Article 4 — Whether the creative power is communicable to a creature

The fourth point of inquiry is whether the creative power, or even the act of creation, is communicable to a creature. (Parallel texts: ST I.45.5; I.65.3; I.90.3; SCG II.20‒21; In II Sent. 1.1.3; In IV Sent. 5.1.3, qa. 3; On Truth, q. 5, a. 9; Quodlibet III, q. 3, a. 3; Compendium theologiae, ch. 70; On Separated Substances, ch. 10.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that it is. For in the same manner and order in which realities go forth from their first principle are they ordered back to their ultimate end, since their first principle is the same as their ultimate end. Now, the lower creatures are ordered to God as their end by means of the higher creatures; for, as Dionysius says, it is a law of the divine nature to draw to itself the last things through the first. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy 5.1 (PG 3:195–98).) Therefore, the lower creatures also go forth from their first principle through creation by means of the higher creatures; and thus, the creative act is communicated to the creature.

Obj. 2: That which, when communicated to a creature, does not draw it outside the bounds of a creature is communicable to a creature by the power of the Creator, who is able to establish even new kinds of creatures. Now, the power to create, if communicated to a creature, would not place the creature outside the bounds of a creature. Therefore, the creative power is communicable to a creature.

The middle is proved as follows. It is said to place some reality outside the bounds of a creature when it is incompatible with the account of being created. Now, it is not incompatible with the account of being created that a creature be able to create, unless because it would seem to need an infinite power in order to create. But it seems that it would not need such a power, since a thing is as distant from one of two opposites as it participates in the nature of the other. Thus, the further a thing is from being black, the more white it is. Now, the creature has a finite participation in the nature of being; therefore, its distance from unqualified non-existence is also finite. And the bringing of a thing into existence from a finite distance does not demonstrate infinite power. Therefore, the creative act can proceed from a finite power, and consequently, the creative power is not incompatible with the account of being created, nor does it place the creature beyond the bounds of a creature.

Obj. 3: Regarding the statement just made, that a thing is as distant from one opposite as it participates in the other, it might be remarked that this is true when both opposites are natures, such as contraries are, but not when only one is a nature, such as privation and habit, affirmation and negation.

On the contrary, the opposition in question is between contraries in the point of their being distant from each other, and this belongs to them inasmuch as they are opposites. Now, the cause and root of opposition in contraries is the opposition of affirmation and negation. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.6, 1011b17–22.) Therefore, the above statement is especially true of the opposition of affirmation and negation.

Obj. 4: According to Augustine, realities are said to come to be in three ways: in the Word, in the angelic knowledge, and in their own proper nature. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2.8 (PL 34:201–2).) Therefore, it is said: he said, let there be, and it was made (Gen 1). Now, the manner in which things are said to come to be in the angelic intelligence is intermediate between the other two ways. Therefore, it seems that created realities come into being in their own proper nature from the Word of the Creator through the medium of the angelic knowledge; thus, it seems things would be created by means of the angels.

Obj. 5: Nothing and something are more distant than something and being, since nothing and something have naught in common, whereas something is a part of being. Now, God by creating makes that which was nothing to become something and, consequently, that no power becomes some power. Much more, then, can he make a limited power, such as that of a creature, become omnipotence, to which creation belongs. Therefore, he can communicate to a creature the act of creation.

Obj. 6: Spiritual light is nobler and more powerful than bodily light. Now, a bodily light multiplies its very self. Therefore, an angel, who is a spiritual light, according to Augustine, is able to multiply his very self. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 4.22 (PL 34:311–12).) But he cannot do this except by creating. Therefore, an angel can create.

Obj. 7: Substantial forms are not generated, since the composite alone is generated, as the Philosopher proves. Therefore, they cannot be brought into being except by creation. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.8–9, 1033a24–1034b19.) Now, created nature disposes matter for its form. Therefore, as a minister it contributes something towards creation; consequently, it can be communicated to a creature that has a ministry in creation.

Obj. 8: The work of justification is nobler than the work of creation, since grace is above nature. Hence, Augustine also says that the justification of a sinner is greater than the creation of heaven and earth. (Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John 72.3 (PL 35:1823–24).) But the creature exhibits a ministry in the justification of a sinner, since the priest is said to justify or forgive sins as a minister. Much more, therefore, can a creature exhibit a ministry in the act of creation.

Obj. 9: Everything made must be like the agent, as is proved in Metaphysics 7. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.8, 1033a24–1034a8.) Now, the corporeal creature is not like God either specifically or generically. Therefore, it cannot come from God by creation except by means of a creature that is like it at least in genus; consequently, it would seem that corporeal realities are created by God by means of the higher creatures.

Obj. 10: It is stated in The Book of Causes that the second intelligence does not receive of the first goods, which come from the first cause, save through the medium of the higher intelligence. (The Book of Causes, Proposition 19.) Now, being itself is one of the first goods. Therefore, the second intelligence does not receive its being from God except through the first intelligence; thus, it seems that God communicates the creative act to a creature.

Obj. 11: In the same work, it is stated that an intelligence knows what is beneath it through the mode of its own substance, inasmuch as it is its cause. (The Book of Causes, Proposition 8.) Now, one intelligence understands another that is beneath it; therefore, it is its cause. But an intelligence, since it is not composite, is not caused otherwise than by creation. Therefore, an intelligence can create.

Obj. 12: Augustine says that the spiritual creature communicates the species and existence to the corporeal creature, (Augustine, On the Immortality of the Soul 16 (PL 32:1034).) and so it would seem that corporeal creatures are created by means of the spiritual.

Obj. 13: There are two genera of knowledge: one knowledge is for the sake of the reality, and the other that is from the realities. Now, an angel’s knowledge of corporeal realities is not a knowledge that is from the realities, since he has no sense powers by the mediation of which knowledge of sensible things reaches the intellect. Hence, he knows realities by a knowledge that is for the sake of the reality, which is like the divine knowledge. Therefore, just as God is the cause of things by his knowledge, so the angelic knowledge seems to be the cause of things.

Obj. 14: Things go forth into existence in two ways: first, insofar as they go from absolute non-existence into existence, which occurs through creation; second, insofar as they go from potency into act. Now, the material power that is in natural realities can produce realities in the second way, namely, by drawing things out of potency into act. Therefore, an immaterial power (for instance, that of an angel), which is more powerful, can bring a thing into existence in the first way, which belongs to the greater power—namely, by bringing it to existence from absolute non-existence, which is to create. And so it would seem that an angel can create.

Obj. 15: Nothing surpasses the infinite. But it requires an infinite power to lead a thing from nothing to being; otherwise, there would be no reason why creatures should not create. Therefore, no other power can surpass it. And thus, making a creature out of nothing and giving it the power to create is not greater than creating it. Now, God can do the latter; therefore, he can also do the former.

Obj. 16: The greater the resistance offered by the patient to the agent, the greater the difficulty encountered by the agent. Now, a contrary offers more resistance than a non-being since a non-being cannot act as a contrary can. Since, then, a creature is able to make a thing from its contrary, it seems that much more should it be able to make something out of nothing, which is to create. Therefore, a creature can create.

On the contrary (1), being and non-being are infinitely apart. Now, an infinite power is required to operate at an infinite distance. Therefore, an infinite power is required to create, so that the creative power cannot be communicated to a creature.

Furthermore (2), according to Dionysius, the higher creatures, such as the angels, are divided into essence, power, and operation: (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy 11 (PG 3:283–92).) hence, we may conclude that no creature’s power is its own essence, and thus, no creature acts of its whole self, since that by which a thing acts is its power. Now, the production of the effect corresponds to the act of the agent. Therefore, no creature is able to produce an effect in its entirety; consequently, it cannot create, but always presupposes matter for its action.

Furthermore (3), Augustine says that angels cannot create anything, be they good or bad. (Augustine, On the Trinity 3.8–9 (PL 42:875–79).) Now, of all creatures, the angel is the noblest. Much less, then, can any other creature create.

Furthermore (4), it belongs to the same power to create and to preserve creatures in being. Now, creatures cannot be preserved in being save by the divine power, since if it withdrew from things, they would at once cease to be, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 4.12 (PL 34:303–6).) Therefore, things cannot be created except by the divine power.

Furthermore (5), that which is properly speaking a property of one thing cannot be belong to another. Now, it is commonly agreed that to create is proper to God. Therefore, to create cannot belong to something else.

I answer that certain philosophers have held that God created the lower creatures through the mediation of the higher, as is clear in The Book of Causes, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, and Algazel. (The Book of Causes, Proposition 10; Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing 9.4; Algazel (ca. 1058–1111 AD), The Incoherence of the Philosophers, problems 3, 12.) They were led to this opinion through supposing that, from one simple thing, only one thing can immediately arise, and that, through the mediation of the latter, a multitude of things proceeded from the one first being. However, they said this as though God acted from a necessity of nature, for in this way, from one simple thing only one comes to be.

We, on the other hand, hold that things proceed from God through the mode of knowledge and understanding, according to which mode there is nothing to prevent a multitude of things from proceeding immediately from the one first and simple God, inasmuch as his wisdom contains the universe. Hence, according to the Catholic faith, we hold that God immediately created all spiritual substances and the matter of corporeal things, and we deem it heresy to say that anything was created by an angel or by any creature. Therefore, Damascene declares: whosoever shall say that an angel created anything, let him be anathema. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 2.3 (PG 94:866–74).)

Certain Catholic writers, however, have said that, although no creature can create something, it could be communicated to a creature that God should create something through its ministry. The Master favors this opinion in Sentences IV. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 5, ch. 3 (PL 192:661–62).)

Some, on the other hand, say that the creative act could not in any sense be communicated to a creature, and this is also the more common opinion.

In order to make this point clear, we must observe that “creation” names an active power by which things are brought into being; therefore, it requires no preexisting matter or prior agency, for these are the only causes that are presupposed for action. For the form of the thing generated is the terminus of the generator’s action, and is likewise the very end of generation, which does not precede but follows the action, with regard to its being.

Now, it is clear from the very account of the name that creation does not presuppose matter. For what is said to be created is what comes to be from nothing. That it also does not presuppose a previous agent cause is clear from the teaching of Augustine, who proves that the angels are not creators, because they work by means of a nature’s implanted seeds, which are the active powers in the nature. (Augustine, On the Trinity 3.8 (PL 42:875–77).)

Accordingly, if we take “creation” thus, strictly, it is evident that it belongs only to the first agent to create since a second cause does not act save through the influence of the first cause; and thus, every action of a second cause is on presupposition of an active cause.

Nor even did the philosophers themselves maintain that angels or intelligences create anything except through a divine power existing in them—such that we might understand that a second cause could have two actions: one proceeding from its own proper nature, the other from the power of a prior cause. For it is impossible that a second cause, by its own proper power, be the principle of existence as such; for this is proper to the first cause since the order of effects is according to the order of causes.

Now, the first of all effects is being itself, which is presupposed to all other effects and does not presuppose any other effect; (The Book of Causes, Proposition 4.) therefore, to give being as such must be the effect of the first cause alone by its own proper power, and whatever other cause gives being does this insofar as in it is the power and activity of the first cause, and not by its own proper power. This is just as an instrument performs an instrumental action not by the power of its own proper nature, but by the power of its mover; and just as natural heat engenders living flesh by the power of the soul, while, by the power of its own proper nature, it merely heats and causes dissolution.

In this sense, then certain philosophers have held that the first intelligences are creators of second intelligences insofar as they give them being through the power of the first cause existing in them. For being is by creation, while goodness, life, and so forth are by information, as stated in The Book of Causes. (The Book of Causes, Proposition 18.) This was the foundation of idolatry, in that divine worship was accorded to the created substances themselves as though they were the creators of others. The Master, however, in Sentences IV holds that it is possible for this to be communicated to a creature, not such that it would create by its own proper power, as it were, by its authority, but by a ministry, as an instrument. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 5, ch. 3 (PL 192:661–62).)

But, if we look into the question carefully, it will be clear that this is impossible. For the action of anything, even though it belongs to it as to an instrument, must come from that thing’s power. Now, since the power of every creature is finite, it is impossible that any creature work toward creation, even as an instrument. For creation requires an infinite might in the power from which it comes forth. This is made clear by the five following arguments.

The first is that the power of a maker is proportionate to the distance between the thing that comes to be and the opposite thing from which it comes to be. For the colder a thing is (and, therefore, the further removed it is from being hot), the greater will be the strength of the heat required to make that cold thing hot. Now, unqualified non-being is infinitely distant from being, which is clear from the fact that non-being is further removed from any determinate being than any other being, however distant these may be. Consequently, none but an infinite power can produce something from non-being.

The second reason is that the thing is made in the way in which the maker makes it. Now, the agent acts inasmuch as it is in act. Therefore, only that which is wholly in act acts by its whole self, and this belongs to none but the infinite act, who is the first act. Consequently, also none but an infinite power can make a thing according to its whole substance.

The third reason is that, since an accident must be in a subject, whereas the subject of an action is the recipient of that action, only that agent whose action is not an accident but its very substance requires no recipient matter when it makes a thing. And such an agent is none but God; therefore, only he can create.

The fourth reason is that, as all second agent causes have the fact that they act from the first cause, as is proved in The Book of Causes, (The Book of Causes, Propositions 19–20.) it follows that all second agents receive their mode and order from the first agent, who receives neither mode nor order from any other. Now, since the mode of an action depends on the matter that receives the agent’s action, it will belong to the first agent alone to act without presupposing matter from another acting agent and to provide matter for all second agents.

The fifth argument is a reduction to the impossible. For according to the distance of potency from act there is a proportion of powers reducing something from potency to act; for the further the potency is removed from the act, the greater is the power required. Hence, if there be a finite power that effects something without any presupposed potency, there must be some proportion between it and that active power that leads forth a thing from potency to act; and in this way there is a certain proportion between no potency and some potency, which is impossible. For there is no proportion of non-being to being, as is said in Physics 4. (Aristotle, Physics 4.7–9, 213b30–217b28.)

We conclude, then, that no power of a creature can create anything—neither by its own proper virtue, nor as the instrument of another.

Reply Obj. 1: In bringing things to their end, the means to that end are already in existence; therefore, it is not impossible for something to cooperate with God in its action such that some things are brought to their ultimate end. But in the universal bringing of things into being, nothing is presupposed; hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents our imagining a distance infinite on one side and finite on the other. But we imagine a distance infinite on either side when each of the opposites is given as infinite—for instance, if there are an infinite heat and an infinite cold. But the imagined distance will be finite on one side when one of the opposites is finite, for instance, infinite heat and finite cold. Accordingly, the distance of infinite being from non-being, simply speaking, is infinite on both sides, whereas the distance of finite being from non-being, simply speaking, is infinite on one side only, yet it requires an infinite active power.

Reply Obj. 3: The third objection we grant, since it makes no difference to the point at issue whether both opposite extremes be a nature or one only.

Reply Obj. 4: Things are said to come to be in our intelligence in respect of knowledge only, not according to the account of an operative power; therefore, things are brought into being by God not by the mediating actions of angels but only with their knowledge.

Reply Obj. 5: Something is said to be impossible to someone not only on account of the distance between the extremes, but also because it is altogether impossible to be done. For instance, we might say that God cannot come to be from a body, because it is altogether impossible for God to come to be. Accordingly, we reply that omnipotence cannot come to be from a power not only on account of the distance between them, but also because omnipotence utterly cannot come to be. For whatever comes to be cannot be pure act since, from the very fact that it has its being from another, it is proved to have potency and, consequently, cannot have infinite power.

Reply Obj. 6: Bodily light multiplies itself not by creating a new light but by shedding itself over matter. This cannot be said of the angels, since they are self-subsistent substances.

Reply Obj. 7: A form may be considered in two ways.

First, insofar as it is in potency; and in this way, God concreates it with matter, without any intervening action of a disposing nature.

Second, insofar as it is in act; and in this way it is not created but rather is led forth from the potency of matter by a natural agent.

Therefore, there is no need of dispositive action on the part of nature in order that a thing be created.

Seeing, however, that there is a certain natural form—namely, the rational soul—that is brought into being by creation, and whose matter is disposed by nature, we must observe that since the creative act is independent of matter, there are two senses in which a thing is said to be created.

For some things are created without any presupposed matter, neither matter-from-which nor matter-in-which—for instance, the angels and the heavenly bodies; and for the creation of such things nature can do nothing dispositively.

On the other hand, some things are created even though no matter-from-which they exist is presupposed, yet a matter-in-which they exist is presupposed, such as human souls. Insofar, then, as they have matter-in-which, nature can act dispositively, yet not such that the action of nature extends to the very substance of that which is created.

Reply Obj. 8: In the work of justification, man does something, but only as a minister by employing the sacraments. Hence, as the sacraments are said to justify instrumentally and dispositively, the solution comes to the same as the preceding one.

Reply Obj. 9: Although there cannot be a generic or specific likeness between God and the creature, there can nevertheless be a certain likeness of analogy, as there is between potency and act, and substance and accident. This is said in one way insofar as created realities imitate, in their own way, the idea of the divine mind, as the work of a craftsman imitates the form in his mind. In another way, it is true that created realities become in a certain way like the very nature of God, insofar as the different things are beings from the first being, their goods from the good, and so on. However, this objection is not to the point, for even granted that creatures proceed from God through the mediation of some created power, the same difficulty will remain—namely, how this first nature can be created by God, and yet not be like God.

Reply Obj. 10: This error is contained explicitly in The Book of Causes, whose author holds that the lower creatures were created by God by means of the higher; (The Book of Causes, Proposition 10.) therefore, in this matter, the authority of this book should not be accepted.

Reply Obj. 11: The same is to be said of the eleventh objection.

Reply Obj. 12: Augustine is speaking there of the soul, which communicates existence and species to the body not through the mode of creating but through the mode of a form.

Reply Obj. 13: Although an angel does not know realities by a knowledge that is taken from the realities, still it does not follow that he knows by such a knowledge that is a cause of the realities; for his knowledge is a mean between the two kinds of knowledge mentioned. For he knows realities by a natural knowledge, which occurs through the likenesses of the realities flowing into his intellect from the divine intellect, so that in this way his knowledge is not for the reality as the cause of the realities, but is a likeness of the divine intellect, which causes the realities.

Reply Obj. 14: In bringing things from potency to act, many degrees may be observed, inasmuch as a thing may be brought from a more or less remote potency to act, and more or less easily as well. Hence, if the angel’s power surpasses that of material nature, it does not follow that he is able to make a thing from absolute non-being because nature is able to lead forth a thing from potency to act; rather, it follows that he can do this much more easily than nature. Thus, Augustine says that demons are able to apply the seeds of nature more secretly and efficaciously than we are aware. (Augustine, On the Trinity 3.8–9 (PL 42:875–79).)

Reply Obj. 15: No power is greater than the power to create, nor does this prove that the creative power must include the bestowal on a creature of the power to create, since it is utterly incommunicable to a creature. For that a thing be impossible may be due not only to one’s lack of ability to do it, but also sometimes to the very making of the thing that cannot come to be. Thus, God cannot make God, not because of a lack of his power, but because God cannot be made by anyone. In like manner, the creative power cannot be finite, nor can it be communicated to a creature, because it is infinite.

Reply Obj. 16: A thing is difficult to do in two ways.

First, because the patient resists the agent. This does not apply in every case, but only in things that mutually act and suffer in return, in which the agent suffers from a contrary action of the patient. In this way, the heavenly bodies, whose action meets with no opposition on the part of another agent, suffer no difficulty in their action from a contrary action from the patient. Much less does God.

Second—and this applies to all cases—because the patient is far removed from the act. For the further the potency is removed from act, the greater is the difficulty encountered by the action of the agent. Therefore, since absolute non-being is further removed from act than is matter subject to any contrary whatsoever, however intense the other contrary may be, it is evident that it requires a greater power to produce a thing from nothing than to produce one contrary from another.