Article 16 — Whether many things can proceed from one first thing

The sixteenth point of inquiry is whether many things can proceed from one first thing. (Parallel texts: ST I.47.1; SCG II.39‒46; III.97; Compendium theologiae, cc. 71‒72, 102; Commentary on the Book of Causes 1.24; Commentary on Metaphysics, bk. 12, lect. 2. See above: q. 3, a. 1, ad 9.)

Obj. 1: And it seems they cannot. For just as God is essentially good, and consequently, the highest good, so is he essentially and supremely one. Now, inasmuch as he is good, nothing can proceed from him but what is good. Therefore, inasmuch as he is one, only one thing can proceed from him.

Obj. 2: As good is convertible with being, so also is one. Now, in things that are beings, the creature is like God, as stated above. (Q. 3, a. 15.) Therefore, just as it is like God in goodness, so must it be like him in unity, and thus, from the one God one creature must proceed.

Obj. 3: As good and evil, taken in general, are mutually opposed by way of privation, although they are contraries, insofar as they are the differences of habits, so one and many are opposed to each other by way of privation, as is clear in Metaphysics 10. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.3, 1054a23–27.) Now, by no means do we say that wickedness proceeds from God, but from a defect of secondary causes. Neither, therefore, should we say that God is the cause of multitude.

Obj. 4: Cause and effect should be proportionate to each other, inasmuch as single things cause single things and universal things cause universal, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Physics 2.3, 195b25–27.) Now, God is the most universal of all causes. Therefore, his proper effect is the most universal of all, namely, being. Now, multitude does not exist because things have being, since diversity and distinction are the cause of multitude, and all things agree in point of being. Therefore, multitude is not from God, but from secondary causes, from which each thing derives its particular condition, by which also it is differentiated from others.

Obj. 5: Every effect has a certain proper cause. But it is impossible that one thing be proper to many things. Therefore, it is impossible that one thing be the cause of a multitude.

Obj. 6: You will say perhaps that this is true of natural but not of voluntary causes.

On the contrary, the craftsman is the cause of his work through his will. But that work comes from the craftsman in accordance with its proper form, which exists in the craftsman. Therefore, even in voluntary effects each one requires its proper cause.

Obj. 7: There ought to be conformity between cause and effect. But God is altogether one and simple. Therefore, there should be found neither multitude nor composition in the creature, which is his effect.

Obj. 8: One effect cannot proceed immediately from a diversity of agents. Now, as the cause is appropriate to the effect, so is the effect to its cause. Therefore, from one same cause there cannot proceed many immediate effects, and thus, the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 9: In God, it is the same power that begets, spirates, and creates. Now, the power to beget terminates in one only, and likewise the power to spirate, because in the Trinity there can be but one Son and one Holy Spirit. Therefore, the creative power also terminates in one only.

Obj. 10: But you will say that the universe of creatures is in a way one with regard to order.

On the contrary, the effect must be like its cause. But the unity of God is not a unity of order, since in God there is no before and after, nor higher and lower. Consequently, a unity of order does not suffice to make it possible that many things be made by one God.

Obj. 11: One simple thing has but one action. Now, one action has but one effect. Therefore, only one effect can proceed from one simple thing.

Obj. 12: The creature proceeds from God not only as an effect from its efficient cause, but also as what is based on an exemplar from that exemplar. Now, of one thing based on an exemplar there is one proper exemplar. Therefore, only one creature can proceed from God.

Obj. 13: God is cause of things through his intellect. Now, an agent acting by intellect acts through a form in his intellect. Therefore, since there is but one form in the divine intellect, it would seem that only one creature can proceed from it.

Obj. 14: But you will say that, although the form in the divine intellect is one in the reality that is the divine essence, we may nevertheless consider therein a certain plurality according to the various respects to various creatures, so that there is a plurality of account.

On the contrary, these several respects are either in the divine intellect or solely in our reason. In the first case, it will follow that there is plurality and not supreme simplicity in the divine intellect. In the second case, it will follow that God does not produce a variety of creatures except by means of our reason, and consequently, that he produces a variety of creatures through various respects to creatures, which respects exist only in our reason. This is what we are endeavoring to show, namely, that multitude does not proceed from God immediately.

Obj. 15: God brings things into being through his intellect apprehending them. Now, in him there is but one apprehension, since his intellect is his essence, which is one. Therefore, he produces but one creature.

Obj. 16: That which has no being save in reason is not created by God, for such things would seem to be fictions, as chimeras and the like. Now, multitude is only in the reason, because it signifies through an abstraction from several things, which abstraction does not exist in the nature of things. Therefore, God is not the cause of multitude.

Obj. 17: According to Plato, it belongs to the best things to produce the best. (Plato, Timaeus 30a–b.) Now, the best thing can only be one. Since, then, God is best, only one thing can be produced by him.

Obj. 18: Every agent that acts for an end makes its effect as close to the end as it can. Now, God, in producing the creature, ordains it to an end. Therefore, he makes it closest to the end, to the degree that he can. But this can be done only in one way. Therefore, he produces only one creature.

Obj. 19: It is unjust for someone to deal unequally to various recipients, unless these be already unequal either in merit or in some other diversity of condition. Now, no diversity precedes God’s work; otherwise, he would not be the first cause of all things. Therefore, when he first created things, he did not bestow unequal gifts on his creatures. But the diversity and multitude of creatures are in respect of their receiving more or less of the divine gifts, as is clear in The Celestial Hierarchy 4. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy 4.2 (PG 3:179–80).) Therefore, when God first created things he did not produce a multitude.

Obj. 20: God communicates his goodness to creatures according to their capacity. Now, the nature of higher creatures was capable of such perfection and dignity as to be the causes of lower creatures. For the more perfect things can act on things that are less perfect and communicate their own perfection to them. Therefore, it seems that God produced the lower creatures by means of the higher, (The Book of Causes, Propositions 3, 9.) and thus, he did not produce immediately more than one creature, whatever it be, higher than the others.

Obj. 21: The more immaterial forms are, the more active they are, insofar as they are more remote from potency; for a thing acts insofar as it is in act and not insofar as it is in potency. Now, the forms of things that are in an angel’s mind are more immaterial than the forms that are in natural things. Therefore, seeing that natural forms are causes of like forms, it would seem that much more would the forms in an angel’s mind produce like forms of natural things. But the diversity and, consequently, multitude of things result from the form. Therefore, it seems that multitude did not proceed from God except by means of the higher creatures.

Obj. 22: Whatsoever God makes is one thing. Therefore, only one thing proceeds from him, and thus, he is not the cause of multitude.

Obj. 23: God understands but one thing, because he understands nothing outside himself, as is proved in Metaphysics 12. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.9, 1074b15–1075a4.) Now, he is cause of things through his intellect. Therefore, he causes but one thing.

Obj. 24: Anselm says that, within God, the creature is the creative essence. (Anselm of Canterbury, Monologion 8 (PL 158:157).) Now, the creative essence is but one. Consequently, in God too, the creature is one only. But the creature is produced by God according to the same way as it pre-existed in God. Therefore, only one creature proceeds from God, and consequently, multitude is not from him.

On the contrary (1) it is written: Lord, you have disposed all things in number, weight, and measure (Wis 11:21). But there is no number without multitude. Therefore, multitude is from God.

Furthermore (2), God’s power precedes that of any other thing. Now, one point can be the beginning of many lines. (Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 5.6 (PG 3:819–22).) Therefore, in this way God, though he is one, can be the beginning of many creatures.

Furthermore (3), that which is proper to the one as one is most appropriate to that which is supremely one. Now, it is proper to the unit to be the principle of multitude. Therefore, it is most appropriate to God, who is supremely one, to be the cause of multitude.

Furthermore (4), Boethius says, in the beginning of On Arithmetic, that God brought things into being according to the exemplar of number. (Boethius, On Arithmetic 1.2 (PL 63:1083).) Now, what is based on an exemplar conforms to the exemplar. Therefore, he produced things under multitude and number.

Furthermore (5), it is written: you have done all things in wisdom (Ps 103:24). Now, seeing that it belongs to the wise to set things in order, it follows that there must be order and, consequently, multitude in all the things that come to be by wisdom. Therefore, the multitude of things is from God.

I answer that the impossibility of many things proceeding from one immediate and proper principle would seem to arise from the cause being determined to its effect, so that it would seem due and necessary that if the cause be such and such, such and such an effect would arise. Now, there are four causes, two of which, namely, the material and the efficient cause, precede the effect as to their internal existence; while the end precedes it, if not in existence, yet in intention; and the form precedes it in neither way, considered as form, since the effect has its being by the form and, consequently, its being is simultaneous with that of the effect; but insofar as it is also the end, it precedes in the intention of the agent. And although the form is the end of the activity, being the terminus of the agent’s activity, nevertheless, not every end is a form. For there is an end in intention outside the end of the activity, as in the case of a house. For the house’s form is the end terminating the builder’s activity, but his intention does not terminate there, but rather at a further end: namely, inhabitation; in this way, the end of the activity is the form of a house, and that of the intention, inhabitation.

Accordingly, the necessity of such and such effects coming into being cannot arise from the form as such, since thus it is simultaneous with the effect; rather, it must arise either from the power of the efficient cause, or from the matter, or from the end, whether the end of the intention or the end of the activity.

Now, it cannot be said, in God, that his effect is necessitated by matter. For because he is the author of all being, nothing in any way whatsoever having being is presupposed to his action, so that one would be bound to say that, owing to the disposition of matter, his action must produce this or that effect.

Likewise, neither can it arise from the effective power. For because his active power is infinite, it is not terminated at one effect save to that which would be equal to him, and this cannot be competent to any effect.

Therefore, if it be necessary that he produce an effect beneath himself, his power considered in itself is not determined to any particular degree of distance, such that it would be necessary for such and such an effect to be produced by that active power itself.

Likewise, neither can it arise from the end of the intention. For this end is the divine goodness, which gains nothing from the production of the effects.

Again, it cannot be wholly represented by those effects nor be wholly communicated to them, such that one would be able to say that it would be necessary for an effect of God to be such and such in order wholly to participate of God’s goodness; for it is possible for an effect to participate thereof in many ways, so that no effect is rendered necessary by the end. Thus, necessity arises from the end when the intention of the end cannot be fulfilled, either at all or not conveniently, without this or that thing.

It remains, therefore, that necessity in God’s works cannot arise except from the form that is the end of the activity. For the form, since it is not infinite, has determined principles without which it cannot exist, and a determined mode of existence; thus we might say, for instance, supposing that God intends to make a man, that it is necessary and due that he give him a rational soul and an organized body, without which a man cannot exist. And we can say something similar as regards the universe. For that God wished to make the universe such as it is, was not necessary or due either on account of the end, or the power of the efficient cause, or the potency of matter, as we have shown.

But given that he wished to make the universe such as it is, it was necessary that he should produce such and such creatures, from which such and such a form of universe would arise. And seeing that the perfection of the universe requires both a diversity and a multitude of realities, inasmuch as it cannot be found in one of them, on account of the latter’s remoteness from the perfection of the first good, it was necessary, on the supposition of that intended form, that God should produce many and diverse creatures: some simple, some compound, some corruptible, and some incorruptible.

Through failing to consider this, some philosophers have wandered from the truth in diverse ways.

For some, not understanding that God is the author of the universe, have maintained that matter did not exist from another, and that matter itself necessitated diversity among the things produced therefrom. They did this either by making things differ according to the rarity or density of their matter, like the earliest of the natural philosophers, who could not see further than the material cause. (As, for example: Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes; cf. Anaximenes (6th century BC), Diels-Kranz 13A5, 13A7.) Or they did this by the action of some efficient cause, whereby different effects were produced according to a difference of matter, just as Anaxagoras held that a divine intelligence produced the diversity of things by freeing them from the commixture of matter, (Anaxagoras, Diels-Kranz 59B12–13.) and as Empedocles explained by friendship and strife the various differences and connections arising from diversity of matter. (Empedocles (5th century BC), Diels-Kranz 31B17, 21, 22, 26, 35.)

That these were in error is apparent for two reasons.

First, because they did not hold that all being flows from the first and supreme being, as we proved above. (Q. 3, a. 5.)

Second, because, according to them, it would follow that the order and distinction of the parts of the universe arose from chance, since they were necessitated by the necessity of matter.

Others, like Avicenna and his school, ascribed the plurality and diversity of things to a necessity arising from the efficient cause. (Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing 9.4.) He said that the first being by understanding himself produced one effect only, namely, the first intelligence, which of necessity fell short of the simplicity of the first being, to the degree that potentiality began to be mixed with act (inasmuch as the one receiving being from another is not its own being but is in a certain way in potency to it). And in this way, inasmuch as this first being understands the first being, so another and lower intelligence proceeds from it, and inasmuch as it understands its own potency, the heavenly body proceeds from it, which it moves; and inasmuch as it understands its own act, the soul of the first heaven proceeds from it. Thus, through many intermediates, diverse things are multiplied.

But this opinion also cannot stand. First, because it would have the divine power terminated at one effect, which is the first intelligence. Second, because it makes other substances besides God to be the creators of other creatures, and we have shown this to be impossible. (Q. 3, a. 4.) Moreover, this opinion, like those already mentioned, would imply that the beauty arising from the order of the universe is the result of chance, since it ascribes the diversity of things not to the intention of an end but to the determination of active causes to their effects.

Others, like Plato and his followers, erred regarding the necessity imposed by the final cause. For he said that the production of this universe was the necessary outcome of God’s goodness as understood and loved by him, so that the best would produce the best universe. This indeed may be true if we look only at what is, and not at what are able to be. For this universe is the best of the things that exist, and that it is best in this way is due to the highest goodness of God. Nevertheless, God’s goodness is not so bound to this universe that it could not have produced a better or one that is less good.

Others, again, erred through failing to note what is due to the formal cause, noting only that which is due to the divine goodness. Thus, the Manicheans, considering that God is supremely good, thought that only those creatures proceed from God that are the best of creatures, namely, those that are spiritual and incorruptible, whereas they ascribed corporeal and corruptible beings to another principle. The error of Origen, although contrary to this, comes from the same source. (Origen, On First Principles 1.7, para. 5; 1.8, paras. 2, 4.) For he considered God to be supremely good and just, and for this reason he believed that at first he created only the best, that is, the rational creatures, all equal to one another, and that these by their free will acted in various ways, for good or for evil, and he maintained that from this resulted the various degrees of things in the universe. He held that those rational creatures that turned to God were promoted to angelic dignity, and to the various orders according to the degree of their merits, while the remaining rational creatures who by their free decision sinned, in his opinion, fell into the lower things and were bound to bodies: some that sinned less grievously bound to the sun, moon, and stars, some to human bodies, some transformed into demons.

Both of these errors apparently disregard the order of the universe and confine their observation to its individual parts. For the very order of the universe is sufficient proof that from one principle, without any previous difference of merits, originated various degrees among creatures so that the universe would be complete (which universe, by its multiplicity and variety of creatures, represents that which in the divine goodness pre-exists simply or without distinction). This is just as the very perfection of a house or of the human body requires a diversity of parts, since neither would be complete if all its parts were of the same condition; for instance, if every part of the human body were an eye, since the functions of the other parts would be wanting, or if every part of the house were the roof, the house would be incomplete and fail of its end, which is to shelter from rain and disaster.

Accordingly, we must conclude that the multitude and diversity of creatures has proceeded from one principle, not on account of a necessity imposed by matter, nor on account of a limitation in power, nor on account of goodness or a necessity imposed by goodness, but from the order of wisdom, in order that the perfection of the universe might be realized within the diversity of creatures.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as God is one, so too that which he produced is one, not only because each thing is one in itself but also because all things taken together are in a sense one perfect thing, and this unity requires diversity of parts, as we have already shown.

Reply Obj. 2: The creature is like God in unity, inasmuch as each thing is one in itself, and inasmuch as all things together are one by a unity of order, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: Wickedness consists entirely in privation of being, whereas multitude is caused by being. For the very difference between one being and another is a certain being. Therefore, since God is not the source of a thing tending to non-being but is the source of all being, he is not the principle of wickedness, but he is the cause of multitude. It must be observed, however, that oneness is twofold. There is a one that is convertible with being, which adds nothing to being save non-division; and this one excludes multitude, insofar as multitude results from division—not the extrinsic multitude that the one constitutes as a part, but intrinsic multitude that is opposed to one. For when we say that a thing is one, we do not deny the existence of other things extrinsic thereto with which it constitutes a multitude; rather, we deny a division of it itself into many. The other kind of one is the principle of number, and to the account of being it adds that of measure; and multitude is a privation of this unity, since number results from the division of the continuous. Yet multitude does not entirely exclude unity, since when a whole is divided the parts still remain undivided; but it does exclude the unity of a whole. But wickedness, considered in itself, excludes goodness, since in no way does it constitute a good nor is it constituted thereby.

Reply Obj. 4: Being stands to things contained under being in a different way than animal (or any other genus) stands to its own species. For a species adds to its genus (such as man adds to animal) a difference that is outside the essence of the genus; for “animal” names merely the sensitive nature, which latter does not contain “rational.” But things contained under “being” add nothing to being that is outside the essence of being. Therefore, it does not follow that the cause of an animal as such is the cause of the rational as such. But it does follow that the cause of being as such must be the cause of all the differences of being, and consequently, of the entire multitude of beings.

Reply Obj. 5: Appropriateness of a cause to its effect regards the likeness of the effect to its cause. Now, the likeness of the creature to God is viewed according to the creature’s fulfilling what, in reference to it, exists in God’s intellect and will, just as the products of the craftsman’s art are like him insofar as the form of the art is expressed in them and they reveal the craftsman’s will in reference to their constitution. For just as the natural agent acts through its own form, so does the craftsman act through his own intellect and will. Accordingly, God is the proper cause of each creature inasmuch as he understands each creature and wills it to be. However, the statement that the same thing cannot be proper to many is true of an appropriateness of equality and does not apply to the case in point.

Reply Obj. 6: The reply to the sixth objection is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 7: Although there is a certain likeness between the creature and God, it is not one of equality. Hence, it does not follow that, because unity in God is altogether free of multitude and composition, therefore, the same unity is to be found in the creature.

Reply Obj. 8: Although an effect cannot surpass its cause, a cause can surpass its effect, and consequently, several effects can proceed from one cause, although one effect cannot proceed immediately from several causes.

Reply Obj. 9: Although in God the generative and the creative power are the same in reality, they do not connote the same respect. Rather, the generative power connotes relationship to that which proceeds by nature, and which therefore can be but one, while the creative power implies relationship to what proceeds by the will, and which consequently need not be one.

Reply Obj. 10: As we have already indicated, although the creature imitates the unity of God, it does not follow that its unity is of the same kind as God’s.

Reply Obj. 11: Although God’s action is one and simple, for it is his essence, we must not infer that it has only one effect, but that it has many; for from the divine action effects proceed according to the order of his wisdom and the decree of his will.

Reply Obj. 12: When what is based on an exemplar perfectly represents the exemplar, there can be but one thing based on the exemplar (except accidentally through the copies differing materially). Creatures, however, do not perfectly imitate their exemplar; therefore, they can imitate it in various ways, and so there are many things based on the exemplar. But there is but one perfect mode of imitation, for which reason there can be but one Son, who is the perfect image of the Father.

Reply Obj. 13: Although the form of the divine intellect is but one in reality, it is many in account according to its diverse relations to creatures, inasmuch as creatures are understood to imitate the form of the divine intellect in many ways.

Reply Obj. 14: These various respects to creatures are not only in our intellect but also in God’s. And yet there are not diverse things in the divine intellect by which God understands, for he understands by one thing only, which is his essence; but many things are there, as understood by him. For just as we understand that the creature can imitate God in many ways, so also does God understand this; and consequently, he understands the various respects of creatures to him.

Reply Obj. 15: Just as God understands all things by one thing, so does he understand them all by one apprehension. For the act of the intellect must be one or many according to the unity or multitude of the principle by which a thing is understood.

Reply Obj. 16: Although a multitude apart from the many things exists only in reason, still the multitude within the many is in the nature of things, just as animal in general is only in reason, whereas the nature of animal is within the individuals. Consequently, both multitude and the nature of animal must be traced to God as their cause.

Reply Obj. 17: The universe that has been created by God is the best possible in respect of the things that exist, but not in respect of the things that God is able to make.

Reply Obj. 18: This argument would hold if that which is done in order to obtain an end can gain the end wholly and perfectly by way of equality, and this is not the case in the question at issue.

Reply Obj. 19: This argument, which is used by Origen, is not very convincing. (Origen, On First Principles 1.7, para. 4; 1.8, paras. 1–2.) For there is no injustice in dealing unequally with equal persons except when one is giving them their due, and this cannot be said of the first creation of things. For that which is given out of one’s own liberality may be given more or less liberally as the giver wills and as his wisdom dictates.

Reply Obj. 20: Although other creatures are beneath the angels, their production requires infinite power in their maker, inasmuch as they are brought into being by creation, since they are not made from preexistent matter. Consequently, we must hold that all creatures as not being made from preexistent matter are created by God immediately.

Reply Obj. 21: Since being is the terminus and proper effect of creation, it is impossible that the things created by God receive their forms from the angels, because every being derives from a form.

Reply Obj. 22: Whatsoever God makes is indeed one in itself, yet this unity, as stated above, does not exclude all manner of multitude, since that multitude whereof unity is a part remains.

Reply Obj. 23: When the Philosopher says that God understands nothing outside himself, he should not be understood as though he meant that God does not understand the things that are outside him, but that even those things that are outside God he beholds in himself, not outside himself; for he knows all other things through his own essence.

Reply Obj. 24: The creature is said to be in God in two ways.

First, as in the creature’s governing cause and preserver of its being; and in this sense, the creature is understood as being distinct from the Creator, so that we may say that the creature is from the Creator. For the creature is not understood to be preserved in being except as already having being in its own proper nature, in respect of which being the creature is distinguished from God. Therefore, in this sense, the creature as existing in God is not the creative essence.

Second, the creature is said to be in God inasmuch as it is in the power of the agent cause, or as the thing known in the knower. In this sense, the creature, as existing in God, is the very essence of God, according to John 1:3: that which was made in him was life. (Cf. q. 3, a. 15, resp.) Nevertheless, although in this way the creature as existing in God is the divine essence, there is not, in this sense, only one creature in God, but many. For the divine essence is an adequate medium for knowing different creatures and a sufficient power to produce them.