Article 5 — Whether there can be anything that is not created by God

The fifth point of inquiry is whether there can be anything that is not created by God. (Parallel texts: ST I.44.1‒2; I.65.1; SCG II.15; In II Sent. 1.1.2; 37.1.2; Compendium theologiae, ch. 68; On Separated Substances, ch. 9; Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 5, lect. 1.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that this is possible. For, since the cause is more powerful than its effect, whatever is possible to our intellect (which takes its knowledge from things) would seem yet more possible to nature. Now, our intellect can understand a thing without understanding that it is from God, because its efficient cause is not part of a thing’s nature, so the thing can be understood without it. Much more, therefore, can there be something in the nature of things that is not from God.

Obj. 2: All things made by God are called his creatures. Now, creation terminates at being, for the first of created things is being, as is said in The Book of Causes. (The Book of Causes, Proposition 4.) Since, then, the quiddity of a thing is outside its being, it would seem that the quiddity of a thing is not from God.

Obj. 3: Every action terminates in an act, just as it also proceeds from an act, because every agent acts insofar as it is in act, and every agent produces its like in nature. But prime matter is pure potency. Therefore, the creative act cannot terminate in it; therefore, not all things are created by God.

On the contrary it is said: from him and by him and in him are all things (Rom 11:36).

I answer that the ancients, in their investigations of the nature of things, proceeded in accordance with the order of human knowledge. Therefore, as human knowledge reaches the intellect by beginning with the senses, the early philosophers were intent on sensible things, and thence slowly by degrees reached intelligible things. And seeing that accidental forms are sensible in themselves whereas substantial forms are not, the first philosophers said that all forms are accidents and that matter alone is substance. And because substance suffices to cause accidents that result from the principles of a substance, the first philosophers held that there is no other cause besides matter and that matter is the cause of whatever we observe in sensible realities. And consequently, they were forced to state that matter itself has no cause and to deny absolutely the existence of an efficient cause.

The later philosophers, however, began to take some notice of substantial forms, yet they did not attain to the knowledge of universals, and they were wholly intent on the observation of specific forms. And therefore they posited certain agent causes, yet not such as give being to things in their universality, but which transmute matter to this or that form; for example, these causes they called “intelligence,” “friendship,” and “strife,” the action of which they held was present in separation and collection. Therefore, according to them, not all beings came from an efficient cause, but matter was presupposed to the action of any efficient cause.

Later philosophers, such as Plato, Aristotle, and their followers, attained to the study of universal being itself; hence, they alone posited a universal cause of things, from which all others came into being, as Augustine states. (Augustine, City of God 8.4 (PL 41:227–29).)

To this view the Catholic faith also adheres. And it may be demonstrated by the three arguments that follow.

First, if in a number of things we find one thing that is common to all, this thing must be the effect of some one cause; for it is not possible that to each one, by reason of its very self, this common something belongs, since each one by itself is different from the others, and a diversity of causes produces a diversity of effects. Seeing, then, that being is found to be common to all realities, which are by themselves distinct from one another, it follows of necessity that being is attributed to them not from their very selves but from some one cause. This seems to be Plato’s argument, since he required every multitude to be preceded by a unity not only as regards number but even in the natures of things.

The second argument is that whenever something is found to be participated in by several things in diverse ways, it must be derived by those in which it is found imperfectly from that one in which it is found most perfectly. For things that are said positively according to more and less have this from an approach to something more remote or more proximate as regards something one; for if it were to belong to each of them from its very self, there would be no reason why it would be found to be more perfectly in one than in another. For example, fire, which is at the extreme of heat, is the cause of heat in all things hot. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1, 993b25.) Now, there is one being most perfect and most true, which follows from the fact that there is a mover altogether immovable and most perfect, as philosophers have proved. Consequently, all other less perfect things must receive being from it. This is the proof of the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1, 993b19–30.)

The third argument is based on the principle that whatever is through another is to be traced back to that which is through itself. Therefore, if there were one heat existing through itself, it would be the cause of all hot things that have heat by way of participation. Now, there is a being that is its own being; this follows from the fact that there must be some first being that is pure act and in which there is no composition. Hence, from that one being all other things exist, whatever are not their own being but have being by way of participation. This is the argument of Avicenna. (Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing 8.6, 9.8.)

Thus, reason demonstrates and faith holds that all things are created by God.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the first cause, which is God, does not enter into the essence of created realities, yet the being which is in created realities cannot be understood except as derived from the divine being, just as a proper effect cannot be understood save as derived from its proper cause.

Reply Obj. 2: From the very fact that being is ascribed to a quiddity, not only is the quiddity said to be but also to be created; for before it had being it was nothing, except perhaps in the intellect of the creator, where it is not a creature but the creative essence.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument proves that prime matter is not created through itself, but it does not follow that it is not created under a form; for it is thus that it has actual being.