D. 25 - Articles of faith

Division of the text

After the Master has examined faith as to its essence, which is known through the definition and the object of faith, here he considers it in the possessor of faith with regard to quantity—according as it grows in someone who has faith. Now, this part is divided in two:

in the first, he considers the amount of faith that is found in believers according to the number of things believed;

in the second, the amount that it has according to the intensity of the habit, at nor is it also to be omitted. (Sent. III. 25. 5 (90). 1.)

Concerning the first, he does three things.

First, he shows that the faith that is sufficient for salvation extends to recognition of the deity;

second, that it extends to recognition of the redeemer, at but it is asked whether, before the coming [of Christ] or before the law, belief in these things would have been sufficient for salvation. (Sent. III. 25. 1 (86). 2.)

Third, he shows which articles of the faith concerning the redeemer faith extends to, at but it is asked: since salvation would not have been available to the ancients, as it is not to the moderns, without faith in the mediator, would it have been necessary for them to believe concerning the mediator all the things that we now believe? (Sent. III. 25. 3 (88). 1.)

But it is asked whether, before the coming [of Christ] or before the law, belief in these things would have been sufficient for salvation. Here he does two things:

first, he shows the teaching;

second., he raises a certain question from what has been said, at what, then, will be said of those simple persons, to whom the mystery of the Incarnation was not revealed? (Sent. III. 25. 2 (87). 1.)

But it is asked: since salvation would not have been available to the ancients, etc. Here he also does two things:

first, he shows the teaching;

second, he raises a question, at it is also usual to ask concerning Cornelius. (Sent. III. 25. 4 (89). 1.)

Nor is it also to be omitted. Here he shows that faith according to the quantity that it has from the intensity of the habit, is equal to hope, charity, and works. And concerning this, he does two things:

first, he shows the teaching;

second, he resolves a problem, at but what has been said here and earlier . . . seems to be contradicted by the Apostle’s statement. (Sent. III. 25. 5 (90). 2.)

Here there are two questions.

First, about the definition of the articles of the faith. (Q. 1.)

Second, about the explicit knowledge of them. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

The definition of the articles of faith

Concerning the first, two things are to be asked:

first, about the articles in themselves.

second, about the distinctions among the articles.

Article 1

Whether Richard of Saint Victor’s definition of an article of the faith is adequate

Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question we proceed thus, (Parallels: below, a. 2, ad 6; ST II-II.1.6; Super 1 Cor. 15, lect. 1.) and explicate the definition of Richard of Saint Victor, (Not Richard of Saint Victor, but William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea, bk. 3, tract. 3, ch. 2, q. 1.) which goes as follows: an article of the faith is the indivisible truth of God, compelling us to believe. However, it seems that this is inadequate.

Obj. 1: For an indivisible truth is a non-complex truth. But faith is complex, as was said above. Therefore an article of faith is not an indivisible truth.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, among the articles of the faith some are included that do not pertain to God except as cause, for example, the resurrection of the body. But it does not suffice to say that the truth is of God, because then every truth would be from God, and yet not every truth belongs as an article of the faith. Therefore it seems that it is improperly said about God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, compulsion implies necessity. But faith is voluntary, because no one believes unless he wills to, as Augustine says. (Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), tract. 26, para. 2) Therefore, he says wrongly that it compels us to believe.

Obj. 4: Again, another definition is given by Isidore: an article is the perception of divine truth that tends toward it. (This statement is not found in Isidore, although Albertus Magnus, Bonaventure, Alexander of Hales, among others, also attribute it to him.) Now, the perception of divine truth is also through natural reason, for example, that we know God exists; and nevertheless, this is not an article of the faith. Therefore, he defines “article of the faith” wrongly.

Obj. 5: Again, Hugh of Saint Victor’s definition, an article of the faith is nature with grace, (This statement is not found in Hugh of Saint Victor, although it is attributed to him also by Albertus Magnus and Alexander of Hales, among others.) provokes this objection: an article is something believed. But nature with grace describes the believer. Therefore, since the believer is not what is believed, “article” is badly defined.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that “article” can be called formed or unformed. (Parallels: ST II-II.1.6; Super 1 Cor. 15, lect. 1.) For an object is proportioned to its habit. But the object of faith is an article. Therefore, since faith may be formed or unformed, it seems that articles also may be.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, to tend toward God is an act of formed faith. But it belongs to an article of faith to tend toward God, as is clear from one of the definitions attributed. Therefore an article can be unformed or formed.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, one of the articles of the faith is: I believe in God. But this is an act of formed faith. Therefore, an article can also be either formed or unformed.

On the contrary, in the articles of the faith, there is no difference between sinner and just man. However, there is a difference between being formed by charity and having unformed faith. Therefore, being formed and being unformed do not pertain to the articles of the faith.

Furthermore, it is not within human power to change the articles of the faith. But having unformed faith is within human power, inasmuch as it is caused by sin. Therefore, having unformed faith is not considered to be a characteristic of the articles.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the articles of the faith should not have been collected into the symbolum, or Creed. (Parallels: ST II-II.1.9.) For the whole faith is taught to us sufficiently by Sacred Scripture. Therefore, it was superfluous to compose the Creed.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Creed is proposed as a rule of faith, and faith’s act is to assent. But as Augustine says in a letter to Jerome, (Augustine, Epistulae, epist. 82: ad Hieronymum, para. 1 (CCSL 34.2:354; PL 33:277).) only the apostles and prophets were granted this honor—that whatever they said should be believed to be true. Therefore, after the Apostles’ Creed, there should not have been any other creeds.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is asked why the Apostles’ Creed and the Nicene Creed are divided into three parts according to the three person of the Trinity, while the Athanasian Creed is divided according to the divinity and humanity of Christ.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it is asked why the Apostles’ Creed is said silently in Prime and Compline, while the other two are said aloud, one [the Nicene] after the Gospel and the other [the Athanasian Creed] in prime.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that the word “article” is from Greek, and it indicates a lack of division. (Articulus is the diminutive of artus, which is the Latin form of the Greek word arthron (“joint,” “limb,” “member”).) Thus, the members that cannot be further divided into other members are called articles, and it is according to this way of speaking that the conclusions that are sought in any science or treatise are called articles: because from them, as from something like indivisible principles, the collection of truths is amassed that completes the inquiry; and this is why in judicial courts those things that are certified by witnesses or are to be certified are called articles. However the faith does not inquire, but relies upon those things that pertain to the faith by the testimony of God who says them. Therefore, anything in the faith that contains a special difficulty, and whose supposition does not depend on anything else being supposed, is properly called an article of the faith. And this is why in the definition given, Richard included both the proper meaning of the name, by saying that it is an indivisible truth, and the etymology according to its meaning in Latin, by saying it compels us to believe.

Reply Obj. 1: In non-complex things, speaking per se, there is only truth equivocally. Therefore, “indivisible” is to be understood not simply speaking, but in the genus of complex things.

Reply Obj. 2: An article of the faith is said to be about God either because it pertains to the divine nature or a divine person, either by reason of itself or by reason of its assumed nature, or his proper effect, which cannot happen by any created power, and cannot be perceived by human reason; and thus the objection comes to nothing.

Reply Obj. 3: An article is said to compel belief, not out of the necessity of force, but out of the necessity of the end, for without faith in the articles there can be no salvation.

Reply Obj. 4: The perception of divine truth that happens through natural reason tends toward the understanding of principles as to what it depends upon. But the perception of divine truth that is in an article tends toward the first truth not only as an end or object, but as toward what it is resolved into, as in the cause of its own credibility.

Reply Obj. 5: Hugh did not intend to define the word “article,” but to show the things that the faith is about; for it is about works of creation, for which nature was instituted, and about works of reparation, for which the grace of God is bestowed.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that the word "article" names what is to be believed as an object of faith. Now, a different disposition in the doer does not change the object of an activity, and the object is not named from the disposition of the doer, but rather vice versa; for example, color is not named from the different dispositions of the person seeing—for example, whether some people have inflamed eyes, and others have clear eyes. Now, the faith’s being formed or unformed pertains to the disposition of the believer—not what has to do with the intellect, where the faith is, but what has to do with the its relation to the will, where charity is; and therefore, it cannot properly be said that an article is formed or unformed.

Reply Obj. 1: An object is proportioned to its habit in those things that pertain to the nature of the habit, but not in those things that arise from the disposition of the person having the habit.

Reply Obj. 2: That definition is given about an article through the act of faith. That is why it says, perception of divine truth. And thus what belongs to formed faith characterizes the act, not the object.

Reply Obj. 3: the answer to the third objection is similar.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that the word for the Creed, symbolum, conveys a likeness and a bringing together, (The Greek word symbolum comes from sum (with) and ballein (throw), indicating things put together.) and therefore the word symbolum is imposed from four different kinds of bringing together. First, from the many people brought together in one faith. Second, from those preaching the faith—because all the apostles collected together announced this rule of faith, each one adding something of his own. Third, because what is to be believed is brought together from different places in Sacred Scripture, so that it may be easily had. Fourth, all the divinely granted benefits are collected there, which is why Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 3 (PG 3:423).) that the symbol of religion can more appropriately be called the Eucharistic hierarchy, good grace, as it were.

Reply Obj. 1: Things that were handed on in Sacred Scripture but in different places had to be brought together in one place, so that the faith could be held more readily.

Reply Obj. 2: The fathers who announced other creeds after the apostles did not add anything of their own, but the things that they added they took from the Sacred Scriptures. And since some of the things in the Apostles’ Creed pose difficulties, the Nicene Creed, which more extensively described the faith in some of its articles, was formulated to explain it. And because certain things were implicitly contained in those creeds that needed to be explained on account of heresies that arose, the Athanasian Creed was added, which was specifically opposed to heretics.

Reply Obj. 3: At the time of Athanasius, heresies were arising especially against the person of the Son in both of his natures, and for this reason his creed is divided into two parts according to the two natures of Christ. However, other creeds that were composed not with the principal intention of combating heretics, but rather manifesting or elucidating the teaching of the faith, are divided into three parts according to the three persons of the Trinity, on which our faith is principally founded.

Reply Obj. 4: The Apostles’ Creed was formulated when the faith had not yet been made public, and therefore, it is said secretly; and because it was composed to set forth the teaching of the faith, it is said daily in Prime and in Compline, at the beginning of the day and night, as a sign that all our activity must take its beginning from our end, and because we are protected by our faith in adversity and prosperity. However, each of the other creeds was composed at a time when the faith had been disseminated, and that is why they are sung publicly. And because they were not composed for proposing the faith, but for defending or elucidating it, they are not said every day, but on days when people are most accustomed to come to church, and on days when a certain solemnity occurs that has to do with the articles in that creed. And since the Nicene Creed was composed to manifest the faith, it is said after the Gospel, as a sort of exposition of it. However, the Athanasian Creed, which was composed against heretics, is said during Prime, as though to drive off the shadows of heresy.

Article 2

Whether the articles of the faith are appropriately distinguished in the Creed

To the second we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST II-II.1.9.) It seems that the articles are not appropriately distinguished in the Creed.

Obj. 1: For the three persons of the Trinity are equal. But there are several articles pertaining to the persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, there should likewise be several pertaining to the person of the Father.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, that God is one is provable by demonstration, as is that God is the Creator of things. For this reason, even some of the philosophers, like Avicenna, grant this by a demonstration from motion. But the articles that pertain to the essence of the faith cannot be proved by demonstration, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, they are improperly listed in the Creed in articles.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as power is appropriated to the Father, wisdom is appropriated to the Son. Therefore, just as omnipotence is mentioned in the Creed, wisdom should also be mentioned, as well as other attributes.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in the Creed the faith should be explained as to all believers. But not all believers share in believing in God, but only those with formed faith. Therefore, it seems that it is wrongly said, I believe in one God; and that someone who has unformed faith would commit the sin of lying by saying this.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, when it is said to believe in God, the end of faith is indicated. But only God is the end of faith. Therefore, when something that is merely created is contained in the Creed—like the Catholic Church, for example—it seems that this manner of speaking is improperly included.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, just as the sacrament of the Incarnation began at Christ’s conception and was concluded in his birth, the mystery of the Passion began in his Passion and concluded in his burial. But two different articles are assigned to his conception and birth. Therefore, two articles should be assigned to his Passion and burial.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, just as certain works are appropriated to the Father and the Holy Spirit, so also to the Son. Therefore, just as certain divine works, like creation, are included with faith in the Father and the work of remission of sins with the article on the Holy Spirit, some divine work should be included in the articles on the Son.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, no mention is made of the descent into hell in the Nicene Creed. Therefore, it seems to contain insufficient articles.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, we ask why it does not say “Creator” but “maker” in the Nicene Creed.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, faith in the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar poses the greatest difficulty. Therefore, since nothing is said in any of the creeds about it, it seems that the faith is insufficiently handed on in them.

I answer that the articles of the faith are distinguished in two ways. First, as to the things to be believed themselves and according to this, there are fourteen articles; the other way is as to those who have distinguished the articles, and in that way there are twelve according to the number of the twelve apostles. However, since an article is a truth about God, this can be two kinds: either it is about God himself alone, or about God by reason of the nature he assumed.

If it is the first, then it can happen in three ways: either it is about God by reason of his nature, or by reason of the divine persons, or by reason of God’s proper effects. If by reason of his nature, then we have the first article: I believe in one God. If by reason of the person, then it is either the person of the Father, and then we have the second article: the Father, the almighty; or the person of the Son, and then we have the third: and in Jesus Christ, his only Son; or the person of the Holy Spirit, and then we have the fourth: I believe in the Holy Spirit. If it is by reason of his effect, either it pertains to a condition of his nature, and then it is the fifth article: Creator of heaven and earth; or to the good of grace, and then we have the sixth: holy Catholic church, the communion of saints, the remission of sins; or it pertains to the perfection of glory, and then we have the seventh: the resurrection of the body and life everlasting. Now some people distinguish these three articles differently, for they include the work of creation in the first article, which pertains to the truth of essence; and they divide the last article into two articles, calling the resurrection of the body one article and life everlasting another. But the first way of distinguishing seems better, because the Apostle expressly sets forth one article about creation in Hebrews 11:3: by faith we understand that the world was created by the word of God. And again, the completion of life eternal and glory includes the union of body and soul. Again, it should be known that the work of creation is joined to the article about the person of the Father, because it pertains to power, which is appropriated to the Father. However, two other works are attached to the articles about the Holy Spirit, because the union of the Church is appropriated to him, which is implied in what is said: the holy Catholic Church, the remission of sins; as well as the communication of goods that happens through charity, such that the good of one benefits another.

Now, the articles pertaining to the assumed nature are also seven. The first pertains to his conception: who was conceived by the Holy Spirit. The second, to his nativity: born of Mary. The third, to the Passion: suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, died, and was buried. The fourth refers to the descent to the dead: he descended into hell. The fifth, to the Resurrection: on the third day, he rose from the dead. The sixth, to his Ascension: he ascended into heaven, where he sits at the right hand of God the Father. The seventh to his coming at the judgment: from thence he shall come to judge the living and the dead. Now, Peter summed up three of these articles in one, namely, the article about the unity of essence, the Father’s omnipotence, and the work of creation. The reason for this is that the work of creation, because of the power that it reveals, is appropriated to the Father who is also the source of the whole deity; and thus it applies to Peter, who is the head of the apostles, just as the Father is head of the Trinity. Now, John set down the article about the person of the Son, while James the son of Zebedee united the articles about the conception and birth. Then Andrew set forth the article about the Passion. Philip set down the descent to the dead; Thomas, the Resurrection; Bartholomew, the Ascension; Matthew, the coming at the judgment; the article about the person of the Holy Spirit, James, the son of Alpheus. Two apostles divided the work of grace—for Simon set forth the effect of grace in the attainment of good at, the holy Catholic Church, the communion of saints; while Jude the son of James as to the removal of evil, the remission of sins. Matthias stated the effect of glory, or Thomas again, as some people say. However, others have attributed the articles above to the apostles differently. But in this there is not a lot of force.

Reply Obj. 1: The Father is not sent like the other persons of the Trinity; and thus because of the effect of sending, more articles are appropriated to them than to the Father.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not an article of the faith that God is simple, but that God is as faith supposes, namely, having care of all things, rewarding and punishing—as the Apostle makes clear, for he delineates it like this in Hebrews 11:6: that he is, and that he rewards those who seek him. Likewise, the philosophers did not recognize God as Creator in the way that faith holds, namely, such that after things did not exist, they were brought forth into being. Rather, they take creation according to another mode, as was said in Book II. (In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 2.)

Reply Obj. 3: All the articles, especially those that pertain to divine works, are proved by God’s omnipotence, in the same way that an angel proved the Incarnation when he came to the Virgin in Luke 1:37: because no word is impossible with God. And this is why omnipotence is particularly included as a sort of root of faith.

Reply Obj. 4: In the Creed is proposed to us the rule of faith toward which all people should reach. However, they should not strive to reach only an act of unformed faith, but also an act of formed faith; and this is why an act of formed faith is included in the Creed. Nevertheless, someone who has unformed faith and says the Creed does not sin, because he says this in the person of the Church.

Reply Obj. 5: Pope Leo says (According to Rufinus Aquileiensis, Commentarius. in Symbolorum, n. 36 (PL 21:373).) that the preposition in should not be added here, so that we say, and in one holy Catholic Church, etc., but it should be said, and one holy etc. But Anselm says (According to Moos this claim is not found in Anselm.) that it can be said, in one, inasmuch as in this effect uncreated truth is understood, namely such that the meaning is, in one holy, that is, in the Holy Spirit uniting the Church.

Reply Obj. 6: As has been said, an article is indivisible truth existing above reason, and where diverse difficulties occur in which what is said is above reason, it is necessary to set forth diverse articles. However, holding that God was buried does not contain a different difficulty than holding that he suffered or died; and thus all this is included under one article. But his birth does contain a different difficulty beyond the difficulty of his conception, because in his conception there is the difficulty that God became man, and that his conception happened without male seed. But in his birth the difficulty is from the fact that he came out of the Virgin’s closed womb. And for this reason there are two articles.

Reply Obj. 7: On the part of the Son’s power is included the work that he performed in his assumed nature in seven articles, as was said.

Reply Obj. 8: As Innocent III says, the Nicene synod was chiefly convened against Arius, who denied that the Son was true God. And for this reason, the descent into hell was suppressed, which seemed most to detract from the Son’s divinity. Or it could be said that because that creed was promulgated to manifest the faith against heretics, but no error arises about the descent into hell, they did not take care to explain that article, but included it implicitly in the article on the Resurrection, in which is understood the terminus from which he rose; just as in the article on his conception they implicitly handed down the article on his birth, since there was no specific error about his birth.

Reply Obj. 9: Some philosophers held that the world had been created by God and yet it existed from eternity, as Augustine tells. (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 11, ch. 4, n. 2 (CCSL 48; PL 41:319).) For this reason, the Nicene Creed which was specifically decreed in order to eliminate errors, specified maker, which emphasizes more the beginning of the world’s duration, and that it exists from God’s acting by his will, not by a necessity of nature.

Reply Obj. 10: Faith in the body of Christ and all the sacraments and the power of the keys and everything like this are included in the article that is about the effect of grace, which is, the holy Catholic Church. And this is why in the Nicene Creed it is added, I believe in one baptism. However, some people say that it can be reduced to the article on the Passion. But the first explanation is more probable.

Question 2

The explication of the faith

Next we ask about the explication of the faith, and as regards this two things are asked:

first, the necessity of its becoming explicit;

second, as regards which things must one’s faith be explicit.

Article 1

Whether the explicitness of one’s faith is necessary for salvation

Quaestiuncula 1

To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: In I Sent., d. 33, a. 5; ST II-II.2.5; De veritate, q. 14, a. 11.) It appears that faith being explicit is not necessary for salvation.

Obj. 1: For grace and free decision is enough for salvation. But the gratuitous habit of infused faith is not enough for the explicitness of one’s faith, and neither is free decision informed by grace. Rather, the teaching of faith making it determinate must come for that, since faith comes from what is heard (Rom 10:17). Therefore the explicitness of faith is not necessary for salvation.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one is damned by what he cannot avoid. But if someone is born in the forest, or among unbelievers, he cannot possess in any distinct way knowledge about the articles of the faith; for no teacher of the faith is at hand, nor has he ever heard mention of the faith. Therefore such a one is not damned, and yet he does not have explicit faith. Therefore it appears that the explicitness of faith is not necessary for salvation.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, an explicit cognition of the articles of faith can only be present in one who has use of free decision. But many are salved who have no use of free decision, such as baptized infants and simpletons. Therefore an explicitness in one’s faith is not necessary for salvation.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, subtle things should not be proposed to the simple, as is clear from the Apostle (1 Cor 3:1). But nothing is subtler than the things that are above reason, which are the sorts of things that pertain to faith. Therefore the faith should not be explicated to the simple, and yet they are saved. Therefore the explication of the faith is not necessary for salvation.

On the contrary, whoever would draw near to God must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who seek him (Heb 11:6). But to draw near to God is necessary for salvation. Therefore so is having explicit faith with respect to certain things.

Furthermore, no one is saved without hope. But for hope there must be an explicit cognition of the things hoped for, since faith is the assurance of things hoped for (Heb 11:1). Therefore having faith explicitly about certain things is necessary for salvation.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that everyone is bound to having an explicit faith about all the things that pertain to the faith. (Parallels: In I Sent., d. 33, a. 5; ST II-II.2.5; De veritate, q. 14, a. 11.) For all the articles of the faith pertain equally to the faith. Therefore if one must have an explicit knowledge about some of them, for the like reason he must have it of all.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, one man is not distinguished from another in reference to what is known universally, since the knowledge of universal principles is inborn in all men. But to hold faith about a certain article in an implicit way is to hold faith about that article in a universal way. Therefore by having only an implicit faith about an article he is no different, as regards that article, from someone who does not believe. Therefore one must have an explicit faith about all the articles.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as mortal sins are avoided through the precepts of the law, so the errors of heresy are avoided through the articles. But someone is bound to serving the precepts of the law so that he might avoid all sins. Therefore he is also bound to knowing the articles of the faith so that he might avoid all errors and heresies. But only one who has explicit faith about all the articles can do this, since one who knows something only implicitly and universally can err in the particular. Therefore having a faith made explicit about all the articles is necessary for salvation.

On the contrary, an explicated knowledge of the articles of faith is had only through study. But study is not necessary for salvation. Therefore an explicated knowledge of all the articles is not necessary for salvation.

Furthermore, according to this view there would be few who had faith, since it is difficult to find anyone who can explicate the articles as regards all the things that are contained implicitly in the articles.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that the great are not more bound [to knowing the articles] than are lesser ones. (Parallels: In IV Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, resp. 2; ST II-II.2.6; De veritate, q. 14, a. 11; Super Hebr. 11, lect. 2.) For simple men are examined about the difficult articles, and are condemned as heretics if they answer badly. Now, this would not be so unless they were bound to knowing them. Therefore lesser people are not less bound to knowing them than are the great.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one is bound to more things than is another except insofar as he has obligated himself to them. But it appears that the great have not obligated themselves to knowing the articles explicitly. Therefore they are not more bound than are lesser ones.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the greater appear to be those who know more. Therefore, if they were obligated to believing more things, it appears that they would report an inconvenience [as arising] from their knowledge.

On the contrary, the great ought to teach the faith to the lesser. But one who teaches should know more fully. Therefore they are bound to knowing more explicitly than the lesser.

Furthermore, to one to whom more is committed, from him more is required. But more is committed to those who are great than to those who are lesser. Therefore a greater knowledge of the faith is required from them.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that the lesser ones do not have an implicit faith in the faith of the greater ones. (Parallels: ST II-II.2.6; De veritate, q. 14, a. 11; Super Heb. 11, lect. 2.) For just as faith is implicit and explicit, so is knowledge. But when one has implicit knowledge, it is not implicit in some knower, but in the universal reality of the knowable thing. Therefore neither does one have a faith implicit in the faith of someone else.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, that in which is implied the knowledge of one who has implicit knowledge is the rule of his knowledge. But the rule of our faith is not a human knowledge, which can be deceived, but the divine knowledge, which is infallible. Therefore it appears that a man should not have implicit faith in the faith of another man, but in the knowledge of God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no one sins if he conforms himself to his rule. But the great are those set above others, and even teachers. Therefore if the simple ought to have implicit faith in the faith of the great, a simple person saying something against the faith would not sin, if it were preached by some teacher or prelate—which appears to be false.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, one must know the one in whom the knowledge of something is implied, just as one who has implicit knowledge of some particular in universal principles must know those principles. Therefore a man should not have implicit faith in the knowledge of another man.

On the contrary, everyone learning has implicit faith in the knowledge of his teacher since, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations 1.2, 165b3.) the learner must believe. But the great are made so for the sake of teaching the faith to lesser ones. Therefore the lesser ones should have an implicit faith in the knowledge of the greater ones.

Furthermore, this is clear from the authority indicated in the text.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that someone attains salvation in two ways. For some do not attain it by their own proper merit, but by someone else’s merit—such as baptized infants and simpletons, whom Christ’s merit supports, in which they are made participants by the reception of the sacrament. For they do not have their own proper merit, since they do not have the use of free decision, which is needed in order to merit. However, whoever has use of free decision is bound to adding his own proper merit to Christ’s merits. Now, merit consists in the act of the virtues, so for their salvation they must have both the act and the habit of the virtues. But the act of all virtues depends on the act of faith, which directs one’s intention, so in everyone who has free decision it is required, for his salvation, that he have the act of faith and not only its habit. However, faith cannot go into act except by knowing determinately and explicitly what pertains to faith. Therefore in everyone who has the use of free decision, having a faith that is explicit in some respect is necessary for salvation.

Reply Obj. 1: In things that are necessary for salvation, God never abandons and has never abandoned a man seeking his salvation unless he remains so due to his own fault. Whence the explication of things that are necessary for salvation would either be divinely provided for a man, through a preacher of the faith, as is clear with Cornelius in Acts 10, or through a revelation. With such supposed, it is within the power of his free decision that he go forth into the act of faith.

Reply Obj. 2: If such a one does what in itself belongs to the pursuit of salvation, God would provide for the salvations of such a one in one of the described ways.

Reply Obj. 3: The solution is clear from what was said.

Reply Obj. 4: The things that are above reason pertaining to faith are not proposed to simple men such that the things themselves would be examined; rather, they are proposed to them in the enigma of the words, to which they would assent. And in this way the faith is said to be of the words, as was said above in the preceding distinction. (Above, d. 24, exposition of the text.)

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that the act of faith is necessary for salvation because of this: that it directs the intention in all the acts of the other virtues. And therefore so far must each person have an explicit faith, as much as suffices to direct him to the ultimate end. Whence it is not necessary for salvation that a man know all the articles of faith explicitly, since without the explication of some of them a man can have a right intention for the end.

Reply Obj. 1: This is clear, because there is not the same account of all the articles.

Reply Obj. 2: Universal principles, wherein is implied the knowledge of particular conclusions, are known to man through the natural light. And therefore as regards implicit knowledge of a science, one man is not distinguished from another. But the light of faith, insofar as implicit knowledge is had, is an infused light that is infused in one and not in another. Therefore the account is not similar.

Reply Obj. 3: We are bound always and in all situations to the negative precepts, and thereby sins of transgression are sufficiently avoided. But a man is always bound to the affirmative precepts, but not in all situations, but according to a determinate place and time. Now, the affirmative precepts are about the acts of the virtues. Therefore a man is not always bound to exercising the act of a virtue, nor with respect to all the ways in which he can exercise it. Rather, it is enough that a man act at the obligatory time. And therefore it is not necessary that a man have explicit knowledge about all the articles of faith, but [only] about the ones that are necessary according to that time. And through this, all errors and doubts are sufficiently avoided, since just as the habit of temperance inclines one to resist luxury, so too the habit of faith inclines one to resisting all things that are against the faith. Whence in the time when there emerges the necessity of explicitly knowing it—either on account of a contrary teaching that is threatening, or on account of a powerful doubt that is arising—then a man of faith, from the inclination of his faith, does not consent to the things that are against the faith; rather, he defers his assent until he might be instructed more fully.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that the articles of the faith become explicit in two ways. In one way, with regard to the substance of the articles themselves, insofar as one knows the articles themselves distinctly. In another way, with regard to things that are implicitly contained in the articles, which happens when a man knows the things that follow upon the articles, and the power of the truth of the articles themselves, through which they can be defended from every attack. As regards the first explication, all are wholly bound who have the office of teaching the faith, whether due to their grade of dignity, such as priests, or due to revelation, such as prophets, or due to their ministry, such as teachers and preachers. But this is not so with others, on whom does not lie the office of teaching the faith, because it suffices for them, as they have only to rule themselves, to know those articles through which they can direct their own proper intention to the ultimate end. However, as regards the second explication of the articles, no one is wholly bound to know them to the point of making explicit all the things about salvation that are contained in the articles. For this cannot be except in heaven, where the very truth of the articles will be seen fully. But anyone on whom lies the office of instructing others about the faith—those who are being called “the great”—are bound to know as much of this explication as pertains to his office. But lesser ones, on whom the office of teaching does not lie, are not bound to this explication.

Reply Obj. 1: The simple are not condemned as heretics because they do not know the articles, but because they stubbornly defend the things that are contrary to the articles. This they would not do unless they were to have a faith corrupted by heresy.

Reply Obj. 2: By the very fact that someone takes up the office of teaching he is obligated to knowing the things that he ought to teach.

Reply Obj. 3: Those who know more are not called “great,” but rather those on whom lies the office of teaching the faith. These sometimes know less, as consequence of sin, to whom it is said, because you have rejected knowledge, I reject you from being a priest to me (Hos 4:6). Yet neither is it due to the knowledge that is required of them that they report an inconvenience, since having knowledge is an honor for them.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that those on whom lies the office of teaching the faith are middles between God and men. Whence, relative to God they are men, and relative to men they are gods, insofar as they are participants of divine knowledge through their knowledge of the Scriptures, or through revelation, as is said in John 10:35: he called them gods to whom the word of God came. And therefore lesser ones, who ought to be taught about the faith by the great, must have an implicit faith in their faith, not insofar as they are men, but insofar as they are gods by participation.

Reply Obj. 1: The determinate knowledge of the principles of demonstration is acquired from sensation. Whence for their determination we do not need teaching, and in such principles a man has, from the beginning, an implicit knowledge of all the things that follow from them. Nonetheless, he has an implicit knowledge in another knower’s cognition insofar as he needs to receive knowledge through teaching, for the learner must believe. And therefore knowledge and faith are not alike, since there are not inborn natural principles within us to which the articles of the faith can be traced back. Rather, the entire determination of faith is in us through teaching, and therefore one must have an implicit faith in a man’s cognition.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as in movers there is found a first mover that is an unmoved mover, and a second mover that is both mover and moved, after which there is what is only moved, so it is in things that regulate. There is something that is regulating and in no way regulated—and this is the notion of the first rule, and such is God; there is also something regulating that is regulated—and such a rule of human faith is a divine man, as even the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.3, 1113a5–6.) that the virtuous man is the measure of all human acts; and there is one who is only regulated, who are the lesser ones themselves.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as a man should obey a lesser power only in matters to which the higher power is not opposed, so too a man should measure himself to the first rule in all things according to his mode, but to the second rule a man should measure himself in matters that are not discordant with the first rule. For in matters that are discordant, it is no longer the rule. And on account of this, one should not assent to a prelate preaching against the faith, since in this he is discordant with the first rule. Nor is the subject wholly excused due to ignorance, since the habit of faith causes an inclination to the contrary, since it necessarily teaches one about all that pertain to salvation, according to 1 John 2:27. Whence, if a man is not too ready to believe every spirit when something unusual is preached, he would not assent; rather, he would ask someone else, or he would commit himself to God to not taking into himself the secret things of God that are above his own measure.

Reply Obj. 4: It was given to men to perform miracles so that it might be shown that God speaks through them. Nor must one have an implicit faith in such a man possessing revelation, as far as [how] such a man acquires his knowledge, divinely or through human reputation.

Article 2

Whether the faith progresses over the succession of time

Quaestiuncula 1

To the second we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.1.7; 2.7; 174.6; De veritate, q. 14, a. 12.) It appears that the faith does not progress through the succession of time as far as things that should be believed explicitly.

Obj. 1: For faith, as it says in the text, (Sent. III, 25.5(90).1.) is proportioned to charity. But charity is the same and equal through all time periods. Therefore so is faith.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the fact that human knowledge grew in the sciences is due to the imperfection of those who first imperfectly discovered the arts, as is said in On Sophistical Refutations 2. (Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations 2.33, 183b17–20.) But the teaching of the faith does not have its beginning from human discovery, but from the inspiration of God, wherein falls no imperfection. Therefore it should not have progressed through the increase of time.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, faith always remains the same as regards it substance. Therefore if the knowledge of the faith progresses according to diverse time periods, it would have to be that what in the first time is held only implicitly, in the later time is knowledge even explicitly. But it belongs to the lesser to have faith in the knowledge of the great. Therefore whenever there was an implicit faith of a certain article in a certain man, there was an explicit faith of that same article in some other man. Now, it is fitting in every time that some articles are known implicitly by some and explicitly by others. Therefore the faith did not grow through the succession of time.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, an article is an indivisible truth. (Above, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 1, sed contra.) But what is indivisible cannot be further distinguished. Therefore, since faith was always contained under certain articles, it appears that it could not be further distinguished so that the articles might be known explicitly.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, through this it appears that in the same way for the same reason the articles could be multiplied through the succession of time periods—which appears to be false.

On the contrary, in Exodus 6:3 the Lord said to Moses, I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob; and my name, 'Almighty,' I did not manifest to them. (RSV reads: I am the LORD. I appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, as God Almighty, but by my name the LORD I did not make myself known to them.) Therefore something about God was revealed to Moses that was not revealed to his ancestors. Likewise David says, I understand more than the aged (Ps 119:100), and Peter asserts that it is fulfilled in his time what is said in Joel 2:28, I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh (Acts 2:17).

Furthermore, Gregory says (Gregory the Great, Homiliarum in Ezechielem, bk. 2, hom. 4, n. 12 (PL 76:980).) that through the succession of time there was an augmentation of the knowledge of the divine.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that it was not always necessary to have an explicit faith about a redeemer. (Parallels: below, expos. text.; In IV Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, resp. 1; ST II-II.2.7; De veritate, q. 14, a. 11; Super Heb. 11, lect. 2.) For men did not know through faith about that which the angels were ignorant, for the cognition of faith through revelation that is from God is by the mediation of the angels, as Dionysius says in the Celestial Hierarchy. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4, para. 2 (PG 3:179).) But the angels did not know the mystery of redemption; whence the Apostle says in Ephesians 3:9 that it was hidden in God. Therefore neither did men have an explicit faith about him.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Adam did not foreknow his own fall. But if he had not sinned, human redemption would not have occurred. Therefore the man did not always know explicitly the mystery of human redemption.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 9, para. 3 (PG 3:262).) many were saved before the coming of Christ, even among the gentiles. But they did not have an explicit faith about the redemption, since the revelation was not made to them: he has not dealt thus with any other nation (Ps 147:20). Nor did they place an implicit faith in the faith of the Jews. Therefore the faith in a redeemer was not necessary for salvation in all times.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the coming of a redeemer is not derived from a dictate of the natural law. But those who were under the natural law were saved in fulfilling the things derived from the dictate of the natural law, just as in the time of the written law was the case for things that the written law commanded. Therefore it was not always necessary to have an explicit faith about a redeemer.

On the contrary, Christ is the head of the whole Church. Now, no one is saved outside of the Church. Therefore no one is saved who is not or has not been a member of Christ. But no one has been a member of Christ who has not believed in Christ. Therefore no one has ever been saved without faith in Christ.

Furthermore, just as a creator is a principle of existing in a nature being constituted, so too a redeemer is a principle of the restoration of a fallen nature. But no one can be saved without restoration, just as neither can something exist without a natural existence. Therefore, since faith about a creator was always necessary for salvation, for a like reason too faith in a redeemer was always necessary for salvation after man’s fall.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that it was not necessary to believe the articles concerning the redeemer that the Master touches on in the text. (Sent. III, 25.3(88).2. Parallels: ST II-II.2.7; De veritate, q. 14, a. 11; Super Heb. 11, lect. 2.) For John the Baptist was among the great, and he was held to having an explicit faith according to that time. But he himself had doubts about Christ’s death, as the Master says in the text. (Sent. III, 25.3(88).3.) Therefore it appears that the patriarchs did not have explicit faith about the death of Christ.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, conception precedes birth. But it is not said to have been necessary that they have an explicit faith about his conception. Therefore it was not necessary that they have an explicit faith about his birth.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of our resurrection, so too his Ascension is the cause of our ascension. But our salvation consists in the resurrection of our bodies and in our ascension to the place of glory. Therefore it was necessary to believe in the Ascension just as it is necessary to believe in the Resurrection.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, through his descent into hell we have been drawn out of hell. Now, this latter is necessary for salvation. Therefore so is belief that Christ descended into hell.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the salvation of men could have occurred without Christ coming in judgment, since Christ merits nothing for us through the latter. Therefore it appears that it was not necessary to believe that Christ is to come in judgment.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that it was not necessary to have an explicit knowledge of the Trinity. (Parallels: below, expos. text.; In IV Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, resp. 1; ST II-II.2.8; De veritate, q. 14, a. 11.) For Hebrews 11:6 says that one must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who seek him. Therefore it appears that it was not necessary to know of the distinction of the persons.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the knowledge of faith is necessary insofar as it directs us to the end. But God is our end insofar as he is the highest good, which pertains to his essence. Therefore it appears that it was enough to believe in the essential things about God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Holy Scripture is the rule of faith. But in Old Testament Scripture no express mention was made of the Trinity. Therefore it was not necessary for belief.

On the contrary, the knowledge of Christ insofar as he is God is more salvific than knowledge of him insofar as he is a man. But it was necessary to have knowledge of his humanity. Therefore much more so knowledge of his Godhead. But he is the Son of the Father insofar as he is in his Godhead. Therefore it was necessary to have knowledge of the Father and the Son.

Furthermore, the sending of the divine persons was always necessary for salvation. But Augustine says (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 20 (CCSL 50; PL 42:908).) that one sent is known to be from another. Therefore it was always necessary to know that in God there is someone who is from someone else, and thus to know the Trinity by faith.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that faith is a sort of knowledge. Now, the quantity of one’s knowledge is considered in two ways: namely, according to its objects, and according to the efficacy of its acts concerning its object. Moreover, a habit is specified from its object, so the first quantity is essential to the habit; and according to this one considers the magnitude of one’s faith, which follows the quantity of its articles. And therefore in reference to this quantity, faith neither grows nor shrinks, since it always remains the same. However, the efficacy of one’s agency is due to the condition of the agent, and therefore with respect to three other magnitudes faith can progress while it itself remains the same, relative to the diverse conditions of men.

Now, in the act of faith three things are found relative to which the quantity of the efficacy of faith can be considered. Two of them are according to its proper nature: namely, to think—and in reference to this faith is said to be great in cognition—and to assent—and in reference to this faith is said to be great in its constancy, since “assent” indicates certitude and determination, as was said above. (Above, d. 23, a. 2, corpus and ad 1.) However, the third is in the act of faith insofar as it is informed by charity, and in reference to this faith is called great in devotion. But the certitude of faith comes from the will determining the intellect to one thing, and so does its formation by charity, which is in the will, and moreover, the will has dominion over its acts also in reference to any time. Therefore, in speaking of the essential meaning of the “magnitude of faith” in reference to constancy and devotion, progress is considered according to the will’s readiness, which comes from grace, not from the succession of time periods—except incidentally, insofar as in a certain time there is a fuller inflowing of grace than in another, as regards the common state [of mankind], although not as regards all persons. But thinking pertains to the intellect, the virtues of which require experience and time, as is said in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.1, 1103a15.) And therefore the quantity of faith that is in reference to the knowledge of its articles, speaking according to its essential meaning, does grow according to change of time.

Reply Obj. 1: Charity is in the will. Now, things that pertain to the will do not need experience and time, as do things that are in the intellect, where faith is, except insofar as a habit must be acquired through practice—which is not the case for charity. And therefore the progress of charity, properly speaking, is not considered in reference to diverse time periods—except incidentally, insofar as in the time of the redeemer a fuller grace is poured out as regards the common state [of mankind], but not as regards individual persons.

Reply Obj. 2: The fact that the sciences progress with the succession of time periods is not only because of the imperfection of the things discovered, but also because of the inability of the learners, who were not able to receive the whole science from the beginning. And thus in things that are of the faith it happens that it was necessary that by small steps the human intellect was made accustomed to the things of the faith. On account of this the Lord said to his disciples, I have yet many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now (John 16:12).

Reply Obj. 3: Those who immediately received from God knowledge of the faith, as regards things that were not made explicit to them, did not have an implicit faith in the faith of another man, but in the knowledge of God himself. On him they reposed what had been revealed to them of the secret things of divine wisdom.

Reply Obj. 4: An article is said to be an indivisible truth as regards what is made explicit in the article. But it is divisible as regards the things that are potentially contained in the article, insofar as it calls one what in a certain way it calls many. And these those things that precede the article and the things that follow upon it. And with respect to this an article of the faith can be explicated and divided.

Reply Obj. 5: Something that is contained in an article can be made explicit in two ways. In one way, insofar as one article sometimes is contained in another, or two in one common one; for example, the resurrection of the dead is in a way contained in the Resurrection of Christ, and the Passion and Incarnation in the common article that is the mystery of redemption. And in this way, an implicit faith is made explicit in the determinate articles of the faith. And this explication was completed through Christ. This is why one may not add to or take away from his teaching, as regards the essentials of the faith, as it says at the end of Revelation (Rev 22:18–19). But before the coming of Christ it was not complete; this is why, even as regards the great, it grew according to diverse time periods. In another way, that which is contained in an article is not an article, but something attendant on the article, and with respect to this the faith can be made explicit every day, and it has been made more and more explicit through the study of the holy.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that the human race stands to the faith in a redeemer according to diverse time periods in three ways. For in the first state, before sin, it was not necessary that any man have an explicit faith about a redeemer, since man was not yet brought into servitude; rather, it was enough to have an implicit faith in God’s knowledge, that is, such that a man would believe that God would provide for him in things that were necessary for his salvation. However, in the second state, after sin and before the coming of Christ, some had an explicit faith about a redeemer, those to whom a revelation had been made, who were called “the great”; but some, as “lesser ones,” had an implicit faith in the faith of the great, so the sacrament of redemption was proposed to them under the signs of the sacrifices. And in the third state, after the coming of Christ, because the mystery of redemption was now fulfilled bodily and visibly, and also preached, all are bound to believing explicitly. And if someone has no instructor, God would reveal it to him, unless he leaves [God] due to his own fault.

Reply Obj. 1: The angels learned of the mystery of the Incarnation first, before men, as Dionysius says in the Celestial Hierarchy, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4, para. 4 (PG 3:182).) as regards what should be believed pertaining its very substance, but not as regards all the circumstances of the articles. These they later knew as they came about. We have spoken about this more fully in Book II. (In II Sent., d. 11, q. 2, a. 4.)

Reply Obj. 2: The authorities introduced in the text are speaking about after sin, whether before or after the law was given.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the divine law was not given commonly to all the nations—as were the Jews, from whom the Christ was to be born, and thus it was necessary that the faith be more powerfully thriving among them—nonetheless, revelations were made to many gentiles, through angels, about the Christ. This is clear of the Sybil, who prophesied explicitly about Christ; (See Isidore of Seville, Etymologiarum siue Originum libri XX, bk. 8, ch. 8, n. 7 (PL 82:310); Augustine, Contra Faustum, bk. 13, para. 15 (CSEL 25:394; PL 42:290), and The City of God, bk. 18, ch. 23 (CCSL 48; PL 41:579); Lactantius, Institutionum, bk. 4, ch. 18 (PL 6:506).) it is even written in the Roman histories that in the time of the emperor Constantine there was found in Greece a body in a sepulcher with a metal plate on its breast on which was written, the Christ will be born of a Virgin and I believe in him. You will see me again, O Sun, under the times of Irene and Constantine. (See Theophanus, Chronog. Ed. Acad, Litt. Reg. Bor. vol. 1, p. 704.) Even those to whom no special revelation was made were able to be saved, even if they had heard nothing of the law of Moses, nor knew nothing about it, since that law was not given to all, but only to the Jews. Whence these others did not sin if they did not keep the observances of the law. But it is otherwise for the law of Christ, which has been proclaimed to all. Yet they were saved by an implicit faith in the redeemer, when they put an implicit faith in God’s knowledge, or in things that they learned indeterminately from God, whoever they were. This is just as the great among the Jews, as regards things that were not yet revealed to them, as long as they do not stubbornly hold to something contrary, against one preaching the faith.

Reply Obj. 4: Although nature was not sufficient through itself for knowledge of a redeemer, yet it was sufficient with the written law in the time of the law, and helped by grace before the law.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that explicit faith is necessary to direct one’s intention to the ultimate end. And through sin man had been led away from that end, and could not be led back except through the mediator of God and men, the Lord Jesus Christ. Therefore after sin it was necessary that one have an explicit knowledge about the redeemer, and chiefly as regards those things by which we have been led back to the end, in the overcoming of the enemy by whom we have been held captive. Now, so that we might be led back to the end, four things were required. The first is that our champion might be appointed, which occurred in his birth. The second is that he would fight on our behalf, which occurred in his Passion. The third is that he would overcome, which occurred in his Resurrection, when by overcoming death he opened the way to eternity. The fourth is that he would make everyone partakers of his victory, and this will be in the judgment, when he will render good things to the good, and bad to the bad. And therefore principally these things needed to be known explicitly about the redeemer. Yet it is possible that, according to diverse time periods, the distinction and explication of these increased before the coming of Christ, so that to the degree that these periods were closer to the coming of the Savior, so much more fully did they perceive the sacraments of salvation, as Gregory says. (Gregory the Great, Homiliarum in Ezechielem, bk. 2, hom. 4, n. 9 (PL 76:979).) And in this respect, both of the opinions in the text can be true, the first as regards those closer [to the coming of Christ], and the second as regards those more remote from it.

Reply Obj. 1: John the Baptist knew these articles fully, so he had no doubt about them. However, he was able to doubt, without any prejudice to his salvation, about the other article about the Passion, implicit in that time—namely, about his descent into hell—although he did not do so stubbornly. This is clear, because he asked his to be taught. Or it could be said, as others say, that he himself had no doubt, but he as it were appeared to doubt insofar as he asked, not for his own sake, but for the sake of instructing his disciples. Or it was a doubt not based on ignorance, but on wonder and piety.

Reply Obj. 2: The article about his conception was implicitly contained in the article about his birth, insofar as the former is the way to birth; the article about the descent into hell is in the article about the Passion; and article about the Ascension is in the article about the Resurrection, since the victory of one who rose is completed in it.

Reply Obj. 3–4: Whence the reply to the third and fourth objections is clear

Reply Obj. 5: In Christ’s judgment nothing will be merited for us, but that which he merited before he will render to us.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that, through the sending of the divine persons into us, a man is led to the ultimate end not only after sin, but even before sin. And therefore an explicit knowledge of the Trinity was necessary not only after sin, but even before sin—yet not in the same way before the coming of Christ and after. For before his coming, only the great had an explicit faith about this, but after the Incarnation all are bound to having an explicit faith about the three persons, just as they are about the mystery of the Incarnation, which cannot be known without the distinction of the persons being known, and because the sacraments of salvation are bestowed with the invocation of the Trinity.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle asserted that the things that any man must believe explicitly in any state; but this was not the case with the knowledge of the Trinity.

Reply Obj. 2: For being directed to the end one must know not only the end, but also the things without which one cannot go to the end. And therefore one must have explicit knowledge about the faith in the Trinity, since without their being sent one cannot come to the end of beatitude.

Reply Obj. 3: Because it was not necessary that they believe all things explicitly, therefore the mystery of the Trinity was not stated manifestly in the Old Testament. Rather, it was there in a veiled way, so that the wise could receive it.

Exposition of the text

In the Church also there are some who are less able. (Sent. III. 25. 2 (87). 2.) To the contrary: It is just not enough for salvation that the mystery of the Incarnation be believed, even explicitly. It should be said to this that there is a likeness not as to all things but as to certain ones of the articles of faith, for they do not know how to distinguish those, although they do explicitly recognize what is contained in the articles. Now, they are bound to know explicitly the articles that the Church solemnizes and continually mentions, like the Trinity.

These believe what they do not know. (Sent. III. 25. 2 (87). 2.) This is against what was said above, that the faith is not about things unknown. It should be said to this that just as it is believed implicitly, it can also be implicitly known. Now, “not knowing” means not knowing explicitly.

It is also usual to ask concerning Cornelius. (Sent. III. 25. 4 (89). 1.) It should be known that Cornelius had explicit faith about the mystery of the Incarnation, although it would have sufficed for his salvation even if he had had an implicit faith about it. But he did not have distinct faith about the time of the Incarnation. This is why, since this had just begun to be necessary for salvation, Peter was sent to him to instruct him.

Nor is it also to be omitted that faith, hope, charity, and work are equal in some respect in our present state. (Sent. III. 25. 5 (90). 1.) More will be said below about this equality of habits and working, in Distinction 36. But here it should be known that working here seems to name virtues regulating outward works, such as the cardinal virtues, which also have interior acts, which is where this equality must be found. Or, if he is speaking about outward works, an equality can be found as to the formation of the work rather than the quantity of the act, for sometimes a person does works that are lesser in kind, but he does them out of greater charity than another person does greater ones.

And so it is not placed after faith and hope because it arises from them. (Sent. III. 25. 5 (90). 1.) To the contrary, in Matthew 1:2 it says: Abraham begot Isaac, Isaac begot Jacob. That is, faith begets hope, hope begets charity. It should be said to this that it is understood as to the act, not as to the habit.

Not that faith and hope precede . . . in cause or time. (Sent. III. 25. 5 (90). 2.) To the contrary: Someone may have faith who does not have charity, like someone who approaches baptism under false pretenses, only having faith. It should be said to this that he is speaking about faith and hope as virtues.