D. 38 - Lying

Division of the text

Having considered and explained the five precepts of the second tablet, here the Master considers certain things opposed to the fifth precept, namely, lying and perjury. Now, this part is divided into two:

in the first, he considers lying;

in the second, perjury, in Distinction 39, at now let us consider perjury. (Sent. III. 39. 1(150).)

The first part is divided into two:

first, he distinguishes the diverse modes of lying;

second, he defines lying, at here we must see what lying is. (Sent. III, 38.3(146).1.)

The first of these is divided into two.

In the first part, he lays out a certain division of lying that makes known which lie is a mortal sin and which lie is a venial sin.

In the second, he lays out another division that makes known which lie is more grave than which, at it is also to be known that there are eight kinds of lying. (Sent. III, 38.2(145).1.)

As regards the first he does two things:

first, he distinguishes three modes of lying;

second, from the things said he manifests something that one could have a doubt about, at as for the lying of the midwives and Raab, Augustine defines it as venial. (Sent. III, 38.1(144).1.)

Here we must see what lying is. (Sent. III, 38.3(146).1.) Here he defines lying, and he does three things in reference to this.

First, he shows what lying is;

second, he shows that every lie is a sin, at Augustine indicates that every lie is a sin. (Sent. III, 38.5(148).1.)

Third, he resolves something that appeared to be opposed to this, at it is usual to ask concerning Jacob. (Sent. III, 38.6(149).3.)

As regards the first he does three things:

first, he shows what a lie is;

second, he shows what it is to lie, at but to lie is to speak against what one feels in one’s soul. (Sent. III, 38.4(147).1.)

Third, he resolves a certain question, at here it is usual to ask: if a Jew says that Christ is God, even though he does not feel this in his soul, is he telling a lie? (Sent. III, 38.4(147).2.)

Augustine indicates that every lie is a sin. (Sent. III, 38.5(148).1.) About this he does two things.

First he shows that in every lie there is the danger of sin.

Second, he shows that error, which is a lie’s effect, can sometimes also occur with sin, and sometimes without sin, at it is also to be known that 'in some things, it is a great evil to be deceived; in some it is a small evil, and in others none at all.' (Sent. III, 38.6(149).1, quoting Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 19 (CCSL 46; PL 40:241).)

Question 1

Lying

Here five things are asked:

first, what a lie is;

second, about the division that he lays out;

third, whether every lie is a sin;

fourth, whether every lie is a mortal sin;

fifth, about the order of lies in the gravity of sin.

Article 1

Whether the definition of lying stated in the text is fitting

To the first we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST II-II.110.1.) It appears that a lie is not well defined in the text. (Sent. III, 38.3(146).1; the definition in question is taken from Augustine, "false signification of speech with the intention of deceiving." Contra Mendacium, ch. 21, n. 26 (PL 40:537).)

Obj. 1: For one who says something true that he believes is false is lying, as Augustine says in On Lying. (Augustine, De mendacio, ch. 3, para. 3 (CSEL 41:415; PL 40:489).) But here the signification of the speech is not false. Therefore a lie is badly defined as false signification in speech.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, lying is opposed to being truthful. Now, the virtue of being truthful consists not only in speech, but also in deeds, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.7, 1127a20.) Therefore not all lies happen by a false signification in speech.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as was said in Book II, (In II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3.) intention looks to the ultimate end. But something does not receive its species from its ultimate end, but rather from its proximate end, which is the will’s object. Therefore, since a definition one should include only things that specify the thing defined, it appears that it is not fitting to put the intention to deceive in the definition of lying.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, what is common to both good deeds and bad should not be placed in the definition of something bad, especially not as what completes the definition. But a bad intention can be found commonly both in things that are good by their genus and in things that are bad by their genus; this is clear even in the proposed matter, where one who speaks the truth so that it would not be believed, if he thinks that anything he says would not be believed. Therefore the intention to deceive should not be placed in the definition of lying.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, he who lies as a joke does not intend to deceive, because he knows that he is not believed. But still a jocose lie is counted among the lies. Therefore the intention of deceiving should not be placed in the definition of lying.

I answer that a sin can arise within human acts in two ways. In one way, from the very nature of the thing done, which is bad in itself, as in things that bad by their genus; in another way, from an abuse of it within the knower, as when someone does things that are good by their genus with a base intention. Therefore lying embraces both of these, since in itself is it disordered. Because a disorder in the signifying can only come from the falsity of the signification, therefore false signification is included in lying. Now, in moral matters a false signification is not enough for the notion of sin, since it is not [always] in a man’s power to signify what is true, anymore that it is to know what is true. Whence in lying there must be false signification of the sort that by it someone willingly deviates from rectitude. However, this occurs only when one knowingly says something false, since one who does so in ignorance does not do so voluntarily. Now, from this very fact—that someone knowingly speaks something false—he intends to signify falsity. Therefore the intention to deceive is placed in the definition of lying as completing it, whereas the false signification of speech is, as it were, its material.

Reply Obj. 1: Lying and a lie differ in this: “lie” names something that according to itself is from the genus of bad things, in its own abstraction, whereas “lying,” by reason of its concretion, indicates the deflection—that is, the sin on the part of the speaker. Whence someone lies even by speaking what in itself does not deviate from the truth, if in his own opinion it does so deviate; however, what he says is not a lie.

Reply Obj. 2: Speech has been given to man principally for the sake of signifying. Whence every sign by which someone signifies something is understood by the name “speech,” and a lie can be accomplished in every such sign, as is clear in the signs and gestures of monks. This can be compared to the way all the other senses partake of the name “seeing,” which names the more principal sense.

Reply Obj. 3: The end is of two sorts. One is what is proper to some virtue or vice, and is commensurate with its object. And the intention of this sort of end pertains to the species of the virtue or vice as does the willing of its object; for willing to endure difficulties is just as essential to fortitude as is intending the good that belongs to that habit. The other is the common end, such as happiness in reference to all the virtues. And the intention of this sort of end does not specify a virtue. Now, the intention placed in the definition of a lie is the intention of its proper end, and of what is proportionate to its object. For just as a truthful person speaks the true by his love of the true, so a liar speaks the false by intending falsity.

Reply Obj. 4: From the very fact that a deed from the genus of good things becomes appropriated to some vice by way of a perverse intention, it is drawn into the species of that vice, for example, when one enters a church for the sake of stealing something. This is why even truthful signification in speech, when done with the intention to deceive, is drawn into the species of lying.

Reply Obj. 5: The intention to deceive can be understood in two ways: in one way, in reference to the deception insofar as it is only it in the deceiver; in another way, insofar as it is both in the deceiver and in the one deceived. For whoever says something false, so far as it is in his power, deceives—even though it is not always the case that someone is deceived by his words. Therefore whoever knowingly says something false intends a deception as far as it is in the power of the deceiver. This is why the intention of deceiving is common to every lie. But an intention by which one intends the deception not only just to be deceptive, but also so that others become deceived, is absent in a jocose lie. This is why it has the least of the notion of a lie.

Article 2

Whether the division of lying in the text is fitting

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: below, a. 5; ST II-II.110.2; De decem praeceptis, a. 8; In Psalmos 5.) It seems that lying is not divided well in the text.

Obj. 1: For incidentals should be set aside, since they are infinitely many. But it is incidental to a lie as such where it occurs, and whether it is advantageous, or damaging to someone. Therefore lying is not fittingly divided in reference to these things.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 4, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.8, 1128b3‒4.) play has its use even in the virtuous life, because it is a sort of rest. But a lie is called “officious” when it occurs for someone’s benefit, and “jocose” when it occurs for the sake of a joke. Therefore the jocose lie is included in the officious lie, so it should not be divided from it.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Philosopher, in the Ethics 4, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.7, 1127b10.) says that someone is deceitful who for no reason pretends things are greater than they are. But the jocose, officious, and pernicious lies are done for some reason. Therefore there is a lie other than these three.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Augustine asserts (Augustine, De mendacio, ch. 14, para. 25 (CSEL 41:444; PL 40:505); see Sent. III, 38.2(145).1.) that there are eight kinds of lies. Therefore they are not fittingly divided as only three.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it appears that even in those eight there is a certain superfluity. For the lie that occurs in teaching religion is distinct from the others only in its matter. But a material multiplication should be ignored. Therefore that lie should not be distinguished from the others.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, the Philosopher, in the Ethics 4, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.7, 1127a13‒32.) divides lies into ostentation and irony. Therefore, since these members are omitted here, this division appears inadequate.

I answer that lying is here being divided so as to make known how sin occurs by the diverse ways of lying. And therefore here the ways of lying are not assigned as making a diversity in lying as such, but more insofar as lying is a sin. On account of this, three ways of lying are assigned insofar as the deception, which is the completion of the lie, can come in three grades. The first grade is such that it is only in the deceiver who is being deceptive, even though no one is deceived by him; and this happens in the jocose lie. The second grade is that the deception reaches as far as the opinion of the hearer, such that he judges as true the falsity that the speaker presented to him; and in this grade consists the officious lie, wherein the hearer is not drawn to a greater evil beyond that, upon hearing the false intention, he conceives it according to the speaker’s intention. The third grade is that the hearer is led further by the deception, according to the speaker’s intention, even to a loss in things or his person; and this is the pernicious lie.

Reply Obj. 1: And through this, the reply to the first objection is clear. For although the division is incidental to the lie as such, still it is not incidental to the lie insofar as it is a sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Although play is something beneficial [to a virtuous life], nonetheless play that is the play of the liar is not.

Reply Obj. 3: He who lies for no reason traces back to the jocose lie, especially if he lies about indifferent matters and things that cannot relate to anyone losing anything. For playful activities are done for the sake of nothing, as is said in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.6, 1176b9.)

Reply Obj. 4: Those eight kinds of lies are contained under the first three. But they are divided more particularly because in diverse matters there can be a greater or lesser sin. Whence the three members of the second division trace back to the pernicious lie. For someone’s harm can be brought about either in the spiritual life (and this is the first, which occurs in the teaching of religion) or in other things, whether harm accomplished leads to no one’s benefit, which is the second mode, or it leads to someone’s benefit, which is the third mode. The two other modes trace back to the jocose lie, since sometimes someone lies for the sake of the delight he has in lying, and this is the fourth mode, but sometimes he does it for the sake of someone else’s delight, who is pleased by the lie, and this is the fifth mode. And the three last modes trace back to the officious lie, for sometimes someone lies to avoid another’s monetary loss, and this is the sixth mode, sometimes the loss of their person, as regards bodily life, and this is the seventh mode, and sometimes their loss as regards things that belong to virtue, and this is the eighth.

Reply Obj. 5: Material multiplication should be touched on here, insofar as a diverse degree of fault is implied by it.

Reply Obj. 6: The Philosopher assigns two species to lying insofar as it is opposed to virtue. And therefore he divided lying into the excessive, which is the ostentatious, and the diminished, which is irony. For the ostentatious man is one who feigns things to be greater than they are, whereas irony feigns them to be less than they are. However, here lying is being divided for the sake of knowing the degree [of fault] in it, and therefore one must divide it differently.

Article 3

Whether every lie is a sin

To the third we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.69.1, 2; 110.3; Quodl. VIII, q. 6, a. 4; Super De Trinitate, q. 3, a. 1; Sent. Ethic. IV, lect. 20.) It appears that not every lie is a sin.

Obj. 1: For no sin comes from an instinct of the Holy Spirit. But in Genesis 27:19 Jacob said, as is noted in the text, (Sent. III, 38.6(149).3.) that he was the firstborn when he was not, on account of the familiar counsel of the Holy Spirit that he received from his mother. And thus he lied. Therefore that lie was not a sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no sin is rewarded by God. But the Egyptian midwives were rewarded by God for the lie they told Pharaoh in Exodus 1:19. Therefore some lies are not sins.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no virtuous person, as such, sins. But according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 4, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.7, 1127b7.) it pertains to the virtue of truthfulness to incline toward understatement, wherein there is a certain lie. Therefore not every lie is a sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as is said in 2 Peter 1:21: men moved by the Holy Spirit spoke from God, those who have handed on to us the divine Scriptures. But there are found in Scriptures certain statements that are not true according to what the words say, such as in Judges 9:14, the woods of the forest went to the bramble, so that it might rule them. Therefore, since no sin arises by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, it appears that not every lie is a sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the vice of lying, which is opposed to the virtue of truthfulness, is found not only in things said, but also in things done. But someone can sometimes signify by a deed something that is not so, and do this without sin, as is written of Christ in Luke 24:28, when he feigned that he was going to go further. Likewise Joshua pretended that he was fleeing before the inhabitants of Ai, and David pretended that he was a simpleton before the king of Achis. (Joshua 8 and 1 Samuel 21:13.) Therefore one can also lie in words without sin.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, a lie appears to be sin only from its deceiving. But sometimes it is useful for a man that he be deceived and err in something, as is said in the text, (Sent. III, 38.1(144).1; 2(145). 1.) and this happens often. Therefore sometimes someone can lie without sinning.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, no fitting act is a sin. But an officious lie is such, since an office is an act that belongs to a person according to the statutes of his fatherland. Therefore and so on.

On the contrary, Augustine says in his On Lying: whoever has thought there is some kind of lie that is not a sin deceives himself in an ugly way. (Augustine, De mendacio, ch. 21, para. 42 (CSEL 41:165); PL 40:516.) Therefore every lie is a sin.

Furthermore, every disorder in human acts, if it be voluntary, is a sin. But wherever there is a lie, there is a disorder, since the voice is being applied to signify something that cannot be signified. Therefore every lie is a sin.

Furthermore, nothing is opposed to virtue other than sin. But every sin is opposed to the virtue that is truthfulness, as is clear from the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.7, 1127a27‒b8.) Therefore every lie is a sin.

I answer that because evil happens in manifold ways, the perversity of any circumstance—even when the other appropriate circumstances are present—causes a sin in one’s conduct. So if someone receives what he ought not, however much good he intends, or however much it is the case that other ordered circumstances are seen present, he will not avoid sinning. Now, since speech was invented for the sake of expressing the conception of the heart, whenever someone speaks what he does not hold in his heart, he speaks what he should not. However, this happens in every lie. Whence every lie is a sin, however much someone might lie for the sake of some good.

Reply Obj. 1: The words that Jacob spoke, according to a certain understanding, held a necessity or truth, for he was owed primogeniture by God’s choice. And according to this understanding, the Holy Spirit ordained the words, from whose instinct and understanding he was speaking—whether he himself received that understanding from the words explicitly, or he intended to signify this implicitly, according to what the Holy Spirit ordained. Whence he is free from the charge of lying. And the same account can be given of all the statements that appear to savor of a lie said by those men of whom it appears loathsome to grant that they lied.

Reply Obj. 2: The midwives literally lied; nor were they rewarded for their lie, but for their piety, because they freed the Hebrew boys.

Reply Obj. 3: The lesser is included in the greater, but not vice versa. And when the virtuous person chooses to say less than he can, he does not lie according to the truth of the thing, but he touches on something true.

Reply Obj. 4: The words that are written in Sacred Scripture are either the words of the one who handed on the Scripture, or the words of someone speaking that are recorded in Scripture. If the words are taken in the first way, there can be no lie in them, since in figurative locutions the sense of the words is not what they indicate at first glance, but what the one speaking them intends to indicate in this manner of speaking. For example, he who says, “the meadow is laughing,” intends to signify the flowering of the meadow under a certain likeness of a thing. However, if they are the words of someone speaking of whom a record is being made, either they are those of someone who Scripture is arguing is wicked, and thus it is not unfitting that there are also lies there, like the words of the Jews blaspheming Christ; or they are those of someone who Scripture commends as not being of perfect virtue, but someone making progress, like the midwives who are commended in that they do something profitable insofar as it does not harm someone else, but they lied out of subservience to God; or else they are the words of someone who Scripture commends as being of perfect virtue, and proposes as an example. And thus the account of the words of Scripture is the same.

Reply Obj. 5: Deeds are not ordered of themselves to signifying, as speech is. And therefore if one does something whereby something false is given to be understood, it is not necessary that by this very fact he does what he should not do, as it is said that he should not be speaking when something false is being signified in the speech. Whence it is not necessary that every such deed is a sin, and especially when the deed is shown for the sake of signifying something. For then the account of those deeds is the same as that of figurative speech. For just as figurative speech has its truth not from the sense that the words have at first glance, but from what the speaker intends to do [in them], so too the Lord showed himself to want to go further, as though by the likeness of going a greater distance he signified his distance from the disciple’s knowledge—and in this [his signification] held a truth.

Reply Obj. 6: Although in a certain situation it is beneficial to someone that he be deceived, nevertheless nothing evil should be done for the sake of this good, just as one should not steal for the sake of giving alms. And thus, since lying carries a disorder of itself, one should not lie for someone’s benefit.

Reply Obj. 7: A lie is called “officious” not in its own notion, but by reason of the cause that inclines one toward lying.

Article 4

Whether every lie is a mortal sin

To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.70.4; 110.4; De decem praeceptis, a. 8; In Psalmos 5.) It appears that every lie is a mortal sin.

Obj. 1: For every sin that leads to one’s destruction is a mortal sin. But Psalm 5:6 says, thou destroyest those who speak lies. Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything that turns one against faith is a mortal sin. But lying is this kind of thing, as Augustine proves in On Lying. (Augustine, De mendacio, ch. 8, para. 11 (CSEL 41:429; PL 40:496).) Therefore every lie is a mortal sin. The minor premise is clear from the fact that if in any situation lying is licit, then it is not always necessary to have faith in a good man, and if he is not to be believed in one thing, there will be no necessity to believe him in others.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if any lie is innocent of mortal sin, the officious lie appears to be such. But the officious lie is a mortal sin, since through it an eternal reward is exchanged for a temporal one. For Gregory says in his Gloss on Exodus 1, about the Egyptian midwives, the reward of their beneficence, which could have been rewarded in eternal life, was exchanged for an earthly compensation through the fault of the lie. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 18, para. 3 (CCSL 143A; PL 76:41).) Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the text says (Sent. III, 38.1(144).2.) that for perfect men it is damnable to lie for another’s benefit. But only a mortal sin is said to be damnable. Therefore, for the perfect, an officious lie is mortal. And for the same reason every other lie is, since the officious lie appears damnable than others. And consequently even in other men every lie is a mortal sin, since worse conditions do not belong to the perfect than those belonging to others.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, only mortal sin is forbidden by a divine precept. But in the prohibition of false witness every lie is forbidden, as Augustine says in On Lying. (Augustine, De mendacio, ch. 5, para. 6 (CSEL 41:419; PL 40:491).) Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.

On the contrary, spiritual houses are not raised up thanks to mortal sin. But God raised up spiritual houses for the Egyptian midwives, according to Jerome. (Jerome, Commentarii in Isaiam, bk. 18, ch. 65, v. 21 (CCSL 73A; PL 24:672).) Therefore the midwives, when lying, did not sin mortally, and thus not every lie is a mortal sin.

Furthermore, no mortal sin is granted to anyone. But in a gloss on Exodus 1 (source) it is said that lying is granted for the weak. Therefore not every lie is a mortal sin.

Furthermore, Gregory says (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 18, para. 3 (CCSL 143A; PL 76:41).) that we believe one is easily loosed from an officious lie. But a sin is called “venial” from the fact that it is easily forgiven. Therefore an officious lie is a venial sin.

I answer that a sin is called “mortal” because it deprives a man of spiritual life. Now, life is spiritual through charity. Whence, those sins are mortal from their genus that turn one against the love of God and neighbor. Therefore two kinds of lie should be laid down to be mortal sins: the first is against God, as when someone lies in the teaching of religion; the second is what turns one to denying justice toward one’s neighbor. The latter is the sort of lie that is ordered either to the perversion of a legal judgment, as when someone says something false in the courtroom, or when it is ordered to someone’s harm, which cannot be done without mortal sin. But other lies, although they have a certain disorder, still do not turn one away from the love of God and neighbor; they are sins, but they are venial.

Reply Obj. 1: That authority is not speaking about every lie, but only about a pernicious one.

Reply Obj. 2: If an uttered lie is judged to be licit, then the judgment itself turns one toward against faith. Yet it is not necessary that every lie is ordered to turning one against faith, especially when it is not about things that relate to faith.

Reply Obj. 3: There are different opinions about the lie of the midwives. For some say that the lie was for the sake of preserving the lives of the infants, and thus it was an officious lie, and a venial sin, and it was also for the sake of preserving their own lives, and thus it came from passion, and was a mortal sin. But this does not appear reasonable, since a man should safeguard his own life no less than that that of another. And therefore others say that there are three things to consider in the midwives’ acts. The first is the very piety by which they wanted to spare the infants—and with respect to that they either merited or were disposed to merit, and this is how one should understand Jerome’s words that God raised up spiritual houses for them. There was also the lie, which was a venial sin, whether it was for the freedom of the infants or for the freedom of their own lives (which appears more correct to one closely examining this, according to Gregory’s words); and in this way according to Augustine in On Lying, (Augustine, De mendacio, ch. 17 (CSEL 41:453; PL 40:510).) they have the praise not of perfect justice, but of one progressing towards justice. And there was also the omission of confession of the divine truth and justice, if nevertheless they were bound to confess this then before Pharaoh; and with respect to this there could have been there a mortal sin. And according to this it can be understood that they exchanged an eternal reward for a temporal one. Or if they did not sin mortally in this, an eternal reward is said to be exchanged for a temporal one because their goodwill had a temporal reward not informed by grace; were it joined to grace, it would have had an eternal reward.

Reply Obj. 4: According to some, every lie is a mortal sin for perfected men. The reason for this some assign in two ways.

For some take their reasoning from the perfection of charity, through which a man’s mind adheres to the highest truth. Therefore their every lie occurs with deliberation and comes from contempt, so it cannot be venial, just as neither could man in the first state sin venially. But this is not helpful for the claim, since by the same reasoning they could commit no other venial sin, which is quite false, no matter how perfected men might become. For even among the Apostles there was venial sin; for John says, if we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves (1 John 1:8).

Others take their reasoning from the perfection of the state insofar as some carry their perfection in public, for example, religious and prelates; and faith is placed in such as upholders of the truth. Whence, if they were to deviate from the truth in some matter, a great prejudice to the truth would result thereby. But again, this is not persuasive, since one does not believe them as the upholders of the truth in all their deeds and statements, but only in the ones that look to the office of upholding the truth, like teaching and judgment. In such matters, were they to deviate from the truth, there is no doubt that they would sin mortally.

And therefore it should be said that no lie or sin that is not mortal from its genus becomes a mortal sin for perfected men, unless it be against their vow. But it can incidentally become mortal for them, and even for others, such as if it occurs against their conscience, though erroneous, or by reason of its scandal, or the like. What the text says—that the officious lie for perfected men is damnable (Sent. III, 38.1(144).2.)—should be understood comparatively, since in the same genus of sin the perfect sins more than the imperfect, although both sin venially or mortally. Nonetheless, this aggravating circumstance does not make it infinitely grave, such that what is venial to one becomes mortal to another.

Reply Obj. 5: Something is forbidden by divine precept in two ways. In one way, there is what is directly against what the precept says; and in this way the pernicious lie is forbidden, as is clear from the very form of the precept: you shall not bear false witness against your neighbor. In another way, there is what is indirectly forbidden, as outside what the precept says; and in this way the jocose and officious lie, like other venial sins, are forbidden by the divine precept.

Article 5

Whether the grades of lies are well assigned in the text

To the fifth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.110.2; De decem praeceptis, a. 8; In Psalmos 5.) It appears that the grades of lies are incongruously assigned in the text. (Sent. III, 38.2(145).1; the grades are taken from Augustine: "the first and to be carefully avoided is that capital lie which is done in the teaching of religion; to this lie one ought not be induced for any reason whatever. The second is such that it profits no one, but hurts someone. The third is that which profits one so as to hurt another. The fourth, that which is done exclusively for the lust of lying and deceiving, which is an astonishing lie. The fifth, that which is done out of a deep desire to please by sweet-talk. All these being avoided, there follows a sixth kind, which hurts no one and helps someone, as when, if someone else's money is about to be unjustly taken from him, one who knows where the money is should lie about this knowledge. The seventh, which hurts no one and profits someone, as when, not wishing to betray a man who is sought in order to be put to death, one should lie. The eighth is that which hurts no one, and helps to preserve someone from bodily uncleanness." De Mendacio, ch. 14, n. 25 (CSEL 41:444; PL 40:505).)

Obj. 1: For whenever someone knowingly speaks something false, he lies. But someone in a disputation knowingly speaks something false, even in things that pertain to the faith. Therefore he speaks a lie in the teaching of religion. But this is not more grave than a pernicious lie. Therefore the lie that occurs in teaching is not the first and gravest sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it happens that someone might lie with a joke about things that pertain to religious faith. Yet neither is this thought to be more grave than a lie that inclines to a grave loss for one’s neighbor. Therefore the same thing follows.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the officious lie has more the notion of a lie than does a jocose lie, as is clear from things said. Therefore, since the jocose lie is placed before the officious, it appears that they are not fittingly ordered.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, anyone to whom wickedness is pleasing for its own sake appears to sin against the Holy Spirit. But the sin against the Holy Spirit is the most grave, as was said in Book II. (In II Sent., d. 43, q. 1, a. 2.) Therefore, since he would appear to delight in wickedness itself, it appears that this lie is more grave than the others—and yet it is placed in the fourth position.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, to the degree that a greater harm is avoided through a lie, so much less of a sin it is. But the death of the body is a greater loss than is the impurity of the body. Therefore the seventh lie, which occurs to safeguard one’s life, should be placed after the eighth, which occurs to safeguard someone from bodily defilement.

On the contrary, we have the authority of Augustine, in his book On Lying. (Augustine, De mendacio, ch. 14 (CSEL 41:444; PL 40:505).)

I answer that every sin has a certain magnitude according to its own genus, to which something can be added or subtracted by reason of something joined to it. This is also why the magnitude of a lie can be considered according to three grades.

The first grade is when the lie’s magnitude is augmented by something joined to it. Now, this addition aggravating the lie is either a profanation of divine things, which is the most aggravating condition, and this is why the lie against the teaching of religion is placed first, or it is the harm of one’s neighbors, and if some benefit is joined to the harm, this mitigates it; and thus, the lie that harms someone and benefits no one is placed in the second position, and third is the lie benefits someone and harms no one.

The second grade of lying is considered without any addition or diminution. But because in every kind of sin, the sin that comes from one’s habit is more grave inasmuch as it comes from a greater desire, therefore the lie that arises from the desire of the one lying is placed in the fourth place. For in anyone who has a delightful habit there is an activity proper to that habit. In the fifth place there is the lie that does not appear to come from a habit, but rather from the intention of some extraneous end that nevertheless neither aggravates nor alleviates the lie, like one that arises from an intention to please or delight.

The third grade wherein a lie’s magnitude is considered is one diminished by what is joined to it, which latter is the intention of being advantageous; this alleviates it the more, the graver is the loss that is avoided by it. And therefore the lie that occurs to avoid the loss of money is placed in the sixth position; seventh is the lie that occurs to avoid being killed; and eighth, a lie that is told to avoid the baseness of [someone else’s] lust, which [lust], on account of its proximity to consent, can barely be [felt] without sin.

Reply Obj. 1: He who speaks something false in a disputation, although he does it knowingly, is not lying unless he is asserting what he is saying. For he states what is false not in his own person, but as bearing the person of the one who denies the truth.

Reply Obj. 2: The distinction of those grades, and their order, are being taken with other things being equal. Whence, what is in that second case can be first, and so too for the others.

Reply Obj. 3: Although an officious lie has more of the notion of a lie than does a jocose lie, insofar as it has more [the character] of an assertion, nonetheless the officious lie has less of evil, by reason of the advantage joined to it. And therefore it is less of a sin.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as was said in Book II, (In II Sent., d. 43, q. 1, a. 2.) not every sin that arises from a habit’s choice is a sin against the Holy Spirit. Otherwise it would not be a specific kind of sin. And therefore the lie that arises from the desire for lying, when it comes from a habit’s inclination—and not from the will’s rebellion against any of the things by which we are freed from sin, which is proper to the sin against the Holy Spirit—will not be a sin against the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 5: “Bodily defilement” is here understood as what has a proximity to sin, by reason of which it is thought to be a greater loss than death of the body.

Exposition of the text

Lest they kill their own soul for the sake of someone else’s body. (Sent. III, 38.1(144).1, quoting Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Ps 5, para. 7 (CCSL 38; PL 36:85).) This can be avoided in the following way, according to Augustine in On Lying. (Augustine, De mendacio, ch. 13, para. 22 (CSEL 41:444; PL 40:503).) For if someone were sought [to be put] to death, when we are simply asked [where he is], without any determination about the location being made, one should respond, “we will not betray him even if we must endure torture”; for this deed he praises a certain bishop. But if we are asked whether he is in some determinate location, one should respond, “I know where he is, but I will not say.”

Particularly if it should be repeated. (Sent. III, 38.1(144).2.) This is said insofar as the multiplication of venial sins disposes one to mortal sin.

And helps to preserve someone from bodily uncleanness. (Sent. III, 38.2(145).1, quoting Augustine, De mendacio, ch. 14, para. 25 (CSEL 41:444; PL 40:505).) But what should be done in the case of the woman herself, if she is sought on account of someone’s lust or defilement? Some say that if she senses that she is perfect, she should not lie, since she would not consent in her violation, and thus she will be undefiled by the sin; but if she senses that she is imperfect, she should commit a venial sin rather than incur the danger of committing a mortal sin. But it would be better to say that, if one does not have the intention of consenting, she should place her hope in God, who does not allow us to be tempted beyond our ability, and she should not sin venially. For by the very fact that it is given that something appropriate and worthy is done, all notion of sin is taken away. And thus, it would not be the case that every lie is a sin, which is against Augustine.

Nor does it seem that every lie is forbidden by this precept. (Sent. III, 38.5(148).5.) This should be understood as meaning “directly,” as what is contrary to the precept.

Nor is the amusing lie included in the above discussion. (Sent. III, 38.5(148).5.) This is true if an intention to deceive is understood here, in virtue of which there is a mistake not only in the one speaking, but also in the one hearing it, since he is deceived, as was said.