D. 33 - Cardinal virtues
Division of the text
After considering the theological virtues, here the Master considers the cardinal virtues. And this is divided into two parts:
in the first, he considers the cardinal virtues themselves in virtue of themselves;
in the second, he shows in whom they have existence, at they were and are most fully in Christ. (Sent. III, 33.2(121).1.)
The first is divided into three:
in the first he enumerates them;
in the second, he shows their acts, at concerning these Augustine says; (Sent. III, 33.1(120).2.)
in the third, he shows in what way they are called “cardinal,” at these virtues are called cardinal. (Sent. III, 33.1(120).3.)
They were and are most fully in Christ. (Sent. III, 33.2(121).1.) Here he shows in whom are the cardinal virtues, and it is divided into two parts:
first, he shows that they are and were in Christ;
second, he asks whether they will be in heaven, at there is a little question as to whether these virtues, since they begin to be in the mind . . . cease to be when they have brought us to things eternal. (Sent. III, 33.3(122).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 14, ch. 9 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1046).)
And regarding this he does two things: first, he states the question, and second, he answers it, at Augustine in book 14, On the Trinity*.* (Sent. III, 33.3(122).1.)
Here there are three questions.
The first is about the moral virtues in common. (Q. 1.)
The second is about the cardinal virtues. (Q. 2.)
The third is about their parts. (Q. 3.)
Question 1
Moral virtues
As regards the first, four things are asked about:
first, the distinction of the moral virtues from each other—for how they are distinct from the intellectual and theological virtues was explained above; (Above, d. 23, q. 1, a. 7.)
second, their efficient cause: whether they are from nature, or by infusion, or by acquisition;
third, about the mean that is required in them.
fourth, whether they are emptied in heaven.
Article 1
Whether all moral virtues are one virtue
Quaestiuncula 1
To the first we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST I.20.4.) It appears that all the moral virtues are a single virtue.
Obj. 1: For Augustine says in On the Customs of the Church, I would have assigned no virtue except the highest love of God. (Augustine, De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum, ch. 15 (PL 32:1322).) But the love of God, which is charity, is one virtue, as is clear from things said. Therefore all the virtues are only one virtue.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, where what is formal is one there can only be material diversity. But all the moral virtues agree in a single formality, since they all hold the complete notion of virtue, insofar as they are receptive to intellect and reason, as is said in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.13, 1144b26.) Therefore they differ only materially, and do not differ in species.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the apprehensive powers are more divided than the appetitive, not less. And therefore so are its habits, since they are proportioned to their powers. But there is one cognitive habit of all that pertain to the moral virtues, as is clear in the moral science, and prudence itself, which is right reason about all things that can be done, as is said in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.5, 1140b4–30.) Therefore also the moral virtues should not be distinguished in species.
On the contrary, essential accidents are distinguished into species only due to the differences of the subjects placed in their definitions. But the moral virtues are also in diverse subjects, since some are in the rational part, some in the concupiscible, some in the irascible—and always in the same ones, since temperance is never found in the irascible, and so on. Therefore it appears that the moral virtues are distinguished into species.
Furthermore, in the same subject there cannot be multiple forms of a single species. But many moral virtues can be in the same thing, even in the same part of the soul; for example, fortitude and gentleness are simultaneously in the irascible part. Therefore they differ in species.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that the other moral virtues are not distinct from prudence. (Parallel: ST II-II.47.5.) For with things that are divided by opposition, the one is not placed in the definition of the other. But prudence is right reason, which is also placed in the definition of the moral virtues, as is clear in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.2, 1103b32.) Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from prudence.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, for an act of virtue only awareness and activity are needed. But prudence causes this, since a prudent man is not only aware but also active, as is said in the Ethics 6 and 7. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.5, 1140b5; 7.2, 1146a8.) Therefore the same as before.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as prudence is right reason about things that can be done, so too art is right reason about things that can be made, as is said in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.4, 1140a21.) But in things that can be made, there are not any performative habits distinct from the arts that are the directive habits. Therefore in the things that can be done neither should we distinguish performative moral virtues from their directive prudence.
On the contrary, the moral virtues are distinct from the intellectual virtues, as was said above. But prudence is an intellectual virtue, as is clear in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2–3, 1139b10–1140a20.) Therefore it is distinct from the moral virtues.
Furthermore, habits are distinguished through their acts. But Augustine assigns a different act to prudence than to the other moral virtues, as is clear in the text. (Sent. III, 33.1(120).2, referencing Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 14, ch. 9 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1046).) Therefore they are distinct from one another.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that neither are the other moral virtues distinct from the other three [cardinal] virtues noted in the text. (Parallels: ST I-II.61.4; II-II.123.2; 141.2; De virtutibus, a. 12, ad 23; De virtutibus cardin., a. 1, ad 1; Sent. Ethic. II, lect. 8.) For a part is not divided against its whole. But all the other virtues, Cicero says, (Cicero, Rhetorici libri duo qui uocantur De inuentione, bk. 2, cc. 53–54.) are parts of them. Therefore they are not distinct from them.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the properties of spiritual realities are investigated from their names, as is clear from Dionysius. But the name “temperance” indicates a certain moderation and measure; likewise, the name “fortitude” indicates incapacity for failure relative to difficult things; and the name “justice,” an equality or straightness—this is why we call the just “equal” and “ruled,” as is clear from the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1129a33.) Therefore, since these things are required in every moral virtues, it appears that the other moral virtues are not distinct from them, nor are they from each other.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, every sin is expelled only through a virtue. But every sin is expelled through justice, as is clear in the justification of the impious. Therefore the other moral virtues are not distinct at least from justice.
On the contrary, nothing is primary, or principal, relative to its very self. But these virtues are called “cardinal” or “principal” relative to the others. Therefore they are distinct from them.
Furthermore, habits are distinguished through their acts and objects. But diverse specific matters are assigned to these virtues, as will be clear below. (Response to qa. 1.) Therefore they are specific virtues that are distinct from others and from each other.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that because whatever is for the sake of an end is made determinate according to the requirements of the end, powers and habits that are ordered to acts as to their ultimate perfection must be distinguished according to their diverse acts. This is like how even the potentialities of matter are distinguished through their relation to diverse forms. Now, not every diversity of acts makes a difference of the powers and habits, but only one that is due to the diversity of the objects from which the acts are specified, the way a motions [are specified] from their destinations. However, the difference of destinations that makes a diverse species of motion comes from that notion according to which it ends the motion. Whence, the fact that a fall ends at water or on land does not make a diverse species of local motion, since the local motion was not toward the earth or water as such, but insofar as they were downward—whereas generations that end at the forms of water and earth do differ in species. And likewise diverse objects do not divide acts specifically unless theirs is a diversity that follows that notion according to which it is an object. For to see the white and the black are not specifically diverse acts [of sight], since each of them is the object of sight according to one notion—namely, insofar as they are colored things that are actually visible through light. And thereby it happens that insofar as some habits or powers are more immaterial, so to that degree are they more universal, and are less distinguished [from each other]; for they attend to a more universal notion of their object—just as to the five proper senses there corresponds a single common sense, and also one imagination.
Nevertheless, note that, since sometimes there are many habits in one power, a certain diversity is enough to distinguish habits that is not enough to distinguish powers. For a power stands to its act in a different way than does a habit; this is why even the object stands to each according to a different notion. For a power is a principle of acting absolutely speaking, whereas a habit is a principle of acting readily and easily. And therefore what corresponds to the power is the object according to that notion by which it relates to act simply speaking, whereas what corresponds to the habit is the object insofar as it relates to the facility of the act.
And therefore the diversity of the matter or object in its order to things that cause facility in the act makes a diversity of habits, but not a diversity of powers. And this is why in speculative concerns, the diverse sciences are caused by a diversity of the matter insofar as it can be made determinate through diverse middle terms and principles, from which arise the facility of the consideration. For example, natural science, which demonstrates from effects and things that are apparent in sensation, differs from mathematics, which cannot proceed from the same principles and middles as regards its own matter. However, what the principle and middle of demonstration are in speculative concerns is what the ends are in practical concerns, as is said in the Ethics 7. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.8, 1151a16.) For we proceed from the intention of them to things that are for the sake of the ends just as we proceed from axioms into conclusions. And therefore all the moral habits are distinct according to their relation to the end, from which first is taken the difference of the good and the evil; for “good” indicates the end, as is said in the Metaphysics 10, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.4, 1055a10–13; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 10, lect. 5, nn. 2027–28; see also Metaphysics 3.2, 996a24; 12.7, 1072b1–25.) whereas “evil” a deviation from the end. And thereby of this virtues are distinguished from vices, and within the virtues, where there is found a diverse notion of the good there are specifically diverse virtues. Now, the good toward which the human virtues are immediately ordered is the good of reason, being against which is man’s evil, as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 32 (PG 3:734).) And because the good of reason is not found in all moral matters in the same way, as is clear, therefore the diverse moral virtues must be different in species.
Reply Obj. 1: As was said above, (Above, d. 27, q. 1, a. 2.) love is of two sorts. One is natural, and this is found in all virtues; whence this love is not appropriated to charity but is common to all virtues, and if Augustine is speaking of this love, it is clear that he is not showing that there is only one virtue. However, the other is animal love, which, insofar as it is in the higher appetite and is gratuitous, does pertain to charity. And this love is indeed found in all the virtues, but not as the same as them through its essence, but insofar they participate in it, inasmuch as they are commanded by charity.
Reply Obj. 2: What belongs to reason and intellect is not partaken of in the same way in the matters of all the moral virtues. For the mean of reason is correctly found in diverse ways in the diverse matters. And therefore such a diversity of matter causes a diversity of form and species, just as happens in natural things when diverse matters are not proportionate to receiving a form of a single notion.
Reply Obj. 3: In all moral concerns there is found one notion of the true, which is the contingent truth founded in human action. And this is why they pertain to one cognitive act. However, a diverse notion of the good is found in them, in virtue of which the order of reason is established in diverse things in diverse ways. And therefore on the side of the appetitive part, the habits that are called “moral virtues” must be diverse.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that, just as speculative reasoning is said to be “right” insofar as it conforms to the first principles that it possesses, so too practical reasoning is said to be “right reason” insofar as it conforms to the right ends. Now, the inclination to the end pertains to appetite, and therefore in the Ethics 6 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139a24.) it is said that the truth and rectitude of practical reason is present insofar as it stands in conformity to right appetite. However, an appetite relative to something is right naturally, relative to its ultimate end, insofar as everyone naturally wishes to be happy; on the other hand, relative to other things the rectitude of the appetite is cause by reason, insofar as the appetite in some way participates in reason, as is said in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.13, 1102b15–16.) And because prudence rectifies the reason, therefore other moral virtues besides prudence are required to rectify the appetite in things wherein it is not rectified naturally. And because the good of reason is not found in the same way in reason itself and things that have the rectitude of reason by participation, the moral virtues are specifically different habits than prudence.
Reply Obj. 1: When certain things are divided against each other and yet equally receive a common predication, then one is not placed in the definition of the other. But when a common [name] is predicated of them through an order of prior and posterior, then the first is placed in the definition of the others, the way that substance is placed in the definition of accidents. And on account of this, prudence is placed in the definition of the other virtues—[prudence] being that wherein the good of reason is found primarily, and the notion of virtue being found [in the other virtues] as a consequence. For what is so through its essence is prior to what is so by participation.
Reply Obj. 2: The prudent man is active by discovering the things that are for the sake of the right end. But besides this, there must be moral virtues that rectify the intention and the inclination toward the end, which is needed even for a man to be active.
Reply Obj. 3: The good of an art is established in an exterior reality brought to perfection through the act of the art, but the good of behavior is established in the one performing it. And therefore in things made by art, as long as someone perfects that good, it does not matter to the notion of the art how the one doing it stands as regards his will for the action—whether he be of firm purpose, or he works with pleasure, or not. On the other hand, it does matter for the perfection of a moral virtue. And therefore in moral matters there must be present habits rectifying the appetite, but not in artificial matters.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that, as was said, the habits of the moral virtues are diversified by the good of reason, which is established essentially in reason’s very judgment, which pertains to prudence, but by participation in the things disposed by reason, and this looks to the moral virtues. Now, reason orders or disposes a moral matter—that is, human acts and emotions—in three ways. First, it does this by ordering the emotions themselves through actions in virtue of themselves, inasmuch as it leads them back to a mean according to a certain commensuration. And in this way it is said to put a “mode” into them, since “mode” indicates measurement. Second, it does this by ordering the subject to the actions and emotions themselves when they have already been ordered in the first way, namely, such that a man firmly adheres to the things that reason has ordered. Third, it does this in an order to something outside to which our acts must be proportioned—whether it be the end, or another man, or whatever else is external. And the rectitude or equality in the virtue is caused in reference to this.
Therefore these three things—the mode, the firmness, and the rectitude—are found in all moral virtues. But in certain matters of the virtues the good of reason attends chiefly to one of them, while in certain others to another, insofar as the natural power that the habit of a virtue perfects itself falls short more in this one or in that one. Whence the whole intensity of reason and virtue is brought to bear where nature falls short. A clear example is how bodily delights are connatural to us, and therefore it is most difficult in such things to hold on to the mode; and on account of this, the virtue that concerns them, namely temperance, chiefly ascribes mode to itself, and so too it takes that name [moderation]. Likewise, man naturally flees death, so too it is most difficult to persevere firmly in deadly dangers; therefore fortitude, which concerns such, ascribes firmness to itself, and so it is named. And likewise, rectitude is sought chiefly in interactions with others, so justice, which concerns such things, has it name from rectitude. And so it is even with the other moral virtues, since they are distinct in species insofar as the good of reason is found in them in diverse ways according to one of the stated ways, according to a condition of its matter.
Reply Obj. 1: The other virtues are not said to be subjective parts of these, but rather integral parts, and that does not prevent their being distinguished from them. This will be clearer below, throughout the whole of Question 3.
Reply Obj. 2: These virtues are denominated from what is primary, or principal, in them. Now, what is primary in the one is not primary in the other, as is clear from things said already, and therefore nothing prevents them from being distinct. Yet note that the saints and the philosophers are found to speak in two ways about such virtues. For sometimes they speak about them insofar as they are specific virtues that possess a determinate matter—for example, when they attribute to temperance the restraint of sexual pleasures. However, at other times they speak of them insofar as they have a certain generality, inasmuch as what they take their name from, and wherein their perfection primarily consists, is extended to other matters and virtues. For example, when they attribute to fortitude one’s strong perseverance not only in mortal dangers, but even in any danger whatsoever. But the first is called [“fortitude”] properly, whereas the second is so by an appropriation or by extension.
Reply Obj. 3: There is a certain general justice and a certain special justice. Special justice is the justice that has its determinate matter in interactions relative to others, according to the notion of what is owed. And in this sense [justice] is here being asserted to be one of the four cardinal virtues. In the other way justice is called “general,” and in two ways. In one way, insofar as it is a certain rectified state of the soul itself, insofar as a man is ordered in the way he ought to be, both in himself and to others; and in this way the impious are said to be made just. In another way, insofar as it is the same as every virtue, differing from them only in notion, insofar as someone orders his act of virtue to the common good, according to the command of the law. This happens in the acts of all the virtues, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1129b12–20.) we will make this more clear below. (Below, aa. 2, 3.)
Article 2
Whether the moral virtues are in us by nature
Quaestiuncula 1
To the second we proceed thus. (Parallels: In I Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 3; In II Sent., d. 39, q. 2, a. 1; ST I-II.55.1; 63.1; De veritate, q. 11, a. 1; De virtutibus, a. 8; Sent. Ethic. II, lect. 1.) It seems that the moral virtues are in us by nature.
Obj. 1: For Damascene says, the virtues are natural, and are naturally and equally in all of us. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 14 (PG 94:1046).) Antonius says the same thing as well in his exhortation to the monks. (Athanasius, Vita et conversatio Antonii, ch. 20 (PG 26:871).)
Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Physics 2, (Aristotle, Physics 2.1, 192b35; Aquinas, In Physic., bk. 2, lect. 1, n. 7.) things caused by natural principles are by nature. But reason is among the natural principles in a man. Therefore, since the virtues proceed from reason, it appears that they are natural.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, man is the most perfect of all the animals. But in the other animals by their nature there is present a disposition to doing the things that befit them—for example, in swallows their disposition to make nests. Therefore, since the virtues are nothing other than inclinations to deeds that befit man, it appears that the virtues are natural things implanted in man.
On the contrary, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 23 (PG 3:726).) natural goods are not lost through sin. But the virtues are so lost. Therefore they are not natural.
Furthermore, we do not habituate ourselves to things that are from our nature. But in the works of virtue habituation is helpful. Therefore the virtues are not from our nature.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that they cannot be acquired by our acts. (Parallels: In II Sent., d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, ad 6; ST I-II.51.2; 63.2; De virtutibus, a. 9; Sent. Ethic. II, lect. 1.) For continence, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 7, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.1, 1145a35–b5.) is something less than virtue. But we cannot acquire continence from our acts: I perceived that I would not possess continence unless God gave her (Wis 8:21). (The RSV has “wisdom” for “continence.”) Therefore much less can the other virtues be acquired from our acts.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in nothing is something acquired through any action unless it receives some reality through the actions. But one who acts, insofar as he acts, receives nothing, indeed, he more sends something forth from himself. Therefore no virtue is acquired from the very fact that one acts.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, nothing acts beyond its own species, since an effect cannot be nobler than its cause. But the activities that arise before virtue do not belong to the virtues, but only to the natural powers. Therefore, since virtue is nobler than an activity that comes only from a natural power, it appears that virtues cannot be acquired through activities of this sort.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, one activity cannot cause the habit of a virtue, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, 1098a16–20.) And likewise, neither can many, as it seems, since many activities cannot occur simultaneously, and what does not exist does not act. Therefore in no way are virtues acquired from our actions.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says, in On Memory and Recollection, (Aristotle, On Memory 2, 452a27; Sent. De memoria, lect. 6, n. 383.) that custom is as though it were nature. This is why from custom something becomes connatural and easy for a man. But virtue is nothing other than a certain facility and inclination through the mode of nature toward the good of reason, as Cicero says. (Cicero, Rhetorici libri duo qui uocantur De inuentione, bk. 2, ch. 53.) Therefore from a custom a virtue is acquired.
Furthermore, in action evil is not stronger than good. But a vicious habit is acquired by evil actions. Therefore out of good works a virtuous habit is acquired.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that we need not claim that there are any infused moral virtues. (Parallels: ST I-II.51.4; 63.3; De virtutibus, a. 10.) For things that can be caused through natural virtues need not be caused divinely, outside their natural principles—unless this sometimes occurs miraculously, as when health is so restored, which nature can also restore, although not so quickly. But we can attain the moral virtues through natural principles, as has been shown. Therefore we do not need virtues to be infused into us.
Obj. 2: For any act to be perfect it is required only that it be a rectified and a meritorious act. But an acquired virtue is enough to rectify an act, and charity is enough to render it meritorious. Therefore we do not need infused moral virtues.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the virtues that God works in us without us are qualities of the mind, as Augustine says, (Augsutine, Contra Iulianum, bk. 4, ch. 3, n. 15 (PL 44:743); De libero arbitrio, bk. 2, ch. 19 (CCSL 29; PL 32:1268).) and are not in powers affixed to the organs. But some of the moral virtues, as has been said, (Above, a. 1, qa. 1, sed contra 1.) are in the irascible and concupiscible parts, which are not parts of the mind as they are affixed to the organs. Therefore such virtues, at least, cannot be infused.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, moral virtues are called “moral” from “mores,” as is clear in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.1, 1103a17.) But what arises from our mores is not something infused. Therefore the moral virtues cannot be infused.
On the contrary, [Wisdom] teaches self-control and prudence, justice and courage (Wis 8:7), and these four touch on the four cardinal virtues, as the Master teaches in the text, (Sent. III, 33.1(120).2.) which are moral virtues. But God’s wisdom teaches not only by instructing but also by moving one’s affect. Therefore such virtues are also infused.
Furthermore, all the virtues are present in baptized infants and those who have just repented of their sins. But they cannot be acquired, since the former do not participate in their own act of virtue, as is said in the Ethics 1, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.9, 1100a1–6.) nor can one act of contrition suffice for acquiring all the virtues. Therefore all the moral virtues are also infused.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that the infused virtues also do not differ from the acquired in species. (Parallels: ST I-II.63.4; De virtutibus, a. 10 ad 7–9; De virtutibus cardin., a. 4.) For an agent does not make something specifically different because it is outside the thing; whence, the eye of one born blind that God restores is of the same species as the eye he causes in some other creature. But the infused virtues differ from the acquired according to their first agent. Therefore they do not differ in species.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, habits are specified by their acts and objects. But the object and the act of infused and acquired temperance are the same. Therefore they are not specifically different.
Obj. 3: One might say that their acts differ insofar as the acts of the infused virtues are meritorious, unlike the acts of the acquired.
On the contrary, the act of no virtue is meritorious except insofar as it is formed by charity. But to be formed or unformed does not make a difference in species in the virtues, as is clear with faith, where the difference is in virtue of something extrinsic. Therefore the infused virtues do not differ in species from the acquired.
Obj. 4: One might say that the infused virtues act for the sake of God, but the acquired do not.
On the contrary, God is not the object of the cardinal virtues but of the theological. Therefore, since virtues do not receive their species from their ultimate end, but rather from their object and act, it appears that thereby the acquired and the infused virtues still do not differ in species.
On the contrary, every part placed in a definition makes a thing different in species. But Augustine places infusion in the definition of virtue, according to which God works in us without us. (Augustine, De libero arbitrio, bk. 2, ch. 19 (CCSL 29; PL 32:1269).) Therefore the infused virtue differs in species from the acquired.
Furthermore, two forms of the same species cannot be in a single subject. But the infused virtue exists simultaneously with the acquired virtue, as is clear when in an adult who possesses an acquired virtue comes forward for baptism, who then does not receive the infused any less than does a child. Therefore acquired and infused virtues differ in species.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, just as in natural things some assert that all forms exist in matter, and that the natural agent draws them out from their place of hiding out to the open, insofar as it removes things preventing that form from appearing, (See Aristotle, Physics 1.4, 187b, for the views of Anaximander and Anaxagorus.) so too some also say this about the habits of the soul. This is why Plato said (Plato, Meno 82a‒85d, and Phaedo 72e‒75e; see also Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.1, 71a29‒71b.) that all knowledge is in the soul by its nature, and learning is nothing but recollecting. And similarly, as regards the virtues Damascene appears to say (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 14 (PG 94:1046).) that they are in us from our nature, and impediments to these virtues are taken away through exerting ourselves, just as by removing rust from iron we appear to bring out a brilliance that is naturally in it.
Now, all such opinions are in a certain respect true and in certain respect false. They are true inasmuch as a certain beginning of the things described is from our nature, just as form exists in the potency of matter, and knowledge of conclusions exists in the universal principles, since what is learned in the particular is beforehand known in the universal. The virtues also preexist in our natural ordination to the good of virtue, which is in the reason knowing such a good, and even in the will naturally desiring it, and even sometimes in the lower powers [desiring it], inasmuch as they are naturally subject to reason, and even in some men from their very make-up there is less resistance to the good of reason, according to which the Philosopher says, in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.13, 1144b5.) that some are brave and temperate immediately from birth. This is why Cicero says that the seedbeds, or beginnings, of the virtues are natural. (Cicero, De officiis, bk. 1, ch. 17, para. 54.) However, the stated opinions are false inasmuch as the completion of the forms, in virtue of which they are in act, is from an extrinsic agent. In fact, the completion of knowledge is from teaching or discovery, whereas that of the virtues is from habituation or infusion. And this is why the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.1, 1103a25.) that to receive them is innate in us, but habituation perfects them.
Reply Obj. 1: And through this, the response to the authority of Damascene is manifest.
Reply Obj. 2: Reason is both man’s nature and his reason; whence, from its being reason it adds a certain manner of causing a thing that is above the manner in which it is caused by another naturally. And in this way reason is a principle of the virtues.
Reply Obj. 3: Because he has reason, which gathers things together, man is oriented toward multiple activities that have reason as their principle. This is why man is not provided by nature with thing necessary for clothing himself or defense, as are the other animals with fur and claws; for these determinate tools cannot be suited for such various and diverse activities. Therefore we are given hands, whereby we can make for ourselves whatever things are necessary as befits us from our reason. And similarly, completion could not be in man from his nature, since what is fitting is not the same for all men. For the mean of virtue should be found to be diverse in diverse men.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that some philosophers, whom Avicenna follows, assert that all forms are from the Giver, and that a natural agent makes only a disposition to such forms; Avicenna likewise says (source) even that knowledge and virtue are from the Giver, and through study and exertion the soul is [only] disposed to receiving the in-flowing of the described habits. Now, this position does away with natural power, which is present in every natural principle for the sake of making something like itself to the degree that the matter in which it acts is receptive of its likeness. And this is necessary from the fact that everything that acts, acts in virtue of its being in act; whence everything that actually something must in some way be able to effect that. And therefore every natural principle is naturally apt to induce its own likeness through its own act. Therefore, since the principles of the sciences and the virtues are naturally implanted in us, as was said, it is necessary that the habits of virtues and sciences are completed through actions coming from those principles. And experience attests to this, since something that before was difficult becomes easy and delightful through habituation. And the delight of the activity is even a sign that a habit has been generated. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.3, 1104b4.)
Reply Obj. 1: A man can have no good unless God gives it to him. But some things are had from God without our cooperation, such as things that are infused, some with our cooperation, such as things that are acquired, and some with the cooperation of our nature, such as natural things.
Reply Obj. 2: In the activities of the soul there is a certain gradation, insofar as one power is subject to another, and even in the same power there can be found a higher and a lower, insofar as it is related to diverse objects. Now, the lower is naturally apt to receive from the higher, and therefore through activities coming from natural reason and will, wherein preexist the seedbeds of virtues, a habit is acquired in the irascible and concupiscible [parts of the soul]. And through the activity of will and reason, insofar as they bear on the end and the first principles, the habit of knowledge and that of virtue are acquired in those [parts of the soul] as regards things that are for the sake of the end and as regards conclusions. And in this way a habit is acquired through the activity that comes from the doer, according to which the lower part receives from the higher. However, in the higher part the habit is only natural or infused.
Reply Obj. 3: Just as principles are have more power than conclusions, and even contain them by their power, so too the seedbeds of the virtues that are in the highest part of the soul are of greater dignity than the virtues that are in the lower parts, and the former contain the latter by their power. And therefore activities coming from such principles are like the works of the virtues, and can perfect the habit of a virtue, just as the knowledge of the conclusions is generated from the contemplation of the principles.
Reply Obj. 4: Just as many drops erode stone, insofar as the last acts in the power of all the preceding ones—which themselves only prepare the matter for erosion, but themselves erode nothing—so too the last activity acting in the power of all the preceding ones causes the habit of virtue.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that, as was said, the seedbeds of virtues that are in us are an ordination of the will and reason to the good connatural to us. Now, since man has been ordered by the divine liberality to a certain supernatural good—namely, eternal glory—virtues that are proportioned to that end cannot be caused from these seedbeds of virtues. Whence virtues that order our life to that end must be caused by that which gives us the inclination to that end. Now, this is through the grace of God. Whence, we must have certain infused moral virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: Health restored through a miracle is not ordered to anything different than is the health that arises from nature. And therefore those who have health from natural principles do not need health through miracles. Therefore health is not like the infused virtues, which order someone to something different than do the acquired virtues, as was said.
Reply Obj. 2: The rectitude of an action arises from its proportion to the end. But the proportion of an action is taken in diverse ways for diverse ends. Whence, sometimes an action is rightly proportioned to the civil good that is not rightly proportioned to eternal glory. Whence there must be other, infused virtues, that rectify actions from their proportion to that end.
Reply Obj. 3: The infused and acquired virtues are in the irascible and concupiscible parts only insofar as they participate in reason in some way. And on the side [of reason], they do not have a dependence on a bodily organ, but rather are contained under the mind as also under reason, insofar as they participate in it.
Reply Obj. 4: “Mores,” according to which a virtue is called “moral,” convey a certain inclination of the appetite toward doing good or evil. And because this inclination arises frequently from habituation, therefore mores, spoken about in this way, arise from custom. But the inclination referred to does not always arise from habituation; sometimes it arises from one’s nature, as when one speaks of the “mores of the beasts” in the History of Animals 8, (Aristotle, History of Animals 8.1, 608a24.) and even as a gift from God. And in this way the infused virtues can be called “moral.”
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that the acquired virtues and the infused differ in species—that is, fortitude from fortitude, temperance from temperance, and so on. For, as was said, ends are just like the principles in actions. Now, if there were some science that could not be traced back to naturally known principles, it would not be of the same species as the others, nor would it be called a “science” univocally. Whence, since the ends of the infused virtues do not preexist in the natural seedbeds of the virtues, but rather exceed human nature, the infused virtues must differ in species from the acquired virtues, which proceed from those seedbeds. Whence, they even perfect man in different lives—the acquired in civil life, the infused in spiritual life, which is from grace, according to which a virtuous man is a member of the Church.
Reply Obj. 1: An effect proportionate to its agent differs specifically according to a diversity of agent. Whence animals generated from seed and those generated from putrefaction are not of the same species. Now, although the divine power is capable of all effects and exceeds them infinitely, still there are some effects that can exist only due to the divine power, and such effects are not proportionate to anything else. Whence such effects differ in species from those effects that can also be produced by other causes, even though the divine power can also produce them.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the acts of an acquired virtue and an infused virtue are materially the same, nonetheless the acts are not the same formally. For the circumstances are limited by the acquired virtue according to their proportion to the civil good, but by the infused virtue according to their proportion to the good of eternal glory. This is also why sometimes what is excessive according to the civil virtue is moderate according to the infused virtue, such as when a man fasts, and willingly offers himself to death to defend the faith.
Reply Obj. 3: Insofar as they are meritorious they do not differ in species, except inasmuch as the acquired virtues are closer to merit on account of the end to which they are ordered.
Reply Obj. 4: Although the ultimate end does not cause them to be identical in species, still it does cause a diversity, just as a diversity in genus makes a diversity in species. Still, it should be noted that an actual relation to a remote end does not make the stated difference, but only an original relation to it does so, insofar as a diverse proportion in the act and habit arises from a diversity of end.
Article 3
Whether the moral virtues lie in a mean
Quaestiuncula 1
To the third we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II.64.1; II-II.17.5.ad 2; De virtutibus, a. 13; De spe, a. 1, ad 7; Sent. Ethic. II, lect. 6, 7.) It appears that the moral virtues do not lie in a mean.
Obj. 1: For one cannot find a middle or extremes in something indivisible. But the emotions and activities that relate to the moral virtues are indivisible things. Therefore they do not lie in a mean.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a mean is equally distant from its extremes. But some moral virtues are closer to one extreme than to the other; for example, someone brave is more like someone rash than he is like a coward, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.7, 1115b28; 1116a5–10; 2.8, 1109a10–11.) Therefore the moral virtues do not lie in a mean.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, a mean and its extreme are not the same thing. But virtue is an extreme, since it is the limit of a power, as is said in On the Heavens 1. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.1, 281a11.) Therefore it does not lie in a mean.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, sometimes the evil lies in the mean and good lies in the extreme, at least in one [extreme]. For example, in chastity, as long as a man abstains from sexual conduct, he does not sin; likewise, in magnanimity, which is an extreme in greatness, insofar as it stretches one toward great things; likewise, also in honesty, since a man cannot speak the truth too much. Therefore it appears that the good of virtue does not lie in a mean.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, if virtue is a mean, it is a mean only between two vices. But some virtues are not between vices, such as justice, for if one accepts too much, he sins, but if less is given him, he does not sin. Therefore, not every moral virtue lies in a mean.
On the contrary, there is what the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106b13–17; 1107a17.)
Furthermore, as an art stands to things that can be made by means of it, so does a virtue stand to the deeds done through it. But an art is corrupted through superfluity and deficiency. Therefore so too is a virtue, so it lies in a mean.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that in justice the mean is not something real. (Parallels: ST I-II.64.2; II-II.58.10; De virtutibus, a. 13; Quodl. VI, q. 5, a. 4.) For the definition of the genus should be preserved in each of its species. But in the definition of virtue the mean is placed in reference to reason. Therefore in justice there is a mean of reason, not a mean of some real thing.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the other virtues there is said to be a mean of reason, and not a mean of real things, because the mean is determined in diverse ways according to diverse conditions. For example, what is too much for one to eat is not too much for someone else to eat. But a diverse condition is also observed in justice, since distributive justice does not equally belong to all, but to each insofar as he is worthy of something. Likewise also in commutative justice one is not punished as much for striking a private man as for striking a ruler. Therefore in justice there is not a mean of reality, just as neither is there in the other virtues.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the mean of a virtue should be found in what is rectified and perfected through the virtue. But the end of the virtues is the rectification not of an exterior reality, but of the one acting according to reason. For eupraxia, that is, good action, is the end in all the virtues, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139b3.) Therefore there is no mean of a reality there, but one of reason alone.
On the contrary, the mean that is understood according to a proportion of one reality to another reality is a mean of reality. But justice’s mean is understood according to the proportion of a reality to a reality, as a geometric mean in distributive justice, or an arithmetic mean in commutative justice, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.3, 1131b13; 5.4, 1132a1.) Therefore there is a medium of reality here.
Furthermore, justice is a certain equality. But equality is also a mean in reality between more and less. Therefore also in justice there is a mean of reality.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that there is no mean in the intellectual virtues. (Parallels: ST I-II.64.3; De virtutibus, a. 13; De spe, a. 1, ad 7.) For the mean is found in the emotions insofar as it measured according to reason. But in the intellectual virtues one cannot find anything superior according to which they would be measured. Therefore one cannot find a mean in them.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the mean of virtue is between contrary emotions. But there are no contrary emotions in intellectual matters, since the notions of contrary things are not contrary in the intellect. Therefore in the intellectual virtues one cannot find a mean.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, wherever one can find a mean one can also find extremes that corrupt the mean. But in the intellect one cannot find extremes that corrupt a mean, since the intellect is corrupted by neither by the great nor the small, as is said in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429b3; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 3, lect. 7, n. 688.) Therefore in the intellectual virtues there is no mean.
On the contrary, the mean is found in moral virtues only insofar as they participate in right reason. But right reason is found in intellectual matters prior to being found in moral matters. Therefore the mean is more truly in the intellectual virtues than in the moral virtues.
Furthermore, art is an intellectual virtue, as is clear in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.3, 1139b16.) But the Philosopher proves in the Ethics 2 that there is a mean in virtue from there being a mean in art. Therefore an intellectual virtue has a mean.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that even the theological virtues hold to a mean. (Parallels: ST I-II.64.4; II-II.17.5.ad 2; De virtutibus, a. 13; De caritate, a. 2, ad 10, 13; De spe, a. 1, ad 7; Super Rom. 12, lect. 1.) For in moral virtues there is a mean insofar as their acts proceed from right reason. But the acts of the theological virtues are not against reason. Therefore they also lie in a mean.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, hope is a mean between presumption and despair. But hope is a theological virtue. Therefore the theological virtues are a mean between vices.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the faith walks a middle path between two heresies, namely, that of Nestorius and that of Eutyches. But faith is a theological virtue. Therefore the theological virtues lie in a mean.
On the contrary, Bernard says (Bernard, Liber de diligendo Deum, vol. 3, para. 1 (Bernardi opera; ed. J. Leclercq et H.M. Rochais, 1963, p. 119; PL 182:974).) that the measure of charity is to have no measure. But virtues are said to lie in a mean insofar as they have a measure. Therefore charity does not lie in a mean, and for the same reason neither do the other two.
Furthermore, where it is not possible to render what is equal, one also cannot be excessive. But in things that are for God one cannot render an equal, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 8. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.13, 1163a16.) Therefore excess is not possible in the theological virtues, which have God as their object; and so too neither is a mean possible.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that all moral virtues are constituted in a mean. For the moral virtues concern emotions and actions, which one must direct according to the rule of reason. Now, in all things regulated there lies something right according to which they are made equal to the rule. But equality is a mean between the greater and the lesser. And therefore the right of virtue must lie in a mean between what exceeds the right measure of reason and what falls short of it.
Reply Obj. 1: Actions and emotions, although they are indivisible in their essence, are nonetheless divisible incidentally—whether according to their intensity, or according to time, or according to place, or according to their objects, or according to things of this sort. And therefore in this respect one can also find a mean in them.
Reply Obj. 2: A mean can be found in something in two ways. In the first way, from its comparison to extremes of the same thing, as a middle in a circle; and such a mean must be equally distant from both extremes. In the other way, from its comparison to a certain rule outside it; and in this way the mean need not be equally distant from the extremes, but it need only be equal to the rule. This is clear when wood is cut according to a certain rule, but one does not always take away as much as is left behind. And such a mean is the mean of moral virtue, which has right reason for its rule. This is why sometimes it approaches closer to one extreme than to the other, inasmuch as it conforms to right reason.
Reply Obj. 3: Virtue is an extreme relative to the contrariety of good and evil, since man’s good lies in reason, and so in the extreme of equality to reason. But as regards the contrariety in which the virtues lies, it is in a mean, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1107a17.)
Reply Obj. 4: The mean of virtue is preserved according to all the circumstances together being made equal to reason. Now, it happens in some virtues that, when all the other circumstances have been made equal to it, one cannot find an extreme in something else, since one can find an excess in this only from its comparison to other circumstances. This is clear in the example of the virtue of honesty, since a man cannot speak the truth too much, providing that he is speaking a truth that he ought to speak, and when and where and to whom he ought, and so on. But an excess in this circumstance is found according to the excess in other things, for he who speaks a truth that he must not also speaks too much truth. And so it is in magnanimity [there is no extreme] by reason of too much, and so too in chastity; since a man cannot abstain too much as long as the other circumstances are preserved.
Reply Obj. 5: Virtue is called a mean in two ways. In one way, by reason of the matter that it is concerned with, insofar it makes it equal to right reason; and this belongs through itself to every moral virtue. And in this way it is a mean by participation in the extremes. In another way, it is called a mean by reason of the habit, namely, insofar as the habit of a virtue is a mean between the habits of two sorts of wickedness; and this is a mean through rejection of the extremes. And this is incidental to virtue, nor must it be present in all virtues, and on account of this the habit of justice need not be a mean between two kinds of wickedness, as is said in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.5, 1133b31–32.) Rather, it attains its mean in its matter.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that in justice there must be not only a mean of reason, but also one of a reality. The reason for this is that justice concerns actions, and them according to their order to someone else; whence they take as a rule the one whom the deeds of justice concern. And therefore just as the emotions that the other virtues concern must be made equal to reason, so too the deeds that justice concerns must also be made equal to the one to whom justice is being done. And this can only occur insofar as just as much is rendered to him, according to reality, as is owed to him. And therefore here there is a mean of reality.
But between two things equality can be established in two ways. In one way, insofar as something is rendered to each of them; and herein consists distributive justice, which does not give to each what is equal in quantity, but in proportion, since it gives to each as much as is owed him. And therefore the mean in distributive justice is called a mean according to geometrical proportionality, wherein the same proportion is preserved, but not the same quantity. For example, six is the mean between four and nine, since the proportion it has to four, namely one and a half, nine has to it—even though nine exceeds six by three and six exceeds four by two. In another way, the equality of justice is established between certain people insofar as one ought to receive something from the other because the other beforehand received from the one, and this is commutative justice. And because someone ought to receive from another as much, in quantity, as he gave him, therefore in this species of justice the mean is preserved according to an arithmetic proportion wherein the same quantity is preserved; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.4, 1132a1.) for example, three is a mean between four and two, since it differs from both by an excess unit.
Reply Obj. 1: In justice what is the mean of reason is also the same thing as the mean of reality.
Reply Obj. 2: In justice a person’s condition is considered only insofar as the quantity of the thing varies depending on a person’s conditions. For he who strikes a ruler commits a greater offense, and therefore should be punished more. And likewise it is also clear, in distributive justice, that the diversity of persons redounds to a diversity of the reality.
Reply Obj. 3: In justice the rectification of the deed and the rectification of things coincide, as was said.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the good of the intellectual virtues consists in speaking the truth. Now, truth consists in the intellect’s and the spoken word’s being conformed, or made equal, to reality. And because equality is a mean between greater and lesser, therefore the good of an intellectual virtue must lie in a mean, namely, such one says that reality is so. Now, if [the intellect or words] exceed this, whether into the more or the less, they will be false; this relates to the intellectual virtues the way vice does to moral virtues, and this is insofar as the intellect considers something absolutely. But insofar as it reasons from one thing to another, the mean is found not only according to its being measured by reality, but even according to the conclusions being measured by their principles, or things for the sake of the end [being measured by their ends] in active matters.
Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 10, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1053a31–33; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 10, lect. 2, nn. 1956–60.) the measure of our intellect is reality, and therefore, inasmuch as it is equal to reality, this latter is its rectification. Nonetheless, the principles are also the rule for the conclusions, and understanding is in a certain manner the rule for the principles.
Reply Obj. 2: The contrariety of the emotions approaches the mean of moral virtue. This is why for anger, which does not have an opposite emotion, the mean of the moral virtue with reference to more and less lies in the very same emotion.
Reply Obj. 3: The extremes in the intellectual virtues are not taken relative to a great or a small intelligible. Rather, the extreme is in the direction of too much when something is attributed to something that is not present in it, whereas the extreme is in the direction of the too little when what is present in a thing is denied of it; moreover, falsity occurs in both ways, whereas the truth occurs when what is present is said to be present, or what is not present is said not to be present. And these extremes corrupt not the substance of the intellect, but the truth of the intellect.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that the mean in all virtues that hold to a mean is drawn from the fact that a virtue attains what is equal and fitting in measure within its proper matter. Whence, if there is some virtue that has the measure itself as its matter, there will be no extremes or mean there; rather the good of that virtue would be simply to attain that measure, just as if a virtue’s matter is the truth. Now, the first measure of all things is God himself, as also the Philosopher himself says in the Metaphysics 10. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1053a31–b3; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 10, lect. 2, n. 1959).) Whence the theological virtues, which have God, who is the ultimate end, as their object, and by whom all things are measured, cannot have the notion of a mean. For in that matter there are no extremes, just as also in things that are joined to an evil end one can find no mean.
Reply Obj. 1: Right reason is not for the sake of avoiding extremes in a matter wherein there cannot be an excess.
Reply Obj. 2: Faith is a theological virtues insofar as it adheres to the first truth, and from this side there can be no mean in it, since one cannot excessively adhere to God. But from the side on which one who adheres to the first truth affirms or denies [the articles of faith], there is a mean there, since in this respect it has a likeness with the intellectual virtues.
Reply Obj. 3: Likewise hope does not have a mean insofar it adheres to God, but it does on the side of its subject.
Article 4
Whether the moral virtues will remain in heaven
To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II.67.1; II-II.136.1.ad 1; De virtutibus, a. 4.) It appears that the moral virtues will not remain in heaven.
Obj. 1: For faith and hope are nobler than the moral virtues. But faith and hope will be emptied out of us. Therefore so will the moral virtues.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the moral virtues perfect us in the active life. But this life will cease in heaven, where there will only be contemplation. Therefore also there will also be no moral virtues in the heaven.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the moral virtues deal with the emotions. But these will not exist in heaven. Therefore neither will the moral virtues.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, fortitude and temperance are in the irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul. But according to some, sensitive powers will not remain in the soul when separated from the body. Therefore neither will temperance and fortitude.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, in heaven we will be like the angels of God (Matt 22:30). But those who assert that there is chastity and sobriety in the angels, whom the Philosopher calls “gods” in the Metaphysics 10, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.8, 1074b1–5; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 12, lect. 10, n. 2597.) appear laughable. Therefore they will not be in them.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, patience is an extremely noble virtue because it itself has a perfect work. But it will not remain in heaven, except as regards its fruit, as Augustine says in On Patience. (Augustine, De patientia, ch. 29, para. 26 (CSEL 41:690; PL 40:626).) Therefore neither will the other moral virtues.
On the contrary, such [moral] virtues were most fully present in Christ. But the virtues that are emptied out of us in heaven are the ones that were not present in Christ, for example, faith and hope. Therefore such virtues are not emptied out in heaven.
Furthermore, justice is immortal (Wis 1:15). (RSV has “righteousness” for “justice.”) But a man’s ordination toward his very self is not less necessary than is his ordination toward others, which arises through justice. Therefore the other moral virtues also remain in heaven.
Furthermore, in heaven men will be conformed to God. But these virtues are exemplars in God, as Macrobius says. (Macrobius, Super somnium Scipionis, bk. 1, ch. 8.) Therefore they will also be in the saints in some way.
I answer that all of the described virtues have two acts, one that it exercises over its proper matter, and the other that it has when it attains its end. For example, the brave man, when he is in the danger of battle, exercises his act in its proper matter, namely fears and daring feelings, but when as victor he returns home he has the act of rejoicing over the victory attained through the previous battle. Now, it was said above (In III Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, resp. 3.) that some moral virtues are infused and some acquired, and that the acquired ones direct one in civil life, so they have the civil good as their end. And because this civil society will not remain in heaven, therefore no act of them will remain, neither as regards their end nor as regards their proper matter, in virtue of which they tend toward their end. And therefore these habits are taken away. However, the infused moral virtues perfect us in the spiritual life, according to which a man is a citizen of the city of God and a member of the body of Christ, which is the Church. And this civil society will certainly not be emptied out in the future; rather, it will be perfected. Whence for these virtues the acts that concern the proximate end of each virtue will remain, and therefore the habits of the infused moral virtues will remain.
Reply Obj. 1: Faith and hope are nobler than the moral virtues by reason of their object. But because they have essentially annexed to them an imperfection in their relation to their object, an imperfection that is not annexed to the moral virtues, therefore the moral virtues need not be emptied out, the way hope and faith will be.
Reply Obj. 2: The virtues that perfect one in the active life, even the acquired virtues, need not be taken away when someone enters the contemplative life. Rather, they now have other acts, insofar as they attain their proximate end since the contemplative life is the end of the active life. And therefore Macrobius distinguished three grades of these virtues, insofar as they are present in men. For they are the political, according to which a man is rectified by them in civil acts; the purgative, according to which someone immersed in civil matters longs for the rest of contemplation; but some are said to have a purified mind inasmuch as one, having set aside all exercise of the civil life, applies his entire self to the rest of contemplation. And in this last state, he says that the act of temperance is not to just to refrain from desires, but to have wholly forgotten them, and the act of fortitude is not to conquer [the enemy], but not even to notice him; and so on for the others.
Reply Obj. 3: With respect to acts that they have as regards their proper matters, they will not remain, but [they will] with respect to the acts that they have in the attained end, which is resting from the tumult of the emotions.
Reply Obj. 4: Some say that the sense powers do not actually remain in the separated soul, yet they say that they do remain in the soul’s essence as in their root. And likewise also the habits of the virtues of the lower part [of the soul] remain in the virtues that are within reason and in grace itself, as in their root.
Reply Obj. 5: These virtues are in the angels in a different way than they are in men, and even in heaven. For men have endured emotions of this sort, which have been restrained by these virtues, or they have a nature such that they can endure them—which is not the case with the angels. Whence, in the angels and in God they exist as exemplars, but in men in heaven as virtues of the purified mind. Yet one should note that the Philosopher is speaking of the acquired virtues, which perfect a man in the life of the earthly city, in which life we have no communion with angels. Whence this is not like the virtues that perfect one in the life of the city of God, which is constituted of angels and men.
Reply Obj. 6: Patience is not said to remain with respect to the act that it has as regards tolerating evils. Yet the habit does remain, as does the act that it has in the rest of its proper end.
Question 2
The cardinal virtues
Next, we ask specifically about the cardinal virtues:
first, which, and how many, virtues should be called “cardinal”;
second, their matters and objects;
third, their acts;
fourth, their subjects;
fifth, which of them is more primary or principal.
Article 1
Whether any virtues should be called “cardinal”
Quaestiuncula 1
To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II.61.1; De virtutibus, a. 12, ad 24; De virtutibus card., a. 1, ad 5, 12.) It appears that no virtues should be called “cardinal.”
Obj. 1: For the same virtues that are called cardinal are also called “general”; whence also Cicero assigns parts to them. (Cicero, Rhetorici libri duo qui uocantur De inuentione, bk. 2, cc. 53–54.) But the virtues are distinct from each other, as has been said. Therefore it appears that they should not be called “cardinal.”
Obj. 2: Things that are divided from each other are simultaneous, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Categories 13, 14b33.) and thus one is not more principal or foundational than another. But the virtues divide up the genus of virtue. Therefore no one is more principal than another, and thus one should not be said to be “cardinal” relative to another.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the virtues are divided against vices. But the principal vices are not called “cardinal,” but “capital.” Therefore the principal virtues should be called “capital,” not “cardinal.”
Obj. 4: Furthermore, if they are called “cardinal” because one attains them in eternal life, as is said in the text, (Sent. III, 33.1(120).3.) for the same reason all the virtues should be called “cardinal,” since we merit life by all of them.
On the contrary, the text says otherwise. (Sent. III, 33.3(122).2–5.)
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that the moral virtues should not be called “cardinal,” but rather, others should. (Parallels: ST I-II.61.1; 66.4; De virtutibus, a. 12, ad 24; De virtutibus card., a. 1.) For the theological virtues are closer to the end, since they have the ultimate end as their object. Therefore, since the end is the principle in activities, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 7, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.8, 1151a16.) the theological virtues are more principal or foundational, and thus they deserve the name “cardinal” more.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, charity is said to be the root of the virtues, faith their foundation, and hope their anchor. (See Eph 4:17, Col 1:23, and Heb 6:19, respectively.) But the relation of a root to a tree, of a foundation to a house, and of an anchor to a ship is the same as the relation of a hinge (cardinis) to a door. Therefore the theological virtues can be called “cardinal” just as the moral virtues can.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the intellectual virtues are nobler than the moral virtues because they perfect one in the contemplative life, which is nobler than the active life. Therefore the intellectual virtues deserve the name “cardinal” more than do the moral virtues.
On the contrary, only one of the cardinal virtues here enumerated is intellectual—namely, prudence, which is in a certain way moral. Therefore the cardinal virtues are more in the genus of moral virtues than in the genus of intellectual virtues.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that there should not be said to be so many cardinal virtues as this. (Parallels: ST I-II.61.2; 66.1, 4; De virtutibus, a. 12, ad 25; De virtutibus card., a. 1; Sent. Ethic. II, lect. 8.) For these virtues are in three of the soul’s powers. But among them, only one is foundational, namely, the rational power. Therefore so too among the virtues there is only one that is cardinal.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, if the same virtues are called “general” and “cardinal,” but there are only two general virtues—justice and prudence, as was said before (Above,* q. 1, a. 1, resp. 2; resp. 3, ad 3.)*—then it appears that there are only two cardinal virtues.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, in every power we find something among those things that pertain to that power that is the most principal or foundational. Therefore, if there are three powers in which virtues are present, it appears that so too only three ought to be cardinal virtues.
On the contrary (4), it appears that there should be more than the four. For virtues are opposed to vices. But there are seven capital vices. Therefore the cardinal virtues also should be seven.
Furthermore (5), two cardinal virtues are placed in the rational [part of the soul]: prudence and justice. Therefore likewise two cardinal virtues should be placed in each of the other powers, and since there are three powers, there will be six cardinal virtues.
Furthermore (6), just as prudence is the perfection of practical reason, so too is art. But the rectitude and truth of practical reason consists in its conformity with a rectified appetite, as is said in the Ethics 6; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139a24.) and this occurs through the moral virtues, as was said. Therefore, just as prudence is asserted to be a cardinal virtue among the moral virtues, so too should mechanical art.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that other virtues more deserve to be cardinal than do these. (Parallels: ST I-II.61.3; De virtutibus, a. 12, ad 26; De virtutibus card., a. 1; Sent. Ethic. II, lect. 8.) For each thing is denominated from what is more foundational in it, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.9, 421a16–18; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 2, lect. 19, n. 481.) But the irascible power is denominated from anger (ira). Therefore since gentleness is opposed to anger, and fortitude is opposed to fears and daring feelings, which are also emotions of the irascible part, it appears that gentleness is more a cardinal virtue than is fortitude.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is great in any genus is more foundational within that genus. But magnanimity works great things in all the virtues, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.3, 1123b30.) Therefore it appears that magnanimity is more cardinal than fortitude, since both are in the irascible part.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, a virtue is called “cardinal” as that in which other virtues are made firm. But humility makes firm all the virtues, since, as Gregory says, (Gregory the Great, Homilia in evangelia, hom. 7, para. 4 (CCSL 141:52; PL 76:1103).) someone who gathers the other virtues without humility, as it were, carries dust in the wind. Therefore it appears that humility especially should be considered cardinal.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, penitence calls all one’s failings back to their perfection. But the other virtues remove individual failings. Therefore, since penitence is a virtue, as Ambrose says, (Ambrose, Expositio psalmi cxuiii, serm. 22, ch. 3 (CSEL 62:489; PL 15:1512).) it appears that it most powerfully should be called “cardinal.”
Obj. 5: Furthermore, it is more praiseworthy to give something of one’s own than to give back what is not one’s own. But liberality bestows what is one’s own, whereas justice returns to someone what is his own. Therefore liberality should be a cardinal virtue more than justice should.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that the four virtues here enumerated are called “general,” “principal,” and “cardinal.” For the principle of anything is the most powerful part of it, even more than half of it, as is said in the Ethics 1, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, 1098b7.) and therefore that which is the most powerful in any genus is said to be “principal” in that genus. And because a habit is weighed from its acts, and its acts from its objects or matter, therefore virtues are called “principal” that are about what is most powerful in the virtues’ matter or matters. For example, the most potent element in things that pertain to the concupiscible part of the soul are the delights of touch; this is why temperance, which concerns such delights, is the principal virtue, whereas wittiness, which concerns delights found in play, is a secondary virtue. This is like how the sailor’s art, which pertains to the ship’s end, which is sailing, is principal relative to the art that makes the ship, since the end is the most powerful element in all things; also, in the art that makes the ship, that which produces the form is more foundational or principal than what prepares the matter. And because all things that belong to something are ordered to the most powerful element in it, therefore the principal virtues and arts move by their command the secondary virtues and arts to their proper acts, as the sailing art commands the one that makes the ship. And in virtue of this, the former is called “architectonic” relative to the latter, as though it were its ruler. And because the acts of the thing moved are founded on the action of its mover, therefore the acts of a secondary mover are founded on the principal action the way the motion of a door is founded on its hinge (cardinem). And this is why a principal virtue is said to be “cardinal,” and a secondary virtue is said to be attached to it. Now, everything that is moved by something acts, in the power of its mover, as its instrument. And therefore also the motion of the cardinal virtue is in some way participated in by the virtues attached to it. And in virtue of this, a cardinal virtue is called “general,” as joined to many virtues, [each of which] is called its “part,” insofar as it participates in it in some way.
Reply Obj. 1: They are not called “general” by way of predication, but by a certain participation, as was said. Whence species are not assigned to them, but rather parts.
Reply Obj. 2: Things that divide up something univocally common are simultaneous with each other as regards the intention of the genus, although one can be the cause of the other as regards existence. For example, local motion is the cause of the other motions, against which it is divided. But things that divide something analogously common stand to each other as prior and posterior, even with respect to the intention of the common thing that is being divided, as is clear with substance and accident. Whence, from the fact that one virtue is divided from another it does not follow that one cannot be more foundational than another.
Reply Obj. 3: The perfection of sins is not through their order to the end, but more through their turning away from the appropriate end. Whence the motion of sins do not become like a door through which one enters a house. And therefore the principal sins are not likened to a hinge, so they are not called “cardinal”; rather, they are only called “capital” from the fact that they bring in certain acts of other [sins].
Reply Obj. 4: Although all the gratuitous virtues lead one to the kingdom of heaven, nevertheless they do not acquire the name “hinge” from this fact, but rather the name “doorway.” However, those virtues by which one reaches eternal life, and on which the motions of the other virtues are founded, are properly called “cardinal.”
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the cardinal virtues are so named, as was said, according to a likeness with a hinge, on which the motion of a door is mounted. Now, it is of the notion of a doorway that through it one enters the interior of the house, and therefore that through which one cannot move further into something does not have the notion of a door. However, the theological virtues, because they are concerned with the ultimate end, have nothing beyond them on the side of the object to which they tend. Whence, in the theological virtues one does not find the notion of a door, and on account of this they cannot be called “cardinal.” Likewise, neither can the intellectual virtues, since they perfect one in the contemplative life, which is not ordered to another life beyond it—but the active life is ordered to it. And that is why, because the moral virtues perfect one in the active life, and their acts are not about the ultimate end but about their objects, in both respects the notion of a door remains in them. And this is why cardinal virtues are found only within the genus of moral virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: Although they could be called “principal,” still they are not called “cardinal,” for the reason already given.
Reply Obj. 2: “Foundation,” “anchor,” and “root” name that in which something is firmly mounted as regards its rest. And therefore those names befit virtues that have the end for their object, wherein there is rest. But “hinge” says something on which something else is firmly mounted for its motion, as was said. Therefore this name befits virtues that are concerned with things that are for the sake of the end, through which one moves to the end.
Reply Obj. 3: The response is the same as the first.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that there are only the four cardinal virtues, the reason being that, because the matter of the moral virtues is the things that pertain to the appetites wherein also reason directs, the matter can be considered in two ways. In one way, insofar as it has the notion of what can be deliberated upon and chosen, according to which reason acts concerning this; and this is prudence, which is a mean between the moral and intellectual virtues, as was said above. (In III Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 3.) The other way of considering the matter is insofar as it has the notion of a desirable good. Now, two things pertain to appetite, namely, action and emotion, and the emotion is in the irascible and concupiscible parts. Therefore justice concerns the actions, and fortitude the irascible emotions and temperance the concupiscible emotion. And thus there are four cardinal virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: A hinge is that on which the motion of a door is immediately mounted. Whence a cardinal virtue must be concerned with what is foundational in individual matters, and not merely about what is the foundational principle, which pertains to reason.
Reply Obj. 2: Justice and prudence are called “general” relative to all the virtues. However, temperance and fortitude are not spoken of this way relative to all the virtues, but only relative to the virtues that are connected to them. And this generality is enough to be a cardinal virtue, whereas the preceding generality is not required. Although justice, insofar as it is the same as every virtue, is not the cardinal virtue, as was said. Moreover, prudence is not general as regards its essence, since it is divided against the others, but as regards its matter, because it directs in all moral matters.
Reply Obj. 3: “Reason” sometimes embraces two powers: namely, the cognitive power, wherein is prudence, and the affective power, which is called “will,” wherein is justice, as will be explained below. (Below, a. 4, resp. 3.) However, the concupiscible and the irascible parts are only in the appetitive power, so the account is not alike.
Reply Sed Contra 4: Although the virtues are opposed, nonetheless the principal virtue need not be opposed to the principal vice. For the primacy or principality of a virtue is noted in reference to what is principal simply speaking, since the judgment made about a thing absolutely speaking is the same that made about it relative to the virtuous man, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.8, 1099a22–23.) But the primacy or principality of a vice is determined by how it is more naturally apt to move one away from the rectitude of reason. And these line up in some respects but not in others; whence some capital vices are opposed to cardinal virtues, such as luxury and gluttony to temperance, but some are not opposed to a principal virtue, such as wrath to gentleness.
Reply Sed Contra 5: The irascible and the concupiscible [parts of the soul] do not belong to the cognitive [part] but only to the appetitive. And therefore there cannot be two cardinal virtues in them, as we said there are in reason.
Reply Sed Contra 6: An appetite is said to be rectified in two ways. In one way, in itself, insofar as the things that are in the appetite are ordered; and the moral virtue causes this rectitude. And because prudence conforms practical reason to the appetite so directed, therefore it has a matter in common with the moral virtues, and it works with them in the same activity; an on account of this it is counted among the moral virtues. In the other way, an appetite is said to be rectified from a rectitude that is outside of it. And this is being rectified materially, insofar as it tends to make something rectified outside itself. The rectitude that is in things made by art is of this sort. And in this way a mechanical art conforms reason to a rectified appetite, and therefore it is not counted among the moral virtues.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that, as is clear from things said, every moral matter is traced back to four things that differ either in reality or in notion (for this is sufficient for the difference of habits, as was said before): namely, concupiscible emotion, irascible emotion, and action, and all of these insofar as they are subject to reason; in this way, all of them put on the notion of a single object or matter. Now, among the concupiscible emotions, the chief ones are the delights relative to touch, as is clear from things said; (Above, d. 26, q. 1, a. 4.) and temperance is concerned with them. And therefore in this matter itself there is a cardinal virtue. However, the emotions of the irascible part are chiefly those that arise from a difficulty that is naturally apt to bring about one’s death; and therefore fortitude, which concerns emotions of this sort, is the cardinal virtue in this matter. Now, in actions that concern things that come into the activities of life wherein we act in community with each other, the chief ones are those actions by which things of this sort distinguished from each other. For the stated distinction is the principle of our communal interaction; therefore justice, which attributes to each what is his own, is the cardinal virtue in this matter. However, among the things that reason accomplishes as regards moral matters, the chief one is the choice toward which the deliberation and all things of this sort are ordered; and therefore prudence, which makes the right choice, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.10, 1143a3.) is the cardinal virtue in this matter.
Reply Obj. 1: The same thing is not required for an emotion to be a principal emotion, and for it to be the principal matter of a virtue, and for it to denominate the power. For because denomination arises from what is complete, ultimate, and more manifest, the irascible power is denominated from the emotion of anger, which is the ultimate of the other emotions that are in the irascible part, and a composite emotion, as was said above. But to be a principal emotion requires that the appetite be affected according to the condition of a desirable mover—namely, such that it seek a good and flee an evil. And thus, in the irascible part fear and hope are the principal emotions. But to be the principal matter of a virtue requires that the emotion, by way of intensity, exceed the other emotions in that power, just as temperance is concerned with the delights of the concupiscible part. However, an imminent destructive evil—as are mortal dangers—is naturally apt to cause a more intense emotion than is an anticipated good, or than the desire for retribution for an evil suffered. And therefore there is a principal virtue as regards rash and fearful emotions, which concern dangers of this sort, but not as regards hope or anger.
Reply Obj. 2: That relative to which a virtue is principal should be more principal, or primary, not only in its intensity, but also in its dependency—namely, so that what is principal that does not depend on others, but others are in some way ordered to it. For example, the delights of touch do not depend on other delights, but rather, others are ordered to it; otherwise the notion of being a cardinal virtue would not be preserved in [temperance]. However, the great thing to which magnanimity attends depends on the other virtues, since it works something great in the acts of the other virtues, and therefore it presupposes the other virtues, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.3, 1123b30.) And on this account, magnanimity cannot be a cardinal virtue.
Reply Obj. 3: Humility is called the “preserver” and “foundation” of the other virtues in their existence, inasmuch as it removes an obstacle, namely arrogance, that infiltrates one’s good works so that it they might be made apparent, as Augustine says. (Augustine, Regula tertia uel Praeceptum, n. 2 (PL 32:1379).) But it is not so called on account of the principality or primacy of its matter, toward which the matters of the other virtues are traced back, such that thus the motions of the other virtues are made firm in humility, which would make it a cardinal virtue. However, humility has the same thing for its matter as does magnanimity, although under a diverse notion. For humility has the notion of the small, from its consideration of one’s proper fragility, whereas magnanimity has the notion of the great, from its consideration of divine help or a divine good, whether gratuitous or natural, just as it is a good of reason.
Reply Obj. 4: Granted that penitence is a virtue, it will not be a cardinal virtue, insofar as it presupposes the matters of other virtues, just as magnanimity does, for penitence is feeling the pain of one’s sins. But the matter of sins and virtues is the same.
Reply Obj. 5: Liberality also presupposes justice, since no one can give something of his own unless he have something of his own. And justice causes this. Whence, the act of liberality presupposes the act of justice, and therefore it is not a cardinal virtue, but is annexed to justice.
Article 2
Whether prudence has a specific matter
Quaestiuncula 1
To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that prudence has no specific matter. (Parallels: ST I-II.57.4; II-II.47.4.ad 2; 47.5; De virtutibus, a. 12; Sent. Ethic., bk. 6, lect. 4.)
Obj. 1: For a certain philosopher (Andronicus of Rhodes.) says that the physics, dialectic, and rhetoric are included under prudence. But there is nothing in the world that is not traced back to one of these, since the physics is about things that are by nature, dialectic about the works of reason, and politics about civil deeds. Therefore prudence does not have any determinate matter.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the Ethics 6 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.5, 1140a28.) the Philosopher says that prudence is wholly deliberative. But deliberation occurs even in things that arise from mechanical arts. Therefore prudence is about all these things.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6 that prudence is right reason about things that can be done. But the things that can be done are all the things that pertain to the virtues. Therefore it does not have any matter distinct from that of the other virtues.
On the contrary, every virtue that has matter in its definition has a special and determinate matter. But some matter is in the definition of prudence, for it is right reason about things that can be done. Therefore it has a determinate matter.
Furthermore, it is a specific virtue. Therefore it has a specific object.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that the emotions are not the matter of temperance and fortitude. (Parallels: ST II-II.123.3; 141.3; Super Ethic. II, lect. 8; III, lect. 14, 19, 21.) For in all things that arise from matter or concern a matter, the matter is preserved. But the virtues spoken of calm one from the emotions. Therefore the emotions are not their matter.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, that according to which the virtues are distinguished should be assigned as the matter of the virtues, since habits are distinguished through their objects. But these virtues and those connected to them are distinguished in reference to exterior things—since some are about mortal dangers, some about sexual delights, some about honors, and so on for the others. Therefore exterior things, and not emotions, are their matter.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is common to every virtue should not be assigned as the matter for some specific virtue. But delight is found in all the specific virtues, since one must take as a sign that a habit has been generated that delight occurs in its activity. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.3, 1104b4.) Therefore delight and other emotions are not the matter of any determinate virtue.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3 that fortitude is about fearful and rash emotions, whereas temperance is about desires. Now, these name emotions. Therefore it appears that the matter of these virtues are emotions.
Furthermore, that on which a thing’s form is placed is the thing’s matter. But the form of these virtues is the mean. Therefore, since the mean is placed in the emotions, it appears that the emotions are the matter of these virtues.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that justice is not about actions. For the same thing cannot be the matter and the act concerning the matter. But the act of justice is a certain action. Therefore actions cannot be the matter of justice.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, even exterior actions arise from interior emotions. But justice is not said to be about emotions; rather, the other virtues are. Therefore it is not about actions.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, a virtue that embraces all the virtues does not have any special matter. But justice is like this, as is said in a Gloss on Genesis 1—even specific justice. For among interactions, which commutative justice, which is a species of specific justice, deals with, the Philosopher in the Ethics 5 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.2, 1131a6–7.) places adultery, which concerns the matter of temperance, and malicious murder, which concerns the matter of gentleness. Therefore it appears that one should not attribute any special matter to justice.
On the contrary, there is what the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1129a2.) that justice is about actions.
Furthermore, it is about something that no other virtue is concerned with, namely, monetary gains. Therefore it has some special matter.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that prudence concerns what the deliberation is about, in that it pertains to prudence to do well as regards deliberation by deliberating, making a judgment, and giving a command. Now, deliberation is about contingent actions done by us, so there must also be prudence about this. And because a prudent man is said to deliberate well simply speaking, he must deliberate about things that are ordered to man’s good simply speaking. Now, this consists in the perfection of the soul, whose ultimate perfection is the appropriate activity of the soul’s powers. And therefore prudence is in these things wherein the good of the one acting consists, and these are called “things that can be done.” For things that go out to exterior matter to perfect it are called “makings” more than “deeds,” and the earlier mentioned mechanical art is concerned with such. Therefore things that can be done, insofar as one can deliberate on them, are the proper matter of prudence.
Reply Obj. 1: Physics and dialectic are not contained under prudence as regards the things they are about, but as regards the use and employment of them.
Reply Obj. 2: The actions of a mechanical art are ordered to the perfections of the exterior matter, and not the perfection of the one doing them—except incidentally, insofar as he uses the things that he makes. But this is incidental to the art, so to deliberate well about these things is not to deliberate well simply speaking, but for a certain end. And on account of this, in reference to such someone is not called “prudent” simply speaking, but “prudent in this.”
Reply Obj. 3: Just as the object of the intellect, as the true, and the object of the will, as the good, are the same thing in reality, so too the matter of prudence and of the other virtues can be the same thing in reality by diverse in notion—that of prudence insofar as the matter can be deliberated upon, but that of the other virtues insofar as the matter can be done.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that, as was said, the matter of prudence is the good that can be done by us, the good pertaining to the perfection of the soul. Now, the rectified action of the soul, wherein consists its perfection insofar as it pertains to the active life, consists in two things: namely, in the moderation of the soul’s emotions, and in the appropriate use of exterior things. Therefore, since one must possess the moral virtues to accomplish what prudence has decided upon, there must be certain virtues for both of these things. Therefore as regards moderating the emotions there is temperance and fortitude, and others like them; whence the proper matter of temperance is the emotions that concern the delights of touch, whereas that of fortitude is the fearful and daring emotions in things that are most terrible.
Reply Obj. 1: The virtues do not wholly extinguish the emotions; rather they moderate them. This is why the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2 that some consider the virtues to be incompatible with emotions and quiet, but this is not right. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.3, 1104b24.)
Reply Obj. 2: These virtues are distinguished by exterior things only insofar as it happens that the soul is affected by such emotions in diverse ways. Whence the emotions are their proximate matter, but the exterior things are their remote matter insofar as they are the objects of the emotions themselves.
Reply Obj. 3: Other virtues are not about delights as about their matter; rather, their delight is more a consequence of the act of the virtue.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that not only must a man be moderate as regards his interior emotions but even as regards his exterior actions. But the moderation in them can occur in two ways. In one way, through their order to the agent; and in this way, the notion of moderating exterior actions and interior emotions is the same. Whence this pertains to the other virtues that concern emotions. In another way, through their order to someone else with whom one lives; and in this way it has a special notion of moderation, and therefore a special virtue is required. Whence justice is for this, as are those things that trace back to justice. Therefore the proper matter of justice is our exterior actions insofar as they are ordered to others. Now, exterior things, like money and the like, are the matter of justice insofar as they enter into use; therefore they too are its remote matter.
Reply Obj. 1: The first and principal acts of the virtues are interior acts. Whence, if we posit the exterior deeds as the matter of justice, the act and the matter will not be the same.
Reply Obj. 2: The solution is clear from what was said.
Reply Obj. 3: As is clear from things said, the matter of the virtues is of two sorts: namely, the remote, such as the exterior things that come into the activities of life, and the proximate matter, such as the emotions and deeds. Therefore justice, insofar as it is a special virtue, orders the remote matter of all the other virtues, since the very same things that are naturally apt to bring about violent emotions can be taken up as the matter of one’s action toward someone else. Yet some things are taken up as the matter of one’s action toward someone else that are not strongly naturally apt to bring about emotion, such as money and the like. And therefore whatever is the exterior matter of the other virtues can be the exterior matter of justice, but not vice versa. However, as regards its proximate matter, special justice does not concern the matter of the other virtues, since it does not look exactly at how a man is angered, as long as he does not attack anyone.
Article 3
Whether prudence has an act of virtue distinct from the others
To the third we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.47.6–8; De virtutibus, a. 12, ad 26; De virtutibus card., a. 1; Super Rom. 8, lect. 1; Sent. Ethic. VI, lect. 9.) It appears that prudence does not have an act distinct from the other virtues.
Obj. 1: For, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.10, 1143a3.) prudence gives commands. But to give a command about things to be done appears to be the same as choice, which is the act of a moral virtue, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139a22.) Therefore prudence does not have an act distinct from the other virtues.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the mean is found according to right reason, which pertains to prudence. But to attain the mean in any matter is the act of the virtue concerned with that matter. Therefore the act of prudence is not distinct from the act of the other virtues.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, it belongs to the same thing to act in reference to the end and to act in reference to things that are for the sake of the end. But the different virtues make the right choice about their proper ends. Therefore they also direct the things that are for their ends. But this pertains to prudence, as is said in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.12, 1144a8.) Therefore prudence does not have an act distinct from the other virtues.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139b3.) the proximate end of a virtue is a good action. But prudence directs one to good action. Therefore it directs one to the end of virtue. But this pertains to the other virtues, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106b10–15.) Therefore the act of prudence is not distinct from the acts of the other virtues.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, it appears that the acts of the virtues are not fittingly described in the text. (Sent. III, 33.1(120).2, referring to Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 14, ch. 9 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1046).) For to support the pitiable is an act of mercy [not of justice], and to guard against plots pertains to caution, which some say is [only] a part of prudence.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, to endure troubles does not appear to belong to fortitude, both because to advance toward difficult things appears to be more virtuous, and thus, more to pertain to fortitude; and because to “endure” does not appear to signify an act, but more a lack of motion; and because to endure troubles appears also to be the act of other virtues, such as patience, and charity—which endures all things—and of gentleness; and even because fortitude is not concerned with all troubles, as the Philosopher shows in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.6, 1115a6–7.)
I answer that three things are necessary for the perfection of a moral virtue. The first is the determination of the end; the second, is the inclination to the determined end; the third is the choosing of the things that are for the sake of the end. Now, the proximate end of human life is the good of reason universally; whence Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 32 (PG 3:734).) that a man's evil is to be opposed to reason. And therefore this is intended in all the moral virtues, insofar as the emotions and actions are traced back to the rectitude of reason. However, the rectitude of reason is natural; whence in this way the determination of the end pertains to natural reason, and precedes prudence just as the understanding of principles precedes the science. And therefore the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.7, 1141a31.) that prudence holds the principles as the ends of the virtues.
But this good of reason is made determinate insofar a mean is established in one’s actions and emotions through their appropriate commensuration with the circumstances, which prudence brings about. Whence the mean of moral virtue, as is said in the Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106b28.) is according to right reason, which is prudence. And thus, in a certain way prudence determines the end for the moral virtues, and its act is blended in their acts. But the inclination to that end pertains to the moral virtue that consents in the good of reason through the mode of a nature; and this inclination to the end is called “choice” inasmuch as the proximate end is ordered to the ultimate end. And therefore the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106b36.) that moral virtue makes a choice be rectified.
But the discernment of the things by which we can attain this good of reason, both in deeds and in emotions, is the act of prudence. Whence, the determination of the end precedes the act of prudence and of moral virtue. But the inclination to the end—namely, the rectified choice of the proximate end—is the act principally of the moral virtue, but the act of prudence as its origin. This is why the Philosopher says that the rectitude of a choice is in the other virtues due to prudence, just as the rectitude in the intention of a nature is due to the divine wisdom ordering the nature. And following this, the act of prudence is also blended with the acts of the other virtues. For just as a natural inclination comes from natural reason, so too the inclination of moral virtue comes from prudence, as is the choice of the things that are for the sake of the end, insofar as choice indicates a command of reason about things to be done. But the act of prudence is proper to itself, and is distinct from the acts of the other virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: The choice of the proximate end pertains to the moral virtue insofar as choice pertains to an appetite. But the choice of things that are ordered to that end pertains to prudence, insofar as choice is something of cognition. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.12, 1144a8.) For choice has something of cognition and something of appetite.
Reply Obj. 2: To choose the mean is the act of every virtue in its own proper matter. But to predetermine this mean is the act of prudence.
Reply Obj. 3: A moral virtue’s inclination in a certain way agrees with a nature’s inclination, and in a certain way it differs from it. It agrees with it in that both inclinations are toward a determinate end; but it differs from it in that in natural things, just as the end is determined, so too are things that are for the sake of the end determined, whereas in moral virtues the end is determined, but not the paths to the end—for the mean can be found in diverse things in diverse ways. And because a natural inclination is always in one mode, therefore the inclination of a moral virtue does not suffice in things that are for the sake of the end, but it must be made determinate through a cognitive virtue, namely prudence.
Reply Obj. 4: Not every activity is the end of a moral virtue, but only that which attains the mean wherein is the good of reason. But those activities wherein are sought the appropriate circumstances for the sake of finding the mean are activities that are [also] ends.
Reply Obj. 5: Augustine intends to be considering the acts of the virtues insofar as they are possessed differently here than they are in heaven. And therefore he considers the acts of the virtues in relation to evil, which will not be in heaven. Nor does it matter whether they are are the principal acts of the virtues to which they are assigned, as long as they pertain to it or to some virtue connected with it.
Reply Obj. 6: To endure, insofar as it is an act of fortitude, does not indicate lack of motion, but rather the choice of persevering in troubles for the sake of the good of virtue without the disturbance of immoderate fear. In this it differs from the other virtues, since charity keeps one undisturbed in opposition to hate, gentleness in opposition to anger, and patience in opposition to grief. And this, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.9, 1117a32–35.) is more the act of fortitude than is the advance toward difficulties, insofar as it is more difficult not to flee present evils than it is to head toward evils that do not yet affect one. However, although fortitude is opposed principally to mortal troubles, nonetheless secondarily it is opposed to all other troubles; for in all things the brave man holds up well, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.9, 1117a29–32.)
Article 4
Whether a power of the soul is the subject of any virtue
Quaestiuncula 1
To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.47.6–8; De virtutibus, a. 12, ad 26; De virtutibus card., a. 1; Super Rom. 8, lect. 1; Sent. Ethic. VI, lect. 9.) It appears that no power of the soul is the subject of any virtue.
Obj. 1: For a simple form, as Boethius says, (Boethius, Quomodo trinitas unus Deus ac non tres dii (De Trinitate), ch. 2 (Loeb [H.F. Stewart—E.K. Rand—S.J. Tester, 1973]; PL 64:1250).) cannot be a subject. But the powers of the soul are simple forms. Therefore they cannot be the subject of a virtue.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what the activity belongs to is what the habit belongs to. But powers do not have activities; rather, supposits do. Therefore the soul’s powers are not the subjects of the habits of virtues.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, one lives rightly by virtue, according to Augustine. (Augustine, De libero arbitrio, bk. 2, ch. 19, n. 50 (CCSL 29; PL 32:1268).) But life does not occur through the soul’s power, but rather through its essence. Therefore the virtues are not in powers as in their subject.
On the contrary, a virtue is the ultimate degree of a power, according to the Philosopher in On the Heavens 1. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.11, 281a11; Aquinas, De Caelo, bk. 1, lect. 25, n. 4.) But the ultimate degree is found in what it is the ultimate degree of. Therefore a virtue is in a power of the soul as in a subject.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that temperance and fortitude are not in the irascible and concupiscible [parts of the soul]. (Parallels: ST I-II.56.4; 56.5.ad 1; De veritate, q. 24, a. 4, ad 9; De virtutibus, a. 4; a. 10, ad 5.) For according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.9, 1109a20.) a moral virtue causes right choice. But choice is not an act of the irascible and concupiscible parts, but of free decision. Therefore they are not in the irascible and concupiscible parts as in their subjects, but in free decision.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what belongs to continuous corruption cannot be the subject of a virtue. But sensuality, the parts of which are the irascible and the concupiscible, belongs to continuous corruption; this is why is is signified by a serpent. Therefore the irascible and concupiscible parts are not the subject of any virtue.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the irascible and the concupiscible parts are commanded by reason. But it is unfitting to assert that the acts of virtues are commanded by natural reason. Therefore there are not any virtues in the irascible [and concupiscible parts].
Obj. 4: Furthermore, human virtues should be in that wherein man is distinguished from other things. But this is reason. Therefore they are all in reason, not in the irascible and concupiscible parts.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, contraries are naturally apt to occur in the same thing. But mortal sin is opposed to virtue. Therefore, since its subject can only be reason or will, as every sin is in the will, neither can a virtue be in the irascible and concupiscible parts.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, just as the sensitive appetite serves the will and reason, so too the sensitive apprehensive power serves the intellect. But no virtue is placed in the sensitive power’s apprehensive powers. Therefore none is placed in the sensitive appetite.
On the contrary, the Philosopher in the Ethics 1 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, 1103a3–10.) distinguishes the moral and intellectual virtues, and he distinguishes the moral into those rational by their essence and those rational by participation. But the [moral virtues that are] rational by participation are in the irascible and concupiscible parts. Therefore and so on.
Furthermore, the Philosopher assigns the difference between the self-controlled man and the temperate man in that the self-controlled man suffers the emotion and is not led by it, but the temperate man does not suffer it. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.9, 1152a1.) But this can only be if within the temperate man there is something in the power wherein the emotions are naturally apt to occur. Therefore, since the emotions are in the irascible and concupiscible parts, it appears that there are certain virtues in the irascible and concupiscible parts.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that justice is also in the irascible and concupiscible parts. (Parallels: ST I.21.2.ad 1; I-II.56.6; II-II.58.4; 58.8.ad 1; De malo, q. 4, a. 5, ad 4; De virtutibus, a. 5; Sent. Ethic. V, lect. 1.) For justice is a moral virtue, the subject of which is rational by participation , which is the irascible and concupiscible parts. Therefore justice is in the irascible and concupiscible parts.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, there are three motive powers: the rational, the irascible, and the concupsicible. But justice is not in the rational power, since it is not a cognitive power. Therefore it is in the irascible or concupiscible parts.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the will relates equally to all the deeds of the virtues, for all virtues are voluntary habits. Therefore for the same reason either all virtues are in the will or none of them are. Now, not all the virtues are in the will, since fortitude is in the irascible part and temperance in the concupiscible. Therefore justice is not in the will or reason, as was said. Therefore it is in the irascible or concupiscible part.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, a virtue is in that power as in a subject to which the virtue’s matter pertains. But justice’s matter pertains to the irascible and concupiscible parts, since as regards its exterior matter it surrounds the acts of the other virtues, as was said. Therefore it is in the irascible and concupiscible parts.
On the contrary, Anselm says (Anselm, De veritate, bk. 1, ch. 12, p. 194 (PL 158:482).) that justice is the rectitude of the will preserved for its own sake. But the rectitude of the will is in the will as in a subject. Therefore justice is in the will and not in the irascible and concupiscible parts.
Furthermore, justice consists in an order to someone else. But to order belongs only to reason. Therefore justice is not in the irascible and concupiscible parts, but in reason.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that prudence is not in reason. (Parallels: ST I-II.56.2.ad 3; 56.3; II-II.47.1–2; Sent. Ethic. VI, lect. 4.) For, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.10, 1143a8.) prudence is prescriptive. But to prescribe something pertains to the will, which is the mover of all the powers, as Anselm says. (Anselm, De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae dei cum libero arbitrio, vol. 2, q. 3 (Opera Omnia, ed. F.S. Schmitt, 1946, p. 278; PL 158:534).) Therefore prudence is in the will as in a subject.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it appears that to choose is an act of prudence. But choice is not an act of reason, but of free decision, which is the same as the will. Therefore prudence is not in reason as in a subject, but in the will.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, an involuntary error is more opposed to a habit in reason as in a subject than a voluntary error is, just as it is more blameworthy if a grammarian makes an error involuntarily than if he does so voluntarily. But a sin that someone commits voluntarily is more opposed to prudence than is one that someone does involuntarily. Therefore prudence is not in reason as in a subject, but more in the will.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.5, 1140b4.) that prudence is right reason of things that can be done.
Furthermore, the parts of prudence, according to Cicero, (Cicero, Rhetorici libri duo qui uocantur De inuentione, bk. 2, ch. 53.) are assigned as memory, intelligence, and providence. But these do not pertain to will, but to reason. Therefore prudence is not in the will but in reason.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that substance, which is the subject of all things, receives certain accidents by the mediation of others, and some are caused by the principles of the substance by the mediation of other accidents. For example, it receives color by the mediation of surface, and a flavor is caused by the principles of the mixed body, by mediation of the hot and the cold. Whence the subject of an accident can be assigned in two ways. In one way, it is the substance that is the first foundation of the accidents; and in this way, the habits of the virtues are not in the powers as in a subject, but more in the soul itself, or even in the composite. In another way, its subject is said to be the accident by whose mediation the other accident is in the substance, as surface is the subject of color. And in this way, the habits of the virtues are said to be in the powers as in their subject; for habits are ordered to their acts, and the acts come forth from the soul’s essence by the mediation of a power.
Reply Obj. 1: A form that has neither a matter from which nor matter in which [it exists] can in no way be a subject. But a form that has a matter in which [it exists]—even though it does not have a matter from which—can be a subject. However, it would not be a subject as the first thing sustaining the accident, but as that by the mediation of which the accident exists in the substance.
Reply Obj. 2: Although an activity does not belong to a power as to what performs it, nevertheless it belongs to a power as to the principle of the activity, that by which someone performs it.
Reply Obj. 3: “Living” in one way means the being of what is alive, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 415b13; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 2, lect. 7, n. 319.) and in this way living does not occur through the soul’s powers, but through its essence. In another way, “living” means the activity of what is alive, and in this way living does occur through its powers, which are principles of the activities of life.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that human virtues are things by which a man’s action is rendered good. This is why in every power that is a principle of a human action, there must be the habit of a virtue by which his action is rendered good, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106a15.) or else the man would not be sufficiently made perfect through virtue. Now, the principle of a human action is any power wherein is found something of reason, by which a man has it that he is a man. Whence, since in the irascible and concupiscible parts, which are parts of the sensitive appetite, there is something of reason, by participation, insofar as they can obey reason—unlike with the powers of the nutritive part—there must be certain other virtues in the irascible and concupiscible parts as in a subject; by which virtues those powers they are in become readily obedient to reason. This happens insofar as the emotions are restrained to the point that they do not disturb one’s reason. Whence, in one who suffers the more powerful emotions, but is not led by them, there is indeed a habit in his reason—one that keeps it from being led by them—but not in the powers wherein the emotions themselves occur, as is clear in a self-controlled man. This is why the self-controlled, or abstinent, man is not perfectly virtuous, whereas the temperate or calm man, in whom not only is the superior part is perfected so that it cannot be led astray, but even the lower part is moderated, so that the powerful emotions do not surge forth. And therefore in whatever power there is an emotion for which there is a certain virtue, that power is the subject of that virtue—such as the concupiscible is that of temperance, the irascible that of fortitude and gentleness.
Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139b4.) choice is an appetite, and one of the intellect or reason, for it is completed in the appetite with a preceding inquiry of reason. Whence every appetite to which reason’s command can reach can be a participant of choice, as such—and especially of that choice that is for the end, although that is not the choice about which the Philosopher is speaking there.
Reply Obj. 2: The sensitive appetite, insofar as it is considered in its own nature, is called “sensuality,” and in this way it undergoes continuous corruption; and according to it a man does not differ from a beast, nor can it be the subject of a virtue. But this is not so insofar as it participates in a certain way in reason, and therefore nothing prevents that in this way a virtue can exist in it as in its proximate subject.
Reply Obj. 3: Some virtues are acquired and some are gratuitous. Now, the natural ordination to the good in one’s reason and will is nobler than the acquired virtues. Whence it is not unfitting if their acts are commanded by the natural power, since the virtues that are in the lower parts are obedient to their higher parts in what is natural to them. But the infused virtues are nobler than the natural powers. Yet charity, which is in the will—by the mediation of which reason commands the lower powers—is noblest than all of them. And therefore it is not unfitting that the motions of the other virtues are also commanded by charity.
Reply Obj. 4: Man is distinguished from the beasts not only in that what is essentially rational, but also in what in him is rational by participation.
Reply Obj. 5: A mortal sin is said always to occur in reason not as though every act of mortal sin is the elicited act of reason, since even in the acts of the exterior members there can be a mortal sin. Rather, this is said because no act receives the notion of a mortal sin unless consent is made to it, and likewise no act can be virtuous unless it is ordered by reason. And this latter is the how a virtue exists in the lower powers, insofar as they participate in reason.
Reply Obj. 6: The sensitive apprehensive powers serve the intellect in a different way than sensitive appetites serve reason and will. For the sensitive apprehensive power serves intellect by presenting it with its object, and therefore the intellect participates more in something from sensation than vice versa, whereas the sensitive appetite serves will and reason as its mover, and in this way the former participates in something from the latter. And therefore it is in a certain way rational, that is, by participation, but the sensible apprehensive power is not. And on account of this, the sensitive apprehensive power cannot be the subject of a virtue as the sensitive appetite can.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that justice cannot be in the irascible and concupiscible parts as in a subject, since it is not concerned with the emotions. For it does not pertain to it to moderate emotions, but to moderate exterior actions that are toward others. Whence it must be in that power, as in a subject, toward which pertains the use of exterior things in their order to others. Now, use is an act of the will, according to Augustine (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 11 (CCSL 50; PL 42:982).)—but not absolutely speaking, insofar as the will is for the end, but insofar as it presupposes a composition of reason’s ordering one to someone else. And therefore justice is in the will, taken in this way, as in a subject. For in the will insofar as it is a willing of the end there cannot be any moral virtue, since the will has a natural inclination to the civil and natural good of a man as to its proper subject. But insofar as the will is of things that are ordered to the end, in this way there can be a moral virtue in the will, namely justice, just as prudence too is in the cognitive power.
However, what was said about the subject of justice is consonant with all the things that others say about the subject of justice. For some say it is is in reason—which cannot be so insofar as reason is a cognitive power, but insofar as reason embraces both cognition and affection, in virtue of which the will is said to be in reason. And others say that it is in the whole soul—which is true insofar as the will is the universal mover of all the soul’s powers; whence even the Commentator in his Ethics 5, (Averroes, Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 5, last chapter.) says that it is in both the rational and the concupiscible parts. And a similar account can be given to all the virtues that are not concerned with the emotions, but with activities, such as liberality, magnificence, and the like.
Reply Obj. 1: What is called “rational by participation” is not only the irascible and concupiscible parts, but appetite universally, as he says in the same place. And therefore although the will is by its essence in the intellectual part, still as regards its act it in a certain way participates in reason—and chiefly insofar as it wills the things that are for the sake of the end, which it intends insofar as they are preordained by reason. And therefore it can be the subject of a moral virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: The rational embraces not only the cognitive reason, but even the will, and in this way justice is in the rational part as in its subject.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the will equally holds its command over all matters and acts of virtues, still the matters of certain virtues, like the emotions, also pertain to other powers more immediately. And therefore the virtues that are principally concerned with the emotions are in those powers as in their subject. But the matters of some virtues do not pertain to any power other than the will, and therefore the virtues that concern those matters are in the will as in their subject.
Reply Obj. 4: The matters of the other virtues can be the matter of justice not insofar as they carry an emotion, but insofar as they enter into the use of an activity directed toward someone else.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that prudence is in practical cognitive reason as in its subject. But note that just as there cannot be a moral virtue in the will insofar as it wills the end, on account of its natural inclination, so too it cannot be in reason insofar as it knows about the end, since the end is the principle in activities. Whence, just as in contemplative reason there are innate principles of demonstrations, so in practical reason there are innate ends that are connatural to man. Whence for them there is neither an acquired nor an infused habit, but only a natural one, such as synderesis—in place of which the Philosopher in the Ethics 6 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139a18.) posits [the intellectual virtue of] understanding in the active [powers]. Therefore it is granted that prudence is in practical reason insofar as it is concerned with things that are for the sake of the end.
But because a natural inclination to any end is from the one who instituted the nature, who applies such an order to the nature, therefore the natural inclination of the will to the end is not from reason—except perhaps in virtue of the natural communication by which it happens that an appetite joined to reason naturally tends to conform itself to reason as to its rule. And from this it occurs that the will is naturally inclined to the end, which end is naturally implanted in reason. Whence, since the consideration of the things that are for the sake of the end presupposes a natural cognition of the end, which latter follows the will’s natural inclination to the end, a habit perfecting reason in its consideration of things that are for the end presupposes the appetite’s inclination to the end. And this inclination in the higher appetite—that is, the will—is natural, whereas what is in the lower appetite is from habituation, or from a gift of God, as regards its completion. But a certain beginning of it is from nature, insofar as it is naturally able to listen to reason.
Therefore the prudent man differs from the self-controlled man in this: the man of self-control has a perfect reason as regards the things that are for the sake of the end, yet one presupposing the natural inclination of the will for the end, whereas the prudent man has the same while also presupposing the inclination that comes from an acquired or infused virtue in his lower powers. And therefore prudence, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.12, 1144a31.) has its principles in the other moral virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: Reason also commands by the mediation of the will, insofar as it reaches the conviction that something should be done.
Reply Obj. 2: To choose is an act of prudence as regards what belongs to cognition in a choice.
Reply Obj. 3: This belongs to prudence insofar as it presupposes the inclination of the will and that of the lower powers.
Article 5
Whether the other cardinal virtues are traced back to prudence as to the more principal, or their cause
To the fifth we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST II-II.47.6.) It appears that the other cardinal virtues are not traced back to prudence as to the more principal (Or "foundational.") and their cause.
Obj. 1: For knowing, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.4, 1105b2.) contributes little or nothing to virtue. But prudence is a certain knowledge, as is said in the Topics 4. (Aristotle, Topics 4.2, 122a31.) Therefore it has least of the notion of virtue.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the soul’s passions are healed by virtues. But for someone to be healed bodily it is not necessary that he have the science of medicine; rather, it suffices that someone else has it, and the healing itself is more valuable than is the science of medicine, since the former is the end of the latter. Therefore it is not necessary for virtue that one have prudence, and it itself is the least principal of the other virtues.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 2, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1, 993b24–25; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 2, lect. 2, nn. 292–93.) of things that share a name and a definition, that to which the name belongs primarily is the greatest in that genus and the cause of the others. But the name “virtue,” according to Boethius, (Not found in Boethius; however, see Cicero, De re publica (fragmenta in aliis scriptis seruata), bk. 5, fr. 9.) was extended from fortitude to the other virtues. Whence, too, Wisdom 8:7 understands fortitude by “virtue.” (See perhaps Wisdom 8:7 in the Vulgate: Et si justitiam quis diligit, labores hujus magnas habent virtutes: sobrietatem enim et prudentiam docet, et justitiam, et virtutem, quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus.) Therefore fortitude is the more principal of the other virtues, not prudence.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, that on account of which something else is interrupted is more principal than it. But all the other virtues are interrupted for the sake of justice, as Cicero proves in On Duties 1. (Cicero, De officiis, bk. 1, ch. 10.) Therefore justice, not prudence, is the more principal virtue.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, the opposite of what something is opposed to is what that thing is suited to, as the Philosopher says in the Topics 2. (Aristotle, Topics 2.8, 114a3–10.) But what is opposed to temperance is what is most blameworthy and wicked, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.12, 1119a25–30.) Therefore temperance is the most praiseworthy, and prudence is not.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.12, 1144a31.) that the principles of prudence are found in the moral virtues. But principles are of greater power than are things that come from the principles. Therefore the other moral virtues are of greater dignity than is prudence.
On the contrary, in every genus what directs is the more noble. But it pertains to prudence to direct in all the moral virtues, as is clear from the definition of virtue stated in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106b36–1107a2.) Therefore it is the nobler of the virtues.
Furthermore, habits are proportioned to the powers they are in. But reason, wherein is prudence, is higher than the other powers, wherein are the other virtues. Therefore prudence is the nobler of the virtues.
Furthermore, Gregory says a virtue by which one sees himself capable of more, when without the moderation of reason, hastens to worse dangers. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 1, ch. 32, n. 45 (CCSL 143; PL 75:547).) But the moderation of reason pertains to prudence. Therefore without prudence the other virtues, to the extent that they are greater, are so much more harmful. And thus it appears that prudence is the most powerful among the virtues.
I answer that prudence is the more principal of the cardinal virtues, and to it all the others are traced back as to a cause. Whence Anthony says (Vitae patrum, bk. 4, ch. 42 (PL 73:841); Collat. patrum, bk. 2, ch. 2 (PL 49:526).) that the discernment that pertains to prudence is the mother, custodian, and moderator of the virtues. And this is clear as follows. For virtue, as Cicero says, (Cicero, Rhetorici libri duo qui uocantur De inuentione, bk. 2, ch. 53.) moves one in the manner of a nature, namely, though a certain inclination of one’s affect. Now, every inclination of a nature demands a certain cognition that both pre-establishes the end, inclines one to the end, and provides the things by which one attains the end. For these things cannot occur without cognition. On account of this also the philosophers say that the work of nature is the work of an intelligence; otherwise the things that come to be by nature would happen by chance. And through this moderation, through reason, which prudence perfects and rectifies, the end of the other virtues must be pre-established—not merely the common end, but even their proximate ends, which is to attain the mean in its own proper nature. Now, the mean is determined according to right reason, as is said in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1107a1.) Second, through right reason there is an inclination to their proper end, which inclination is the intention of the end in the acquired virtues insofar as, due to actions regulated by reason, the habit of the virtue causing this inclination is brought about; and with respect to this it is called the “mother of the virtues.” Third, prudence makes straight the path of each virtue that stretches to its end, insofar as, through deliberation and choice, useful things are separated out from harmful, relative to the end of the virtue; and with respect to this it is called the “moderator and custodian” of the virtues. Whence Gregory says in Morals on the Book of Job 2 that unless the other virtues act prudently when they desire, they can by no means be virtues. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 2, ch. 46 (CCSL 143; PL 75:588))
Reply Obj. 1: Knowledge of two sorts. One is universal, and this does either little for virtue, if it is about the acts of virtue, or nothing at all, if it is of other things that do not pertain to virtue. But another knowledge is directive in a particular action that the delight that causes ignorance of the choice corrupts; and this knowledge does much for virtue. Indeed, without it there is no virtue, nor is this without a virtue; and this pertains to prudence. For, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.5, 1140b13–15.) delight corrupts the judgment of prudence.
Reply Obj. 2: Bodily health does not need the art of medicine to perfect a healthy man’s actions, so in this way to have health a man does not need to have the art of medicine himself. But a man cannot perform a virtuous action except through prudence, since the more intensely one has a virtue, the more it harmful it would be without the discernment of prudence, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.13, 1144b9.) and is clear from the authority of Gregory, noted above.
Reply Obj. 3: “Virtue” is the name of a genus, but “human virtue” or “moral virtue” names the species. Therefore, although that which is virtue, as virtue, is found more principally in fortitude, on account of its difficulty, nonetheless that which is moral or human virtue has this from reason, whereby a man is a man and one who has a choice of his actions, as is said in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139b4.)
Reply Obj. 4: What Cicero says should be understood to be about legal justice, which attends to the common good; concerning the same thing the Philosopher too says, in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1129b26–28.) that it is more brilliant than the other virtues, just as the morning star is more brilliant than the other stars. However, this is not said by comparison of one virtue to another, but by the comparison of one’s private good, which virtue attends to simply speaking, to the common good.
Reply Obj. 5: In contraries this does not always follow; rather, sometimes it follows the opposite way. This happens especially in things that are ordered to each other according to the perfect and the more perfect. And therefore what diminishes the perfection of the greater good is not as bad as what takes away even the small good itself that remains.
Reply Obj. 6: Just as contemplative reasoning proceeds to a conclusion from principles that are known through themselves, so too the reasoning of prudence proceeds to a choice and counsel about things that are for the sake of the end from the end itself. And therefore the ends of the other virtues are the principles of prudence. Yet these ends preexist in reason essentially, since a moral virtue tends to it insofar as the appetite is in accord with reason. Whence prudence, which perfects reason, is most of all akin to these ends.
Question 3
The parts of the cardinal virtues
Next we ask about the parts of the cardinal virtues. Concerning this four things are asked about:
first, the parts of prudence;
second, the parts of temperance;
third, the parts of fortitude;
fourth, the parts of justice.
Article 1
Whether memory of past things, understanding of present things, and foresight of future things are the parts of prudence, as Cicero says
Quaestiuncula 1
To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I.22.1; II-II.48; II-II.49.1, 2, 6; De veritate, q. 5, a. 1; Sent. De memoria, lect. 1, nn. 298–99.) It appears that the parts of prudence are badly designated by Cicero.
Obj. 1: For he divides prudence into the memory of past things, the understanding of present things, and the foresight of future things. (Cicero, Rhetorici libri duo qui uocantur De inuentione, bk. 2, ch. 53.) For foresight, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.7, 1141b8–9.) does not extend beyond human goods. But understanding is of even divine things. Therefore the latter cannot be a part of prudence.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, to deliberate well pertains especially to the prudent man, as is said in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.7, 1141b9.) But deliberation is not about past things. Therefore, since memory is of past things, memory does not appear to be part of prudence.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, foresight appears to be the same thing as prudence. Therefore it should not be assigned as a part of it.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, some assign the parts of prudence as foresight, caution, circumspection, and teachability; and it appears this is done badly. (Parallels: ST I.22.1; II-II.48; II-II.49.3, 6–8; De veritate, q. 5, a. 1.) For all these things must come together for any act of prudence. But habits are distinguished through their acts. Therefore the virtues are not distinct from each other.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, teachability is from one’s nature. But prudence is an acquired or infused virtue. Therefore it should not be asserted to be a part of it.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, to be cautious about what is opposed to one pertains to every virtue. Therefore one should not place caution as more a part of prudence than of the other virtues.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, the Philosopher in the Ethics 6 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.9–12, 1142b1–1143b25.) joins three things to prudence: good consideration, good sense, and fairness; and this appears to be done badly. (Parallels: ST II-II.51.1–4.) For he himself says in the same book (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.5, 1140a30–31.) that the prudent man is altogether deliberative. But good consideration, as he says, is good deliberation. Therefore good consideration is the same thing as prudence, not its part.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, good sense is good adjudication. But judgment in things to be done is choice itself. Therefore, since to choose rightly is proper to prudence, it appears that good sense is the same thing as prudence.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 14 (PG 94:1046).) that fairness is the same thing as conviction. But conviction pertains to judgment. Therefore it appears that good sense and fairness do not differ.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, a certain Greek philosopher (Pseudo-Andronicus of Rhodes, Per pathon.) attributes ten parts to prudence: good consideration, astuteness, foresight, and kingly, military, political, economic, dialectical, rhetorical, and natural parts. (Parallels: ST II-II.47.11; II-II.48; II-II.50; Sent. Ethic. VI, lect. 7.) And this appears to be badly done. For there is a certain natural knowledge about things that are necessary, and prudence is not about such, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.6, 1141a1.) Therefore the natural is not a part of prudence.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, dialectic and rhetoric are certain arts and sciences. But prudence is divided against science and art in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.6, 1140b34.) Therefore they are not its parts.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6
that politics is the same thing as prudence. Therefore it should not be asserted as its part.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, there are many other activities in cities besides military activities. Therefore the latter should no more be placed as a part of prudence than should the other duties of the city, like governing, negotiating, and the like.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 8, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.12, 1160a31–b10.) there are three forms of city: namely, the kingly, when there is one who presides, establishing laws, for the utility of the people; aristocracy, when many rule in diverse offices on account of [their] virtue; and timocracy, when the rich preside equally. Now, in all of these there is something of prudence. Therefore one should not place the kingly more than the other two [as parts of prudence].
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that all wholes can be traced back to three kinds—namely, the universal, the integral, and the potential—and similarly, three sorts of parts are found corresponding to these three. For the integral part enters into the constitution of the whole, as a wall is in the constitution of a house; the universal part of a whole receives the predication of the whole, like man of animal; and the potential part receives neither the predication of the whole nor must it enter into the constitution of the whole, but rather it participates in something of the whole’s power, as is clear in the soul. For the rational soul is called the “whole soul” in that all the powers of soul are gathered in it, whereas the sensitive soul in beasts and the vegetative in plants are called “parts of the soul,” because they have something of the power of soul, but not the whole. This is why it says in the book On Plants that they do not have soul, but part of soul. (Pseudo-Aristotle, De plantis 1.2, 817b24.)
And following this, parts of prudence and of the other virtues are assigned in three ways. For in one way they are assigned as integral parts, since certain things that are needed for any virtue, things wherein the perfection of the virtue consists, are the parts of that virtue; and these parts, properly speaking, do not name virtues by themselves, but the one virtue’s conditions that are integral for it. In another way, its parts are assigned as subjective parts, and in this way these parts do name virtues, and they are distinct from each other—but not from the whole of which they are signified as its parts, since it is predicated of them. In the third way, parts are assigned as parts of a potential whole, inasmuch as some virtues participate in something of the mode that is principally and perfectly found in a certain virtue. And this will be clear through the individual cases.
Therefore in this way I say that the parts that Cicero assigns to prudence are its integral parts. For prudence is concerned with particular things that can be done, wherein universal principles are directive, on account of the contingency and variety of these things; and therefore, just as it is said of the sciences in the Posterior Analytics, (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.7, 75a38-b6.) one must take principles from the same genus, so that the prudent man might rightly reason about the things that one must do, from their likeness with other things done. And therefore one needs experience and time, so that from the things that occurred before, which one holds in memory, and from those that his understanding looks upon, he may foresee things to come. For memory, according to him, is that whereby the soul recounts the things that were, understanding that whereby one looks upon things that are now, and foresight that whereby something to come is seen before it occurs. Whence foresight is the completing and formal part of prudence, but the others are traced back to it as though they were its material parts.
Reply Obj. 1: “Understanding” is here taken as the cognition of things that can be accommodated to a deed that can be chosen. And because understanding is properly of universal things, which do not fall under time and thus in a certain way hold on to the form of the present, this is why he says that understanding is of present things, and not only of the universal things—which the prudent man does need in order to reason rightly about things to be done—but also about singulars that exist right now.
Reply Obj. 2: The prudent man does not need memory of past things for their own sake, but in their order to present things that can be chosen, as was said.
Reply Obj. 3: Providence is the formal and completing part of prudence, and therefore in a certain way this prudence even embraces those things from which reason proceeds in its foresight about future things.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, about the other parts that some assign, I say that those too are as integral parts. For they are required for prudence insofar as it makes a conjecture about future matters from past and present matters, from which it proceeds. For a prudent man must find a path accommodated to the intended end—this he does through foresight, which is a present investigation treating a future event—and further, he must remove the obstacles.
Now, one’s foresight can be impeded in three ways. In one way, on the side of the path to be found, which sometimes appears good when it is not; and caution removes this impediment, to which it belongs to discern virtues from vices presenting the appearance of virtues. In another way, from its order to the end, lest the path that is in itself suited for the end be impeded from being able to lead to the end because of something extrinsic. And this pertains to circumspection, which is a wariness abut the contrary vices by which prudence is most of all impeded. In a third way, on the side of the very man aiming at the end, who cannot find paths accommodated to the intended end, so he must receive instruction from others. Whence, the prudent man must either have the practical principles from himself or more readily receive them from another, whereas one who has neither is a useless man, as is said in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.4, 1095b10–14.) And in this way “teachability” is said in the passive sense. However, if “teachability” is taken actively, then it will pertain to prudence according to the latter’s most perfected existence—namely, insofar as he finds things that are useful for the end not only for himself, but even for others; and in this way prudence is said to be for the instructing of the inexperienced.
Reply Obj. 1: It is not against the notion of parts of virtue as integral that all of them concur in one act.
Reply Obj. 2: Although teachability has a beginning in one’s natural disposition, nonetheless it has completion through grace, or through custom, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 1 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.2, 1095b4–5.) that one must be led about civil matters by customs, since such a man has the principles of things that can be done, or he can receive them easily [from them].
Reply Obj. 3: Because prudence regulates all the other virtues, therefore they all participate in something of prudence, just as the irascible and concupiscible parts participate in reason in a certain way. Whence what pertains to the other virtues by participation—namely, caution—pertains to prudence essentially.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, about the parts that the Philosopher lists, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.9–11.) note that they are as potential parts, insofar as they are virtues that are both distinct from each other and from prudence, as he himself says. For it pertains to reason to command what should be done, since other virtues obey reason in some way. However, reason commands only if it is first perfected in itself as regards what is its own, just as no thing moves another before [it acquires] its own perfection. Now, the perfection of practical reason, as with speculative reason, consists in two things: in discovering, and in making a judgment about things found.
However, the discovery in things to be done occurs in deliberation, so one must have the virtue through which reason deliberates. And this is good consideration, which, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.9, 1142b16.) is the rectitude of deliberation, by which the good is sought through fitting means at the appropriate time and with the other circumstances. Also, one must have the virtue by which one judges well about things deliberated upon; and this is good sense and fairness—how these differ will be explained later. And one must have the virtue that commands well, and this is prudence, which, as the Philosopher says in the same place, gives commands.
But because in things that are to be done, the knowledge is ordered to action, both the deliberation and the judgment about the deliberations are taken back to the command about the action, as to their end. And on account of this, prudence uses the others, and is principal relative to the others, and the others participate in its mode, as was said above.
Reply Obj. 1: Both deliberation and judgment pertain to the prudent man, not as his principal acts, but as the things that he uses for his acts.
Reply Obj. 2: The judgment consists in the terms being known, but the choice is the application of that cognition to action. Whence judgment precedes choice.
Reply Obj. 3: Good sense pertains to making judgment in things to which the commands of law extend commonly; whence, good sense is an adjudicative habit about things that can be done. But right judgment about things wherein the law falls short pertains to fairness, which has a special difficulty, wherein equity directs it, as is said in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.11, 1143a20; see below a. 4, resp. 5.) Whence fairness, according to the Philosopher, is equitable right judgment.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, about the ten parts that a Greek philosopher assigns, I say that they are not parts of a single notion, so the division is somewhat artificial. For note that prudence can be considered in two ways: in one way, according to its absolute being; in another way, according to its perfected being. Now, the notion of prudence is preserved in things that pertain to the prudent man himself, but its existence is complete insofar as it extends even to others. Therefore considering prudence in the first way, foresight is as an integral formal part of it, as was said; in virtue of it, prudence is the habit more—that is, better—capable of making a path, so that [the end] might occur as it should. Whence it stands in the place of all the other parts of the same notion.
Now, good consideration is as prudence’s potential part, according to which prudence is the knowledge of things conferred upon—that is, things useful for the end about which one deliberates. And because it itself is first, therefore it is put in place of the other [parts] that follow on it, and they are of a single notion.
However, astuteness is traced back to prudence in the same way that good consideration is, but they differ in this: good consideration finds the mean fitting to the work by reasoning and making inquiry since deliberation is a search, as is said in the Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.9, 1142b1.) but astuteness finds it, as it were, all at once. For it is the habit that suddenly discovers what is fitting, or, as is said in the Posterior Analytics 1, a certain subtlety of finding the means in a non-observable time. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.34, 89b10.) Yet it is not listed as a virtue in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.9, 1142b5.) as good consideration is, both because good consideration relates only to the good, whereas astuteness relates to both good and bad, and because astuteness depends more on one’s natural wits than on habituation. Note also that astuteness is the discovering of the mean without any observable time both in things to be done and in speculative matters, and both in necessary and in contingent matters. But eustochia, which is good conjecture about contingent matters, is used only for things to be done. However, if prudence is considered insofar as it extends to other people, then [the ten parts] are not assigned to it as prudence’s different integral parts, considered absolutely, but only as different subjective and potential parts.
For someone can be coordinated with another in two ways. In one way, according to some specific act, such as students in things that relate to their studies, and soldiers in things that relate to their battles. Whence, this union remains only as long as the act one exercises relative to such coordination with another; and in this way military [prudence] orders things, it being the speculative and practical habit of gather together for an army. In another way, someone is coordinated with others in life, simply speaking; whence, such coordination is naturally apt to remain always, unless it is dissolved accidentally. Now, this is either with respect to those who are of one home—and this is the economical [part of prudence], which is the speculative—that is, deliberative—and practical—that is, active—habit of those who gather together for a home—or with respect to those who are of the same city—and this the political part, which is the speculative and practical habit of those who gather together for a city. Whence, these are subjective parts of prudence.
But in every multitude there is a double order, as is said in the Metaphysics 12: (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.10, 1075a12–15.) one by which the entire multitude is ordered to their common end, and another by which the parts of the multitude are individually ordered relative to each other according to their own proper ends. And therefore the political part [of prudence itself] has two parts. The one belongs to the city’s king, to whom it belongs to make a conjecture about the common good of the whole multitude; and this is called the “kingly” part—which is the experience of one who is to govern the multitude without harming it—or the “law-making” part, as is it is called in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.8, 1141b25.) The other part belongs to each citizen insofar as he is ordered to the common good; and this is just called the “political” part, retaining the common name. And therefore the Philosopher says that the law-making part is architectonic, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.8, 1141b25.) since proximate ends are ordered to the common good. And likewise the military can be divided into the general’s part, which belongs to the general of an army, and the military part, simply speaking; and likewise, the economic can be divided into the paternal, which belongs to the head of the household, and the economic, simply speaking. However, the potential parts of prudence, taken this way, are all the arts and disciplines, since the political makes arrangements about all matters from whom, and how much, one should learn or do, as is said in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.2, 1094a27–b10.) And therefore physics, which is about activities that we do not do, since it is the science of things that happen in nature, and dialectic, which is about activities we do that are ordered to knowing, since it is the science of disputing well, and rhetoric, which is about things we do that are ordered to speeches, since it is the science of speaking well for the sake of persuasion, are all said to be “parts of prudence,” as was said.
Reply Obj. 1: Physics is placed as a part of prudence insofar as prudence makes orders and gives commands concerning it, as was said, but not such that it is a subjective or integral part of it.
Reply Obj. 2: One should say the same thing about the dialectical and rhetorical [parts].
Reply Obj. 3: The political is a certain prudence by which a man is directed in matters that look to others; this is why it names completed prudence. And because not every prudence has such completion, therefore it is listed as a part of it. Yet in one in whom prudence has a complete existence, the habit of prudence and that of politics do not differ in substance, but only in notion.
Reply Obj. 4: Military exercise pertains most of all to the preservation of the community, and therefore its military part is listed here rather than others, like the negotiative part and the like. For they are understood through it, just as the mechanical arts, which in a similar way are parts of prudence, are understood through the liberal arts, which [prudence] touches on.
Reply Obj. 5: Among the other regimes, the kingly is the one with the greater dignity, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 8; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.10, 1160a35.) and therefore the kingly is listed here, rather than the others.
Article 2
Whether self-control, clemency, and moderation are the parts of temperance, as Cicero says
Quaestiuncula 1
To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that the parts of temperance are badly assigned by Cicero, in the Rhetoric 1. (Cicero, Rhetorici libri duo qui uocantur De inuentione, bk. 2, ch. 54; parallel: ST II-II.143.)
Obj. 1: For he says that the parts of temperance are self-control, clemency, and moderation, and this appears wrong because self-control, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 7, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.1, 1145a15–19.) is divided against virtue generally. Therefore it should not be listed as part of any virtue.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, clemency, as Cicero says, is the virtue through which the mind, though moved to hate someone, holds on to its good will. (Cicero, Rhetorici libri duo qui uocantur De inuentione, bk. 2, ch. 54.) Now, this appears to pertain to gentleness, whereas gentleness is not a part of temperance, since it is in the irascible part, whereas temperance is in the concupiscible. Therefore it appears that neither should clemency be listed as a part of temperance.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, “moderation” is said from observing measure (modo). But this is necessary in every virtue. Therefore moderation is not a part of a certain virtue, but follows every virtue.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, Cicero says (Cicero, Rhetorici libri duo qui uocantur De inuentione, bk. 2, ch. 54.) that moderation is the shyness of integrity relating a pure and stable authority. But shyness appears to be the same thing as shame. Therefore, since shame is not a virtue but an emotion, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 4, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.9, 1128b10–16.) it appears that moderation should not be placed as a part of a virtue.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, some say the parts of temperance are sobriety and chastity, and this can be drawn from the Ethics 3; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.10, 1118a23–b8.) and this appears to be said insufficiently. For sobriety concerns the delights of taste, whereas chastity concerns the delights of touch. Therefore, since the other senses have their own delights, it appears that certain virtues should be assigned for them too.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, one can sin not only in the delights of the exterior senses, but even in the delights of the interior senses, and even those of the intellect, as is clear with curiosity. Likewise even in the delights and the desire for exterior things, like honor, money, and the like, that are choice-worthy in themselves, one can sin through excess, as is said in the Ethics 7. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.14, 1154b21–30.) But virtues and vices are about the same things. Therefore one should posit certain virtues about these delights too.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, virtue is about what is difficult and good. But things that not everyone can sustain, like virginity, and abstinence even for necessary food, are more difficult than sobriety and chastity. Therefore the former more than the latter should be listed as parts of the virtue.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, a certain Greek philosopher (Andronicus of Rhodes.) lists seven parts of temperance: namely, seriousness, self-control, humility, simplicity, adornment, good orderliness, and self-sufficiency—and this appears to be done badly.
For seriousness, as he himself says, is the habit according to which certain ones neither bring to others the delights of conversation, nor do they receive them from others. Now, this appears to be vicious and contrary to friendship, which rejoices most in the conversations of friends. Therefore seriousness should not be listed as part of a virtue.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, humility is opposed to arrogance. But the Philosopher places arrogance among the vices that are opposed to fortitude, as is clear in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.7, 1115b29.) Therefore humility is not joined to temperance but to fortitude.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, he says that humility is the habit of not being excessive in costly expenses and undertakings. But whoever is not excessive is content with things that he should be content with. Therefore, since he himself says that this pertains to self-sufficiency, it appears that humility is the same thing as self-sufficiency.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that the parts that Cicero lists are potential parts, insofar as they participate in the measure of temperance. For just as in the sciences one must ask about their measure in reference to their matter, as is said in the Ethics 1, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.3, 1094b11–15.) so too in the virtues. Now, the matter of the moral virtues are human actions and emotions. Moreover, in the emotions there are certain things wherein what occasions the emotion is naturally apt, from its own notion, to move one into action, for example, something delightful that occasions emotions in the concupiscible [part of the soul]. And in these things it is difficult to hold back from acting, and it is easy to follow it out. Whence temperance, which concerns the principal delights, has its measure in holding back; and on account of this, the temperate man is more like the unfeeling man, who is excessive in avoiding [such things], than like the intemperate man, who is excessive in pursuing such delights. However, in emotions wherein the things that occasion the emotion are naturally apt to move one to avoidance, such as as fears and rash feelings, it is difficult to pursue or endure them, but it is easy to flee them. Whence the measure of fortitude, which is concerned with fears and rash feelings about the most terrifying things, is a measure in approaching them; and therefore the brave man is more like the rash man, who is excessive in approaching these things, than like the cowardly man, who is excessive in fleeing them. However, in actions the inclination of the affect is not considered more in relation to the one rather than the other, except incidentally insofar as one is overcome by the emotions. And therefore for justice, which is about our actions, the measure is equality, just as that of fortitude is doing too much, and that of temperance is restraint and doing too little.
Therefore all the virtues wherein the difficulty consists in holding back from doing something agree with temperance in their measure. Now, this happens in all things wherein there is an inclination to pursue something. But this inclination is of two sorts: one wherein the affect is inclined by an emotion, and another wherein, due to its emotions, the inclination is to exterior deeds that are signs of the interior emotion. However, affect inclines to doing either one’s own good—and self-control, which Cicero says (Cicero, Rhetorici libri duo qui uocantur De inuentione, bk. 2, ch. 54.) is that by which lust is ruled by the governance of counsel, restrains this inclination—or someone else’s evil, inasmuch as it is contrary to one’s own good; and this inclination clemency restrains, which virtue Cicero says in the same place is the virtue by which the mind excited to hate someone holds onto its goodwill. Now, moderation restrains the inclination toward exterior deeds by which the interior affect is made manifest, so that nothing immoderate is present in them. This is the virtue through which the “shyness of integrity relates a pure and stable authority.” (See qa. 1, obj. 4.) But because it is most difficult to refrain from the delights of touch, therefore this measure consists principally, and as it were integrally, in temperance, which is concerned with delights of this sort, whereas it is in the others by participation.
Reply Obj. 1: “Self-control” is said in three ways. In one way, insofar as someone has a rectified reason that restrains him from being dominated any longer by powerful emotions; and this concerns the same things as temperance, as is said in the Ethics 7. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.9, 1151b33–1152a4.) For this is how the Philosopher takes “self-control,” and it differs from temperance in that the temperate man does not suffer emotions of this sort. And according to this, self-control is not a virtue, since it does what is good but not easily or with delight, which are both required for virtue; and thus, it traces back to temperance as the imperfect does to the perfect and as a potential part of it. In another way, one calls “self-control” that in virtue of which a man restrains himself not only from illicit delights, but even from ones that are licit. And in this way, it signifies a certain perfect state of temperance, like virginity; whence it traces back to temperance through the manner of a subjective part of it. In a third sense that is called “self-control” whereby the mind is held back from certain desires; and even the Philosopher uses it in this way, in the Ethics 7. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.9, 1151b35.) And in this way it seems Cicero takes it, as is clear by the definition that he asserted. (Above, in the corpus.) Whence, in this way it is placed as a part of temperance, insofar as it participates in the measure of temperance, even about extrinsic things.
Reply Obj. 2: Clemency is not wholly the same thing as gentleness, since gentleness restrains one from the urge, so that someone might not be incited by anger. For according to the Greek philosopher it is a virtue of the irascible part according to which we are moved to anger only with difficulty. However, clemency refrains from exacting vengeance even after the threat is over, and in this way clemency is more concerned with actions. And thus it is a part of equity, for equity reduces punishments, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.10, 1138a1.) Nevertheless, for the given reason, clemency and gentleness can be traced back to temperance as potential parts of it, for potential parts of virtues need not have the matter and subject in common with the virtues, but only the measure.
Reply Obj. 3: “Moderation” is named not from its imposing measure in every matter whatsoever, the way it is taken here, but only in external deeds, so that the appropriate maturity is observed in them. And the most powerful part of this virtue is wittiness, which the Philosopher asserts in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.8, 1128a10–14.) for even in playful matters, wherein something is more difficult, it does not exceed the appropriate measure.
Reply Obj. 4: Here “shyness” is not standing for the emotion of shame, but for a certain exterior comportment, of which shyness can be a cause. For just as chastity is sometimes called “shyness,” because its contrary is very wicked, and shame fears this. Likewise, the contrary of moderation is exceedingly apparent, and in this way it is naturally apt to bring about confusion, and shyness fears this.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said, concerning the other parts [of temperance]—that is, sobriety and chastity—that they are subjective parts of temperance. For chastity is concerned with the delights of touch, absolutely speaking, that are found in sexual acts, whereas sobriety is concerned with the delights of taste insofar as it is a certain touch, which are found in food and drink.
Reply Obj. 1: The delights of the other senses are not vehement the way the delights of touch are, in that they do not occur through one’s being in contact with a thing, but only with its appearance. Whence no difficulty of restraining these latter delights results from the impression of their appearance, and therefore there need not be some virtue for them in the affective part [of the soul]; rather, prudence, which is in reason, is sufficient for this.
Reply Obj. 2: We say the same thing about the other delights.
Reply Obj. 3: Virginity and such are not virtues; rather, they name states of a virtue. And therefore no mention is made of them.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, about the other parts that a Greek philosopher lists, it should be said that they are taken in the same way as are Cicero’s parts, except that he omits clemency. For he includes self-control, and it appears that he takes it in the same way as the Philosopher does; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.4, 1147b21–25.) whence he says that self-control is the habit unconquered by delight. But he divides moderation into many, according to the diverse things in which a man must impose a measure. For there are three exterior things in which moderation imposes a measure. The first are conversations with respect to those with whom we live, and in these seriousness—the definition of which was stated above in the [first] objection—places the measure. The second ones are exterior goods, like clothing, horses, and the like, and in these humility places the measure according to quantity in their use; whence according to him, humility is the habit of not being excessive in costly expenses and undertakings, whereas simplicity is with respect to the measure of acquiring, which according to him is the habit content with the things that they touch, for it is not very solicitous about such things. The third ones are one’s proper actions pertaining to the body, and in this he places the measure relative to acting with dignity, which, according to him, is the knowledge about what is decorous in motion and bearing. But with respect to exterior things that should be considered as at the appropriate time, place, and such, he places orderliness—which according to him is experience in the distinction of, and discretion about one’s actions, so that one might know to speak a word in its time. And with regard to instruments and helps that we need for action, he places self-sufficiency, which according to him is the habit content with things that one needs.
Reply Obj. 1: Seriousness, insofar as it is taken as a virtue, does not wholly reject the delight found in conversation; rather, it rejects an excess of such things. And because a greater difficulty occurs in abstaining from such, therefore this virtue takes its name from the lack.
Reply Obj. 2: The arrogant man, insofar as he extends himself to things that are above him, in this way has something of the measure of the rash. And therefore in a certain way it is traced back to the vices opposed to fortitude; although properly speaking, in the sense in which we common speak about arrogance, it is more the excess of magnanimity. However, humility, insofar as it is a diminution, has something of the measure of temperance. And therefore it is traced back to temperance as a potential part of it.
Reply Obj. 3: The difference between humility and self-sufficiency is clear from the things that have been said.
Article 3
Whether magnificence, confidence, patience, and perseverance are well assigned by Cicero as the parts of fortitude
Quaestiuncula 1
To the third we proceed thus. It appears that the parts of fortitude are badly assigned by Cicero. (Cicero, Rhetorici libri duo qui uocantur De inuentione, bk. 2, ch. 54; parallel: ST II-II.128.)
Obj. 1: For he assigned magnificence, confidence, patience, and perseverance as its parts. For magnificence, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.2, 1122b10.) is the same thing as liberality. But liberality traces back to justice. Therefore so does magnificence.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, confidence pertains to hope. But the matter of fortitude is not the emotion of hope, but rather fear and rashness, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.6, 1115a7.) Therefore confidence is not a part of fortitude.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Philosopher (Aristotle, Topics 4.5, 125b23.) traces meekness and abstinence to the same thing, which appears to be the same thing as patience. For one who is abstinent suffers (patitur) and is not led [by his suffering], and one who is meek does not suffer it. But mildness, or clemency, is listed as a part of temperance. Therefore so is patience.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, it appears to pertain to perseverance to act without swerving. But this is required for every virtue, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.5, 1105b28–1106a1.) Therefore perseverance should not be put down as a part of fortitude.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, Macrobius lists (Macrobius, Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis, Teubner (J. Willis, 1970), bk. 1, ch. 8, para. 7, p. 38.) seven parts of fortitude: magnanimity, assurance, security, magnificence, constancy, endurance, and firmness—and this appears to be badly done. For magnanimity concerns the great honors that are counted among goods, as is said in the Ethics 4, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.3, 1123a34–1124a20.) but fortitude concerns the rash feelings and fears that are of great evils. Therefore magnanimity is not a part of fortitude, since it is concerned with the opposite matter.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, one vice is not opposed to two virtues. But cowardice is opposed to security and assurance. Therefore they are not two virtues, but one.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, constancy is opposed to changeability, and so is firmness. Therefore they should not be listed as two parts of fortitude.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, the Philosopher lists (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.8, 1116a17–1117a28.) five modes joined to true fortitude: the civil, the military, one arising from fury or grief, one arising from experience, which causes the hope of overcoming on account of frequent conquest, and one arising from ignorance—and this appears to be badly done. For these cardinal virtues are political virtues. But adding a genus to a species does not contract it into a part of the species. Therefore civil fortitude is not a part of fortitude.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the military is ordered under the political, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.2, 1094b2.) Therefore military fortitude should not be divided against civil fortitude.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, ignorance excuses one from sin because it removes its voluntary [character]. But the voluntary is required for virtue as much as it is for sin. Therefore ignorance should not be asserted to be a part of any virtue.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, a certain Greek philosopher (Andronicus of Rhodes.) asserts that there are seven things joined to fortitude: stoutness of soul, calmness, magnanimity, virility, perseverance, magnificence, and philanthropy—and it appears to be badly done. For, as he himself says, stoutness of soul is the soul’s hardiness for perfecting its deeds. Now, this is required in all the virtues. Therefore it is not the part of a certain virtue.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to him, calmness is the habit that readies one to attempt something the way it must be attempted, and to endure what reason says. But readiness appears to be the same as facility, which is left to every habit. Therefore calmness is more the genus of virtue than a species of any virtue.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, he himself says that philanthropy is the virtue of a man for discovering undertakings that can be done in concert with others. But actions that can be done in concert are the matter of justice. Therefore this virtue should be listed as part not of fortitude, but rather of justice.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that the parts that Cicero assigns are potential parts, insofar as they participate in something of the matter of fortitude. For fortitude, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.6, 1115a6–7.) properly speaking concerns mortal dangers, and is most of all what is found on the battlefield, since in such situations there is the greatest difficulty. Whence fortitude, according to the Greek mentioned above, is the virtue of the irascible man who is not easily stunned by fears that are mortal; and about this it has two actions, namely to approach and to endure without being stupefied, and this is more proper to [this virtue], as he says. And although the man of fortitude is concerned principally with such things, still he stands properly in all other dangers and hardships as well, in both approaching them and in enduring them.
And therefore all virtues wherein the difficulty occurs because of the approach of something arduous, or because of the endurance of something difficult, participate in something of the mode of fortitude. And they are traced back to it as potential parts of it, in that there is not as great a difficulty in the other dangers as there is in the dangers that fortitude is concerned with.
However, approaching the arduous matter wherein consists a difficulty that is for the sake of doing some great deed is, in this way, magnificence. This, according to him, is the cogitation and administration of great and excellent things with a certain full and most brilliant intention of spirit. Or it is for attaining some great good, and in this way it is confidence, which is a certain hope of reaching the end of something already begun, or rather of attaining a hoped for reality; and according this way of taking it, I believe that magnanimity is the same thing as confidence. And that which causes the difficulty in enduring something is either a laborious good—and perseverance concerns this, which is a stable, continuous, well considered steadfastness in one’s reason; and this is especially so that someone does not withdraw from right reason on account of the grief that arises in his labors. For just as self-control keeps one unconquered by delights, so perseverance [keeps one unconquered] by griefs, as is said in the Ethics 7. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.7, 1150a14.) Or [what causes the difficulty in enduring something] is something bad and injurious; and for this there is patience, which, according to Cicero, is the voluntary and daily bearing of arduous and fearful things for the sake of the integrity or utility.
Reply Obj. 1: Although magnificence shares a matter with liberality, because great deeds arise with great property, nonetheless it shares a mode with fortitude.
Reply Obj. 2: Although fortitude is not about hope as about its matter—rather, magnanimity is—nonetheless, it has a concomitant hope. For the man of fortitude has the highest hope about his own matter. Whence confidence and the other added parts are found in fortitude even insofar as it is a specific virtue, with respect to what is most difficult in them, as certain conditions of the man of fortitude. And in this way also it can be said that in a way they are like integral parts of fortitude.
Reply Obj. 3: A harmful bad thing is naturally apt to beget three emotions: fear, grief, and anger. Whence three virtues make one endure harms of this sort: fortitude so that a man is not disturbed by fear; patience so that he not be disturbed through immoderate grief; and likewise perseverance, which makes a man not abandon the works of reason on account of grief, just as patience does not permit one to abandon his equanimity of mind on account of grief. Whence according to Gregory, true patience is to put up with foreign evils, that is, those brought to bear by others, with equanimity. (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in evangelia, bk. 2, hom. 35, para. 4 (CCSL 141:324; PL 76:1261).) However, mildness keeps a man from being disturbed by anger.
Whence one who abstains, of whom the Philosopher speaks in the Topics 4, (Aristotle, Topics 4.5, 125b23.) is not the same as one who is patient; rather, he stands to the man of fortitude and the meek, and even to the patient, in the same way as the man of self-control stands to the temperate. Whence it is not necessary that, if mildness is traced back to temperance, so is patience too; for the emotion of grief, and fear as well, is due to the triumph of what is harmful. And therefore also the difficulty in patience and fortitude lies in not being overcome by the harmful things; whence patience participates in the mode of fortitude. But anger is oriented toward triumphing over what is harmful; whence it is more difficult to restrain. On account of that, mildness participates in the mode of temperance.
Reply Obj. 4: “Perseverance” in one way signifies the continuance of the virtue, and in this way it is an act of all the virtues. But in another way it signifies the intention to persist, and in this way it is a specific virtue. For it has a specific notion of the object—namely, the laborious work insofar as it is naturally apt to bring about grief.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, about the parts that Macrobius lists, I say that they are of the same notion as the parts that Cicero lists, except that he divides two of them into two species. That is, the confidence that Cicero lists, Macrobius divides into magnanimity—which lies in the hope of accomplishing great things and great honors—and assurance—which lies in attaining middling honors and the like, which virtue the Philosopher says has no name. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.4, 1125b1.) Moreover, he divides perseverance into firmness, which makes one steadfast in deed, and constancy, which makes one steadfast in the spirit’s intention. And he adds one, security, which is opposed to fear; whence it stands closer to true fortitude, but still differs from fortitude, since it represses fear not only about the most terrifying things, as fortitude does, but about anything at all. And endurance is the same thing as patience, and he lists magnificence by its proper name.
Reply Obj. 1: Although magnanimity does not agree with fortitude in its matter, nonetheless it does agree with it in its mode, as was said.
Reply Obj. 2: Cowardice is opposed to security, but not to assurance; rather, desperation is opposed to that.
Reply Obj. 3: Constancy is opposed to changeability of spirit, but firmness is opposed to changeability in any deed.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question about the parts that the Philosopher lists in the Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.8, 1116a17–1117a28.) note that they are also potential parts, yet in a different way than those spoken of before. For the parts mentioned before fall short of fortitude with respect to the difficulty of their matter, whereas the ones that the Philosopher lists fall short of it with respect to the rectitude of what moves them. And therefore they are not virtues; rather, they participate in something of the virtue of fortitude.
Now, three sorts of things move one to an act of fortitude. In one way, there is the intention of something good or honorable, and in this way the virtue of fortitude is either for some temporal good or honor, or something like this; and in this way it falls short of the notion of virtue, and this is the fortitude that he names the “political.” In another way, when what causes the difficulty in the act of fortitude—that is, the magnitude of the danger—is removed; and this is removed by one’s ignorance, and this is the last mode listed, and through one’s hope of overcoming. And this latter can arise from two sources: either from art or practice—and this is military fortitude—or from the experience of victory, as in those who have evaded other such dangers, and this is the second to last mode listed. In the third way, one is moved by the emotion of fury, or grievances borne, or even fear, or desperation; and this is the third mode.
Reply Obj. 1: Fortitude is called “political” from its motivation, because some good customarily presented by cities moves one to an act of fortitude. However, the cardinal virtues are not called “political” in this sense, but insofar as they perfect one in civil life.
Reply Obj. 2: Fortitude is called “military” because soldiers, who have the skill and art of fighting battles, usually possess it. Whence it is said equivocally of military and political [fortitude].
Reply Obj. 3: There is not a total ignorance of the danger, but only of the degree of danger; and therefore the notion of the fortitude is not removed in its entirety, but rather something of its praiseworthiness is removed.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, about the parts listed by the other Greek philosopher, note that they are mostly the same as those that Macrobius lists. For he lists magnanimity, magnificence, and perseverance with their proper names, and he defines them this way: magnanimity is the habit of doing more than commonly happens with the depraved and zealous. For magnanimity is a habit that is not content to avoid depraved things and to do good things as is commonly sufficient unless he might also do this in a more excellent way; and therefore it is said in the Ethics 4 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.3, 1123a34–1125a35.) that he does a great work in all the virtues. And magnificence is the habit that lifts up those who have it, filling them with exaltation, insofar as elevates his intention to undertaking certain great and costly expenses. But perseverance is the knowledge and habit of those things that should be endured, that is, goods, and those that should not be endured, that is, evils, or of things that are neither, that is, indifferent things.
But stoutness of soul, which, according to him, is the soul’s hardiness for completing its deeds, appears to be the same thing as constancy, and this is especially so in spiritual things, which are works of the soul. However, calmness, which according to this philosopher is the habit that allows those who are ready to tolerate and endure what reason says, appears to be the same as patience. Moreover, virility appears to be the same thing as assurance, which we have said differs from magnanimity in that it is for common honors or the like, while magnanimity is of great things and things that go beyond the requirement of virtue. But virility, according to him, is the habit of self-sufficiency in things that are according to virtue and belong to the necessity of virtue.
And just as virility differs from magnanimity, so does he list philanthropy, which is the virtue of discovering undertakings that can be done in concert with others, next to magnificence, which tends toward doing great things in communities. And he differs in this respect from Macrobius, who does not list this distinction, because it appears to be the same thing as liberality, though it differs insofar as liberality looks to the individual good, whereas philanthropy looks to the common good. Whence it more approaches magnificence, for the things that call for costly expenses are most of all the things that pertain to the community.
But the philosopher spoken of omits security, which Macrobius includes, because security appears to be intrinsic to fortitude, as was said.
Reply Obj. 1: As was said above about perseverance—that it can be a specific virtue insofar as it looks to a specific notion of the object, although perhaps that notion can be found in diverse acts or those of all the virtues, just as magnanimity looks to the great—so too one should say of constancy, and stoutness of soul, which is the same thing.
Reply Obj. 2: That readiness is understood to be such that a man is not be disturbed on account of the difficulty of terrifying things, which pertains to patience. Whence, just as patience is a specific virtue, so too is calmness, which is the same thing.
Reply Obj. 3: Although philanthropy shares in justice as regards its matter, still it belongs with fortitude as regards its mode, the way magnificence does.
Article 4
Whether religion, piety, gratitude, vengeance, observance, and truthfulness are the parts of justice, as Cicero says
Quaestiuncula 1
To the fourth we proceed thus. It appears that Cicero badly assigns the parts of justice.
Obj. 1: For he assigns six parts of justice, which are religion, piety, gratitude, vengeance, observance, and truthfulness—and this appears to be badly done. (Cicero, Rhetorici libri duo qui uocantur De inuentione, bk. 2, ch. 53; parallels: ST I-II.60.3; II-II.80.) Because the Philosopher says in the Ethics 8 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.11, 1161b3.) that there cannot be justice between a servant and his lord. But God is Lord most of all. Therefore, since religion belongs to man in his relation to God, it appears that it is not a part of justice.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as latria is owed to God, so too dulia is owed to a man. Therefore just as religion, which is the same thing as latria, is listed as part of justice, so too should dulia be listed.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, above in Distinction 11 (In III Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 1, resp. 1, ad 4.) it was said that piety is the same thing as latria. But latria is the same thing as religion. Therefore piety should not be divided against religion.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, vengeance appears to pertain to the vice of wrath, which is the appetite for vengeance. Therefore it should not be listed as a part of a virtue.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, Macrobius lists (Macrobius, Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis, bk. 1, ch. 8, para. 7, p. 38.) these parts: innocence, friendship, concord, religion, piety, humanity, and affect—and this appears to be badly done. For innocence is opposed to every sin. But only virtue universally taken is opposed to every sin. Therefore innocence is either the same as universal virtue, or is something consequent upon every virtue. So it should not be listed as part of justice.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what follows on all virtues should not be listed as part of a certain virtue. But friendship is like this, since the foundation of true friendship is the honorable. Therefore it should not be listed as part of justice.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Philosopher in the Ethics 9 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.5–7, 1166b29–1168a37.) asserts that three things belong to friendship: beneficence, good will, and concord—and he says friendship is different from all of these. Therefore just as [Macrobius] lists concord, so too he should list the other two.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, affect is required in all moral matters. Therefore it should not be listed as part of some virtue.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, some list five parts, which are obedience toward one’s superior, discipline toward one’s inferior, equity toward one’s equals, faith and truthfulness toward all—and this appears to be badly done. (Parallel: ST II-II.80.1.ad 2.) For general justice, as is said in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1129b12–27; 5.2, 1130b22.) attends to the commands of law. But to obey is to attend to a command. Therefore it is the same thing as general justice. Therefore it is not a part of the justice that is a specific virtue, but rather vice versa.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, severity pertains to justice the same way that equity does. Therefore just as they list equity, so should they list severity.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, faith is a theological virtue. Therefore it shoud not be listed as a part of justice, which is a cardinal virtue.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, truthfulness pertains to the intellect, whereas justice pertains more to the will; for, as Anselm says, (Anselm, De veritate, vol. 1, ch. 12, p. 194 (PL 158:482).) it is the rectitude of the will preserved for its own sake. Therefore it appears that truthfulness is not a part of justice.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, some divide justice into liberality and severity, the former of which they divide into benevolence and beneficence—dividing benevolence into seven parts: religion, piety, innocence, friendship, reverence, concord, and mercy. And this appears to be badly done. For, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.10, 1138a1.) the virtuous man tends to reduce punishments. But severity indicates the opposite of this. Therefore it is not a part of a virtue.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, liberality gives someone what properly belongs to the giver. But justice gives another what is his own and is owed to him. Therefore liberality is not a part of justice.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, mercy (Or "compassion.") is an emotion, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.5, 1105b23.) But no emotion is a virtue, or even a part of a virtue. Therefore mercy is not a virtue or a part of it.
Quaestiuncula 5
Obj. 1: Moreover, (Parallels: ST I.21.1; I-II.60.3.ad 3; II-II.61.1; Sent. Ethic. V, lect. 11.) the Philosopher in the Ethics 5 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1129a33‒1130a13.) divides justice into legal justice and the special justice that is a certain equality in external goods and evils, and he divides that into distributive and commutative justice. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.2, 1130b30‒1131a9.) And he also divides the just (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.6, 1134a25‒5.7, 1135a17.) into the political, the parental, and the matrimonial, and he divides the political into legal and natural. Surrounding justice he also places equity and metaphorical justice. And this seems wrong. For a species should not be divided against its genus. But particular justice is a species of legal justice. Therefore it should not be divided against it.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, we are directed by justice in things that pertain to others. But every action of one person relative to another is a certain exchange. Therefore commutative justice should not be listed as part of special justice, but as the same thing as it.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the politically just appears to pertain to legal justice. Therefore it should not be listed as part of special justice.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the parental, lordly, and matrimonial justice appear to differ only in their matter. Therefore the just should not be distinguished by way of them.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, equity, as he himself says, is something better than justice. Therefore justice should instead be listed as a part of it, rather than vice versa.
Quaestiuncula 6
Obj. 1: Moreover, a certain Greek philosopher (Andronicus of Rhodes.) says that the family members of justice are liberality, benevolence, vengeance, graciousness, piety, thanksgiving, holiness, fair exchange, and law-making—and this appears to be badly done. (Parallel: ST II-II.80.) For even he himself says that graciousness is voluntarily doing what is just. But this is necessary in all justice, insofar as one willingly does it, as is said in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.9, 1136a19.) Therefore it is not part of justice, but is the same thing as it.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, as regards thanksgiving, according to him, it pertains to those who ought to be giving thanks to those from whom they have received. But this appears to belong to liberality, to which gratuitous giving belongs. Therefore it should not be divided against liberality.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to him, holiness is the knowledge that makes us faithful and observers of things that are just as regards God. But this pertains to piety, or to religion. Therefore it should not be divided from piety.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Philosopher in the Ethics 6 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.8, 1141b25‒1142a2.) lists law-making as a species of the political that he asserts as the same thing as prudence. Therefore the making of law pertains more to prudence than to justice.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that justice differs from temperance and fortitude in that they moderate one’s internal emotions whereas justice moderates one’s external actions. This is why the Philosopher says that justice is concerned with one’s actions. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1129a4.) For in adultery, insofar as it is against justice, a disordered use is attended to—namely, of someone who belongs to another; however, insofar as it is opposed to temperance, one attends to a desire that is not restrained under the obligation of reason.
Now, the moderation of external acts is ruled by two things. First, though the action’s relation to the one doing it—and in this way the regulation of both the exterior actions and the interior emotions inclining to the exterior actions are of the same notion. But in another way, it is ruled through its relation to someone else—and in this there is already a different mode of regulation, so a different virtue is required, and this mode properly pertains to justice. Whence mildness, insofar as it proceeds from the interior emotion, draws one back from the same act, namely striking someone, as does justice in its order to others.
However, in every moderation what is moderated must be conformed to some measure or rule. Whence, just as the moderation of emotions is their conforming to reason, so too the moderation of exterior acts as related to others is their being conformed to the one relative to whom they are moderate. And this conformity occurs when one renders to him what, and how much, is owed to him; and this conformity is the proper mode of justice. Whence wherever such conformity is found completely, there is the justice that is the specific virtue, and all the virtues in which it is preserved are subjective parts of this justice. However, where this conformity is not wholly preserved, but only in a certain respect, this is traced back to justice as its potential part, participating in something of its mode.
Now, this conformity is composed of three elements, as is clear from things said: namely, that it be ordered to another, that it is owed to him, otherwise the action would be excessive relative to one it is done to, and that as much as is owed is rendered, otherwise it would fail as too little. But there are certain virtues by which one renders to another what he owes him by the necessity of the law, yet not as much [as he owes him], since this is impossible; for example, in the honor that is owed to God, which religion gives, and that which is owed one’s parents and fatherland, which piety gives. Whence these virtues fall short of justice, and are its potential parts, and stand nearest to it. There are also some by which one renders to another what he owes him not by the necessity of the law, but by a certain integrity, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 8; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.13, 1162b31‒36.) for example, gratitude, which is a reciprocation for benefits received, according to Cicero, and also mercy and the like. And these virtues are a little bit more distant from true justice. Moreover, there are certain virtues by which what the virtue principally concerns is ordered to another yet not in the notion of a being owed, such as liberality. And this is still more distant from true justice. And there are certain virtues that order to someone else what the virtue concerns—not principally, but rather secondarily; for example, when fortitude orders some exterior action, which it is concerned with secondarily, to another as to the common good or to God. And in this way it in a manner wears the form of justice. And in this way every virtue can be traced back to justice, which is why legal justice is said to be the same thing as every virtue, as is said in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1129b27‒1130a13.)
However, as regards the emotions that these virtues are principally concerned with, none [of the other virtues] can have the mode of justice, insofar as a man is immediately ordered in his emotions only to himself. Yet through a certain likeness there is a certain form of justice here, insofar as the diverse powers are counted as diverse persons. Whence this is metaphorical justice, which the Philosopher speaks about in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.11, 1138b6‒14.)
Therefore from the things said it can become quite evident how all these parts assigned by philosophers are parts of justice. For among the parts that Cicero lists, vengeance and observance are subjective parts of true justice, since vengeance renders an evil that is owed, but observance a good to which one has obligated himself. For vengeance, according to him, is the virtue by which force or injury, and everything that is about to harm one, is repulsed by defense and retaliation. However, religion, which is directed to God, and piety, which is directed to parents and those connected by blood or fatherland, are potential parts of it, but close ones, for they render what they owe and from the obligation of law, but not as much as they owe, for this is impossible. Moreover, he defines these this way: religion is what offers devotion and ritual to any superior nature, which they call 'divine.' And it is named from “binding-back” (religando), according to Isidore, (Isidore of Seville, Etymologiarum siue Originum libri XX, bk. 8, ch. 2, n. 2 (PL 82:295).) or, according to Augustine, (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 10, ch. 3, n. 2 (CCSL 47; PL 41:281).) from “choosing-again” (reeligendo) God, whom we had abandoned. But piety is that through which duty and loving devotion is bestowed with good will on those joined to us by blood and fatherland. However, gratitude and truthfulness render what they owe from a certain integrity by which it comes about that a man expresses gratitude for a benefit even though he cannot be compelled to this in court, and this benefit is of the sort that he can show in words and deeds—which pertains to truthfulness, which the even Philosopher considers in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.7, 1127a14‒b9.) For gratitude is that in which are contained the memory of another’s friendly deeds and services, and the will to repay them.
Reply Obj. 1: That objection proves that religion is not a subjective part of justice, not that it is not a proximate potential part.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as piety, which is principally owed to one’s parents, extends to all those connected in blood insofar as they are descended from the same parents, and even to compatriots insofar as they share only in place of birth, so too does religion, which is owed to God, in a certain way extend to those marked with the image of God. Whence religion and dulia are in [the same] proximate genus, and thus Cicero includes the one under the other.
Reply Obj. 3: “Piety” here and there is being taken in different ways.
Reply Obj. 4: To avenge from a desire of punishment is vicious, but to do so from justice alone, and according to the order of right, belongs to justice.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, about the parts that Macrobius lists, note that one of them, innocence, is a subjective part of justice, said properly, such that it does not take from another what is his own; and it is distinguished from that part of justice that renders to each what is owed. But the others are potential parts, two of which relate one to his superior, namely religion and piety, so that they render what they ought, but not enough. And the other four render what is owed because of one’s integrity, and this is to one’s equal—and then it is friendship, which the Philosopher speaks about in the Ethics 4, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.6, 1126b11‒1127a7.) by means of which we employ our actions in a fitting way for the sake of others, and concord, by which we offer aid in the actions of others. Or else they relate us to our inferiors, to whom, out of a debt of integrity, we apply our humaneness with regard to an exterior effect, and a desire to help with regard to one’s interior. (Cf. ST II-II.80.1, ad 2.)
Reply Obj. 1: Innocence is here taken strictly, insofar as it is lacking in harm imposed on another.
Reply Obj. 2: Friendship here is taken not as it is in the Ethics 8, which consists principally in an affect, but as in the Ethics 4, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.2, 1155b17‒1156a5; 4.6, 1126b15‒25.) which consists principally in external affability, which one has even as regards extrinsic things.
Reply Obj. 3: Beneficence is included in humaneness, but benevolence in the affect.
Reply Obj. 4: “Affect” here is being taken strictly, for the desire of assistance of and compassion toward another.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, about the other parts, note that they appear to be subjective parts of justice, said properly. For from the obligation of the law a man is held to obey his superior, to give discipline to one committed to his care, and even to equals, and to uphold equality to all in things, faith in deeds, which is the same as observance, and truthfulness in statements—if what is found in court confessions is taken as the truthful, since otherwise, if it were taken as it was above, it would be a potential part of justice.
Reply Obj. 1: Obedience is a specific virtue insofar as it attends principally to the notion of a command. Whence also one obeys in things that do not pertain to the other virtues. But insofar as it, in a consequent way, looks principally to virtue’s command and good in what it does, in this way it is consequent upon all virtues.
Reply Obj. 2: Here “equity” is being taken in reference to the equality, simply speaking, that is found in communicable things. Whence it includes both severity or rigor, insofar as it upholds the form of the law in things that the intention of law extends to, and equity, which follows the intention of the law while setting aside the form of the law.
Reply Obj. 3: Here “faith” is being taken for trustworthiness, not insofar it names the theological virtue.
Reply Obj. 4: “Truthfulness” here is being taken insofar as it is present in an exterior sign, or word, or whatever else.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, about the other parts that some assign, note that they line up with the same parts touched upon before. For severity, the way it is being taken here, is the same thing as vengeance, and it is divided against all the other parts of justice, since it alone renders evil. Now, liberality, taken very broadly, is being taken for any bestowal of the good, whether it was owed or not owed, whether in one’s affect or in what he does. Whence it is divided into beneficence and benevolence, and these are also being taken in the broadest way possible here. Whence beneficence is divided into seven parts that are all comprehended in the higher parts, since mercy is comprehended in the affect, and reverence, which seems to be the same thing as dulia, is comprehended under religion, as was said before, and even under piety.
Reply Obj. 1: The virtuous man reduces the penalty that is owed while also upholding the intention of the law, without being against the law.
Reply Obj. 2: Liberality here is being taken in a broad sense, as was said.
Reply Obj. 3: Some emotions, although they are not properly speaking virtues, still inasmuch as they are praiseworthy, have something of the notion of virtue, for example, mercy and shyness. And this is especially so insofar as choice is involved.
Response to Quaestiuncula 5
To the fifth question, about the other parts that the Philosopher lists in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1129a33.) I say that the Philosopher’s division is composed of all the things to which the name “justice” can extend. And therefore he lists metaphorical justice, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.11, 1138b7.) wherein only a likeness of justice is preserved; legal justice, which orders things in relation to others even as regards what the virtue does not principally concern, if it is ordered by the law; equity, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.10, 1137a32.) which differs from legal justice insofar as it preserves the law’s intention in things to which the law’s form does not extend, is traced back to the same thing; likewise the lordly and paternal right, wherein what is owed is rendered, but not as much as is owed; and likewise for both distributive and commutative justice, which are subjective parts of specific justice. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.2, 1130b30‒1131a9.) Now, the legally and naturally just do not divide justice, but rather divide that from which arises the obligation of debt in justice; for something is either naturally just or just by positive [law].
Reply Obj. 1: A species can be divided against its genus by a division of a name that is equivocal in its signification.
Reply Obj. 2: Exchange is properly when something is owed to someone because of mutual deeds; for example, because one has labored in another’s vineyard, the latter becomes a debtor to him to the degree that his labor has value. And commutative justice is directive in such matters. For there is an equality here of exchange, since as much as the one gave to another, so much ought he to receive from him; and on account of this it is called “commutative.” But in distributive justice the equality is not related to that of the one receiving with the one who gives; rather, it attends to that of the one receiving relative to someone else who also receives; whence there is not here an equality of exchange, but an equality of distribution. And on account of this it is called “distributive,” not “commutative” justice.
Reply Obj. 3: The political is spoken of in three ways. In one way, insofar as it looks to civic life—and in this way all the moral virtues are sometimes called “political.” In another way, insofar as someone is directed in civic life by the civil order—and in this way even particular justice is called “political,” insofar as it is directive in exchanges according to civil statutes. And then the politically just is divided against the lordly, the matrimonial, and the like, for law extends to directing in these things, since a servant belongs to his lord, and a son to his father, and a wife to her husband. Whence the direction in these things is more according to economic prudence than according to civil statutes. In a third way, the political is named from civil life and civil statutes, and further, from the intention of the common good; and in this way the political pertains to legal justice.
Reply Obj. 4: In these three there are diverse notions of rule, insofar as the one in reference to whom justice exists is more so or less so within another’s power. And therefore what is right in marriage fits more with what is politically right, than what is the parental right, and fits with the parental more than with the lordly; for a wife is closer to equality with her husband than a son is with his father and [even more so] than a servant with his lord. Whence, this is not a difference only in matter, but even in a certain way a formal difference.
Reply Obj. 5: Equity is connected to legal justice, and is about the same things, even though it does not direct one from the same source. For legal justice directs one according to the written law, but equity directs from the lawgiver’s intention. And although it is more excellent than legal justice, still it cannot be called “cardinal,” both because it exists as a supplement to legal justice, and in a way even presupposes it, and because in some way it is the same as every virtue, as also is legal justice.
Response to Quaestiuncula 6
To the sixth question, about the other parts, note that that philosopher’s list differs from the others only in two respects.
First, because it divides religion into reverence, which orders one to God in the rites that are shown to declare his service, like sacrifice and like—whence he calls it the familial knowledge of God—and sanctity, which orders one to God in all other actions of life—whence he says that sanctity is the knowledge that makes one faithful and a keeper of things that are just in relation to God.
Second, because he assigns the subjective parts of justice in a different way. For justice is both in the judge as in its regulator, and in others as in the ones it regulates. Now, two things pertain to the judge: the equality that he establishes, and the passing of a law is for the sake of this; the other is that he punish those who establish an inequality, and the retributive part is for the sake of this. However, on the side of both of these, two things are required for justice. The one is that they preserve an equality in exchange, since to preserve the equality of distributive justice does not belong to the subjects that receive it, but rather to the superior who makes the distribution, and this is the good exchange. The other is that when they go beyond equality, they voluntarily revert to it; and this is graciousness, that is, voluntarily doing what is just.
However, the other parts are listed above: liberality and benevolence by name, and thanksgiving, which is the same thing as gratitude, which was also listed above, for according to him thanksgiving is the knowledge of to whom and when one should be expressing gratitude, and how and from whom it should be received.
However, knowledge is placed in the definition of the virtues named insofar as all the moral virtues participate in something of reason and prudence. Whence Socrates used to say that all virtues are sciences, as is noted in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.13, 1144b17–22.
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Reply Obj. 1: “Voluntarily doing the just” here should be taken not for every way of doing this, but in a determinate matter, as was said.
Reply Obj. 2: Showing gratitude is here being taken for repaying someone because of a benefit received, and in this way it is clear that it is not the same thing as liberality.
Reply Obj. 3: The distinction between holiness and reverence is already clear from things said. Whence holiness is related to all the virtues in the same way, as is legal justice, since just as legal justice performs all the acts of all the virtues for the sake of the common good, so too does holiness for the sake of God.
Reply Obj. 4: According to the Philosopher in the Ethics, the “political” is equivocal in reference to the cognition of prudence and the execution of justice. And so too for the “making of law,” which is a part of the political, as he himself says in the same place.
Exposition of the text
In him, they had the same uses. (Sent. III, 33.2(121).1.) For the virtues related to emotions arising from something external had the same use in Christ as they do in us, on account of his body’s ability to suffer. They also had the use that they have in heaven, on account of his soul’s perfection. But it is otherwise for the virtues related to emotions arising from within, since such emotions were not present in Christ in such a way that it would be necessary to constrain them through virtue. Whence he was able to be tempted by the enemy, but not by his flesh.
But they will then have other uses. (Sent. III, 33.3(122).4.) Therefore they are other virtues, since habits are distinguished through their acts. And to this I say that, just as motion to a terminus and rest in the terminus pertain to the same natural power, so too does rest in the end not require a different habit than the motion tending to that very end. And in this way the acts of virtues on the path and in heaven are distinguished.
Chapter 128 of 186