Article 15 — Whether things proceeded from God of natural necessity or by a decree of his will

The fifteenth point of inquiry is whether things proceeded from God of natural necessity or by a decree of his will. (Parallel texts: ST I.19.4; SCG II.23; In I Sent. 43.2.1; 45.3. See above: q. 1, a. 5.)

Obj. 1: And it would seem that they proceeded of natural necessity. For Dionysius says: as our sun neither by reason nor by pre-election but by its very being enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours the rays of its goodness upon all things according to proportion. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 4.1, 4.4 (PG 3:693–700).) Seeing, then, that the sun enlightens without reason or choice, it does so of natural necessity. Therefore, God also produces creatures by communicating his goodness to them of natural necessity.

Obj. 2: Every perfection of a lower nature derives from the perfection of the divine nature. Now, it belongs to the perfection of a lower nature by its own power to produce its like in some effect. Much more powerfully so, therefore, does God naturally and not voluntarily communicate the likeness of his own goodness to creatures.

Obj. 3: Every agent produces its like; therefore, the effect proceeds from its active cause insofar as it bears a likeness thereto. Now, the creature bears a likeness to God as regards those things which pertain to God’s nature—namely, being, goodness, unity, and so forth—and not merely as regards things in the will or intellect, as the product of an art bears a likeness to the artisan as regards the form of the art and not as regards the artisan’s nature, for which reason the artisan produces it voluntarily and not naturally. Therefore, things proceed from God through the power of his nature and not by his will.

Obj. 4: It may be replied that the divine will communicates the likeness of the natural attributes.

On the contrary, a likeness of nature cannot be communicated otherwise than through the power of the nature. Now, the power of a nature is nowhere subject to the will; therefore, even in God, the Son’s generation from the Father, which is natural, does not occur through the command of the will, and neither in human beings are the vegetative powers of the soul, which are called natural, subject to the will. Therefore, it is not possible for a likeness of the natural attributes to be communicated to creatures by the divine will.

Obj. 5: Augustine says, in On Christian Doctrine, that we exist because God is good, so that seemingly God’s goodness is the cause of the production of creatures. (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 1.32 (PL 34:32).) But goodness is natural to God. Therefore, the emanation of things from God is natural.

Obj. 6: In God, nature and will are the same, and consequently, if he produces things willingly, it would seem that he produces them naturally.

Obj. 7: Natural necessity results from the fact that nature invariably acts in the same way, unless an impediment arise. Now, God is more unchangeable than the lower nature. Therefore, God produces his effects more of necessity than does the lower nature.

Obj. 8: God’s activity is his essence, and his essence is natural to him. Therefore, whatever he does he does naturally.

Obj. 9: Again, according to the Philosopher, the end is what is willed, the means are what we choose. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.2, 1111b26.) But God has no end, since he is infinite. Therefore, he acts not willingly but rather of natural necessity.

Obj. 10: God acts inasmuch as he is good, according to Augustine. (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 1.32 (PL 34:32).) Now, he is the necessary good. Therefore, he acts of necessity.

Obj. 11: Whatsoever exists is either contingent or necessary. Now, a thing is necessary in three ways: by coercion, by supposition, and absolutely. Moreover, it cannot be said that in God anything is potential or contingent, since this argues mutability, as is clear from the Philosopher, because what is capable of being is capable of not being. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 11.5, 1062a20.) Likewise, nothing in God is necessary by coercion, because in him nothing is violent or contrary to nature, as is said in Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.5, 1015a26–b5.) Nor is there anything necessary by supposition, because this depends on certain things being presupposed, and God is not dependent on anything. It remains, then, that all in God is absolutely necessary, and it would seem consequently that he produced things necessarily.

Obj. 12: It is written that God remains faithful, and he cannot deny himself (2 Tim 2:13). Now, seeing that he is his own goodness, he would deny himself were he to deny his own goodness. But he would deny his own goodness were he not to pour it out by communicating it to others, for this is proper to goodness. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 4.1 (PG 3:693–96).) Consequently, God cannot but produce creatures by communicating his own goodness to them; and therefore, he produces them of necessity, because that which cannot but be is convertible with that which is necessary, as is clear in On Interpretation 2. (Aristotle, On Interpretation 1.13, 22a21.)

Obj. 13: According to Augustine, the Father in begetting the Son speaks himself by his own Word. (Augustine, On the Trinity 15.14 (PL 42:1076–77).) Now, Anselm says that by the same Word the Father expresses himself and the creature. (Anselm of Canterbury, Monologion 33 (PL 158:187).) Seeing, then, that the Father begot the Son naturally and not by the command of his will, it seems that so also did he produce creatures; for in God to speak and to make do not differ, according to the words of Scripture: he spoke and they were made (Ps 32:9).

Obj. 14: Every voluntary agent wills of necessity his own ultimate end; thus, man of necessity wills to be happy. Now, the ultimate end of the divine will is the communication of his goodness, since to this end did he make creatures: that he might communicate his goodness to them. Therefore, God wills this of necessity, and thus, of necessity does he produce them.

Obj. 15: Just as God is good through himself, so is he necessary through himself. Now, because God is good through himself, there is nothing in God but the good. Therefore, in like manner there is nothing in him but the necessary; and consequently, he produces things necessarily.

Obj. 16: God’s will is determined to one thing, namely, the good. Now, nature works necessarily through its being determined to one thing. Therefore, God’s will produces creatures necessarily.

Obj. 17: The Father by virtue of his nature is the principle of the Son and the Holy Spirit, as Hilary says. (Hilary of Poitiers, On Synods 12.33 (PL 10:505–7).) Now, the same nature that is in the Father and the Son is also in the Holy Spirit. Therefore, likewise the Holy Spirit himself is a principle naturally. But he is not a principle except of creatures. Therefore, creatures proceed from God naturally.

Obj. 18: An effect proceeds from an acting cause; therefore, an agent is not related to its effect except as related to its action or operation. Now, the relation of God’s action or operation to himself is natural, since God’s action is his own essence. Therefore, the relation of God to his effect is also natural, so that he produces it naturally.

Obj. 19: Only what is good and well done comes to be from what is good through itself. Therefore, also only what is necessary and done necessarily comes to be from what is necessary through itself. Now, such is God. Therefore, all things proceed from him of necessity.

Obj. 20: Since what exists through itself is prior to that which exists through another, it follows that the first agent acts by his own essence. Now, his essence and his nature are the same thing. Therefore, he acts by his nature; and thus, creatures proceed from him naturally.

On the contrary (1), Hilary says: the will of God gave all creatures their substance; and in the same place, such are creatures as God willed them to be. (Hilary of Poitiers, On Synods 24.58 (PL 10:520).) Therefore, God produced creatures by his will and not by natural necessity.

Furthermore (2), Augustine, in The Confessions 12, addressing God says: Lord, you did make two things, one near to yourself, namely, the angel, the other near to nothing, namely, matter. Yet, neither is of your nature, since neither is what you are. (Augustine, Confessions 12.7 (PL 32:828–29).) Now, the Son proceeds from the Father naturally, inasmuch as he has the same nature as the Father, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Trinity 15.14 (PL 42:1076–77).) Therefore, the creature does not proceed naturally from God.

I answer that without any doubt, we must hold that God, by the free decision of his own will and by no natural necessity, brought creatures into being. This may, for the present, be made clear by four arguments.

The first argument is that the universe must have an end, for otherwise all things in the universe would happen by chance; unless perhaps one were to say that the first creatures were not for the sake of an end but acted by natural necessity, and that subsequent creatures are for the sake of an end. This was the opinion of Democritus, (Democritus was born in Abdera, Thrace, around 460 BC; he is known for his atomism.) who maintained that the heavenly bodies were produced by chance but lower bodies by determinate causes; this is refuted in Physics 2 because things that are nobler cannot be less ordered than those of lower dignity. (Aristotle, Physics 2.4, 196a25–b4.) We must, therefore, hold that in producing creatures God intended some end.

Now, both will and nature are found to act for an end, but not in the same way. For nature knows neither the end nor the account of an end, nor even the orientation of what is for the end to the end, it cannot propose the end to itself, nor can it move or order or direct itself to the end; on the other hand, this is within the competency of a voluntary agent, to whom belongs the understanding of the end and all those other things. Therefore, the voluntary agent acts for the sake of the end in such wise that he proposes the end to himself, and to a certain extent moves himself towards the end by ordering his actions thereto. But nature tends to its end as a thing that is moved and directed by an intelligent and voluntary agent, as is clear with an arrow, which tends towards a certain mark on account of the direction of the archer; and in this sense, philosophers say that the work of nature is the work of intelligence. (Aristotle, Generation of Animals 1.23, 731a24.) Now, that which is through another is always preceded by that which is through itself. Consequently, the first director to an end must do this through his will; and thus, God brought creatures into being by his will and not naturally. Nor may it be objected that the Son was naturally begotten by the Father and yet his birth preceded creation; for the Son proceeds not as one ordered to an end but as the end of all things.

The second argument is that nature is determined to one thing; and since every agent produces its like, it follows that nature must tend to produce a likeness that is determinately in one thing. Now, seeing that equality is caused by unity, whereas inequality is caused by multitude, which is manifold (therefore, equality exists between things in only one way, but inequality in many various degrees), nature always produces its equal, unless it be hindered by a defect in the active power or in the recipient or patient. But God is not hindered by a defect in a passive power (since he does not require matter) nor is his own power deficient (but rather, it is infinite). Therefore, this alone proceeds from him naturally that is equal to him: namely, the Son. On the other hand, creatures, being unequal, proceed not naturally but voluntarily, for there are many degrees of inequality. Nor may it be said that the divine power is determined to only one thing, for it is infinite. Therefore, since the power of God extends to the production of various degrees of inequality among creatures, it was by the decree of his will, and not of natural necessity, that he fashioned this creature in this determinate degree.

The third argument is that since every agent in some way produces its like, the effect must in some way preexist in its cause. Now, whatsoever is contained in another is therein according to the mode of what it is in; therefore, as God himself is an intellect, it follows that creatures preexist in him intelligibly, in which sense it is written: that which was made was life in him (John 1:3). But that which is in an intellect does not proceed therefrom except by the mediation of the will; for the will is the executor of the intellect, and the intelligible moves the will. Consequently, created things must have proceeded from God by his will.

The fourth argument is that according to the Philosopher, action is twofold: one that remains in the agent itself, and is the perfection and act of that agent (such as to understand, to will, and the like); the other issues from the agent into an extrinsic patient, and it is the perfection and act of the patient (such as to heat, to move, and the like). (Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.8, 1050a30–b1.) Now, God’s action cannot be understood as belonging to this latter kind of action, because his action is his very essence, and consequently, does not go outside of him. Hence, it must be understood as belonging to the former kind of action, which is only to be found in one possessed of intelligence and will, or even of sensation—which latter again does not apply to God, because the action of sensation, though it does not issue into an external object, is caused by the action of an external object. Therefore, whatsoever God does outside himself, he does as understanding and willing it. Nor is this argument prejudicial to the naturalness of the Son’s begetting, the terminus of which was not something outside the divine essence. We must, therefore, hold that all creatures proceeded from God by his will and not of natural necessity.

Reply Obj. 1: The comparison of Dionysius must be understood to refer to the universality of diffusion; for the sun sheds its rays on all bodies without differentiating one from another, and it is similar with God’s goodness. But this is not understood in reference to the absence of will.

Reply Obj. 2: It is owing to the perfection of the divine nature that by the power of the divine nature its likeness is communicated to creatures, yet this communication was made not of natural necessity but voluntarily.

Reply Obj. 3: This suffices for the reply to the third objection.

Reply Obj. 4: Nature is not subject to will from within, but in externals nothing prevents nature from being subject to the will. Thus, in the local movements of animals nature in their muscles and sinews is subject to the command of their appetite. Consequently, it is not unreasonable if by virtue of the divine nature creatures be brought into existence according to the decision of the divine will.

Reply Obj. 5: The good is the proper object of the will, hence the goodness of God as willed and loved by him is the cause of a creature by the mediation of his will.

Reply Obj. 6: Although will and nature are the same thing in reality in God, they still differ in account insofar as they express respect to creatures in different ways; for nature indicates a respect to some one thing determinately, whereas will does not.

Reply Obj. 7: It is owing not merely to the unchangeableness of nature that it produces a particular effect of necessity, but to its being determined to one thing; this does not apply to the divine will, although it is supremely unchangeable.

Reply Obj. 8: Although God’s activity belongs to him naturally, seeing that it is his very nature or essence, the created effect follows the activity, which, in our way of understanding, is considered as the principle of his will, just as even the effect of heating follows according to the mode of the heat.

Reply Obj. 9: Although God is infinite, he is the end of all things. For he is not infinite in a deprived way, as being finite is a passion of quantity, which is naturally apt to have an end; for in this he is neither an end, nor infinite, nor does he have an end. However, he is infinite in a negative sense, because he is altogether without an end.

Reply Obj. 10: It is true that God acts inasmuch as he is good, and that goodness is in him of necessity, but it does not follow that he acts of necessity. For his goodness works the mediation of his will insofar as it is its object or end. Now, the will is not inclined of necessity to things that are for the sake of the end, although it is necessitated in respect of the last end.

Reply Obj. 11: As regards the things which are in God himself, nothing can be described as potential: all is naturally and absolutely necessary. But in respect of creatures we can call certain things potential there, not in regard to a passive potency but in regard to an active power, which is not limited to one thing.

Reply Obj. 12: Were God to deny his own goodness by doing something contrary thereto, or wherein his goodness were not expressed, we should arrive at the impossible conclusion that he denied his very self. But this would not follow if he were not to communicate his goodness to anything, since his goodness would suffer nothing by not being communicated.

Reply Obj. 13: Although the Word of God proceeds from the Father naturally, it does not follow that creatures proceed from God naturally. But the Father by his own Word speaks his creatures according as they are in the Father himself, and in him they exist as to be produced not necessarily but voluntarily.

Reply Obj. 14: The ultimate end is not the communication of the divine goodness, but the divine goodness itself, for love of which God wills to communicate it. For he works for his goodness’ sake not as desiring to have what he has not but as wishing to communicate what he has, for he acts not from a desire for the end but from love of the end.

Reply Obj. 15: As in God there is naught but good, so in him is there naught but what is necessary. But it does not follow that whatsoever proceeds from him does so of necessity.

Reply Obj. 16: As stated above, (Q. 3, a. 15, resp.) God’s will inclines naturally to his own goodness; whence he cannot will but what is becoming to him, namely, the good. Yet he is not determined to this or that good; therefore, it does not follow that the goods which exist proceed from him necessarily.

Reply Obj. 17: Though the same nature is in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, it has not the same mode of existence in each one of the three, and when I say, “mode of existence,” I mean in respect of the relations. In the Father, it is as not received from another; in the Son, as received from the Father. Consequently, we must not infer that whatsoever belongs to the Father by virtue of his nature, belongs also to the Son or the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 18: The effect follows from the action according to the mode of the principle of the action; therefore, since the divine will, which has no necessary connection with creatures, is considered, in our way of thinking, to be the principle of the divine action in regard to creatures, it does not follow that the creature proceeds from God by natural necessity, although the action itself is God’s essence or nature.

Reply Obj. 19: The creature is like God as regards general conditions but not as to the mode of participation. For being is in God otherwise than in creatures, and so too is goodness. Hence, although from the first good all goods derive, and all beings from the first being, yet all do not derive supreme goodness from the supreme good, nor from the necessary being do all things proceed of necessity.

Reply Obj. 20: God’s will is his essence; therefore, his working by his will does not prevent his working by his essence. For God’s will is not an intention in addition to his essence, but is his very essence.