necessary for the divine effect to follow not whenever the divine nature existed, but when the divine will planned that it should exist, and in the very manner in which he willed it to exist.

Reply Obj. 5: A thing may exist before time in two ways.

First, before the whole of time and before anything belonging to time. In this way, the world did not exist before time, because the instant wherein the world began, though not a time, is nonetheless something belonging to time, not indeed as a part of it but as a terminus of time.

In another way, a thing is said to exist before a time because it is before the completion of the time; and the time is not complete except in an instant before which there is another instant; in this sense, the world existed before time. But it does not follow from this that the world is eternal, since the very instant of time such that it is before a time is not eternal.

Reply Obj. 6: Since every agent produces its like, an effect must follow from an effectively operating cause so as to bear a likeness to its cause. Now, as that which proceeds from a cause that acts by its nature bears a likeness thereto in that it has a form like the form of its agent, so too that which proceeds from a voluntary agent bears a likeness thereto in that it has a form like its cause, insofar as what is brought forth in the effect is according to the plan of the will, as instanced in the work produced by the craftsman. But the will plans not only the effect’s form but also its place, time, and all its conditions; whence the effect of the will follows when the will plans it and not when the will exists. For the effect is like the will not as regards being but as regards what the will plans. Consequently, though the will remain ever the same, it does not follow that its effect should flow from it from eternity.

Reply Obj. 7: God necessarily wills his own goodness and everything without which his goodness cannot exist. Such is not the production of creatures, and consequently, the objection fails.

Reply Obj. 8: Since God made created things in order to manifest himself, it was more fitting and better that they should be made in such wise as to be able to manifest him in a more fitting manner and more expressly. Now, he is more expressly manifested by creatures if they do not always exist; for this brings into greater evidence the fact that they have been brought into being by another, and that God does not need created things, and that they are entirely dependent on the divine will.

Reply Obj. 9: God’s will to create the world was eternal, yet not that the world should always exist, but that it should come to be when he made it.

Reply Obj. 10: Before the world was, the coming to be of the world was possible not by any passive potency, but only by the active power of the agent. Or we may reply that it was possible not by reason of some power, but because the terms of the proposition “the world exists” are not in contradiction to each other. For according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 5, a thing may be said to be possible in this way, without reference to a potency. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.12, 1019b28–35.)

Reply Obj. 11: This suffices for the reply to the eleventh objection.

Reply Obj. 12: This argument stands in the case of an agent that begins a new action, but God’s action is eternal, since it is his substance. He is said, however, to begin to act by reason of the new effect that results from his eternal action according to his will’s plan, which is considered as the principle of his action in its order to the effect. For the effect follows from the action according to the condition of the form that is the principle of that action, just as something is heated through the fire’s heating according to measure of the fire’s heat.

Reply Obj. 13: This argument considers the agent that produces its effect in time without being the cause of time: this does not apply to God, as is clear from things stated above. (Q. 3, a. 15, resp.)

Reply Obj. 14: If “movement” be taken properly, God’s will does not move, but metaphorically speaking it is said to be “moved” by the thing willed; and thus, God’s goodness alone moves his will, according to the saying of Augustine that God moves himself independently of place and time. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 8.22 (PL 34:389–90).) Nor does it follow that creatures were produced whenever God’s goodness existed; for creatures proceed from God not as though they were owed it or by a necessity of his goodness—since the divine goodness does not need them, nor does he gain anything by them—but by his simple will.

Reply Obj. 15: Since the first succession of time is caused by movement, as is said in Physics 4, it is true that every instant is a beginning and an end of time, insofar as it is true that every moment of motion is a beginning and an end of movement; (Aristotle, Physics 4.12, 220b15.) this is why, if we suppose that movement neither always existed nor will always exist, there will be no need to say that every instant is a beginning and an end of time; rather, there will be a certain instant that will be only a beginning, and a certain instant that will be only an end. Hence, this objection argues in a circle, and consequently is not a demonstration; yet it serves the purpose of Aristotle, who employs it to attack a position, as we have said above in the body of the article. In fact, many arguments serve to rebut an opinion on account of the statements advanced by its holders and yet in themselves are not simply speaking efficacious.

Reply Obj. 16: The instant is indeed always considered as flowing, yet not always as flowing from one thing to another, but sometimes as only flowing from something (for example, the last instant of time), sometimes as flowing only towards something (as the first instant).

Reply Obj. 17: This argument does not prove that movement has always existed, but that a circular movement can always exist, because from mathematics we cannot efficaciously conclude anything about movement; therefore, Aristotle does not prove the eternity of movement from its being circular; rather, from the fact that a movement is eternal, he shows that it must be circular, because no other movement can be eternal. (Aristotle, Physics 8.8, especially 261b27–28.)

Reply Obj. 18: This suffices for the reply to the eighteenth objection.

Reply Obj. 19: As the knowable is related to our knowledge, so is God’s knowledge is to creatures. For God’s knowledge is the cause of creatures just as the knowable is also the cause of our knowledge. Therefore, just as a thing can be knowable even without our knowledge existing, as is said in the Categories, (Aristotle, Categories 7, 7b27–28.) so God’s knowledge can exist without the knowable thing having existence.

Reply Obj. 20: God does indeed precede the world by duration, not one of time but of eternity, since God’s existence is not measured by time. Nor was there a real time before the world, but only an imaginary one, inasmuch as now we can imagine an infinite space of time existing alongside eternity and to have been able to have revolved before the beginning of time.

Reply Obj. 21: If the relation of lordship be understood as consequent to the action whereby God actually governs creatures, then God was not Lord from eternity. But if it be understood as consequent on the very power of governing, then it belongs to God from eternity. Nor does it follow that creatures must have existed from eternity, except in potency.

Reply Obj. 22: This is Augustine’s argument to prove that the Son is coeternal and coequal with the Father. (Augustine, Against Maximinus 2.7–8; 2.23 (PL 42:761–62; 796–802).) But this argument is not applicable to the world. For, since the Son’s nature is the same as the Father’s, it requires an eternity and equality with the Father; otherwise, were this denied him, it would savor of envy. The nature of the creature, however, does not require this, and consequently, the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 23: The Greek text reads: the Lord shall reign for age upon age and beyond; and Origen, as quoted by a Gloss, (Glossa ordinaria 1, 626, at Exodus 15:18, (PL 113:232).) says that by age we are to understand the space of one generation, the limits of which are known to us; by age upon age we are to understand an immense space of time, which has an end, yet it is unknown to us; and that God’s reign will extend even beyond this. Hence, eternity here means the duration of time. Anselm in the Proslogion, however, takes eternity to mean aeviternity, which has no end; (Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion 19–20 (PL 158:237–38).) and yet, God is said to reign beyond it because, in the first place, aeviternal things can be thought of as non-existent; second, because they would not exist if God ceased to uphold them, and in this sense, of themselves they do not exist; third, because they do not possess their whole existence at once, but in them there is a certain succession of change.

Reply Obj. 24: That which has a beginning must have a measure of its duration because it begins through movement. But time does not begin thus by creation; therefore, the argument does not follow. However, it may be said that every measure is measured by itself within its own genus; thus, a line is measured by a line, and time by a time.

Reply Obj. 25: Time is not like permanent things, which have their whole substance at once, so that there is no need for the whole of time to exist as soon as it begins to exist. Consequently, nothing prevents saying that time begins in an instant.

Reply Obj. 26: God’s action is eternal, but its effect is not, as we have stated above; hence, though God was not always a cause, since his effect did not always exist, still it does not follow that he was not the cause potentially, since his action always existed, unless we refer the potency to the effect.

Reply Obj. 27: According to the Philosopher, the true is in the mind, not in things, for it is the intellect’s becoming equal to the things. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.4, 1027b25–34.) Therefore, whatsoever has existed from eternity has been true by the Truth of the divine intellect, which is eternal.

Reply Obj. 28: Whatsoever things are said to be true from eternity do not vary in their truth, but are true by the one same Truth of the divine intellect, yet with reference to the various things that are going to be in their own proper being; and thus there can be a certain distinction in that truth resulting from their various relations.

Reply Obj. 29: The saying of the Philosopher refers to the speech existing in our intellect, or in our oral statements, since the truth of our intellect or word is caused by the existence of the reality; but conversely, the truth of the divine intellect is the cause of the realities.

Reply Obj. 30: On the part of God, there is no difference between “to make” and “to speak,” for God’s action is not an accident but his substance; nevertheless, “to make” connotes the effect existing in its own proper nature, whereas “to speak” does not.

Reply Sed Contra: The arguments on the contrary side, although they prove what is true, are not demonstrative, except the first, which is based on authority. For the argument taken from the growth of perspicacity in the course of time does not prove that time must have had a beginning. For it was possible that the study of the sciences may have been frequently interrupted and subsequently taken up anew after a long interval, as the Philosopher also says. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 11, 1059a18–1069a14; 12.7, 1072b19–24.) Again, the soil is not so consumed by erosion on one part of the earth’s surface without a corresponding increase taking place elsewhere through the combination of the elements. And God’s duration, although it is the same as the divine nature in reality, differs therefrom in account; whence it does not follow that he is before the world in duration because he is before it in nature.