D. 40 - The last two precepts

Division of the text

Having considered the precepts of the Decalogue that look to one’s exterior deeds and speech, here the Master sets forth the two last precepts, which look to the desire of the heart.

And about this he does three things:

first, he enumerates these precepts;

second, he introduces questions about them, at but it seems that the commandment about not coveting a neighbor’s things is the same as the one that says: You shall not steal; (Sent. III, 40.1(162).1.)

third, he summarizes what he has said, and continues to the subsequent one, at you have heard the ten chords of lute. (Sent. III, 40.3(164).2.)

As regards the second part, he proposes two questions.

The first is about the difference between these precepts and the other precepts of the Decalogue.

The second is about the difference between the entire Old Law and the New, which takes its origin from the solution to the first question, at but since here the desire of another’s wife and another’s thing is forbidden, why is the law said to restrain the hand, but not the soul? (Sent. III, 40.1(162).2.)

And as regards this he does three things.

First, he proposes the question and resolves it.

Second, he proposes a question about the effect of the letter of the Old Law, at but if it is asked which is the letter that the Apostle describes as killing, 'it certainly is the Decalogue.' (Sent. III, 40.2(163).1, quoting Augustine, De spiritu et littera, ch. 4, n. 6, and ch. 14, para. 25 (CSEL 60:170, 179; PL 44:203, 215).)

Third, he briefly presents the difference between the letter of the Gospel and the letter of the law, at but the letter of the Gospel differs from the letter of the law because different things are promised. (Sent. III, 40.3(164).1.)

Question 1

The last two precepts

Here four things are asked:

first, about the assignment of these precepts;

second, whether it is true that the law of Moses restrains only the hand;

third, whether the same law justifies and kills;

fourth, whether it promises eternal or earthly things.

Article 1

Whether the two precepts about desire, or concupiscence, are fittingly assigned

To the first we proceed thus. It appears that these two precepts are not fittingly assigned.

Obj. 1: For negative precepts are ordered to the prohibition of sins. But the sin of the heart and of deed are one thing, as was said in Book II. (In II Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 1.) Therefore the desire for adultery and theft should not be forbidden by a different precept than that about adultery or theft.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as one can sin in the heart and deed with theft and adultery, so one can with murder and the other sins. But the other precepts—whether the negative or the affirmative ones—are not divided by desire and deed. Therefore neither should the precept about theft and adultery be divided in this way.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, nothing that can be done licitly should be forbidden by the law. But someone can licitly possess the home of his neighbor, insofar as he might buy it. Therefore he can licitly desire it. Therefore this desire should not be forbidden by the law.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as it is possible to sin desiring the things of one’s neighbor, so too [it is possible to sin] in the desire of curiosity, which Augustine says is the desire of the eyes, (Augustine, De vera religione, ch. 38 (CCSL 42; PL 34:153).) and likewise in the desire of honors and the like—in regard to which desires there are even diverse virtues and vices. But the precepts are given for the sake of leading men to the virtues, and to forbid vices. Therefore diverse precepts should have been given for all these desires.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, everything contrary to a precept is a mortal sin. But the first motions that come from a corrupt desire are not mortal sins. Therefore no precept should be given about not desiring.

I answer that the intention of law is that men be led to virtue. Now, for a virtue it is not enough that the act of the virtue be done in whatever way; rather, the man must act knowingly and willingly and for the sake of an appropriate end, with perseverance and delight. Likewise too, it is not enough that a contrary act be set aside in just whatever way, but only if the will for doing it be also abandoned, and the emotions inclining one to the illicit act be ordered. And therefore the precepts of the Decalogue should forbid not only illicit acts, but even the desire for illicit things.

Reply Obj. 1: The sin of the heart and deed, as is said in the same passage, when joined together, are one thing. But because sometimes one sins in the heart without it reaching action, then the sin of the heart is distinguished from the sin of the exterior act. And this is why it is forbidden by a different precept.

Reply Obj. 2: The affirmative precepts command some good act. Now, the good arises from diverse things united for its perfection, which is from one and entire cause, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 30 (PG 3:730).) Therefore by this very fact that some good act is commanded, all the conditions required for goodness are implied. And therefore the affirmative precepts were not distinguished as regards the same genus by a precept of a deed and one of the heart.

However, a sin that is forbidden by a negative precept occurs in many ways because of individual defects, as Dionysius says. And therefore diverse precepts can be ordered to the diverse things that can lead to sin. Nevertheless, it is more important that the sins of theft and adultery be divided in this way by diverse precepts than that murder or the other sins be so divided; for the good in and of itself moves desire, and the objects of theft and adultery are temporal goods. This is why even the desire for these things, without its going forth into action, through itself contains a certain delight. This does not happen in murder, the object of which is causing harm to one’s neighbor, which of itself is more likely to cause horror than delight.

Reply Obj. 3: One cannot licitly possess the home of one’s neighbor without ownership having been transferred to another, and then it is no longer one’s neighbor’s home. And therefore the desire, or concupiscence, for the house is not forbidden simply speaking, but the desire for the house of one’s neighbor. For the very name “concupiscence,” because it indicates an intensity of desire, appears to express a certain excess, and thus evil.

Reply Obj. 4: The desire of curiosity, which happens through the eyes, traces back to the desire for the delight of the flesh—to which also the delights of the other senses trace back, as to what is more foundational. However, the desire for honor, esteem, or the like traces back to the desire for temporal goods, the worth of which is measured by money. And thus it is clear that desire, or concupiscence, is in some way forbidden by these two precepts, according to the rule given above about understanding the precepts. (Above,* d. 37, a. 2, resp. 1, ad 2, and resp. 3.)*

Reply Obj. 5: A law is given only to one who has reason. This is why only that desire that reaches a consent of reason, which is a mortal sin, is directly forbidden by a precept of the law. Now, the desire that occurs in the first motions [of the emotions] is not against the law, but is outside the law; and therefore it is a venial sin.

Article 2

Whether the Mosaic law restrains only the hand, or even the mind

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST I-II.107.1, ad 2; In Psalmos 18.) It seems that the Mosaic law ought to restrain not only the hand, but also the mind.

Obj. 1: For ordering one’s mind to virtue and holding it back from sin belong to the same thing. But the Mosaic law orders the mind to virtue, as is clear in Deuteronomy 6:5: you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart. Therefore it also restrains the mind from sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, desire is in the soul. But the Old Law restrains one from desire, as is clear in the last two precepts. Therefore it restrains the mind from sin.

Obj. 3: One might say that it does not restrain every desire.

On the contrary, as was said, every desire is forbidden under these last two precepts. But these last two precepts are given in the Old Law. Therefore it restrains the mind from sin entirely.

Obj. 4: You might say that this should be understood [only] in reference to the ceremonial precepts.

On the contrary, the ceremonial precepts of the law did not command one to abstain from any sin, but rather what one should do as a figure [of something to come]. Therefore they do not restrain the hand more than the mind.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the law of Moses is more perfect than the civil law. But the civil law restrains not only the hand but even the mind; otherwise it would not lead one to virtue, which consists principally in the mind. Therefore the Mosaic law restrains not only the hand but also the mind.

On the contrary, the New Law is more perfect than the Old Law. But nothing can be more perfect than a restraint of both the mind and the hand. Therefore they are not both restrained in the Old Law.

Furthermore, in Matthew 5:22 the Lord adds to the precepts of the law pertaining to an exterior deed, something regarding the interior act of sin: for example, about wrath. This would not be so if the Old Law restrained the mind. Therefore the Old Law does not restrain the mind.

Furthermore, nothing restrains the mind except grace. But the Old Law did not confer grace. Therefore it did not restrain the mind.

I answer that the coercion of law, according to the Philosopher at the end of the Ethics, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.9, 1180a4‒12.) is necessary so that those whom persuasion does not incline to the good might be coerced through penalties. Whence the restraint of the law extends as far as inflicting a penalty through the law. Now, just as the Old Law promised weak souls only earthly things, so too it inflicted temporal punishment for sins—an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. However, temporal punishments for sins cannot be inflicted on the mind except insofar as the sins burst forth into an exterior act; for otherwise one cannot make any judgment about them. And therefore the Old Law was said to restrain the hand and not the mind. But the New Law promises and threatens eternal things as reward and punishment, and eternal punishment is inflicted by that Judge who is the searcher of the heart. And therefore it restrains not only the hand but also the mind. This is clear in the precept: you shall not kill, for the transgression of which the Old Law killed a man, whereas the New Law threatens eternal punishment for interior wrath: every one who is angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment (Matt 5:22)

Reply Obj. 1: By its affirmative and negative precepts, the law ordered the mind to virtue and drew it back from vice. Yet it was not able to order any penalty against the such [mental] transgressors of precepts, in virtue of which penalty it is said to restrain or coerce. And therefore it does not follow that it restrains the mind.

Reply Obj. 2: And through this, the solution to the second objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 3: The law forbids every desire as regards its genus, yet it does not restrain one from all of them by punishments, but only from the ones that burst forth into action.

Reply Obj. 4: The ceremonial precepts called for sacrifices for certain sins, but not for sins of the heart, the way it did for sins of action. And thus, the ceremonial precepts restrained the hand more than the mind.

Reply Obj. 5: The civil law, although it intends to lead one to the virtues through the restraint of punishments, nonetheless coerces not the mind through punishments, but only the hand.

Article 3

Whether the Old Law made one just

To the third we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II.98.1; 100.12; Super Rom. 2, lect. 3; 3, lect. 2; Super Gal. 2, lect. 4; 3, lect. 4.) It appears that the Old Law justified and did not kill.

Obj. 1: For Matthew 19:17 says, if you would enter life, keep the commandments, and he is speaking of the commandments of the Decalogue, as is clear in the same place. But no one enters life unless he is made just. Therefore the Old Law justified, that is, made one just.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, law is a certain teaching of justice, since it is the art of equality and goodness. Therefore it can make one just only by teaching justice. But the Old Law taught justice, for I should not have known what it is to covet if the law had not said, 'You shall not covet' (Rom 7:7). Therefore the Old Law justified.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, everything that removes the dispositions to, and causes of, sin does not kill, but justifies. The Old Law did this by forbidding sin. Therefore and so on.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in natures it so happens that as each thing occurs for the most part, so is it naturally apt to occur, as is said in the Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics 2.8, 199a10; Aquinas, In Physic., bk. 2, lect. 13, n. 3.) Therefore if the Old Law for the most part killed, then so was it naturally apt to kill. But everything that has a nature ordered to killing is evil. Therefore the Old Law was evil—which is false.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, death did not follow from the Old Law except as occasioned by it. But death follows even from the New Law as occasioned by it: we are the aroma of Christ to God . . . among those who are perishing, . . . a fragrance from death to death (2 Cor 2:15–16). But the New Law is not said to kill on account of this. Therefore neither should the Old Law be said to kill, but to justify.

On the contrary, the written code kills, but the Spirit gives life (2 Cor 3:6), and this is speaking of the written code of the Old Law. Therefore the Old Law did not make one just.

Furthermore, the man who practices the righteousness which is based on the law shall live by it (Rom 10:5), and a Gloss says, he who is made just by the works of the law has a temporal reward, not a reward with God. (Augustine, Expositio epistulae ad Galatas, para. 21 (CSEL 84:81; PL 35:2119).) But true justice has its reward with God. Therefore the Old Law did not make one just.

Furthermore, he who is made just by his works is not made just gratuitously. But the justification of the law can occur only through works. Therefore, since true justification occurs gratuitously, as is clear from Rom 3:24, it appears that the law did not justify.

I answer that, the law in a certain way justified, and in a certain way it killed.

To understand this, note that to “justify” here can be taken in two ways: in one way, it is to cause justice, and in another way to teach justice. Now, justice is of two sorts: a certain justice is acquired, and another justice is infused. Acquired justice is caused by one’s deeds, and civil law makes men just in this way, insofar as it causes the habit of justice in those who observe the law through the exertion of deeds. And in this way the Mosaic law was also able to make one just, by causing acquired justice. But we are not concerned with this justice at present. However, infused justice is from God alone as its agent, and this is why a law cannot induce it through one’s deeds. Rather, such justice is induced through the New Law, because grace, which formally makes one just, is bestowed on one through its sacraments. Of course, the sacraments of the Old Law did not bestow grace, as will be said in Book IV, (In IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 5.) and therefore the Old Law in no way made one just as causing grace, but as teaching justice. For the form of justice consists in the observance of its commandments. Now, the letter of the law is said to kill both as regards both its moral and ceremonial precepts, but in different ways. It kills as regards its ceremonial precepts, speaking essentially, because when the time of grace was revealed, they began to be lethal. But as regards its moral precepts, it kills only incidentally, insofar as, by the law itself forbidding a sin while not offering the help of grace against it, the weak received the threat of sin in three ways. First, because from the very fact that it reminded of sin the one in whom the desire for the sin was not extinguished, the desire blazed up in him again, like when water is shown to someone who is thirsty. Second, because from the very fact that the sin was forbidden it is, as it were, placed on a certain height as something difficult to possess, and thereby a human mind subject to the sin is more vehemently drawn to it, as is written in Proverbs 9:17: stolen water is sweet. Third, because the law, by forbidding, added a specific guilt to the sin, insofar as not only has one transgressed the natural law, but one was then also a violator of the written law.

Reply Obj. 1: The observance of the law’s commandments is necessary to attain eternal life, since without it one who has time to act cannot enter eternal life. Yet the observance of the law’s commandments was not enough to attain life unless the mode of charity is joined to it, which the law was in no way able to cause. And therefore it did not perfectly make one just.

Reply Obj. 2: To teach justice is not to make one perfectly just, but only to dispose one to it. However, there is a law—that is, the New Law—that causes justice as its efficient cause, through sacraments that bestow grace.

Reply Obj. 3: This proves that the law did not kill, speaking essentially, but it did make one just, speaking in terms of disposition.

Reply Obj. 4: That argument would follow if the cause of death came from the law. But it did not come from it; rather, it was more ordered to the contrary. But the cause of death arose from the sin of those who were given the law. This is like the cause of death not being the sun, if those with a fever die while standing in the sun.

Reply Obj. 5: In the New Law there is no failure that it cannot render just again, as there was in the Old Law. And therefore an occasion for death could be derived from the Old Law more than from the New Law. For no occasion for death follows upon the New Law, except for those who despise it, since it offers help to those who wish to observe it. But the Old Law occasioned death even for those who wished to observe it, when they failed on account of weakness.

Article 4

Whether the Old Law promised only temporal things or also eternal things

Quaestiuncula 1

To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.91.5; 99.6; 107.1.ad 2; Super Rom. 8, lect. 3; 10, lect. 1.)

Obj. 1: It appears that the Old Law promised not only temporal things, but also eternal things. For in the law what is promised is asserted as the reward of the law. But God promised his very self, who is the eternal good, as Abraham’s reward; this is clear in Genesis 15. (A possible reference to Genesis 15:1: fear not, Abram, I am your shield; your reward shall be very great.) Therefore it promised not only temporal things, but eternal.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is promised in the law is the reward of virtue. But the reward of virtue ought to be better than virtue. Therefore, since virtue is better than every temporal reward, it appears that the law should not promise earthly things.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is opposed to the notion of virtue should not be present in the law. But it is contrary to virtue, and can corrupt it, that its acts be done for the sake of an earthly good. Therefore the promise of earthly things should not occur in the law.

On the contrary, a man can be appropriately motivated to act rightly only for things that he holds as valuable. But the carnal people to whom the Old Law was given held only temporal goods as valuable. Therefore the promise of such things should be given them.

Furthermore, it is not the spiritual which is first but the physical (1 Cor 15:46). But the Old Law was given first. Therefore in it there should be not a spiritual promise, but a temporal one.

Quaestiuncula 2

Moreover, it appears that the Old Law does not differ from the New by their roots being in fear and love. (Parallel text: ST I-II.107.1.ad 2.) For the difference within a law does not follow from the diversity in those who observe the law, but rather vice versa. For a law is a rule and measure of those who observe it. But whether one does something from fear or love arises from diverse dispositions of those observing the law. Therefore the two laws are not distinguished in reference to this.

Obj. 1: For the difference within a law does not follow from the diversity in those who observe the law, but rather vice versa. For a law is a rule and measure of those who observe it. But whether one does something from fear or love arises from diverse dispositions of those observing the law. Therefore the two laws are not distinguished in reference to this.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one fruitfully keeps the law unless he observes it from love. But in the state of the Old Law there were many who observed it in a fruitful way, those deserving eternal life due to this. Therefore the Old and New Laws are not distinguished by fear and love.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a servile fear—which the fear is divided against love—looks to punishment. But the threat of a greater punishment is found in the New Law than in the Old, as is clear in Hebrews 10:29, where it says, how much worse punishment do you think will be deserved by the man who has spurned the Son of God? Therefore the New Law rests upon fear more than does the Old.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Augustine, Contra Adimantum, para. 17, n. 2 (CSEL 25:166; PL 42:159).) that the abbreviated distinction between the law and the Gospel is fear versus love.

Furthermore, you did not receive the spirit of slavery to fall back into fear (Rom 8:15), and a Gloss says, the precepts in the Old Law were kept by fear. (source)

Quaestiuncula 3

Moreover, it appears that the Old Law is not more burdensome than the New. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.107.4; Quodl. VI, q. 8, a. 2; Super Matth. 11.)

Obj. 1: For what has something additional in it contains more. But the New Law adds to the Old Law, according to Matthew 5. (Matthew 5:20–48.) Therefore it contains more, and so it appears to be more difficult.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, to the degree that a state of virtue is more perfect, so does it hold a greater difficulty, since art and virtue are concerned with the difficult and good, as is said in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.3, 1105a9.) But the state of the New Law is more perfect than the state of the Old. Therefore the New Law is more difficult.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, light burdens should be placed on the weak and small. But those who were under the Old Law are likened to the small, and those under the New to men who have been perfected, as is clear in Galatians 4. (See Galatians 4:1–7, 21–31.) Therefore the New Law is heavier than the Old.

On the contrary, Matthew 11:30 says, my yoke is easy, and my burden is light.

Furthermore, Peter says of the Old Law, why do you make trial of God by putting a yoke upon the neck of the disciples which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear? (Acts 15:10). Therefore and so on.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, according to Dionysius in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 5, n. 2 (PG 3:502).) the New Law is a middle between the heavenly Church and the state of the Old Law. And therefore the eternal good, which is manifested clearly and fully in the heavenly Church, is promised manifestly in the New Law, whereas it was promised in the Old Law only under certain figures. Whence Hebrews 10:1 says, the law has but a shadow of the good things to come. And this was for three chief reasons. First, so that from these figures they might come to know, and become accustomed to hoping for, greater things from God. Second, so that not only their knowledge but also their affection might be led by the hand toward eternal things. Third, because eternal goods could not be shown to them immediately, as the price had not yet been paid; whence a delay of the [eternal] promises would render the promise ineffective with the weak.

Reply Obj. 1: Wherever eternal things are being promised in the Old Law, this is under a certain figure and likeness of temporal things. And following this, God even establishes himself literally as Abraham’s reward, insofar as he rewards him in the multiplication of his seed and in the bestowing of Promised Land. Or it could be said that this should be understood of the promise made commonly to all under the Old Law, but not of the one that was made specifically to certain perfected men, who belonged to the New Law.

Reply Obj. 2: Temporal promises are not put in the law as the rewards of the virtues, but as certain incentives to virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as doing something from fear of punishment is against the notion of perfect virtue, and still it leads one to virtue, so too does doing something from fear of temporal retribution. And therefore just as in the law there is a threat of punishment, so too can there be a promise of temporal reward.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that from the very mode of their law-giving it is apparent that the Old Law is a law of fear, and the New Law a law of love. For the New Law took its beginning from a display of divine charity, since the New Covenant was consummated in the pouring out of the blood of Jesus Christ, who was the sign of the most perfect charity. However, the Old Law took its beginning in a manifestation of divine power, which inspires fear; whence too in the very giving of the law, on account of the lightning, the voice, and the thunder, terror seized those listening to the point that they said, let not God speak to us, lest we die (Exod 20:19).

And therefore the Old Law led men chiefly through its threat of punishments, whereas the New Law did so through blessings shown and hoped for. And this was sufficiently fitting to the state of the human race, such that first as an uncultivated people it was coerced by fear of punishment, and later it would be perfected in the good by love. For just as fear is the path to love, so the Old Law is to the New.

Reply Obj. 1: This difference is drawn not only from the side of those observing the law, but also from the manner of giving the law, as was said.

Reply Obj. 2: Those who observed the Old Law from love were perfected. Whence they belonged to the New Law, wherein is found the state of perfection.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the New Law threatens greater penalties, still the threat of the penalties is not the principal inducement in the New Law, as it was in the Old. Rather, it is the promise of rewards and the recollection of blessings that incite one to love. And therefore the New Law has as its principal root not fear but love.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that the difficult and burdensome is measured according to the strength of the one enduring it, for something is burdensome to the weak that is light to the strong. And therefore we can speak of the burden of the law and the Gospel in two ways: either as regards the heaviness of the precepts according to themselves, or through their comparison to the power of those observing them.

If we are speaking in the first way, then as regards number the precepts of the Old Law were more burdensome. For the Old Law draws together many precepts for ceremonial and judicial matters, whereas the New Law has only precepts regarding moral matters, ones that even the law of nature commands, and they are contained in one short phrase: the love of God and neighbor. But as regards the explication of these precepts, in this way the precepts of the New Law are in a certain way more difficult. For the power of the moral precepts is more explicit in the New Law than in the Old, and the New Law adds the counsels, although it is not coercive as regards them, and the New Law even forbids certain things that the Old Law permitted, as a concession to weakness, such as the bill of divorce, and the like.

However, if we are speaking in the second way, then the Old Law was absolutely speaking more burdensome—both because it did not bestow the help of grace to fulfill the commandments, as does the New Law, and because the Old Law coerced one by way of fear to what the New Law leads one from love, which makes all things light.

Reply Obj. 1: The New Law’s addition to the Old is either as regards the counsels, to which the New Law does not obligate one, or even as regards making explicit things that are implicitly held in the Old Law. Whence from this it cannot be concluded that the New Law is heavier.

Reply Obj. 2: The virtuous man does with delight things that pertain to virtue, as is said in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.9, 1099a12.) And therefore however difficult they are, perfect virtue does them more lightly than one lacking virtue does easy things—the latter being is saddened by the fact that he must abstain from illicit delights.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as he who is straightening a bent stick bends it in the contrary direction so that thereby it might become straight, as is said in the Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.9, 1109b4‒10.) so too for the sake of those striving for virtue things should be arranged such that those who have been more bent away from the rectitude of virtue would be more drawn away from contrary vices. And on account of this too heavier burdens are placed on the penitent than on the innocent. And thus even greater burdens were to be placed on a carnal and stiff-necked people, to drive out its hardness, since nonetheless they would not exceed its measure; this is like how a narrower diet is imposed on the sickly and a stricter discipline on children.

Exposition of the text

Nor his handmaid, and so on. (Sent. III, 40.1(162).1, quoting Exodus 20:17.) Note that someone’s handmaid could be desired in two ways. In one way, as a concubine—and in this way this pertains to the sixth precept—and in another way as property—and in this way it pertains to the seventh.

You have heard the ten chords of the lute. (Sent. III, 40.3(164).2.) By the “ten chords of the lute” are understood the ten precepts of the law. For just as so great a minstrel as David, by the music of his cither and lute, expelled the evil spirit from Saul, as is said in 1 Sam 16:23, and killed a bear and a lion, as is said in 1 Sam 17:34, so too Christ, who is signified by David, striking our hearts as a lute with the ten precepts, kills the beasts of all the mortal sins in us, and perfects the virtues by which one reaches eternal life, wherein we may live with Christ through all ages of ages. Amen.