Article 8 — Whether God works in nature by creating

The eighth point of inquiry is whether God works in nature by creating, and this is to ask whether creation is blended with the works of nature. (Parallel texts: ST I.45.8; In II Sent. 1.1.3, ad 5; 1.1.4, ad 4; Commentary on Metaphysics, bk. 7, lect. 1.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it is. For Augustine says: the apostle Paul, considering the secret works of God in the creation and formation of things, and the outward works of creatures, takes a comparison from agriculture when he says, “I have planted, Apollo watered, but God gave the increase.” (Augustine, On the Trinity 3.8 (PL 42:875–77).)

Obj. 2: To this it may be answered that “creation” is being taken here broadly for any kind of making.

On the contrary, Augustine intends there to draw from the Apostle’s words the distinction between the creature’s activity and that of God. (Augustine, On the Trinity 3.8 (PL 42:875–77).) Now, this distinction is not based upon “creation” taken in a general sense for any kind of making, because in this way, even nature creates, since it does make something (as we have shown above), (Q. 3, a. 7.) but not by “creation” taken properly. Therefore, the words quoted must be taken as referring to creation properly so called.

Obj. 3: Augustine adds: just as in our life, none but God can inform the soul with righteousness, whereas even men can outwardly preach the Gospel, so God inwardly creates the visible world, while he applies to nature, in which he creates all things, the various external operations of the good or bad angels or men or any animals whatsoever; thus, to the soil he applies husbandry. (Augustine, On the Trinity 3.8 (PL 42:875–77).) Now, he informs the soul with righteousness by creating in the proper sense of the word, since grace is effected by creation. Therefore, he creates natural forms in the proper sense of the term.

Obj. 4: You may say, however, that natural forms have a cause in their subject while grace has not, and this is why grace is created in the proper sense while natural forms are not.

On the contrary, according to a Gloss on Genesis 1:1, to create is to make something out of nothing. (Glossa ordinaria 1, 3–6, at Genesis 1:1 (PL 113:69).) Now, this preposition out of sometimes connotes efficient causality, as in 1 Corinthians 8:6, of whom are all things . . . by whom are all things, and sometimes it connotes material causality, as in Tobit 13:21, all the walls thereof round about of precious stones. Hence, when something is said to be made out of nothing, it is not the relation of an efficient cause that is denied (since then God would not be the efficient cause of creatures) but that of a material cause. But natural forms have efficient causes within their subjects, and in this they differ from grace; they also have matter in which they are, and this belongs also to grace. Consequently, grace is not more capable of being created than are natural forms, since it also has a cause in its subject.

Obj. 5: Artificial forms have no cause in their subject but are entirely effected from without. If, then, grace is said to be created because it has no cause in its subject, for the same reason accidental artificial forms must be the result of creation.

Obj. 6: That which has no matter as its constituent part cannot come to be from matter. Now, forms have no matter as a constituent part, because form is contradistinguished both from matter and from the composite, as is clear in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412a6–10.) Since, then, forms come to be (since they have a beginning of existence), it would seem that they do not come to be out of matter, and consequently come to be from nothing, and therefore are created.

Obj. 7: But it might be said that, although natural forms have no matter as a constituent part from which they exist, they have matter in which they exist and, as such, are not created.

On the contrary, the rational soul is a form in matter like other natural forms. But it is admitted that the rational soul is created. Therefore, we must say the same of other natural forms.

Obj. 8: You might say that the rational soul is not brought out from matter, as other natural forms are.

On the contrary, nothing is brought out from that in which it does not exist. Now, before generation is complete, the form which is the terminus of generation is not in the matter; otherwise, contrary forms would be in matter at the same time. Therefore, natural forms are not brought out from matter.

Obj. 9: The form that is the terminus of generation does not make its appearance before generation is complete. If, then, it was there, it was latent, and the result would be that all kinds of forms are latent in all kinds of matter, an opinion upheld by Anaxagoras (Anaxagoras, Diels-Kranz 59B4; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.4. Anaxagoras was born in Clazomenae in Asia Minor ca. 500 BC.) and disproved by Aristotle, in Physics 1. (Aristotle, Physics 1.4, 187b7–188a18.)

Obj. 10: You will say perhaps that the natural form does not exist in the matter completely before generation is complete, but incompletely, as Anaxagoras maintained.

On the contrary, if the form is in any way at all in matter before the generation is complete, it is there as to some part of itself, and if it is not there completely as to some part of itself, it does not preexist. Hence, the form will have several parts and, consequently, is not simple, which is contrary to what is laid down at the beginning of the Six Principles. (The Book of Six Principles was written by Gilbert de la Porrée (1076–1154 AD); the work proposed to complete the Aristotelian categories by adding six “adjacent forms” to them.)

Obj. 11: If the form does not preexist completely in matter and is made complete subsequently, this complement must be the result of generation. Now, this complement does not preexist in matter, because then the form would be there completely. Therefore, this complement at least would be created.

Obj. 12: It will be said perhaps that it preexisted in matter in an incomplete way—not in respect of a part but because it existed at first in one mode and afterwards in another mode; for at first it was potential and afterwards actual.

On the contrary, when a thing is in one mode at first and afterwards in another, this is an alteration, not a generation. Hence, if the work of nature consists in nothing more than that a form that was previously in potency becomes afterwards actual, it follows that nature’s activity does not produce generation but only alteration.

Obj. 13: In the lower nature one finds no active principle that is not an accident: thus, fire acts by its heat, which is an accident, and so on. Now, an accident cannot be the active cause of a substantial form, since nothing acts beyond its own species; moreover, an effect cannot transcend its cause, whereas a substantial form transcends an accident. Therefore, a substantial form is not produced by the action of a lower nature, and consequently, it is the result of creation.

Obj. 14: The imperfect cannot be the cause of the perfect. Now, the soul’s strength is not in the brute animal’s seed except imperfectly. Therefore, the soul of a brute animal is not produced by the natural action of the seminal power; thus, it must be produced by creation, and likewise all other natural forms.

Obj. 15: That which is neither ensouled nor living cannot be the cause of an ensouled and living thing. Now, the animals engendered from rotting matter are living, animated things; moreover, one does not find in nature any living beings from which they receive life. Therefore, their souls must be produced through creation by the first living thing, and for like reason, so also must other natural forms.

Obj. 16: Again, nature does not produce other than its like. But we find certain natural things of which there is no previous likeness in their generator; for in species, a mule is not like either a horse or an ass. Therefore, the form of the mule is not the result of the nature’s action but of creation, and thus the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 17: Again, Augustine says, in On the True Religion, that natural things would not be informed by their forms unless there were some first thing by which they were informed. (Augustine, On True Religion 3.3, 11.21, 18.35 (PL 34:123–24, 131–32, 137); On Free Will 2.17 (PL 32:1265–66).) But this is God himself. Therefore, all forms are created by God.

Obj. 18: Again, Boethius says that forms that exist in matter come from forms that exist without matter. (Boethius, On the Trinity 2 (PL 64:1250–51).) Now, forms that exist without matter, so far as the present question is concerned, can only be the ideas of things existing in the divine mind. For the angels, who may be described as forms existing without matter, are not the causes of natural forms, according to Augustine. (Augustine, On the Trinity 3.8–9 (PL 42:875–79).) Therefore, natural forms are not produced by the action of nature but are bestowed by creation.

Obj. 19: Being is caused by creation, as is said in The Book of Causes. (The Book of Causes, Proposition 18; cf. Proposition 4.) Now, this would not be true unless forms were created, since the form is the principle of being. Therefore, forms exist by creation, and God works something in nature by creation, namely, the forms themselves.

Obj. 20: That which exists through itself is the cause of that which does not exist through itself. Now, the forms of natural things do not exist through themselves but exist in matter. Therefore, their cause is a form existing through itself and, consequently, must be created by an extrinsic agent. Hence, it would seem that God works in nature by creating forms.

On the contrary (1), the work of creation is distinct from the work of governance and propagation. Now, that which is done by the action of nature belongs to the works of governance and propagation of things. Therefore, creation is not blended with the work of nature.

Furthermore (2), God alone can create. Hence, if forms are created, they will be the work of God alone, so that all nature’s work, the purpose of which is the form, will be useless.

Furthermore (3), just as matter is not a part of the substantial form, so neither is it a part of the accidental form. Hence, if the reason why substantial forms must exist through creation is that they have no matter, the same argument will apply to accidental forms. Now, as the thing generated is perfected by the substantial form, so does a disposition come to be by an accidental form; consequently, nature would take no part in generating, neither as perfecting nor as disposing, and all natural action would be useless.

Furthermore (4), nature procreates like things from like things. Now, the thing generated is found to be like its generator in species and form. Therefore, the form itself comes to be through the action of the generator and not through creation.

Furthermore (5), the actions of diverse agents do not terminate in one effect. But from matter and form comes to be simply one thing. Therefore, there cannot be one agent to dispose the matter and another to induce the form. Now, it is the natural agent that disposes the matter; therefore, it also induces the form. Consequently, forms are not produced by creation, and creation is not blended with the works of nature.

I answer that there have been different opinions on this point, and it seems that the root of all of them was one and the same principle: nature cannot make something out of nothing.

From which, some concluded that no reality comes to be except in the sense that it is drawn out of another reality in which it was latent. The Philosopher imputes this opinion to Anaxagoras, who apparently was deceived through failing to distinguish potency from act, for he thought that whatever is generated must already have been in actual existence. But in reality, it must have preexisted potentially and not actually; (Aristotle, Physics 1.4, 187a36–37.) for if it did not preexist potentially, it would come to be out of nothing, while if it preexisted actually, it would not come to be, since what is does not become.

Since, however, the thing generated is in potency through matter and in act through its form, others have maintained that a thing comes to be as regards its form with a preexisting matter. And since nature’s activity cannot be from nothing, and therefore presupposes something, nature did not act (according to them) except on the side of the matter by disposing it to form. But the form, which must come to be and is not presupposed, must be from an agent that does not presuppose anything but can make something out of nothing; and such is the supernatural agent which Plato held to be the giver of forms. And Avicenna held this to be the lowest intelligence among separate substances. (Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing 9.4.)

But some recent followers of this opinion say that it is God. Now, this seems incongruous. Since everything has a natural tendency to produce its like (because a thing acts insofar as it is actual, namely, by making actual that which previously was potential), there would be no need of likeness according to substantial form in the natural agent unless the substantial form of the thing generated existed through the action of the agent. Also, from the fact that what should be acquired in the thing generated is found to be actually in the natural generator, and each thing acts inasmuch as it is in act, it seems incongruous to seek another generator and pass over this one.

It must be observed, then, that these opinions seem to have arisen from an ignorance of the nature of form, just as the first-mentioned opinions arose from an ignorance of the nature of matter. For “being” is not predicated univocally of the natural form and the thing generated. For a generated natural thing is said to be through itself and properly speaking, as having being and subsisting in its own being. But the form is not thus said to be, for it does not subsist nor has it being through itself; rather, it is said to be or called a being because something is by it. For example, accidents are called beings because by them a substance is such or is so much, but not as though by them it is simply speaking, as it is by its substantial form. Hence, accidents are more properly said to be of a being, rather than beings, as is clear in the Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.1–2, 1028a15–b32; 7.7, 1033a12.)

Now, that which is made is said to come to be according to the way in which it is said to be. For being is the terminus of making, whence, properly speaking, it is the composite that comes to be through itself. Nevertheless, a form, properly speaking, does not come to be but is that which it becomes—that is to say, something is said to come to be by the acquisition of that form. Accordingly, the fact that nothing is said to come be by nature out of nothing does not prevent our asserting that substantial forms exist through the action of nature. For what comes to be is not the form but the composite, which comes to be from matter and not from nothing. And it comes to be from matter insofar as matter is in potency to the composite itself through its being in potency to the form. Consequently, it is not proper to say that the form comes to be in the matter, but rather that it is led forth from the potency of matter.

And from this principle itself—that the composite and not the form comes to be—the Philosopher shows that forms result from natural agents. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.8, 1033b24–1034a7.) For, since the thing made must be like its maker, and that which is made is the composite, it follows that the maker must be composite and not a self-subsistent form, as Plato maintained; thus, just as the thing made is composite, that by which it comes to be is a form in matter brought to act. And so too the generator is composite and not a mere form; rather, the form is that whereby it generates—the form, I say, that is existing in this matter, such as this flesh, these bones, and so forth. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.8, 1034a5.)

Reply Obj. 1: In these words, Augustine ascribes creation to God in the works of nature by reason of nature’s powers, which in the beginning God implanted in matter by the work of creation, not as though something were created in each and every work of nature.

Reply Obj. 2: In these words of Augustine, “creation” is to be taken in its proper sense, yet it is not to be referred to natural effects but to the powers by which nature works, which were planted in nature by the work of creation.

Reply Obj. 3: Since grace is not a subsistent form, neither to be nor to come to be properly belongs to it through itself; consequently, properly speaking, it is not created in the same way as self-subsistent substances are created. Nevertheless, the infusion of grace approaches the account of creation insofar as grace has not a cause in its subject—neither an efficient cause nor the sort of material cause wherein it preexists potentially in such a way that it can, like other natural forms, be brought forth into act by a natural agent.

Reply Obj. 4: Hence, the reply to this objection is clear because when we say that a thing comes to be from nothing, we deny that it has a material cause. And it in some way pertains to the absence of matter that a form cannot be brought out from the natural potency of matter.

Reply Obj. 5: Although nature contains no efficient principle with regard to artificial forms, such forms do not surpass the order of nature, as grace does; in fact, they stand under that order, because everything natural is nobler than the artificial.

Reply Obj. 6: From the fact that a form has no matter as part of it, it would follow that being created would belong to it, if like a self-subsistent thing it could come to be, properly speaking.

Reply Obj. 7: Although the rational soul has matter in which it exists, it is not brought out from the potency of matter, since its nature is raised above the entire material order, as is evidenced by its intellectual activity. Moreover, this form is a self-subsistent thing that remains when the body dies.

Reply Obj. 8: The form that is the terminus of generation was in matter before generation was complete, not actually but potentially. Moreover, it is not incongruous that of two contraries one is in act and the other in potency.

Reply Obj. 9: The reply to the ninth is thus made clear, since Anaxagoras held that forms preexist in matter not actually but in a latent state. (Anaxagoras, Diels-Kranz 59B4; cf. Aristotle, Physics 1.4, 187a28–b6.)

Reply Obj. 10: The form preexists in matter imperfectly, not as though a part of it were actually there and another part not, but because it is wholly there in potency, and is afterwards led forth wholly into actuality.

Reply Obj. 11: Hence, we may gather the reply to the eleventh objection, for it is clear that existence of the form is not perfected by adding something extraneous that was not already in the matter potentially.

Reply Obj. 12: To be in potency and to be in act do not signify diverse accidental modes, from the diversity of which alteration would arise, but rather substantial modes. For even substance is divided by potency and act, like any other genus.

Reply Obj. 13: An accidental form acts in the power of the substantial form as its instrument, just as a fire’s heat, in On the Soul 2, is called the instrument of the nutritive power. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 416b17–30.) Therefore, it is not incongruous if the action of an accidental form terminate in a substantial form.

Reply Obj. 14: Again, the heat in the seed also acts as the instrument of the soul’s power, which is within the seed. And though this power is imperfect, it is a certain impression left by a perfect soul; for it is in seed from the soul of the generator, and it also acts in the power of a heavenly body to whom it belongs as an instrument, as it were. Hence, we do not say that the seed begets, but rather that the soul and the sun do. (Aristotle, Physics 2.2, 194b14.)

Reply Obj. 15: Animals engendered from putrefaction are of a less perfection than are other animals; hence, in engendering them, the strength of the heavenly body, impressed on the lower matter, has the same effect as the heavenly body does in engendering of more perfect animals with the power of seed.

Reply Obj. 16: Although a mule is unlike a horse or ass in species, it is like them in the proximate genus, by reason of which likeness its own species (an intermediate species, as it were) is engendered from different species.

Reply Obj. 17: Just as the divine power (namely, the first agent) does not exclude the action of a natural power, so neither does the first exemplary form, which is God, exclude the derivation of forms from other lower forms that effect forms like themselves.

Reply Obj. 18: Hence, we gather the reply to the eighteenth objection, for Boethius means to say that forms that are in matter derive from forms that are without matter not as from proximate causes but as from the first exemplars. (Boethius, On the Trinity 2 (PL 64:1250–51).)

Reply Obj. 19: Being is said to be the result of creation insofar as every second cause, when it gives being, does so insofar as it acts in the power of the first creating cause; for being is the first effect and presupposes nothing else.

Reply Obj. 20: A natural form that is in matter cannot be traced back to a self-subsistent form of the same species, because a natural form has matter in its own account; rather, it is traced back to a self-subsistent form, as we have stated.