D. 31 - Duration of charity
Division of the text
After the Master has discussed charity, here he considers its duration. This consideration is divided into two parts.
In the first, he determines about the duration of charity in regard to its essence;
in the second, about its duration in regard to its order, showing how it was in Christ and how it will be in the blessed, at now it remains to investigate whether Christ, according to his humanity, preserved the order of loving which was set out earlier. (Sent. III, 31.3(114).1.)
The former is divided into two parts.
In the first, he considers the duration of charity;
in the second, the duration of other habits, at it is to be noted too how faith, hope, and knowledge are said to be made void. (Sent. III, 31.2(113).1.)
Concerning the former, he does three things.
First, he lays down a false opinion of some authors, who said that charity cannot be lost, and the reasons for that opinion;
second, he brings in objections to the contrary, at both reason and authority defeat these people. (Sent. III, 31.1(112).7.)
Third, he responds to the arguments advanced in favor of this opinion, at but the fact that the Apostle says: 'Charity shall never fall away,' does not at all support their view. (Sent. III, 31.1(112).8, referring to 1 Cor 13:8.)
Here there are two questions for discussion:
the first, on the emptying out of charity through sin; (Q. 1.)
the second, on its emptying out through glory. (Q. 2.)
Question 1
The loss of charity through sin
Concerning the first, we will inquire into four things:
first, whether charity once had can be lost;
second, whether someone can be erased from the book of life;
third, whether the least charity can resist any temptation whatsoever;
fourth, of the quantity of charity in those who rise up from sin.
Article 1
Whether one who has charity can lose it
To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.24.11–12; SCG IV.70; De caritate, aa. 6, 12, 13; Super Rom. 8, lect. 7; Super 1 Cor. 13, lect. 3.) It seems that one who has charity cannot lose it.
Obj. 1: For everyone who has charity is born of God, since charity makes men sons of God. But everyone who is born of God does not sin, as is said in 1 John 3:6. Therefore everyone who has charity does not sin; and so charity once had cannot be lost.
Obj. 2: Further, there is merit of eternal life in whomsoever has charity, since charity is the principle of meriting, as was said. But someone is unjustly treated if what he merited is not returned to him, since it is owed to him. Therefore eternal life will be given to whosoever has charity at some time. But eternal life will be given to no one unless he has charity in the end. Therefore whosoever has charity will have it in the end; and so it cannot be lost, at least as regards having it in the end, as it seems.
Obj. 3: Further, what is most powerful cannot be conquered by what is weakest. But charity is the most powerful, since it is strong as death, as is said in Song of Songs 8:6. Sin, however, is the weakest, since evil is weak and sluggish, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 32 (PG 3:731).) Therefore charity cannot be expelled through sin. Yet there is in no other way in which it can be lost. Therefore charity, once had, cannot be lost.
Obj. 4: Further, cupidity is the root of all evil (1 Tim 6:10). (RSV renders this as “the love of money is the root of all evils.”) But charity—at least perfect charity—is not compatible with cupidity, as Augustine says in Eighty-Three Questions. (Augustine, De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 36, n. 1 (CCSL 44A; PL 40:25).) Therefore one who has charity cannot fall into something evil; and thus he cannot lose it.
Obj. 5: Further, if sin expels charity, the sin that does so must be either a sin that already is, or a sin that has not yet come to be. But it is not a sin which already is, since that does not conquer charity; nor a sin that has not yet come to be, since what does not exist cannot act. Therefore sin in no way expels charity.
Obj. 6: Further, what is or occurs for the lesser part stands further from what is or occurs for the most part than it does from what is indifferent to alternatives. But from that which is indifferent, nothing can proceed, as the Commentator says in the Physics 2; (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 2.) therefore much less can something proceed from what is or occurs for the lesser part. But charity, although it does not bring it about of necessity that good always be done, nevertheless brings about an inclination for good to be done in most cases. Therefore one who has charity cannot do evil, to which he has no relation, except for the lesser part ; and thus he cannot sin or lose charity.
Obj. 7: Further, charity’s love is stronger than natural love. But natural love is not lost through sin; therefore neither is charity’s love.
Obj. 8: Further, charity is greater than faith; and each is a gift of God. Since therefore faith is not taken away through mortal sin, it seems that neither is charity.
On the contrary, it says in Revelation 2:4: I have this against you, that you have abandoned the love you had at first. Therefore charity can be lost.
Furthermore, there is no need for caution in him who cannot fall. But caution is [taught as] necessary for one who is standing through charity: if you think you are standing, watch out that you do not fall (1 Cor 10:12). Therefore charity can be lost.
Furthermore, David had charity at first, for otherwise he would not have begged that the joy of salvation be given back to him; (See Ps 51, esp. v. 12.) and nevertheless [the same verse indicates that] he sinned and lost the charity whose restoration he was begging. Therefore charity once had can be lost.
Furthermore, whoever cannot sin has a free will confirmed in good. But not everyone who has charity has a free will confirmed in good. Therefore someone who has charity can sin, and thus lose charity.
I answer that the opinion of those who held that charity, on account of its firmness, cannot be lost, is similar to the opinion of Socrates who held that one who has knowledge, on account of its nobility and certainty, cannot go astray, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 7; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.2, 1145b25.) and so there is a similar proof and disproof of each, as well as a refutation of the proof. For each position is most powerfully disproved through experience, but is “proved” through the firmness of knowledge and charity.
Now, the Philosopher refutes the just-mentioned proof regarding knowledge by pointing to the fact that knowledge chiefly consists in the universal, whereas actions are concerned with singulars. And therefore concupiscence, which tends to the particular good unless it be restrained, impedes the application of universal knowledge to the particular, absorbing the consideration of knowledge in a particular matter of action, so that although a morally incontinent man seized by the fervor of concupiscence considers rightly and not merely holds by habit some universal, (for example that all fornication is to be fled), nevertheless when he descends to this particular good by the force of concupiscence, the habit of right reason is bound, so that he cannot carry through an act of right consideration about the particular.
In a similar way, too, charity is chiefly concerned with the eternal good, so that it makes one have the universal conception that nothing is to be done against God; but when a man descends to the particular, some temptation absorbs the aforesaid inclination of charity, as was said about knowledge. But since charity loves God more vehemently than any concupiscence loves any mutable good, if someone should extend the affection that he has toward God to the particular work he is engaged in, using this as a rule for his work, he would never fall into sin. But because it is in our power to use or not use the act of charity, for charity does not compel the will, affection for a mutable good can therefore prevail and induce a sin. And on account of this, it is evident that every sin comes from error and from contempt, in other words, negligence [of charity’s rule of working]. Hence Boethius says, such weapons we brought you as would keep you safe by their unconquered strength, if you had not earlier thrown them away. (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 1, prose 2 (PG 63:599).)
Thus, the man who has fallen into [mortal] sin loses charity, since by sin he is divided from God, and this is because he sets for himself another end and there cannot be two ultimate ends. Hence, since charity has for its cause conjunction with God, it is immediately lost by one act. And this immediate loss may be found in all accidents that have a cause outside of the subject in which they exist, because nothing can remain in being once it has been separated from its essential cause, as is evident with light. However, it is otherwise with habits that have their cause in the subject itself, because they are not totally destroyed through one act of sin.
Reply Obj. 1: This statement is to be understood thus: as long as he wishes to use grace, through which he is a son of God, he will not sin; for by this grace he is able to resist sin.
Reply Obj. 2: Some said that only final charity, and no other, merits [eternal life]. But this is false, since only the charity that is in the last moment of life can be called “final,” and perhaps at that moment a man merits nothing, but instead sleeps. Hence, it should be said that any act of charity merits eternal life and makes this something owed to it. But when a man sins, he now becomes, in a way, other than he was before, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.3, 1165b22.) since he is changed from what was fitting for him according to his nature to what is against that nature. And therefore it is not necessary that eternal life should be given to him as something owed, even as something the return of which is owed to a person in his right mind is not to be returned to a person gone mad.
Reply Obj. 3: It is not owing to any defect in charity that it is conquered by sin, but rather owing to a defect in the one who has charity, who does not make use of it [in order to avoid sin], as was said.
Reply Obj. 4: Although cupidity is not actually present in him who has charity, still the root of it remains in the soul, and through charity it can be blocked so that it does not rush forward into act. And when cupidity is not blocked, it starts germinating, and expels charity.
Reply Obj. 5: Charity is expelled in the very instant in which sin comes to be; and just as that instant is the first in which sin begins to be, so it is the first in which charity begins not to be, as is evident in the case of natural things when there are two contrary forms.
Reply Obj. 6: What is indifferent to each outcome is determined to one outcome insofar as it is moved from another extrinsic cause, and thus [when it is determined in this way] an effect can proceed from it. But when it is not made wholly determinate by a single thing, it remains able to be determined to the opposite as well. And in this way, from that thing [the will] which stands to something [evil] for the lesser part insofar as it is already determined by a first cause [charity], the contrary [of that to which it is already determined by the first cause] can occur for the lesser part on account of some determining cause [sensible affection] contrary to that first cause determining it for the most part. And so it is likewise with the topic at hand: for just as charity, as far as lies in it, inclines [a man] for the most part to what is good, so sensible affection inclines [a man] for the most part to what is pleasant to sense, and from this inclination, as from a kind of habit, the will is inclined to sin.
Reply Obj. 7: Natural love is, at the level of the will, entirely determined to one [end]. But it is not the same with the love of charity, except in the blessed who are now confirmed in good.
Reply Obj. 8: A man is not totally separated from God by sin, for if he were, he would simply cease to exist; but he is separated from God with respect to the ultimate and perfect conjunction with him that charity brings about. And therefore it is not necessary that faith be taken away by sin, as charity is—even as the air loses the sun’s rays when clouds come in between but does not lose every sort of brightness, for instance that which comes from reflection, the sort that appears even where there are no direct rays of sun.
Article 2
On the book of life
Quaestiuncula 1
To the second we proceed thus. (Parallels: In I Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5; ST I.24.1; De veritate, q. 7, aa. 1, 4; Super Philip. 4, lect. 1.) [We divide the article into three subquestions: 1. whether the book of life is something created; 2. whether the book of life is about God; 3. whether anything can be said to be erased from the book of life]. It seems that the book of life is something created.
Obj. 1: For on Sirach 24:23, all these things are the book of life, (NRSVCE renders this as “all this is the book of the covenant”; v. 23 in NRSVCE corresponds to v. 32 in the Vulgate.) a gloss says, the book referred to here is the Old and New Testament. (citation missing.) But that is something created; therefore so is the book of life.
Obj. 2: Further, on Revelation 20:12, another book was opened, the book of life, the Gloss says [the book is] Christ, who will then appear manifest to all. (Glossa Ordinaria, at Rev 20:12 (PL 114:745).) But he will not appear to all except according to his human nature. Since therefore human nature in Christ is created, it seems that the book of life is something created.
Obj. 3: Further, a book, insofar as things come to be written in it, is receptive of impressions from without. But uncreated things are not susceptible to alien impressions. Therefore the book of life is not something uncreated but something created.
Obj. 4: Again, it seems that the book of life is proper to the Son. For the Gloss interprets Psalm 40:7, in the head of the book it is written of me, (The NRSVCE renders this “in the scroll of the book it is written of me.") to mean in the Father, who is my head. (Glossa Ordinaria (PL 113:903).) But in the Divinity, he whose head is the Father is the Son. Therefore the book of life is the Son.
Obj. 5: Again, it seems that the book of life is the Holy Spirit. For “life-giving” is attributed to the Holy Spirit both in the Creed and in John 6:63: it is the Spirit who gives life. Therefore since the book of life is ordained to life, it befits the Holy Spirit, whether properly or by appropriation.
On the contrary, Augustine says in the City of God, the book of life is God’s foreknowledge, which cannot fail. (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 20, ch. 15 (CCSL 48; PL 41:681).) But foreknowledge is something essentially uncreated and is appropriable to the Son; therefore, so is the book of life.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Furthermore, it seems that the book of life has to do with God. (Parallels: ST I.24.2; De veritate, q. 7, aa. 5–7.) For on Psalm 69:28, let them be blotted out of the book of the living, the Gloss says, the book of the living is God’s knowledge. (Glossa Ordinaria (PL 113:95).) But God has maximal knowledge of himself. Therefore the book of life has to do with God.
Obj. 2: Further, he is the font of any life whatsoever. If therefore the book of life is about others who have life by way of participation, much more is it about himself who has life in the way of the origin.
Obj. 3: Again, it seems that it is about all creatures. For foreknowledge extends to all creatures. But the book of life is the divine foreknowledge, as was said above. Therefore it will be about all things.
Obj. 4: Further, it is said in John 1:3, what was made, in him was life. (Due to a difference of punctuation, RSV renders vs. 3 and 4 as “and without him was not anything made that was made. In him was life, and the life was the light of men.”) But every creature is made; therefore every creature is written in the book of life.
Obj. 5: Again, it seems that the book of life is also about the wicked. For on Luke 10:20, your names are written in heaven, the Gloss says, whether someone performs heavenly or earthly works is eternally fixed within the memory of God, being annotated in this quasi-text. (Glossa Ordinaria (PL 114:296).) But performing earthly works is characteristic of those who are wicked. Therefore since the book of life is nothing other than the reservoir of the divine memory, it seems that the book of life is also about the wicked.
Obj. 6: Again, the book of life is ordained to life. But the life of nature is common to the good and the wicked, and the life of grace, moreover, is common in this life to those who are foreknown but not predestined and those who are predestined to eternal life. Therefore the book of life is about the good and the wicked, the predestinate and the foreknown.
On the contrary, something is said to be “written in God” which has an exemplar in him. But evil things, insofar as they are evil, have no exemplar in him. Therefore they are not written there.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Furthermore, it seems that nothing written there ought to be said to be erased from it. (Parallels: In I Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5; a. 3, ad 3; Super Philip. 4, lect. 1.) For the book of life is divine predestination, as the Gloss says on Philippians 4:3. (Glossa Ordinaria (PL 114:607).) But no one is said to fall away from predestination; therefore neither should anyone be said to be erased from the book of life.
Obj. 2: Further, a book in which something can be written down and erased is changeable. But the book of life is unchangeable, since it is something uncreated. Therefore no one can be erased from it.
Obj. 3: Further, what is taken for true according to mere opinion, since it is true only in some respect, should not be spoken of as though it were simply so. But on Psalm 69:28, let them be blotted out of the book of the living, the Gloss says (Glossa Ordinaria (PL 113:950).) that this is to be taken only in respect to the hope of those who suppose themselves to be written there. Therefore it seems that [properly speaking] no one ought to be said to be erased from it.
On the contrary, whoever has sinned against me I will blot out of my book (Ex 32:33). But many sin; therefore many are erased.
Furthermore, no one is both written in the book of life and damned. But many who earlier were written in book of life are afterwards damned, as is clearly seen among the disciples of Christ to whom it was said, rejoice, for your names are written in the book of life (Luke 10:20), (NRSVCE renders “heaven” for “the Book of Life.”) even though from their number many turned aside and fell away, as is said in John 6:67. Therefore some who were written there earlier are erased.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that the “book of life” of which we now speak is said metaphorically. Hence its meaning must be grasped in terms of likeness to a material book, the notion of which seems to be that it contains some figures that function as though likenesses of the things known by means of that book. Hence what we are speaking of is called the book of life because it contains likenesses by which life can be known. It would not, however, be the book of life in a sufficient way—that is, as though producing perfect knowledge about life—unless it should contain likenesses of every life in particular, since knowledge at the universal level is imperfect and still in potency to particulars. But to have in just this way the likenesses of all things that have life, and to have these likenesses determinately, belongs only to the divine mind, in which are the proper exemplars of all things. And for this reason the book of life is not something created, but is the divine knowledge about life, not only at the universal level but down to the particular, with respect to everything in which life is found. And since knowledge is essential [to the divine nature] and is appropriated to the Son, therefore the book of life is something essential in God and is appropriated to the Son.
Reply Obj. 1: The Old and New Testament is called the book of life as though producing knowledge about life at the universal level and teaching commandments by which life is attained; but nevertheless it does not produce knowledge about the life of each one in particular. And therefore it can be called the book of life in some sense, but not according to the full notion.
Reply Obj. 2: Christ according to his human nature is called the book of life as though the universal exemplar of life, not as though he were a likeness causing one to know particularly the life of each one.
Reply Obj. 3: The likenesses or figures in that Book are not something added to its essence, since the exemplar notions, as was said in Book I, (In I Sent., d. 36, q. 2, a. 1.) are the divine essence itself; and therefore it is not necessary that it should receive alien impressions.
Reply Obj. 4: The Father is called “head of the book,” that is, of the Son, insofar as “book” is appropriated to the Son.
Reply Obj. 5: While life may be appropriated to the Holy Spirit, knowledge about life is appropriated to the Son.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that God’s knowledge is called the book of life. Since, however, a book is properly about those things of which it produces knowledge through figures and likenesses existing in the book, therefore only the knowledge of those things that God knows through a likeness can be called a book. Now, God does not know evils through likenesses of evils existing in himself; they are rather known in the manner of privations. In like manner, too, God does not know himself through a likeness of himself, but rather by the fact that he is present to himself according to his own essence. Hence neither the knowledge God has of himself nor the knowledge he has of evils can be called a book, except when it comes to the punishments of the wicked insofar as these punishments are just and good, for from this vantage, God’s knowledge may be called the Book of Death. Life, however, is counted among good things. Hence the book of life must be understood with respect to the life found in creatures; and although God has knowledge about the life of nature, of grace, and of glory—so that with respect to any of the aforesaid lives God’s knowledge could be called the book of life—nevertheless the perfect notion of life is found only in the life of glory, which suffers no admixture of death. And therefore the book of life, according to its proper sense, is the knowledge of God that he has about the life of glory of each one [who can receive it].
In this way, the book of life differs: (1) from God’s knowledge, which is about both temporal and eternal things; (2) from God’s foreknowledge, which is about both the good and the wicked; (3) and also from predestination, since predestination, properly speaking, is about future things and implies providential direction to an end, since it is the purpose to have mercy. But the book of life implies simple knowledge about life, leaving the time undetermined; hence both those who already have life and those who are going to have it are said to be written in the book of life.
Reply Obj. 1–7: And through this response, the solution to all the objections is evident.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the book of life, as was said, is God’s knowledge about the life of glory of any man. Now, a thing has being in a twofold manner: in itself and in its cause. In itself, indeed, it is simply, while in its cause, it has being in a certain respect. But grace, just in itself, is a sufficient cause of glory, so that he who has grace has now, in a certain respect, the life of glory. Therefore God has knowledge about the life of glory of anyone in two ways: in one way, insofar as God knows the very life of glory to be in that one [right now], or to be in him in the future, simply; and then such a man is said to be written in the book of life simply, or, as certain ones put it, “enrolled,” from a likeness to those who are enrolled in the military or in some office; in another way, insofar as God knows the life of glory to be in that one, or to be in him in the future, in its cause, which is grace; and such a man is said to be written in the book of life in a certain respect, or, as certain ones put it, “noted down.” Since therefore it is impossible that the knowledge of God should fail, it follows that whomsoever he knows is to have eternal life will in fact have it. Hence that man who is written simply, or “enrolled,” in the book of life cannot be erased from it.
But since grace, which is the cause of glory in a man who has present justice, ceases to be a cause of glory in him when he falls away from justice by sin, therefore God’s knowledge about that man’s grace is not a knowledge of grace as cause of glory. Hence the knowledge God has of that grace does not now pertain to the book of the life of glory. And according to this, he is said to be erased from the book of life not by some change made in the book itself, but rather by some change in the one in whom it happens that grace is not now the cause of glory. And God is said to erase someone from the book of life insofar as God permits him to fall away from justice by sin.
Reply Obj. 1: “Predestination” implies direction to an end, which “book of life” does not imply, as was said. And so, the one who has only present justice cannot be called predestined, but he can be said in some way to be written in the book of life, as was explained.
Reply Obj. 2: The solution is evident from what was said above.
Reply Obj. 3: The gloss is speaking there about the writing by which someone is written in the book of life simply.
Article 3
Whether any charity can resist any temptation
To the third we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III.62.6.ad3; 70.4; De caritate, a. 10, ad 4.) It seems that not any charity whatsoever can resist any temptation whatsoever.
Obj. 1: For just as charity is an obstacle to sin, so also is reason, as was said above. But not any [power of] reason whatsoever is capable of resisting temptation, as can be seen in the morally incontinent, who have right reason and yet are overcome, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.8, 1151a20.) Therefore not any charity is capable of resisting any temptation.
Obj. 2: Further, there is greater difficulty in resisting evil than in doing good, simply speaking. But the least [amount of] charity cannot do any and every good work; therefore neither can it resist any and every temptation.
Obj. 3: Further, in resisting the greatest temptation, there is the greatest merit, since in that case there is the greatest fight that merits a crown. But the least charity cannot bring about the greatest reward; therefore neither can it resist the greatest temptation.
Obj. 4: Further, imperfect charity does not resist venial sins. But the onslaught of mortal sins is greater than that of venial sins. Therefore imperfect charity does not resist the greatest temptations.
Obj. 5: Further, it is said in 1 Corinthians 10:13: God is faithful, and he will not let you be tempted beyond your strength. (NRSCE reads "tested" for "tempted.") But those to whom that verse was written had grace, as is evident from the beginning of the letter. (See 1 Cor 1:2.) Therefore some temptation is beyond the power of the one who has grace or charity.
On the contrary, it is impossible to avoid every sin unless every temptation to sin is resisted. But the least charity can avoid every sin, since even a man existing in a purely natural state would have been able to do this. Therefore any charity is capable of overcoming every temptation.
Furthermore, charity loves the law of God more than cupidity loves thousands of gold and silver pieces, as a Gloss says on Psalm 119. But a greater love can resist a lesser love. Therefore any charity is capable of resisting any temptation.
Furthermore, no one commits a sin in something he is not capable of avoiding, as Augustine says. (Augustine, De libero arbitrio, bk. 3, ch. 18, n. 50 (CCSL 29; PL 32:1295): quis enim peccat in eo quod nullo modo caveri potest? cf. De duabus anim., ch. 12 (PL 42:108): si ita coguntur ut resistendi potestas nulla sit, non peccat.) If therefore the one who has charity were not able to resist any temptation, it seems that he would not commit sin by consenting to [at least some] temptation.
I answer that “resisting temptation” is said in two ways: in one way, it means that someone is not conquered by temptation; in another way, that someone conquers temptation. For someone is said to be conquered by temptation when, by a temptation, he is drawn away from a good he proposes to follow and into consenting to sin, as occurs in the morally incontinent man who has right reason but is led astray [by some sensible good]; for someone who never even proposes to follow the good, such as the intemperate or lustful man, is not “conquered by” temptation, since he freely gives into it. That man is said to conquer, however, who not only is not led into an act of sin from a temptation coming upon him, but also, owing to the greatness of his virtue, esteems the temptation as though it were nothing; whereas the man who suffers difficulty from a temptation but is not led away by it, does indeed resist temptation by not consenting to it, but does not conquer, properly speaking.
Speaking therefore in the first way about resisting sin [that is, not being conquered], in this manner any charity is capable of resisting [any] sin, on account of a free will freed from the slavery of sin, although it suffers difficulty under the impulse of temptation; whereas speaking of temptation in the second way [that is, as a prey of conquest], in this manner a charity that is small when the temptation begins is capable of resisting any temptation, because [when made use of] it becomes great by the time the temptation has ended, since God will always administer help to one who is fighting. Yet on the hypothesis that a certain charity were always to remain small, it would not be capable of resisting temptation in the second way.
Reply Obj. 1: The case of the morally incontinent and the case of one who has charity are not parallel, since the one who has charity really has the habit of virtue right now, which the incontinent one does not have. And further, even the incontinent man is not overcome as though unable to resist, since if he wanted to use the right reason he has, he could, as was said above.
Reply Obj. 2: Although [in resisting evil] there is greater difficulty in regard to labor [than in doing good], still there is not greater difficulty considered in terms of an excess of the work vis-à-vis the power; and this is what one looks to when it comes to virtues, as was said. (Above, d. 30, a. 5, ad 5.) Or it can be said that even the least charity is capable of attaining the greatest object, but not of positing a greatest act in regard to intensity.
Reply Obj. 3: A small charity is capable of leading to great merit with respect to the accidental reward, but not with respect to the substantial reward, as was said above.
Reply Obj. 4: Imperfect charity could even resist venial sins, if someone made use of charity against the temptation to commit venial sins—not as though he would avoid all of them, but because he is able to avoid any given one.
Reply Obj. 5: The Apostle speaks with respect to what a man can endure without disturbance of soul; and only perfect charity can bring it about that a man preserve equanimity in the midst of great tribulations.
Article 4
On the charity with which a man rises up from sin
Quaestiuncula 1
To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III.89.2, 3.) [We divide the article into three subquestions: 1. whether a man always rises up from sin to a lesser charity than he had before he sinned; 2. whether a man always rises up from sin into a greater charity than he had before he sinned; 3. whether a man rises up from sin into a charity at least equal to the charity he had before he sinned]. It seems that a man always rises up from sin with less charity.
Obj. 1: For on Amos 5:2 (fallen, no more to rise, is maiden Israel) the gloss says, it is not denied that she might rise, but rather that she can rise as a virgin, since one who has gone astray, even if he be carried back on the shepherd’s shoulders, does not have as much glory as if he had never strayed. (Jerome, Commentatorium in Amos, bk. 2, ch. 5 (PL 25:1036).) But glory is commensurate with charity. Therefore a man after sinning does not have as much charity when he rises, as he had at first.
Obj. 2: Further, Ezekiel 44:10–13 says, the Levites who went far from me . . . shall not come near to me, to serve me as priest. But as regards the spiritual priesthood of the faithful, someone comes near to God through charity. Therefore the one who at some time went away from God by sin does not have as much charity as he had before.
Obj. 3: Further, beginning charity is never as much as advancing and perfect charity. But sometimes when someone falls, he had until that moment advancing or perfect charity; whereas when he rises up from sin, he has beginning charity [since he appears to be starting over again]. Therefore he does not have as much charity as before.
Obj. 4: Further, that which is without charity can never dispose to receiving the influence of divine light as much as charity can do. But insofar as someone disposes himself to grace, God infuses grace into him. Therefore someone remaining in charity always receives more of the influence of grace than one receiving charity anew; and so the same conclusion follows as before.
On the contrary, the offering of Judah and Jerusalem will be pleasing to the Lord as in the days of old and as in former years (Mal 3:4). But charity makes everything of ours to be accepted by God. Therefore someone rising after a fall can have as much charity as he had at first.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Furthermore, it seems that he always rises up from sin with a greater charity. For on Genesis 1:5, there was evening and there was morning, the first day, a Gloss says, the evening light is that from which someone falls; the morning light, that in which he rises. But morning light is greater than evening light. Therefore, too, the grace or charity in which someone rises is greater than that which he had before he fell.
Obj. 2: Further, Romans 5:20 says, where sin increased, grace abounded all the more. But where grace abounds all the more, there is greater charity. Therefore, [the same conclusion follows].
Obj. 3: Further, sin conquers the first charity, but [when a man rises up] it is then conquered by the second charity. Therefore the latter charity is stronger and greater than the former.
On the contrary, an innocent man is not less apt for receiving grace than a sinner. But the man who received the first grace as an innocent man, receives the second grace as a sinner. Therefore it need not be the case that the second grace is greater than the first.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Furthermore, it seems that the charity of the one rising up from sin is at least always equal. For on Romans 8:28, we know that in all things God works for good for those who love him, a Gloss says, even in when one falls into sin. But this would not be so, if the sinner were to rise with less charity. Therefore he never rises up with less charity, but always with charity [at least] equal to what he had before.
Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says that penance restores everything that has been taken away. (This is not found in Ambrose. The Nicolaï edition says that it can be gathered from Hypognost. bk. 3, ch. 9 (PL 45:1631) from these words: repentance is a thing both very good and perfect which calls the fallen back to the perfect.) But this would not be so, if the penitent were not to rise up in a charity at least equal to what he had before. Therefore someone always rises up with [at least] an equal charity.
Obj. 3: Further, contrition ought to be proportionate to the preceding sin. But sin is proportionate, in a certain way, to the grace that it expels. Therefore the grace or charity through which a man has contrition for sin ought to be equal to the preceding grace that the sin expelled.
Obj. 4: Further, penance restores life to merits deadened by sin. Therefore the penitent will have as much glory as he merited before his sin. But he merited as much as he had of charity. Therefore the glory the penitent will have is proportionate to the charity he had before his sin. Yet this glory is proportionate to the charity in which, after his repentance, he is found at the moment of death, since in the place where the tree falls, there it will lie (Eccl 11:3). Therefore the charity with which the penitent rises up from sin is equal to the charity from which he falls.
On the contrary, the least contrition is enough to blot out all sins. But the quantity of charity in which someone rises up after sinning is gauged according to the quantity of contrition for that sin. Since, therefore, when he had grace earlier on, he might have received that grace due to a great preparation, it seems possible that he should receive a lesser grace and charity than he had before [due to a lesser preparation].
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that the measure of charity is pre-fixed by God according to his will, and in some way is [also] commensurate with the effort of the one who receives grace. Hence, because someone after sinning can expend more or less effort to recover charity, and by sin no limit is imposed upon divine liberality—since, as far as lies in him, he is prepared to blot out all sins entirely—it must be said, as is commonly said, that someone can rise up after sin with charity greater than, less than, or equal to that which he had before.
Reply Obj. 1: The Gloss is speaking about the glory of the accidental reward, which is commensurate not with charity but with an act or state: for after sin, a virgin will not have an aureole; and similarly, neither will a sinner rising up after a fall have the joy of continual innocence.
Reply Obj. 2: Someone is driven from an office of dignity on account of the sin committed, even if he should repent, for example, he is driven from the priesthood on account of having committed homicide; and this is because he is not restored [by penance] to a state of such dignity, even though he might be restored to an equal charity.
Reply Obj. 3: It is true, speaking of one and the same charity, that beginning charity is less than advancing or perfect charity; but a given beginner can be greater in quantity of charity than another person who is in the state of one advancing, just as a newborn animal can be greater in size or strength than another animal, even a fully grown one.
Reply Obj. 4: Other things being equal, the one who has charity always receives more of the influence of divine light; but one who does not have charity can yet strive for it more and will receive it more.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that it need not be the case that a man should always rise up with a greater charity, since even a lesser or an equal preparation is a sufficient condition for the infusing of grace.
Reply Obj. 1: The likeness mentioned in that Gloss is not to be evaluated with respect to the quantity of light, but with respect to the order of light to darkness.
Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle is speaking in that passage of the grace of redemption, which superabounded in regard to the offense of the first man; he is not speaking universally.
Reply Obj. 3: Sin does not conquer charity on account of a weakness in charity itself, but because he who sins does not make use of the help that charity affords; and therefore the argument does not follow.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that a man can rise up from sin even with less charity than he had before, since howsoever little he sorrows over sin and prepares himself for grace, as long as he comes to that extent of contrition by which it more displeases him to have gone away from God than any temporal good pleases him, then he will have grace—even if he does not prepare himself for this gift of grace as much as he prepared himself earlier on, when he was innocent.
Reply Obj. 1: This [the fact that we can benefit from a fall] is not understood to refer always to a greater quantity of charity in the one rising up, but [in any event] to the greater diligence or humility, at least actual, in which the penitent sinner rises up. It is less evil, however, that charity should be diminished than that it should be entirely lost; and the lesser evil is reckoned the greater good, as is said in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1129b12.) And therefore sin can turn out to be for the good of one who loves God, even if he should rise up with less charity than he had before, in the sense that through the humility and caution he learns, he is protected from all sorts of loss of grace.
Reply Obj. 2: Penance does restore all things, but the things restored need not be equal to what they were before.
Reply Obj. 3: The quantity of sin is not proportionate to the grace that it excludes, because a small sin can expel the greatest charity, just as conversely a small charity is capable of blotting out the greatest sins, since this [effect] depends upon a man’s effort rather than the habit’s quantity.
Reply Obj. 4: As is evident from what has been said before, that he merited by prior merits so much glory as he had of charity. But through sin he became other than he was, and is not fully restored to the pristine degree he occupied. And therefore he will not fully receive the effect of prior merits, except with respect to the accidental reward, which is measured by acts of charity more than by the habit of charity.
Question 2
The loss of charity through glory
The next subject for inquiry is the emptying out of charity through glory. Concerning this, we will inquire into four things:
first, whether faith and hope are emptied out at the advent of glory;
second, whether charity is;
third, whether the order of charity is;
fourth, whether knowledge is.
Article 1
Whether faith and hope are emptied out in heaven
Quaestiuncula 1
To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II.67.3; II-II.4.4.ad 1; III.3.3.ad 3; 18.2; De spe, a. 4, ad 14; De virtutibus card., a. 4, ad 10.) [We divide the article into three subquestions: 1. whether faith is emptied out in the state of glory; 2. whether hope is emptied out in the state of glory; 3. whether something of the substance of the habits of faith and hope remains in the state of glory]. It seems that faith will not be emptied out.
Obj. 1: For faith is the foundation of the spiritual building. But the foundation remains unmoved, whatever is built upon it. Therefore faith is not emptied out at the advent of glory.
Obj. 2: Further, nothing is expelled except by its contrary. But glory is not contrary to faith. Therefore faith is not emptied out at the advent of glory.
Obj. 3: Further, in regard to things different in species, the perfect and the imperfect can certainly exist together in the same subject, such as that a man might have perfect geometry and imperfect grammar. But faith and the vision of glory are other in species. Therefore the vision of glory does not expel faith.
Obj. 4: Further, opinion and science are related as imperfect and perfect knowledge; and in like manner, the “morning” and “evening” knowledge in angels. But in men science and opinion remain together at the same time, and in the angels morning and evening knowledge remain together at the same time. Therefore faith remains together with the vision had in heaven.
On the contrary, against this is what the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 13.
Furthermore, faith is about things that are not apparent to us. But in heaven, none of the things about which we have faith will be not apparent. Therefore there will be no faith there.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Furthermore, it seems that neither will hope be emptied out. (Parallels: above,* d. 26, q. 2, a. 5, resp. 3; ST II-II.4.4.ad 1; III.3.3.ad3; 18.2; De spe, a. 4, ad 14; De virtutibus card., a. 4, ad 10.)* For just as hope stands to good things, so fear stands to evil things. But servile fear will always remain in the damned. Therefore, similarly, hope will remain in the blessed.
Obj. 2: Further, it says in Sirach 24:21, those who eat of me will hunger for more; and it is speaking of the enjoyment of divine wisdom that will take place in heaven. But one who hungers looks forward to something in the future. Therefore the saints will look forward to something in the future, even in regard to the substantial reward.
Obj. 3: Further, in the faith that is emptied out, something common to faith and glory is found, namely vision. But in hope is found nothing that could remain in heaven, since the very substance of hope is expectation, which will not remain in heaven. Therefore it seems that hope will not be emptied out [but instead, will be simply cancelled out].
On the contrary, who hopes for what is seen? (Rom 8:24). But the saints in heaven see whatever they looked forward to. Therefore hope will not be in them.
Furthermore, hope is the expectation of future beatitude. But in heaven beatitude will not then be something of the future. Therefore neither will hope be there.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Furthermore, it seems that something of the substance of the habits of faith and hope will remain numerically the same. (Parallels: ST I-II.67.5; De virtuitibus card., a. 4, ad 10.) For in every change there must be something common to both terms. But faith and hope are changed into the goods of glory. Therefore something of the substance of the habits of faith and hope must remain numerically the same.
Obj. 2: Further, just as the advent of charity is opposed to unformed faith not in regard to the substance of faith but in regard to its being unformed, so the advent of glory is opposed to faith not in regard to the substance of the vision, but only in regard to its imperfection. But the advent of charity takes away the unformedness of faith, which remains numerically the same habit of faith with respect to its substance, as was said above. (Above,* d. 23, q. 3, a. 4, resp. 1.)* Therefore in like manner, the advent of glory takes away only imperfection, leaving the habit’s substance numerically the same.
Obj. 3: Further, when imperfect knowledge grows into perfect knowledge, the substance of knowledge is not taken away, just as the body’s substance is not taken away when a child grows into an adult, for the man remains numerically the same. But the Apostle compares the emptying out of faith to the perfection of knowledge and of age. Therefore the substance of faith remains numerically the same.
On the contrary, forms, even as they are brought into being entirely from nothing, tend entirely into nothing when destroyed. But because they are habits, faith and hope are certain forms. Therefore when they are destroyed at the advent of glory, as the Apostle says they are, it seems that nothing of them remains numerically the same.
Furthermore, it is impossible that anything be the same in number which is not the same in species, as the Philosopher says about belief and opinion in the Topics 4. (Aristotle, Topics 4.5, 125b36.) But faith and the vision proper to heaven differ in species much more than belief and opinion differ. Therefore the vision of faith and the vision proper to heaven are not numerically the same.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that in faith there is a certain sort of knowledge as well as a mode of knowing, because it knows in a mirror and in an enigma. Now, this mode is one of imperfection, and implies obscurity. Hence, since glory, at its advent, takes away all imperfection and obscurity, it will take away faith’s mode—that is, it will take away faith as regards its mode of knowing—but the knowledge of those things with which faith is concerned will remain—indeed it will not then be enigmatic, but clear.
Reply Obj. 1: Faith is the foundation [of the spiritual building] with regard to what it has of knowledge, not with regard to what it has of enigma. Hence, with regard to that which is foundational, it will remain.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the vision of glory is not contrary to faith with regard to what faith has of knowledge, it is nevertheless contrary to it with regard to what it has of enigma; and in reference to this aspect, it expels it.
Reply Obj. 3: Perfection and imperfection of knowledge can go along well with each other about different things, but not about the same thing; and therefore someone can have simultaneously an imperfect knowledge about what pertains to one thing, and a perfect knowledge about what pertains to another, but there is no parallel in the case at hand, since faith and the vision of glory are about the same thing.
Reply Obj. 4: Although there can be opinion and knowledge of the same thing, nevertheless they are not of it according to the same middle term, but according to different middle terms; and therefore they can co-exist. But faith and the vision proper to heaven are of the same thing and according to the same middle term, since faith assents to the first truth on account of the first truth itself, and similarly so does the vision of glory. And therefore the latter’s perfection is not compatible with the former’s imperfection. But morning and evening knowledge, although they are of the same thing in reality, are nevertheless not of the same thing according to the same [mode of] being, since morning knowledge is of a thing insofar as it has being in the Word, whereas evening knowledge is of a thing insofar as it has being in its own nature—and therefore there is no parallel with faith and the vision of glory.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that judgment about habits must be taken from the acts of which they are the source. Now there are two kinds of acts: an act that is of the imperfect as imperfect, such as motion; and an act that is of the perfect as perfect, such as an operation that follows upon a form.
It sometimes happens, however, that an act of the perfect is found in the imperfect, insofar as it is now participating something of perfection, even as something of the act of the white is in the pallid. When therefore the imperfect arrives at perfection, the act of the imperfect, insofar as it has something of the perfection into which it was tending, remains with regard to what is of the substance of the act, but is taken away with regard to what belonged to the act’s imperfection, as the stammering speech of a boy when he reaches a more mature age is taken away with regard to what was of imperfection in that speech, while there remains whatever was of the perfection and substance of speech. But motion, which is an act of the imperfect [as such], when it attains the motion’s terminus, does not remain with regard to anything that belongs to the substance of the act, but only with regard to the root according to which it was in motion to begin with—which [root] was a certain proportion and order of the imperfect to perfection.
Now, knowledge, as such, implies an act of the perfect; and therefore knowledge had in the state of imperfection remains [in the state of perfection] with regard to what belongs to knowledge itself, the imperfection being taken away.
Hope, however, insofar as it tends toward a difficult [good] as yet unpossessed and looked for in the future, is like an act of the imperfect, since it is, as it were, a certain motion. And therefore when it arrives at the perfect possession of good, that which belongs to expectation or hope, precisely as such, does not remain, but only that in which this expectation was rooted—namely, the order and proportion of that man to those goods now possessed, which were the same goods that hope was about, when they were not yet possessed. And therefore there is not set down anything the same in species with hope succeeding to it after this life, but rather what succeeds to it is simply the taking hold of, or “comprehension,” proper to beatitude, which bespeaks a now actually possessed order of man to God—the same order that hope was about when it was not yet actually possessed. Hence that order is common to both; and with regard to this order hope remains, but it passes away with regard to the nature of its proper act.
Reply Obj. 1: Those who will be suffering punishments, since they are removed from the participation of eternity, will always be in motion and succession, and on account of this the fear of future evil can continue to be in them. But those who will be in heaven will be supremely in the participation of eternity with regard to the substantial reward they receive; and therefore, according to this participation, there will not be in them anything of a reward still to come in the future, but they have the whole all at once; hence hope does not remain in them.
Reply Obj. 2: The “hunger” spoken of in that text does not imply expectation of something still to come in the future, but rather removes the notion of disgust about what is already amply possessed. Hence with regard to the substantial reward, there will not be any expectation in heaven, but only full enjoyment; but with regard to some accidental things, or even about the robe of the body, there can be expectation there—yet not hope, as was said above. (Above, d. 26, q. 2, a. 1, resp. 2.)
Reply Obj. 3: Even in hope is found something that remains in heaven, namely, order and proportion to a looked-for good. But that order will be perfect in heaven, whereas in the wayfaring state it is imperfect due to the absence of the good to which it is directed.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the removal of anything that is of the substance of a thing induces the corruption of that thing, but the same does not occur upon the removal of something related accidentally to that thing. Now the precise imperfection that glory takes away from faith is of the very substance of faith, pertaining to its species—which is apparent if one considers the notion of the object from which faith receives its species; for obscurity, which enigma implies, pertains to the genus of knowledge. It is therefore necessary that as soon as that imperfection is removed, the substance and species of faith be destroyed, just as if irrationality should be removed from a donkey, the donkey as such would be destroyed. Now, since faith is a simple accidental form not composed out of matter and form, when it is destroyed nothing of faith remains the same in number, but something remains the same in genus—as is evident when something white becomes black or conversely, where that which pertains to color remains, yet the color is not the same in number but only the same in genus; whereas light [which makes color actually visible] remains the same in number whether it be perfect or imperfect, since that imperfection or perfection does not pertain to the species of light, but is accidental to it. And one should speak in a similar way about hope, where the application of what was just said is even more apparent.
Reply Obj. 1: The common thing that remains numerically the same in changes is the subject, whereas the nature of the genus remains generically the same. And thus, in this transmutation [from wayfarer to comprehensor], the soul remains numerically the same, but vision or knowledge remains only generically the same.
Reply Obj. 2: The unformedness in question is not among the things pertaining to the species of faith, as enigmatic knowledge is; and therefore no parallel can be drawn.
Reply Obj. 3: And a similar response should be made to the third.
Article 2
Whether the charity of the wayfaring state will be emptied out in heaven
To the second we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II.67.6; De veritate, q. 27, a. 5, ad 6; De spe, a. 4, ad 7, ad 13, 14; De virtutibus card., a. 4, ad 10; Super 1 Cor. 13, lect. 3.) It seems that the charity of the wayfaring state will be emptied out.
Obj. 1: For it says in 1 Corinthians 13:10, when the perfect comes, the partial will be emptied out. (NRSVCE has "when the complete comes, the partial will come to an end.") But the charity of the wayfaring state is in part, since the commandment love the Lord your God with your whole heart, is not entirely fulfilled in this state, as was said above. (Above,* d. 27, q. 3, a. 4.)* Therefore [such] charity will be emptied out in heaven.
Obj. 2: Further, when the cause is destroyed, the effect is destroyed. But faith generates charity, as is said in a Gloss on Matthew 1. When therefore faith is emptied out, charity too will be emptied out.
Obj. 3: Further, just as faith is enigmatic, so too is charity, since the charity of the wayfaring state moves the affection toward what is not seen as it is in itself. But faith, because it is enigmatic, will be emptied out in heaven; therefore charity too.
Obj. 4: Further, motion ceases when it arrives at its terminus. But charity is a certain motion of the mind toward God. When therefore it arrives at its terminus, charity will cease.
Obj. 5: Further, in things that have a single notion, progress can be made from the one to the other if they differ according to perfect and imperfect. But the charity of the wayfaring state, although it can increase, can never attain to the mode charity has in heaven. Therefore it follows that the charity of the wayfaring state and the charity of heaven are not of a single species; and thus, it seems that charity is emptied out [at the transition from this-worldly to heavenly charity].
On the contrary, charity never falls away (1 Cor 13:8). (NRSVCE renders this “love never ends.”)
Furthermore, the beloved’s presence does not take away love, but increases it. Now charity is the love of God. Therefore when we shall see God present, charity will not be taken away, but rather increased.
I answer that love, according to the notion of its essence, does not imply anything of imperfection, but rather implies simply perfection, inasmuch as it implies affection’s having a terminus of rest, and a certain transformation of the lover into the one loved. Hence glory, at its advent, will take away nothing of those things that pertain to the essence of charity. And therefore charity will not be destroyed.
Reply Obj. 1: That imperfection is incidental to charity; and therefore, when it has been removed, charity will nonetheless remain the same in number.
Reply Obj. 2: Faith is a cause of charity by reason of the knowledge faith imparts, but such knowledge will remain, as was said.
Reply Obj. 3: [The condition signified by the word] “enigma” is essential to faith, since it pertains to the notion of faith’s proper object; but this condition is incidental to charity, and so the same argument cannot be made.
Reply Obj. 4: “To love” does not bespeak a motion that is an act of the imperfect, but a motion that is an act of the perfect, like sensing and understanding, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.7, 431a4–6; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 3, lect. 12, nn. 765–67.) Therefore the argument does not follow.
Reply Obj. 5: The reason that a wayfarer’s charity, as long as he remains a wayfarer, cannot attain to the perfect charity of heaven is his present condition, insofar as he does not perfectly possess what he loves—not so far as that which is proper to the notion of charity is concerned.
Article 3
Whether the order of love obtaining in this life is also to be found in Christ or in the saints who are in heaven
Quaestiuncula 1
To the third we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.26.13; De caritate, a. 9, ad 12.) [We divide the article into three subquestions: 1. whether the order of love obtaining in this life with regard to love of enemies is also to be found in Christ and the saints in heaven; 2. whether the order of love obtaining in this life with respect to love of self and neighbor is also to be found in the saints in heaven; 3. whom Christ loved more, Peter or John]. It seems that the order of love obtaining in this life with regard to love of enemies is neither in Christ nor in the saints who are in heaven.
Obj. 1: For the only enemies of the saints, at least after the day of judgment, will be demons and the damned. But charity is not had toward those, as was said above. (Above, d. 28, a. 5.) Therefore the saints will not love enemies.
Obj. 2: Further, in them there will be the highest conformity of the will to God. But God does not love the enemies of the saints, but hates them. Therefore neither Christ nor the blessed will love their enemies.
Obj. 3: Further, whosoever loves anyone from charity wishes the good of eternal life for him. But Christ did not wish this to enemies, nor do the blessed wish it to them; since if they had wished it, it would surely have come to be. Therefore they do not love their enemies from charity.
On the contrary, to love one’s enemy pertains to the perfection of charity. But in Christ and in the blessed there is the fullest and most perfect charity. Therefore they love enemies.
Furthermore, Christ loved from charity those for whom he died: No one has greater love than this, to lay down one’s life for one’s friends (John 15:13). But [we are taught expressly that] he died for his enemies (Rom 5:6–10). Therefore he loved enemies; and for the same reason, the blessed love them.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: It seems that the order of charity obtaining in this life with respect to love of self, neighbor, those who are close to us, and outsiders, is not in the saints. For Augustine, in On the True Religion, says, perfect justice is when we love more strongly what is more good, and love less what is less good. (Augustine, De vera religione, ch. 48 (CCSL 32; PL 34:164).) But there will be perfect charity in heaven. Therefore anyone in that state will love a neighbor who is better than himself more than he will love himself, and similarly he will love an outsider more than he will love someone close according to the flesh, if the former is better than the latter.
Obj. 2: Further, in heaven there will be perfect conformity of the human will to God. But God loves the better ones more. Therefore, too, each one there will love the one who is better than himself more than he will love himself.
Obj. 3: Further, he for whom a greater good is desired is the one more loved. But in heaven, each man wills a greater good for the one who is better than himself than he wills for himself, since each one wills the good that he himself has, nor does he seek for anyone what that one does not have, for if he did, his desire would not be at rest. Therefore he loves the one better than himself more than he loves himself.
On the contrary, glory perfects nature. But that a man should love himself more than he loves another is an order proceeding from the nature of man. Therefore glory does not remove this order.
Furthermore, were someone to neglect his own salvation for the salvation of another, he would commit a sin. But in heaven there will be nothing disordered. Therefore a man there will always love his own salvation more than that of another; and thus he will love himself more than another.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: It is asked whom Christ loved more, Peter or John; and it seems that it was John. (Parallel: ST I.20.4.) For we read in John 21:20, Peter turned and saw the disciple whom Jesus loved following them. But this remark is not said as if he loved only that one and no other. Therefore it was said on account of the eminence of Jesus’ love for John.
Obj. 2: Further, a love in which affection does not correspond to the effect or signs of love is a feigned love. Now, since Christ showed a greater familiarity to John than to Peter, and his love was in no way feigned, it seems that he loved John more than Peter.
On the contrary, I love those who love me (Prov 8:17). But Peter loved more, as is evident from the last chapter of John. Therefore he too was more loved.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that “enemies of Christ” can be taken in two ways: either with respect to their final departure from him, as with those who are damned, either actually or in the divine foreknowledge; or with respect to their present state of enmity only, as Saul was at a certain time.
With respect to the former kind of enemies, there is in Christ the same notion of love as there is in us toward those whom we know to be damned, because we love their nature. And the nature alone being considered, we would wish eternal life for them; but taking into consideration divine justice as well as their merits, we do not will this good for them, because we love the divine justice more than their nature. The first will [which looks to the nature alone] is antecedent will, while the second [which looks to their merits] is consequent will. And so, [equipped with this distinction, we may say that] Christ loved enemies who were really damned or were going to be damned [in the sense that he was] willing good for them by his antecedent will, which is not always fulfilled, but not [in the sense that he was] willing good for them by his consequent will, as neither does God. And the same account holds for the other blessed concerning those who are actually damned; but concerning those who are going to be damned, perhaps they do not know who all of them are.
But with respect to the other kind of enemies—those, that is, who are enemies only at the present time but who will later become his friends—Christ loved them by both antecedent and consequent will, and wrought good things for them, because the death he endured was efficacious for them.
Reply Obj. 1–5: And from this, the response to the objections is evident.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that there is a twofold opinion about this matter.
For certain ones say that in heaven God will be all in all, and the whole mind, resting in God, will have God as the whole notion of love; and so it will love God above all things, and others so much the more as they are nearer to God—even others more than itself, if they are better. But that position does not seem reasonably said. For each one will love to enjoy God as much as he will love God himself; and since he will love God above all things, above all things he will want to enjoy God; and therefore he will wish this enjoyment of God more for himself than for another. Hence it seems that he will love himself more than another. Moreover, the affection of love does not rest in anything except its proper object. But just as the proper object of love is the good, so the proper object of a particular man’s love is that man’s good. Hence it follows that he will love God supremely, insofar as God is that man’s highest good. Thus it is not necessary that one love someone else more to the extent that he is simply nearer to God, but rather, he should love someone more to the extent that he is nearer to God insofar as God is one’s own good.
And therefore what others say seems more probable—namely, that each one in heaven will love himself more than he loves his neighbor.
But as to the comparison of those who are close to us and outsiders, I believe that, simply speaking, each one will love an outsider who is better more than a blood relative who is not as good, because in heaven the order of love is looked to more in terms of nearness to God than in terms of nearness to self, although it is necessary that both be looked to. Hence among those who are equally good, one will love those who are nearer to oneself more than those who are more distant, but among the unequally good, one will love those who are better more than one loves those who are nearer.
Reply Obj. 1: [In explaining this statement of Augustine’s] one ought to understand that a man loves more the greater goods that are also greater for himself, just as he loves spiritual goods more than bodily goods.
Reply Obj. 2: Our will, precisely by following the motion naturally established in it by God, will be conformed to the divine will.
Reply Obj. 3: By consequent will, he [namely, the saint in heaven] wills a greater good for another than for himself, whereas he wills the good for himself more intensely; but by antecedent will, he wills a greater good for himself. Yet this difference does not impede the resting of desire, since the antecedent will is not will simply but conditionally, or a sort of “willingness,” as certain ones say.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said, as is said by others who take up the question, that Peter loved Christ more by the love that is poured out from Christ into the members [of his mystical body], but John loved him more by the love that rests in Christ himself. To Peter, therefore, the Lord committed the care of the members, while to John he committed the care of his mother—a care that concerned more directly his own person. Hence Peter, too, was more loved by Christ with regard to interior effect, since a greater gift of charity was then bestowed upon him, whereas John was more loved with regard to signs of exterior familiarity—and this, on account of four causes: first, because John symbolizes the contemplative life, which involves a greater familiarity with God, although the active life that Peter symbolizes is more fruitful and more laborious; second, on account of age, because John was a youth; third, on account of his chastity; fourth, on account of his inborn gentleness.
Reply Obj. 1–2: And through this response, the solution to the objections are evident, since each one loved Christ more [in some respect], and in a certain way was more loved by him.
Article 4
Whether the knowledge that we have here below will be entirely taken away in heaven
To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallels: In IV Sent., d. 50, q. 1, aa. 1, 2; ST I.89.1, 5; I-II.67.2; SCG II.81; De veritate, q. 19, a. 1; De anima, a. 15; Quodl. II, q. 9, a. 1; XII, q. 9, a. 1; Super 1 Cor. 13, lect. 3.) It seems that the knowledge that we have here below will be entirely taken away in heaven.
Obj. 1: For it says in 1 Corinthians 13:8, as for knowledge, it will come to an end. But an accident that is destroyed is entirely taken away. Therefore knowledge will be entirely taken away.
Obj. 2: Further, faith is more spiritual than [other] knowledge. But faith will be taken away; therefore knowledge too.
Obj. 3: Further, the actual consideration of knowledge is the most delightful of delightful things. If therefore the knowledge acquired here remains, some cleric great in learning will have more joy in heaven than some old woman whose charity will be greater—which seems to be impossible.
Obj. 4: Further, those who are in heaven know everything in the Word of which they had knowledge here, and many more things and much more perfectly. If therefore knowledge has no other reason to be except for knowing, in vain would past knowledge remain in the blessed.
Obj. 5: Further, habit is ordered to act. Where the act does not remain, therefore, neither can the habit remain, since in vain would it remain. But the act of knowledge that takes place here below will not remain in heaven, since the consideration of various kinds of knowledge consists in understanding with the aid of a phantasm, not only in acquiring knowledge to begin with, but also in considering things we have already learned. Hence, when the organ of imagination is harmed, the intellect’s operation is impeded, even as to things one already knew. Therefore [since the act of understanding with a phantasm will not be in heaven,] neither will the habit of knowledge remain.
Obj. 6: Further, the manner of consideration in knowledge as we now have it is collative. But that mode, where knowledge has to be gathered, will not be in heaven, since if it were, it would follow that study and disputation would take place there, which is absurd. Therefore knowledge acquired here will not remain in heaven.
On the contrary, the Master in Distinction 1 of Book II said (In II Sent., d. 1, q. 2, aa. 4, 5.)—and many philosophers also say—that the soul is placed in the body so that by means of this union it might be perfected by various kinds of knowledge. But in vain would the soul be placed in the body with a view to that purpose, unless knowledge [acquired here below] remained in it after the body perished. Therefore [such] knowledge will remain.
Furthermore, it is beyond doubt that those who are in hell continue to know something of what they once knew, as is evident from the rich man, who in his torments remembered what had belonged to him in this life. But beyond the knowledge they had here, no new knowledge will be added to the damned. Therefore prior knowledge will remain in them.
Furthermore, if knowledge is destroyed with the body, it will be shown to be a temporal good. And so the pursuit of knowledge will be reckoned as a case of solicitude for temporal things, which seems absurd.
I answer that, in the knowledge we have in our present state, there are three things to consider: the habit, the act, and the mode of acting. The mode of acting is that we understand with a phantasm, since in the wayfaring state the doctrine of the Philosopher in On the Soul 3 (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.7, 431a16–18; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 3, lect. 12, n. 772.) is true, namely that the soul would never understand without a phantasm—not only with respect to acquiring knowledge, but also for the consideration of things already known, since the phantasms stand to the intellect as sensible things to the senses. It is characteristic of the act of knowledge that [in our present state] we know conclusions by tracing them back to first principles known per se; while finally the habit of knowledge is a certain quality of a man, fitting him to perform this act.
Now, this mode of understanding comes to be that of the human soul for two reasons. One reason is that the human soul is, in the order of nature, last among grades of intellect. Hence, its potential intellect stands to all intelligible things as prime matter stands to all sensible forms; and on account of this it cannot proceed into act before it receives the species of things, which comes about through sense and imagination. The other reason is that the human soul is the form of the body. Hence, its operation must be the operation of the whole man; and therefore in man the body communicates with the intellective soul not merely as an instrument by which the latter carries out an operation, but as representing an object, namely the phantasm, to the soul; and so it happens that the soul [in our present state] is incapable of understanding without phantasms even the things it already knows.
Accordingly, in the soul separated from the body, the soul’s nature will remain, but its actual union with the body will not remain; and therefore, the soul being considered just in its own nature, it will not need the phantasms with respect to the consideration of what it knew before, but only with respect to the consideration of what it is obliged to know for the first time; and thus, it will be able to consider what it knew before, not indeed by using a phantasm, but out of the habit of science previously had. But it will not be able to know things that it did not know before, except to the extent that they can be elicited from what it already knows, or insofar as other species are divinely infused into it. For to say that the soul, according to what it now has in its nature, cannot understand in any way without the body, is very much akin to [what is said by] those who maintain that the soul perishes with the body, since, as is said in On the Soul 1, (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.1, 403a1; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 1, lect. 2, n. 21.) if none of the operations it has can be without the body, neither can it itself be without the body, for natural operation follows upon nature.
Now, in the aforesaid act of knowledge, there are two things to be considered: the motion of inquiry and of discursive reason, and the terminus, that is, the certainty had about conclusions insofar as they have been traced back to first principles. However, such motion is a thing of imperfection with regard to the need for discoursing in order that certainty be brought about. And therefore in the blessed the act of knowledge will not remain with respect to the necessity of such motion, but with respect to the certainty alone.
And therefore it seems it should be said, according to what certain ones say, that in heaven there will be another mode of understanding for the separated souls, since they will exercise their knowledge without having recourse to phantasms. But after the resurrection it will be possible for both modes of knowing to coexist, insofar as the soul will not then be in subjection to the body but will rule it completely. Yet in the saints the act will be changed, since it will remain with respect to its terminus but not with respect to the discoursing [that now goes along with achieving that terminus]. In the damned, however, this [discoursing] is not removed, so that a need for collation remains. And thus, the habit of science remains in them with respect to its substance; for it seems absurd to say that a habit might remain when its act in no way remains, since a habit is nothing other than a making-able for acting.
Reply Obj. 1: Knowledge will be destroyed with respect to mode and will be changed with respect to act, but will remain with respect to habit, as was said.
Reply Obj. 2: The mode of imperfection is of the essence of faith and belongs to its notion, whereas the mode of knowing by means of phantasms does not belong to the notion of knowledge, but attaches to it owing to the condition of a given subject.
Reply Obj. 3: It is not unfitting that one who has less charity has more joy with respect to some act of his soul, since nevertheless he has less joy about God, which is the essential reward.
Reply Obj. 4: To know something in many ways is not in vain, even as Christ too had natural knowledge of things he knew in the Word.
Reply Obj. 5: This mode of knowing [that is, turning to phantasms] attaches to knowledge owing to the state of the one in whom that knowledge is, for the phantasm, since it is intelligible in potency and not in act, is not the proximate and proper object of the intellect, whose per se object is rather the actually understood species.
Reply Obj. 6: In the blessed there will be the act of knowledge not in regard to the activity of discourse, but only in regard to the terminus of knowledge, namely certainty. Moreover, there would be no need for study or discussion among the blessed, since of all the things they might wish to consider, they could draw their knowledge from the Word or have it by way of direct illumination from superiors. The damned, however, will have no leisure for discussion due to the weight of punishment bearing down on them.
Exposition of the text
Charity which can fail was never true. (Sent. III, 31.1(112).2, misattributed to Augustine but actually Paulinus of Aquileia, Liber exhortationis de salutaribus documentis, ch. 7 (PL 40:1049).) This assertion is true, if charity was lost because of a weakness of love—in other words, so that someone loved God less than that thing for which he commits a sin. For in that case, there would not be true charity.
This and the other things . . . said of charity can be understood about perfect charity. (Sent. III, 31.1(112).9.) That charity is called “perfect” which is in those who are confirmed in good, whether in the wayfaring state or in heaven. Or it is understood not that charity cannot be lost [by the perfect], but rather that it is difficult for it to be lost [by them].
Chapter 126 of 186