Article 18 — Whether the angels were created before the visible world

The eighteenth point of inquiry is whether the angels were created before the visible world. (Parallel texts: ST I.61.3; In II Sent. 2.1.3; On Separated Substances, ch. 17.)

Obj. 1: And it would seem that they were. For Damascene quotes Gregory Nazianzen (Gregory Nazianzen (ca. 330–390 AD) was born in Cappadocia and became archbishop of Constantinople; for his preaching and writing, especially on the Trinity, he is revered as Gregory the Theologian (see PG 35–38).) as saying that at first God devised the angelic and heavenly powers, and the devising was the making thereof. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 2.3 (PG 94:874).) Therefore, he created the angels before making the visible world.

Obj. 2: It may be said that first here denotes an order of nature, not of duration.

On the contrary, Damascene cites two opinions on this point: one of which states that the angels were created first, while the other holds the contrary. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 2.3 (PG 94:874).) Now, no one ever denied that the angels were by nature prior to visible creatures. Therefore, we must take it to refer to the order of duration.

Obj. 3: Basil says, in the beginning of The Hexameron: prior to this world there existed a nature that is intelligible to our understanding, (Basil the Great, Homilies on the Six Days, Homily 1.5 (PG 29:13–16).) and subsequently, he states that this is the angelic nature. Therefore, it would seem that the angels were created before this world.

Obj. 4: The Scriptures, in the beginning of Genesis, treats those things that were created with the visible world; but it makes no mention of the angels. Therefore, it would seem that the angels were not created with the visible world but before it.

Obj. 5: That which is ordered to the perfection of another as its end is posterior to it. Now, the visible world is ordered to the perfection of the intellectual nature since, according to Ambrose, God, who by nature is invisible, produced a visible work in order to make himself known thereby. (Ambrose, The Six Days of Creation 1.5 (PL 14:141–43).) But he could only be made known to a rational creature. Therefore, the rational creature was made before the visible world.

Obj. 6: Whatsoever precedes time precedes the visible world, since time began with the visible world. Now, angels were created before time, since there was no time before the day, but the angels were created before the day, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 1.9 (PL 34:251–53).) Therefore, the angels were created before the visible world.

Obj. 7: Jerome says, on Titus 1, that six thousand years of our time have not yet elapsed, before which for how many ages, for how long think you the angels served God and to his command owed their existence? (Jerome, Commentary on Titus 1.2 (PL 26:560).) Now, the visible world began with our time. Therefore, the angels were in existence before the visible world.

Obj. 8: A wise man produces his effects in due order. Now, the angels precede visible creatures in point of nobility. Therefore, they should have been brought into being first by God who is the supremely wise master-craftsman.

Obj. 9: God, inasmuch as he is good, makes others share in his goodness. Now, angels were capable of being dignified by preceding the visible creature in point of duration. Therefore, seemingly this was bestowed upon them by God’s sovereign goodness.

Obj. 10: Man is called a “microcosm” by reason of his likeness to the macrocosm. Now, man’s more noble part, namely, his heart, is formed before the other parts, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 2.4, 740a4.) Therefore, seemingly the angels, who are the more noble part of the macrocosm, were created before visible creatures.

Obj. 11: According to Augustine, Scripture in the work of the second and following days divided the formation of things into three stages: (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2.7–8 (PL 34:268–70).) for first it states that God said: let there be a firmament made; second: and it was so done; and, third: God made the firmament. The first of these refers to the existence of things in the Word; the second refers to the existence, in the angelic mind, of creatures to be made; the third to the creature’s existence in its own proper nature. Now, when creatures were yet to be made they did not exist. Therefore, angels existed and had knowledge of the visible nature before the latter existed.

Obj. 12: It might be said, however, that it is a question of the making of creatures as to their formation and not as to their first creation.

On the contrary, in the opinion of Augustine, the creation of visible nature did not precede its formation in point of time. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 1.15 (PL 34:257).) Therefore, if angels existed before the formation of visible creatures, they also existed before its creation.

Obj. 13: God’s speaking was the cause of creatures coming to be. Now, it seems that this cannot refer to the eternal birth of the Word, since this was from eternity and not repeated in course of time, and yet Scripture tells of God speaking on each day. Nor can it refer to audible speech, both because there was as yet no man to hear the voice of God speaking, and because before the formation of light it would have been necessary for some other body to be formed, since an audible voice is not produced except by means of a body. It would seem, then, that it refers to spiritual speech, whereby God spoke to the angels; and consequently, that the angels’ knowledge is presupposed as a cause for the production of visible creatures.

Obj. 14: As observed above, Holy Scripture employs three expressions in relating the creation: the first pertains to the existence of things in the Word; the second to their existence in the angelic knowledge; the third to their existence in their own nature. Now, the first of these precedes the second in point both of duration and of causality. Therefore, likewise the second, namely, the angelic knowledge, precedes the third, namely, the existence of the visible creature, both in duration and causality.

Obj. 15: Order is required in the issue of things from their source no less than in their advancement to their end. Now, according to Dionysius, it is God’s ruling that the lowest things should be brought to their end by the intermediate. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 5.1, sect. 4 (PG 3:503–6).) Therefore, in like manner corporeal creatures, being the lowest, proceed from God by the angelic creatures, who hold the middle position; therefore, the angels precede corporeal creatures as a cause precedes its effect.

Obj. 16: It is unbecoming that things utterly disparate should be associated together. Now, angels and visible creatures are altogether disparate. Therefore, they were not associated together in the creation by being formed at the same time. And, it would be a perversion of order if they were created after visible creatures. Therefore, they were created before them.

Obj. 17: It is written: wisdom has been created before all things (Sir 1:4), and this cannot refer to the Son of God, who is the Wisdom of the Father, since he was not created but begotten. Therefore, the angelic wisdom, which is a creature, was formed before all things.

Obj. 18: Hilary says, in On the Trinity: no wonder that we believe that our Lord Jesus Christ was before all ages, seeing that even the angels were created by God before the world. (Hilary of Poitiers, On the Trinity 12.37 (PL 10:455–56).) Now, the Son of God preceded all ages not only in order of dignity, but also in duration. Therefore, the angels also preceded the visible world.

Obj. 19: The angelic nature stands between the divine and the corporeal natures; and aeviternity, which measures the angels’ existence, stands between eternity and time. Now, by his eternity God preceded the angels and the visible creature. Therefore, by their aeviternity, the angels preceded the visible world.

Obj. 20: Augustine says that the angels were always in existence. (Augustine, City of God 11.9 (PL 41:323–25).) But it cannot be said that corporeal creatures were always in existence. Therefore, the angels preceded the corporeal creature.

Obj. 21: The movements of corporeal creatures are directed by the ministrations of spiritual creatures, according to Augustine and Gregory. (Augustine, On the Trinity 3.1, (PL 42:870–71); Pope Gregory the Great (ca. 540–604 AD), Dialogues 4.6 (PL 77:328–32).) Now, the mover precedes that which he moves. Therefore, angels preceded visible creatures.

Obj. 22: Dionysius likens God’s action on things to the action of fire on the things which it burns. Now, fire acts on the nearer bodies before those that are distant. Therefore, God’s goodness produced angelic creatures, which are nearer to him, before corporeal creatures, which are distant from him, and thus, the angels existed before the world.

On the contrary (1), it is written at the beginning of Genesis 1: in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth, (Glossa interlinearis, at Genesis 1:1 (in Glossa ordinaria 1, 3–4).) where Augustine explains “the heavens” to mean the angelic nature and “the earth” the corporeal nature. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 1.17 (PL 34:258–60).) Therefore, the angels were created together with corporeal things.

Furthermore (2), the Gloss of Strabo on the same text states that “the heavens” refer to the empyrean heaven, which was inhabited by the holy angels as soon as it was created. (Glossa ordinaria 1, 3–6, at Genesis 1:1 (PL 113:67–68).) Therefore, the angels were created at the same time as the empyrean heaven, which is a visible creature.

Furthermore (3), man is called a “microcosm” on account of his likeness to the macrocosm. Now, man’s soul comes to be at the same time as his body. Therefore, in the macrocosm, the angelic and the corporeal creature come to be at the same time.

I answer that all the Catholic doctors are agreed that the angels have not always existed, inasmuch as they were made from nothing.

Some, however, have held that the angels were not made at the same time as the visible world but before: a conclusion to which they were led by various reasons.

Some have held that it was not God’s original intention to form corporeal creatures, and that his production of the latter was occasioned by the merits or demerits of spiritual creatures. For Origen maintained that in the first instance God made all the immaterial and rational creatures. These, he said, were all equal, for the divine justice required them to be so. For it seems that, if justice is preserved, there could be no reason for inequality in endowments except diversity of merit and demerit. Consequently, he maintained that the diversity that we observe among creatures was preceded by a diversity of merit and demerit, such that those spiritual creatures who adhered to God more were promoted to the higher orders among the angels, and those who sinned more grievously were chained to the baser and viler bodies, so that this very diversity of merits required that various grades of bodies should be produced by God.

However, Augustine refutes this opinion. (Augustine, City of God 11.23 (PL 41:336–37).) For it is certain that God’s goodness is the sole reason for his producing creatures both spiritual and corporeal, inasmuch as his creatures, which out of his goodness he has fashioned, represent his uncreated goodness according to their mode. Therefore, Scripture says of each of God’s works and afterwards of all of them together: God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good; as if to say that God had formed creatures in order that they might have goodness (Gen 1:31). On the other hand, in the aforesaid opinion, corporeal creatures were formed not because it was good for them to exist, but so that the wickedness of the spiritual creature might be punished. Moreover, it would follow that the order we perceive to exist in the universe is the result of chance, inasmuch as various rational creatures happened to sin variously. For had all sinned equally, there would have been no difference of nature in bodies, according to this opinion.

Consequently, others, rejecting this opinion, upon considering the nature of spiritual creatures, which is of greater dignity than every corporeal nature, asserted that the spiritual substances were established before the corporeal, for just as the created spiritual nature is intermediate by order of nature between God and the corporeal creature, so is it intermediate between them in duration.

Now, seeing that this opinion was held by such great doctors as Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, and others, we must not reject it as erroneous.

But if we consider carefully yet another opinion held by Augustine and other doctors and now more generally accepted, we shall find that the latter is more reasonable. For we must consider the angels not only absolutely but also as a part of the universe, and there is all the more reason for doing so inasmuch as the good of the universe is of greater weight than the good of any individual creature, just as the good of a whole is of greater weight than that of a part. Now, it is fitting that the angels, considered as parts of the universe, be created together with corporeal creatures. For of one whole it seems there should be one production. And if the angels were created separately, they would seem utterly alienated from the order of corporeal creatures, as though constituting another universe by themselves. Hence, we must conclude that the angels were created together with corporeal creatures, yet without prejudice to the other opinion.

Reply Obj. 1–3: This suffices for the replies to the first three objections, which follow the lines of the second opinion.

Reply Obj. 4: According to Basil at the beginning of the Hexameron, the lawgiver Moses at the commencement of Genesis began by relating the origin of visible creatures, omitting spiritual creatures who had been created before; the reason for this omission was that he was addressing himself to an uneducated people incapable of grasping spiritual things. (Basil the Great, Homilies on the Six Days, homilies 1.5–6, 2.1 (PG 29:13–18, 27–30).) Augustine, on the other hand, held that by “the heavens” Moses denoted the spiritual creature, and by “the earth,” the corporeal, when it says: in the beginning God created heaven and earth. And the reason why he expressed the creation of the angels under the metaphor of the heavens and not clearly may be the same as that given above, namely, because the people were uneducated; and also in order to avoid idolatry, to which they were inclined, and of which they would be afforded an occasion if they were told of other spiritual substances besides one God, which would be nobler than the heavens (and all the more, seeing that these very substances were called “gods” by the gentiles). According to Strabo and others before him, “the heavens” in the text quoted signify the empyrean heaven, which is the abode of the holy angels, by the figure of metonymy, as when what contains is given in place of what it contains. (Glossa ordinaria 1, 3–6, at Genesis 1:1 (PL 113:67–68); cf. Genesis 2:8 (PL 113:86).)

Reply Obj. 5: According to Augustine, the angels’ knowledge of God is not derived from visible creatures; (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 5.5, 4.6–7 (PL 34:325–27, 301).) therefore, the visible creature was made so that it might manifest God not to the angels but to the rational creature, which is man; from this, man is shown to be the end of the creatures. Now, the end, though it is first in intention, is the last in execution; therefore, man was made last.

Reply Obj. 6: According to Augustine, the creation of heaven and earth did not precede in duration the formation or production of light; therefore, he does not mean to say that the spiritual nature was created before the first day by a priority of duration, but by a kind of natural order; (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 1.5 (PL 34:219–20).) for the spiritual substance and formless matter, considered in their respective essences, are not subject to the changes of time. Consequently, we cannot infer that the spiritual creature was formed before the corporeal, since even before the formation of light, mention is made of the creation of the corporeal creature, denoted by “the earth.” According to others, the creation of heaven and earth belongs to the first day, because together with them time was created, although the division of time into day and night began with light; hence, time is stated to be one of the four things first created: namely, the angelic nature, the empyrean heaven, formless matter, and time.

Reply Obj. 7: Jerome is expressing himself in accordance with the opinion of the early doctors.

Reply Obj. 8: This argument would avail were each creature brought into being as existing absolutely by itself, for then it would be fitting for each one to be created separately according to the degree of its goodness. Seeing, however, that all creatures are produced as parts of one universe, it was fitting that all should be produced together so as to form one universe.

Reply Obj. 9: Although it would pertain to a certain dignity of the spiritual creature were it created before the visible creature, it would not conduce to the dignity and unity of the universe.

Reply Obj. 10: Although the heart is formed before the other members, there is but one continual generation of the animal’s body, the heart is not formed by a separate generation and the other members afterwards by a succession of generations at various intervals. Moreover, it cannot be said of the creation of the angels and corporeal creatures that they were produced by one formative act, that is, the spiritual creature before the corporeal, as though the universe were produced continuously; for successive production occurs in things produced from matter, in which one part is nearer than another to the final completion. Consequently, there was no place for succession in the first creation of things, although it could obtain in the formation of things from created matter. Therefore, the doctors who held that the angels were created before the world maintained that the creation of the former was entirely distinct from the creation of bodies, and that there was a long interval between. Moreover, there is need for the heart in an animal to be formed first because its activity conduces to the formation of the other members, while no spiritual creature cooperates in the creation of corporeal creatures, since God alone can create. Hence, the Commentator finds fault with Plato for asserting that God first created the angels and then committed to them the creation of corporeal creatures. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 11, comm. 44.)

Reply Obj. 11: Augustine is referring to the making of corporeal creatures as regards not their first creation but their formation.

Reply Obj. 12: If it be maintained that all things were created together in their form and matter, the spiritual creature is said to have known the corporeal creature that was to be made, not because this formation would be future in time, but because it was known as future, insofar as it was contemplated in its cause, wherein it existed as what could proceed from it; for example, one who considers a box in the principles from which it is made may be said to know it as something to be made.

Reply Obj. 13: God’s “speaking” refers to the eternal generation of the divine Word, in whom from eternity was the type of all things to be made. Nor does the frequent repetition in each work of the phrase God said imply that God spoke in time, for although the Word is one in himself, he contains the proper type of every single creature. Accordingly, God’s Word prefaces each work as the proper type of the work to be produced, lest the work being complete, it be necessary to ask why that particular work was done, while it had already been stated before the production of the work, that God spoke; this is just as, when we wish to indicate the cause of a thing, we start from the knowledge of the cause.

Reply Obj. 14: The existence of things in the Word is the cause of their existence in themselves, while the existence of things in the angelic mind is not the cause of their existence in themselves; therefore, the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 15: A thing is directed to its end by means of its own activity, while it is not brought into being by its own activity, but only by the activity of its efficient cause. Therefore, it is more fitting that the higher creatures should cooperate with God in bringing things to their end than in their production.

Reply Obj. 16: Although corporeal and spiritual creatures are disparate in regard to their own proper natures, they are connected in regard to the order of the universe. Therefore, it is necessary for them to be created together.

Reply Obj. 17: According to Augustine, these words of Sirach refer to created wisdom abiding in the angelic nature, and he holds that it was created first by priority not of duration but of dignity. (Augustine, Confessions 12.15 (PL 32:832–34).) According to Hilary, in On Synods, they refer to the uncreated Wisdom, namely, the Son of God, (Hilary of Poitiers, On Synods 5 (PL 10:493–95); cf. On Synods 9.23 (PL 10:498).) and it is said to be both created and begotten, as may be gathered from Proverbs 8:22 and various other passages of Scripture, in order to exclude any imperfection from the birth of God’s Son. Thus, “creation” implies an imperfection on the part of the creature insofar as it is brought to being from nothing, but it implies perfection on the part of the Creator, who produces creatures without himself changing. But in “birth” the converse holds, for it implies perfection on the part of the one born, insofar as he receives the nature of the begetter, while it implies an imperfection on the part of the begetter, according to the manner of generation here below, inasmuch as begetting is accompanied by change or division of substance in the begetter. Hence, the Son of God is said to be both created and begotten, in order that creation may exclude change in the begetter and birth exclude imperfection in the begotten, the two combining to give us one perfect idea.

Reply Obj. 18: Hilary’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of the early doctors.

Reply Obj. 19: God is the cause of the angelic nature, but the latter is not the cause of the corporeal nature; and thus, there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 20: The angels are said to have been always in existence, not because they existed from eternity, but because they existed from all time; for whenever time was, the angels were. In this sense, corporeal creatures existed always.

Reply Obj. 21: The mover does not of necessity precede in point of time the thing moved, but in dignity, as is clear with the soul and the body.

Reply Obj. 22: In the action of fire on bodies, a twofold order is to be observed, of position and of time. There is order of position in its every action, because all its actions are local, and it exercises its action more fully on the bodies nearest to it; therefore, by spreading forth, its effect is weakened so much that at last it is entirely spent. On the other hand, the order of time is not viewed in its every action, but only in those that it performs by movement. Therefore, as fire illumines and heats bodies, in the heating an order of position and time is preserved, but in illumination, which is not movement but the terminus of a movement, there is only an order of position. Since, then, God’s action in creating is without movement, the comparison is true not as regards order of time but as regards order of position. For in spiritual action the various degrees of nature are the same as the diversity of position in corporeal action. Accordingly, the comparison of Dionysius is verified in this, that as fire pours forth its power more fully on the bodies nearest to it, so too God bestows his goodness more plentifully on things that are nearest to him in the grade of dignity.