Article 2 — Whether creation is a change

The second point of inquiry is whether creation is a change. (Parallel texts: ST I.45.1, ad 2; SCG II.17‒19; In II Sent. 1.1.2.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that it is. For change denotes the succession of one being after another, as stated in Physics 5, (Aristotle, Physics 5.1, 224a21–225a3.) and this is true of creation, for being comes to be after non-being. Therefore, creation is a change.

Obj. 2: Everything that comes to be, comes to be in some way from non-being; for what exists does not come to be. Consequently, just as generation (according to which a thing comes to be as to a part of its own substance) is to the privation of the form (which privation is non-being in a certain respect), so too is creation (whereby a thing comes to be as to its entire substance) to non-being simply speaking. But properly speaking, privation is a terminus of generation. Therefore, properly speaking, non-being simply speaking is a terminus of creation; and thus, creation, properly speaking, is a change.

Obj. 3: The greater the distance between the termini, the greater the change. For a change from white to black is greater than a change from white to pale. Now, non-being simply speaking is more distant from being than one contrary from another or than relative non-being from being. Therefore, since the transition from contrary to contrary, or from relative non-being to being, is a change, much more is creation a change, since it is the transition from non-being simply speaking into being.

Obj. 4: That which is now in a condition different from before is changed or moved. But what is created is now in a different condition than before, since formerly it was simply non-being and afterwards became a being. Therefore, that which is created is changed or moved.

Obj. 5: That which goes from potency to act changes. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 3.1, 201a10–b5.) Now, the creature goes from potency to act; for before creation it was only in the potency of the maker, whereas afterward it actually exists. Hence, that which is created moves or changes, and consequently, creation is a change.

On the contrary, according to the Philosopher in the Categories, there are six species of movement or change. (Aristotle, Categories 14, 15a14–b17.) But none of them is creation, as one may see by taking them one by one. Therefore, creation is not a change.

I answer that in every change there needs to be something common to both termini of the change. For if the opposite termini of a change had nothing in common, one could not name a “transition” from the one to the other. For in “change” and “transition” is designated the same thing now being otherwise than before. Moreover, the very termini of a change are not incompatible (which is required for their being termini of a change) except insofar as they refer to one and the same thing. For two contraries, if referred to different subjects, can exist simultaneously.

Accordingly, there is sometimes one actually existent common subject of both termini of a change, and then we have movement properly speaking, as occurs in alteration, increase and decrease, and local movement. For in all such movements, the one subject, while actually remaining the same, changes from one opposite to another.

But sometimes the same subject common to each terminus is not a being in act but only a being in potency, as happens in generation and corruption simply speaking. For the subject of the substantial form and of its privation is prime matter, which is not an actual being. Therefore, neither generation nor corruption are “movements,” properly so called, but certain changes.

And sometimes, there is no common subject existing either in act or in potency; rather, there is the one continuous time in the first part of which there is the one opposite and in the second part the other; as when we say that this thing comes to be from that—that is, after that, as when we say, “from the morning comes noon.” But this is a change not properly but according to a likeness, insofar as we imagine time itself as though it were the subject of those things that take place in time.

Now, in creation, there is not something common in any of the ways mentioned, for there is no common subject existing either actually or potentially. The time, also, is not the same, if we are speaking of the creation of the universe, since there was no time before the world. Yet we may find a common but purely imaginary subject, insofar as we imagine one common time when there was no world and afterwards when the world had been brought into being. For just as outside the universe there is no real magnitude, and yet we can picture one, so too before the beginning of the world there was no time, and yet it is possible to imagine one. Accordingly, properly speaking, creation does not hold the account of a change according to truth, but only one according to a certain imagination, and not properly but as a likeness.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated in the body of the article, the word “change” denotes the existence of one thing after another in reference to some same thing. But this is not the case in creation.

Reply Obj. 2: In generation, whereby a thing comes to be in respect of part of its substance, there is some common subject of privation and form that is not actually existent. Therefore, just as in generation we find a terminus, properly speaking, so also do we find transition, properly speaking; but it is not so with creation.

Reply Obj. 3: It is true that the greater the distance of the termini, the greater the change, provided that the subject is identical.

Reply Obj. 4: That which is otherwise now than it was before changes, provided the subject remains; otherwise, non-being simply speaking would change, for non-being simply is neither the way it was before nor is it otherwise than it was before. But in order that there be a change, one thing must be otherwise than it was before.

Reply Obj. 5: A passive potency is the subject of change, not an active potency. Hence, that which goes from passive potency to act changes, but that which goes from active power to act does not, and so the objection proves nothing.