Article 6 — Whether there is but one principle of creation

The sixth point of inquiry is whether there is but one principle of creation. (Parallel texts: ST I.44.2; I.65.1; I.49.3; SCG II.41; III.15; In II Sent. 1.1.1, ad 1; 34.1, ad 4.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that there is not. For Dionysius says: the cause of evil is not a good. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 4.19 (PG 3:715–18).) Now, there is some evil in the world. Either, then, it is produced by a cause that is not a good, or it is not caused at all but rather is a first cause. And in either case, we must posit more than one principle of creation, since it is clear that the first cause of good things must be a good.

Obj. 2: But someone may say that a good is not the cause of evil through itself but accidentally.

On the contrary, every effect that belongs to a cause accidentally belongs to some other cause through itself, since everything accidental can be traced to something that is through itself. Hence, if evil be the effect of good accidentally, it will be through itself the effect of something else, so that the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 3: An effect that is produced accidentally happens outside the intention of the cause and does not come to be. If, then, a good be the cause of evil accidentally, it would follow that evil is not something made. Now, nothing is uncreated save a principle of creation, as we have shown above. (See q. 3, a. 5.) Therefore, evil is a principle of creation.

Obj. 4: No harm occurs in the effect outside the intention of the agent except either by reason of ignorance on the part of an agent who lacks foresight or by reason of a lack of power that one cannot avoid. But in God, who is the Creator of all good, there is neither a lack of power nor ignorance. Therefore, evil, which is harmful, cannot occur in God’s effects outside his intention. For Augustine says that a thing is called evil because it is harmful. (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity 1.11 (PL 40:236).)

Obj. 5: That which occurs accidentally happens in the minority of cases, as is said in Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics 2.5, 196b18–29; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.30, 1025a13–21; 6.2, 1026b32.) But evil occurs in the majority of cases, as is said in Topics 2. (Aristotle, Topics 2.6, 112a1–26, 112b12.) Therefore, evil is not due to an accidental cause.

Obj. 6: According to Augustine, evil has not an efficient cause but a deficient one. (Augustine, City of God 12.7 (PL 41:555).) But an accidental cause is an efficient cause. Therefore, a good is not the accidental cause of evil.

Obj. 7: That which is not has no cause, since what is not is neither cause nor caused. But evil, according to Augustine, is a nothing. (Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John 1.13 (PL 35:1385–86).) Consequently, evil has no cause, neither through itself nor accidentally. Therefore, it is false to say that a good is the accidental cause of evil.

Obj. 8: According to the Philosopher, that in which a thing is present with priority is the cause of whatever contains that thing with posteriority; (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1, 993b24.) for example, fire is the cause of the heat in whatever is hot. Now, malice was in the devil with priority. Therefore, he is the cause of malice in all the wicked, and consequently, there is one principle of all the wicked as there is also of all the good.

Obj. 9: According to Dionysius, good occurs in one way but evil in many ways. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 4.31 (PG 3:731–32).) Consequently, evil is nearer to being than good is. Therefore, if good is a nature needing some creator, evil also will need a creator, and so the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 10: That which is not can be neither genus nor species. Now, evil is taken to be a genus. For it is stated in the Categories that good and evil are not in a genus but are themselves the genera of other things. (Aristotle, Categories 11, 14a24–25.) Evil, therefore, is a being and consequently needs a creator. Therefore, since it is not created by a good, we must apparently admit that there is an evil principle of creation.

Obj. 11: Each contrary is a positive nature, since contraries are in the same genus. (Aristotle, Categories 11, 14a20; On Generation and Corruption 1.7, 324a1–4.) Now, what is not cannot be in a genus. But good and evil are contrary to each other. Therefore, evil is a nature; and we come to the same conclusion.

Obj. 12: The difference that makes a species signifies a nature; therefore, in one way nature is whatever informs with a specific difference, according to Boethius. (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures 1 (PL 64:1341–42).) Now, evil is a difference constituting some species, for good and evil are differences of habits. Therefore, evil is a nature, and the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 13: Good is set against evil, and life against death: so also is the sinner against a just man (Sir 33:15). If, therefore, the good is one principle of creation, there must be set against it an evil principle.

Obj. 14: Intensification and remission are said in reference to some terminus. Now, one thing is found to be worse than another. Hence, one must find something worst, in which is the terminus of evils; and this must be the principle of all evil things, just as the supreme good is the principle of all good things.

Obj. 15: A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit (Matt 7:18). Now, evil is found to exist in the world. Therefore, it cannot be a fruit—that is, an effect—of a good cause, which is signified by the good tree. Consequently, some first evil must be the cause of all evils.

Obj. 16: We are told that when things were first created, darkness was on the face of the earth (Gen 1:2). But from the good, which has the nature of light, cannot come the creation of darkness. Consequently, the creation described there is not from a good principle but from an evil principle.

Obj. 17: Everything that comes from something bears witness to that from which it comes, as being like it. But evil bears witness to God in no way, nor is it in any way like him. Therefore, it cannot come from him but must be from another principle.

Obj. 18: Nothing comes from something unless it is in that thing potentially. But evil is not in God either actually or potentially. Therefore, it is not from God, and the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 19: Just as generation is a natural movement, so also is corruption. Now, the terminus of corruption is a privation, just as the terminus of generation is a form. Hence, just as the intention of nature is the induction of the form, so also does nature intend privation. Consequently, evil, being a privation, must have some cause acting through itself just as form does.

Obj. 20: Every agent acts on the presupposition of the first agent. Now, a free decision, in sinning, does not act on the presupposition of the divine action; for there are some sins—like fornication and adultery, which are inseparable from their deformity—which cannot come from God. Therefore, the free decision must either be a first agent or be reducible to a first agent other than God.

Obj. 21: It will be said perhaps that the substance, and not the deformity of the act, comes from God.

On the contrary, the Commentator says: it is impossible for the matter to result from the action of one agent while the form results from the action of another. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 7, comm. 28; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.8, 1033a24–1034a8.) Now, the deformity is, as it were, the form of the sinful act. Therefore, the deformity of a sin cannot be from one cause and its substance from another.

Obj. 22: Only a simple effect can proceed from one simple cause. Now, God is utterly simple. Therefore, such composite things are not from him, but from some other source.

Obj. 23: The stain of sin is something in the soul, for if it were nothing besides the privation of grace, a man, by committing one mortal sin, would have the stain of all sins. Now, the stain of sin is not from God, for God is not the author of that which he punishes, as Fulgentius says: since it is not from eternity, it must have a cause. (Fabius Claudius Gordianus Fulgentius (ca. 465–533 AD), bishop of Ruspe, Ad Monimus 1.17–30, 2.1 (PL 65:165–78, 179).) Therefore, it must be traced back to some cause other than God.

Obj. 24: It is written: I have learned that all the works which God has made continue into eternity (Sir 3:14). Now, corruptible things do not continue into eternity. Therefore, they are not the work of God, and they must be traced back to another principle.

Obj. 25: Every agent produces its like. But corruptible bodies of this sort are not like God, for God is a spirit (John 4:24). Therefore, such corruptible bodies are not from God, and the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 26: Nature always does what is better, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.5, 286b10–287a10.) and this is due to the goodness of nature. But the goodness of God is more perfect than that of nature. Consequently, God makes things as good as he can. Now, spiritual things are better than corporeal things. Therefore, God does not make corporeal things, since had God made them, he would have given them spiritual goodness. It follows, then, that we must admit several principles of creation.

On the contrary (1), it is written: I am the Lord, and there is none else. I form the light and create darkness, I make peace and create evil; I the Lord do all these things (Isa 45:6).

Furthermore (2), evil has no other root but the nature of good, as Dionysius shows. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 4.18–35 (PG 3:713–36).) But this would not be true if evil had a principle of creation contrary to him who creates good things; otherwise the principle of evil things would be more powerful than that of good things, since it would produce its own effect even in good things. Therefore, evil is not from a creative principle other than that of good.

Furthermore (3), the Philosopher proves that there is one first mover. (Aristotle, Physics 8.6, 258b10–259a21.) But this would not be true if there were diverse first creative principles; for one principle would not govern or move the creatures of the other contrary principle. Therefore, there is but one principle of creation.

I answer that, as we have already stated, the ancient philosophers, contemplating only the specific principles of nature, due to their consideration of matter, fell into the error of believing that natural things are not created. Hence, from their consideration of contraries, which they thought were the principles in nature, alongside matter, they came to conceive of two first principles of things. And this was owing to three faults in their consideration of contraries.

The first was that they considered contraries only insofar as they are diverse from the nature of their species, not insofar as there is something one in them due to the nature of their genus, although the contraries are within the same genus. (Aristotle, Categories 11, 14a20.) Consequently, they ascribed to them a cause not in respect of what they have in common but in respect of that wherein they differ. Hence, they traced back all contraries to two first contraries as to two first principles, as is said in Physics 1. (Aristotle, Physics 1.4, 187a12–b27.) Among them, Empedocles made the first contraries to be also the first agent causes, namely, friendship and strife; and he, as is said in Metaphysics 1, was the first to hold that good and evil were principles. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.4, 985a4–9.)

The second fault was that they judged both contraries equally; but because one contrary must always imply privation of the other contrary, it follows that one is perfect while the other is imperfect and that one is better and the other worse, as is said in Physics 1. (Aristotle, Physics 1.2, 185b16–186a3; 1.5, 188b30–189a10.) In consequence, they held that both good and bad, which seemed to be the most generic contraries, are certain distinct natures. For this reason, Pythagoras posited two genera of realities, that is, the good and the bad; in the genus of the good he placed all perfect things, such as light, the male, rest, and the like, while in the genus of the bad, he placed the imperfect, such as darkness, the female, and the like.

The third fault was that they judged things only insofar as they are considered in themselves or according to the order of one reality to another particular reality, but not in their comparison to the entire order of the universe. Hence, when they found one thing harmful to another, or imperfect in itself in comparison with other perfect things, they judged it to be simply bad according to its own nature and did not trace its origin from the cause of a good. On account of this, Pythagoras placed women, as being imperfect, in the genus of bad things.

And from this root arose the fact that the Manichees (That is, the followers of Mani, who founded the religious sect of Manichaeism. The sect’s basis was the doctrine of two principles or dualism.) asserted that corruptible things with respect to incorruptible, visible things with respect to invisible, and the Old Testament with respect to the New Testament, are all imperfect, so they are not from the good God, but from a contrary principle. And this was chiefly because they saw that certain good creatures (man, for instance) suffer harm from certain visible and corruptible creatures.

Now, this error is utterly impossible; rather, all things must be traced to one first principle, which is good. For the present, this may be shown by three arguments.

The first argument is that whenever different things have one thing in common, they must be traced back to one cause in respect of that common thing: for either one is the cause of the other, or they both proceed from a common cause. For it cannot be that this one common thing would belong to each thing according to that which is proper to each of them, as we proved before. (See q. 3, a. 5.) Now, all contraries and things differing from one another that exist in the world are found to have something in common, whether in the nature of their species, or in the nature of their genus, or at least the common account of existing. Consequently, they must all have one principle, which is the cause of existing in all of them. Now, being as such is good; this is evident because everything desires to be, and the account of the good consists in that which is desirable. Hence, above all various causes, we must place one first cause, just as above these contrary agents in nature the natural philosophers placed one first agent (namely, the heaven) as the cause of all the diverse motions in these lower things. Since, however, even in the heaven itself there is a diversity of position, to which diversity as to a cause is traced the contrariety of lower bodies, it is necessary to trace it back further to a first mover that does not move either through itself or accidentally.

The second argument is that every agent acts insofar as it is in act, and consequently, insofar as it is in some way perfect. Now, insofar as a thing is bad, it is not in act, since a thing is said to be bad from the fact that the potency is deprived of its proper and due act. But insofar as a thing is in act, it is good, because in this respect it has perfection and entity, in which consists the account of the good. Therefore, nothing acts insofar as it is bad, but each agent acts insofar as it is good. Consequently, it is impossible that there be an active principle of things other than a good. And since every agent produces its like, nothing even comes to be except inasmuch as it is in act, and for this reason, insofar as it is good. On both sides, therefore, the position which holds evil to be the creative principle of bad things is shown to be impossible. This argument agrees with the words of Dionysius, who states that evil acts not save by virtue of a good, and that evil is outside intention and generation. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 4.18–35 (PG 3:713–36).)

The third argument is that if diverse beings were to be exclusively from contrary principles without these being traced to one principle, they could not possibly come together into one order except accidentally. For a coordination of many things cannot result but from one coordinator, unless perhaps many things were to come together in the same thing by chance. Now, we observe corruptible and incorruptible things, spiritual and corporeal, perfect and imperfect coming together into one order. For the spiritual move the corporeal, which is evident at least in man. Again, things corruptible are disposed by incorruptible bodies, as may be observed in the alterations of elements by heavenly bodies. Nor may it be said that such occurrences come about by chance, for then it would not happen always or for the most part but only in the minority of cases. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.2, 1026b32.) Consequently, all these various things must be traced back to some one first principle by which they are ordered as one. And for this reason, the Philosopher concludes that there is one ruler over all. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.10, 1076a4.)

Reply Obj. 1: As we have shown above, evil is not a being but a lack of being, and consequently, cannot be made through itself, essentially speaking. In this sense, Dionysius says that good is not the cause of evil, and not as though evil were to be traced back to a first cause.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument is true of an effect that can have a cause through itself. Such is not evil, which therefore cannot properly be described as an effect.

Reply Obj. 3: Evil is incidental to effects, but it is not made, essentially speaking; this is clear from the fact that it is not intended. And yet, it does not follow that it is a first principle, unless it be added that evil is a nature. For just as evil, since it is not a being but a privation of being, lacks the proper account of an effect, so much more indeed does it lack the account of a cause, as we have shown.

Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine, God is so good that he would never allow an evil to exist unless he were so powerful as to be able to draw good from each and every evil. (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity 1.96 (PL 40:276).) Hence, it is due to neither lack of power nor ignorance on God’s part that evils occur in the world; rather, it is owing to the order of his own wisdom and to the greatness of his goodness, whence come the many and diverse grades of goodness in things, many of which would be lacking were he to allow no evil to exist. For there would be no good of patience without the occurrence of the evil of persecution, nor the good of the preservation of life in a lion, without the evil of the destruction of the animals on which it lives.

Reply Obj. 5: Evil occurs only in the minority of cases if we compare effects with their proper causes. This is clear in natural things, because there is no fault or evil in the action of nature, except when the active cause is affected by some impediment, and this is only in the minority of cases, as when there are monstrosities in nature, and other such things. On the other hand, in voluntary matters, evil would seem to be more frequent in deeds, insofar as art fails only for the less part, because it imitates nature. (Aristotle, Meteorology 4.3, 381b6; On the Universe 1.5, 396b11.) But in actions, which are affected by vice and virtue, there are two moving appetites, namely, the rational and the sensual, and that which is good in relation to the one appetite is evil in relation to the other. Thus, the pursuit of pleasure is good with reference to the sensual appetite, which is called “sensuality,” but it is evil with reference to the appetite of reason. And, since the majority follow their senses rather than their reason, bad men are consequently found to be more numerous than good. On the other hand, he who follows reason’s appetite for the most part behaves well and not badly except in a few things.

Reply Obj. 6: There are two kinds of accidental cause. One does something towards the effect, but it is called an “accidental cause” because the effect follows from the cause outside its intention; such is the man who finds a treasure while digging a grave. The other accidental cause does nothing towards the effect, but it is called an “accidental cause” because it is accidental to the agent cause, just as the white may be said to be an accidental cause of the house because it is an accident of the builder.

Likewise, there are two kinds of accidental effect. One could be the terminus of the cause’s action but occurs outside the cause’s intention (as, for instance, the finding of the treasure). Such an effect, though accidental with regard to that cause, can be the essential effect of another cause. In this sense, evil has no accidental cause, because (as already stated) it cannot be the terminus of an action. The other kind of accidental effect is one that is not the terminus of an agent’s action, but it is called an “accidental effect” because it is accidental to the effect, just as the white that is accidental to a house may be said to be an accidental effect of the builder. In this sense, nothing prevents evil from having an accidental cause.

Reply Obj. 7: Evil, though it is not a certain nature, is not a pure negation but a privation; and this, according to the Philosopher, is a negation inhering in a subject, for a privation is a negation in a subject; whence inasmuch as it is accidental to something, it can have an accidental cause, in the sense already explained. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.2, 1004a12–16.)

Reply Obj. 8: Evil was in the devil with a priority in time relative to others but not with a priority in nature, as though wickedness were his essence or an accident deriving from the principles proper to his nature. Nor does it matter that he is worse than others, since this is not on account of any connaturality of wickedness to him but is accidental, through his having sinned more fully. But a thing is said to be a principle in relation to other things with regard to that which is said of it essentially and not accidentally.

Reply Obj. 9: It is owing to its perfection that good happens in but one way, because a thing cannot be perfect unless all those conditions come together from which its perfection is, as it were, integrated. If any of these be lacking, the thing is imperfect and therefore evil; and consequently, the imperfection of evil is the reason why evil is so manifold. And thus, evil has less of the account of a being than good does.

Reply Obj. 10: The statement of the Philosopher refers to the opinion of Pythagoras, who maintained that good and evil are genera, as we have said above. This opinion, however, has some truth in it. For, as we have observed, good indicates something positive, but evil indicates a privation; just as every form holds the account of the good, so does every privation hold the account of an evil. And in this way good and evil are in a certain way convertible with being and the privation of being. Now, it is shown in Metaphysics 10 (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.4, 1055a4–38.) that in all contraries, there is an implication of privation and possession, such that the contrary that is the more perfect always is reducible to a good, while the other that is less perfect is reducible to an evil. Hence, the Philosopher says that one of two contraries pertains to an evil action, (Aristotle, Physics 1.9, 192a18.) and in this sense, good and evil may be described as contrary genera.

Reply Obj. 11: Evil, which is contrary to a good, indicates not only a privation but a certain possession with that privation; this possession does not hold the account of evil insofar as it has something of being, but insofar as it has the privation of a due perfection joined to it.

Reply Obj. 12: Evil, inasmuch as it is merely a privation, does not differentiate the vicious habit except with the addition of the intention of an undue end, which intention does not include the account of evil except insofar as the end in question is inconsistent with a due end. Thus, the end of carnal pleasure is inconsistent with the good of reason. The reason why good and evil are assigned as specifying the habits of the soul is that moral acts, and consequently habits, are specified by the end, which is, as it were, the form of the will, which is the proper principle of evil deeds. And good and evil denote relation to the end.

Reply Obj. 13: The meaning is not that good is set against evil as one first principle against another first principle, but that they both derive from one first principle, the one essentially, the other accidentally. This is clear from what follows: and so look upon all the works of the Most High, etc.

Reply Obj. 14: Evil is not intensified by approach to a terminus, but by recession from a terminus; for as a thing is said to be good by participating in the good, so is it said to be evil by withdrawing from the good.

Reply Obj. 15: By the good tree our Lord means a cause of good—not the first cause, but a proximate cause in relation to some singular effect. The same applies to the evil tree. Hence, by the evil tree, he indicates heretics, who are known from their works as a tree from its fruit. This is clear if we consider the comparison, for the first cause of the fruit is not the tree but the root. If, however, we take the tree to signify universally any cause, as Dionysius apparently does, then we reply, as in the answer to the first objection, that good is not the essential cause of evil.

Reply Obj. 16: The darkness mentioned as existing at the beginning of the creation was not a creature but simply the absence of light in the atmosphere. It was not, however, an evil, since the absence of good is an evil only when that good can and ought to be present. For it is not an evil in a stone that it cannot sense, nor is it an evil in a newborn child that it cannot walk. Nor was it owing to imperfection in the agent that the air was created without light, but owing to his wisdom, the order of which requires that something is brought from imperfection to perfection.

Reply Obj. 17: This argument follows only if evil has a cause through itself, and above we have shown this to be false.

Reply Obj. 18: The eighteenth objection is met with the same reply.

Reply Obj. 19: Nature stands in relation to generation otherwise than to corruption. For the form that is the terminus of generation is through itself intended by nature both universal and particular, whereas the privation of a form is outside the intention of a particular nature, although it is according to the intention of universal nature—not indeed as intended through itself, but because without the privation of a certain form another form cannot be introduced. Hence, generation is natural in every way, whereas corruption is sometimes against nature, if we refer it to a particular nature.

Reply Obj. 20: Whatever there is of entity or action in a sinful act is traced back to God as first cause, while what there is of deformity is traced back to the free decision as to its cause. For example, when a man limps, his walking is traced back to the motive power as to its first cause, but that he walks awry is due to a bend in his leg.

Reply Obj. 21: This argument applies to two agents entirely unrelated, but not when one of them operates in the other, for then one effect can proceed from both. Now, God operates in every nature and in every will; hence, the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 22: This argument refers to an agent that acts of natural necessity, and one such agent produces one effect. Nor does it follow that an effect must be simple because its cause is simple, because an effect need not equal its cause either in universality or in simplicity. But God does not act through a natural necessity but through his own will; therefore, he is able to make both simple things and composite things, things mutable and things immutable.

Reply Obj. 23: The stain of sin does not impose a nature on the soul but only the privation of grace, which privation is referred to the preceding sinful act that caused or was able to cause it. Consequently, it does not follow that one who has not committed the act of a particular sin has the stain of that sin.

Reply Obj. 24: God’s works continue forever not in number, but in species or genus; and in their substance, but not in their mode of being, for the fashion of this world passes away (1 Cor 7:31).

Reply Obj. 25: Although God is a spirit, his wisdom contains the accounts of bodies, to which the bodies are assimilated in the same way as works of art are like the artist in respect of his art. However, bodies are like God in respect of his nature insofar as they exist and are good and have a certain unity.

Reply Obj. 26: Nature always does what is better not with regard to the part, but with regard to the whole; otherwise, it would make a man’s body all eye or all heart, for this would be better for each part but not for the whole. In like manner, although it would be better for this or that thing to be placed in a higher order, it would not be better for the universe, which would remain imperfect if all creatures were of one order.