D. 28 - The command to love one's neighbor

Division of the text

Here it can be asked whether by that commandment of love of neighbor we are commanded to love our whole neighbor, that is, soul and body. (Sent. III, 28.1(104).1.) Here, the Master determines the truth about charity in point of its comparison to the object of love.

This consideration is divided into two parts.

In the first, he asks what should be loved from charity;

in the second, in what order they should be loved, where he says: after the above matters, we must discuss the order of charity. (Sent. III. 29. 1 (108). 1.)

The first is divided into three parts.

In the first, he shows what the commandment of charity extends to, with respect to people;

in the second, with respect to angels, at the question arises here concerning angels; (Sent. III, 28.2(105).1, citing Augustine, On Christian Doctrine (CCSL 32), bk. 1, ch. 30, para. 31.)

in the third, he draws a certain distinction from what was said, at here is to be noted. (Sent. III, 28.4(107).1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he determines the truth;

second, he removes a doubt, at here Augustine seems to teach that we are not bound by precept to love ourselves. (Sent. III, 28.1(104).3.)

Question 1

Which objects should be loved from charity

Here, we will address seven questions:

first, whether virtues should be loved out of charity;

second, whether inanimate things;

third, whether angels;

fourth, whether demons; (A. 5.)

fifth, whether evil people; (A. 4.)

sixth, whether someone can love himself out of charity;

seventh, whether one should love one’s own body.

Article 1

Whether virtues should be loved from charity

To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: In I Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 5; ST II-II.25.2; Super Rom. 12, lect. 2.) It seems that virtues should be loved from charity.

Obj. 1: For Augustine says, he who loves his brother, loves more the love by which he loves. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 8, ch. 8 (CCSL 50; PL 42:957).) But the love by which a neighbor is loved is the virtue of charity. Therefore virtues should be loved from charity, since the neighbor is loved from charity.

Obj. 2: Further, that due to which anything is such as it is, is even more so itself. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.2, 72a29; Aquinas, Post. Anal., bk. 1, lect. 6, n. 3.) But true friendship loves the friend on account of what is noble. Hence it loves what is noble even more than the friend. Therefore charity, which is a certain friendship, as was said, (Above,* d. 27, q. 2, a. 1.)* is more loving of the virtues than even of neighbors.

Obj. 3: Further, first acts pertain to the same power as the acts reflective upon them, since they are of the same notion, for example, understanding something intelligible and understanding oneself to understand it. But acts of the same notion are perfected by one and the same virtue. Therefore since the neighbor is loved through charity, through charity is likewise loved the love by which the neighbor is loved; and for the same reason, other virtues are so loved by charity.

Obj. 4: Further, things having reference to our final beatitude should be loved from charity. But we are led to beatitude by the virtues, and they will remain with us in beatitude. Therefore the virtues should be loved from charity.

Obj. 5: Further, charity is love of the ultimate end. But the ultimate end of our life is beatitude. Therefore we ought to love beatitude from charity. But when they reach consummation, virtues and grace will pass into beatitude. Therefore the virtues should be loved from charity.

On the contrary, Augustine sufficiently enumerates the things that should be loved from charity, and he makes no mention of virtues, as is evident in the text. (Sent. III, 28.1(104).2.)

Furthermore, what we love only on account of ourselves is not loved from charity, since charity does not seek after its own (1 Cor 13:5). (RSV reads: “love does not insist on its own way.”) But we love virtues only on account of ourselves, since, being accidents, they do not subsist of themselves; hence neither do they have goodness except insofar as they exist in us. Therefore they should not be loved from charity.

Furthermore, those alone should be loved from charity that share beatitude with us. But virtues, since they are accidents, are not capable of beatitude, or even of life. Therefore they should not be loved from charity.

I answer that, since charity includes love but adds something more, it happens in two different ways that something can be loved from charity.

In one way, something can be loved from charity as that in which the friendship of charity has its term; and in this way, nothing is loved from charity except that to which friendship is capable of being extended. Now friendship cannot be extended to virtues or any accidents, for two reasons. First, because friendship makes a man want his friend to exist and to have what is good. But accidents do not exist on their own, nor have they goodness on their own; being and well-being are theirs only when they exist in substances. Hence, we do want virtues or accidents to exist, yet not for themselves, but for a subject to which we want being or well-being to come by way of those accidents. Second, because friendship consists in a certain association in which friends return love to one another and do the same things and live their lives together. Hence, friendship can exist only toward something that is naturally capable of acting; and since acting belongs not to accidents but to subjects, there can be no friendship for virtues or for any other accidents. And therefore virtues cannot be loved from charity, as that in which charity has its term.

In another way, something can be said to be loved from charity as that in which the love or rational love that is incorporated into charity has its term, even though it is not the object of friendship. And this love, which is called “love of concupiscence,” is ordered to the love of something else that is chiefly loved, as a friend is said to love the health of his friend. And in this way, the virtues are loved from charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there of the love which is God, and by this love the neighbor is loved effectively and exemplarily.

Reply Obj. 2: Virtue or what is noble is not the final cause on account of which a friend is loved; rather it is that which makes him lovable formally. Hence it does not follow that virtue is more lovable than a friend is, or lovable for the same reason a friend is, even as it does not follow that whiteness is more white than a white body.

Reply Obj. 3: It does pertain to charity to love love, but not as if it were that in which charity has its term.

Reply Obj. 4: Charity has its term in things that are referred to beatitude, precisely as things capable of participating in beatitude. In this way, virtue is not referred to beatitude, since virtue itself cannot become blessed.

Reply Obj. 5: The end in which charity chiefly has its term is uncreated beatitude itself. But as for created beatitude, the same reasoning applies as was given above of the virtues.

Article 2

Whether irrational creatures are to be loved from charity

To the second we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.25.3; De caritate, a. 7.) It seems that irrational creatures are to be loved from charity.

Obj. 1: For every meritorious love pertains to charity. But a person can love irrational things meritoriously, as when he loves them by referring them to God, or loves them because they are made by God or because they aid those who are on their way to God. Therefore irrational creatures are to be loved from charity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, charity conforms man’s loving to God’s. But God loves irrational creatures from charity, according to Wisdom 11:24: you love all things that exist. Therefore man, too, ought to love irrational creatures from charity.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, rational creatures are to be loved from charity, since in them a likeness to God is found. But some likeness to God is found in irrational creatures, although not so great a likeness as is found in rational ones. Therefore irrational creatures are to be loved from charity.

Obj. 4: Further, faith, like charity, is a theological virtue. But faith extends in its scope even to irrational creatures, insofar as man believes them to be created by God and to be ruled by divine providence. Therefore charity also extends in its scope to them.

On the contrary, Augustine says: those alone are to be loved from charity who, by belonging with us to a certain society, are referred to God [as their happiness]. (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 23, para. 22 (CCSL 32; PL 34:27).) But irrational things are not of this sort. Therefore they are not to be loved from charity.

Furthermore, charity includes benevolence, as was said above. (Above,* d. 27, a. 1.)* But benevolence cannot really exist toward irrational things, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 8; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.2, 1155b27.) therefore neither can charity.

I answer that there can be no friendship with irrational things for the same reasons there can be no friendship with accidents. For though they have an existence in which they subsist and they have certain activities, they do not share a human life with us, as regards either existence or the activities of life. Consequently, toward them we cannot have the benevolence according to which we wish a friend to exist and to have what is good, which we do not wish for irrational things except insofar as they are related to man. Nor can we have with them the unity of hearts according to which we want and do the same things for our friends—neither of which can occur with irrational things, since they cannot share with us the same activities. Therefore, they cannot be loved from charity as that in which charity has its term.

Nevertheless, there is a way they can be loved from charity: as that in which the love that charity incorporates into itself, namely love of concupiscence, has its term, the same way that a friend loves the possessions and animals belonging to his friend, but still does not have friendship with them. And such a love is not merely commanded by charity, it is also elicited, because charity elicits an act of love not only for objects toward which charity is chiefly directed, but also for those that are ordered to that end. And in this way inanimate things are loved from charity, insofar as they are ordered to that which is chiefly and directly the object of charity.

Reply Obj. 1: A love for inanimate things does pertain to charity [in the manner explained], yet such things are not charity’s object.

Reply Obj. 2: While God loves all creatures from charity, nevertheless he has charity only for rational creatures that he created for the sake of beatitude, through which they are made sharers of his own life.

Reply Obj. 3: The likeness of image that is found in rational creatures makes them capable of sharing one and the same life with God and with each other, namely, the life of glory. The likeness of trace that is found in other creatures does not suffice for this. Whence there is no parallel.

Reply Obj. 4: Faith does not imply some association between the believer and the one believed in, as charity implies between the lover and the beloved. Hence the same reasoning does not apply to both.

Article 3

Whether angels are to be loved from charity

To the third we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.25.10; De caritate, a. 7, ad 9; Super Rom. 13, lect. 2.) It seems that angels are not to be loved from charity.

Obj. 1: For as was said before, (Aa. 1, 2.) man’s charity does not extend to things that do not share in human life. But angels do not live a human life. Therefore charity does not bring it about that men love angels.

Obj. 2: Further, charity, since it is a friendship, exists between those who are naturally suited to converse with each other. But the conversation of the angels, who are called gods, is not with mortals, as is said in Daniel 2:11. (RSV reads, “whose dwelling is not with flesh.”) Therefore angels are not to be loved from charity.

Obj. 3: Further, charity, since it is a friendship, is a certain equality. But angels are much superior to us. Therefore charity or friendship cannot be had toward them.

Obj. 4: Further, since they are incorporeal and thus of another genus, angels stands further from us than irrational animals, which belong to the same genus we do [namely, animals]. But we cannot love irrational animals from charity; therefore much less can we love angels.

On the contrary, neighbors are to be loved from charity. But angels are neighbors to us, as is said in the text. (Sent. III, 28.3(106).2.) Therefore they are to be loved from charity.

Furthermore, friendship causes friends to will the same thing and to be friends of the same ones. But God loves the angels from charity just as he loves us from charity. Therefore we, too, should love the angels from charity.

I answer that, as has been already said, (Above, a. 2.) charity or friendship can exist only between those who participate in the same life. Now, the life of men and of angels is twofold. One life belongs to them in accordance with their nature, and in this respect, men and angels do not share the same life, but men share a human life with one another, and angels an angelic life with one another, for it pertains to each [rank of being] to be occupied with the same kinds of activities. Yet both have another life through grace, in which they become participants of the divine life; and this life they do share with each other and with God. Therefore, in terms of this life, they can have friendship with each other, and this friendship is charity.

Reply Obj. 1: “Human life” may be spoken of in two ways: either that kind of life which accords with [mere] human nature, and if spoken of in this way, angels do not share in human life; or that kind of life which belongs to man by his participation in the divine life, and if spoken of in this way, the angels do share in human life.

Reply Obj. 2: Men and angels are naturally suited to converse with each other in heaven, where we shall be equal to the angels, as is said in Matthew 22:30. And we converse in some way with the angels even in this life, insofar as we lead an angelic life on earth.

Reply Obj. 3: Friendship requires not a strict equality but a proportionate equality—in other words, that one friend behaves toward the other in keeping with his own proportion, as is said in the Ethics 8. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.4–5, 1157b26–1158a2.) Nevertheless, a great inequality dissolves friendship, namely, when they do not share the same life.

Reply Obj. 4: When it comes to our souls, we share more in common with angels than with brute animals, but when it comes to our bodies and bodily powers, we share more in common with brute animals than with angels. But, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.8, 1168b30.) man is more that which falls on the side of the soul than that which falls on the side of the body, because each thing is [in a way] that which is most powerful in it. Simply speaking, therefore, we stand further from brute animals than we do from angels.

Article 4

Whether we ought to have charity for evil people

To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallels: In II Sent., d. 7, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2; ST II-II.25.6; De caritate, a. 8, ad 8, 9; De duobus praeceptis caritatis, a. 2; Super Gal. 6, lect. 2.) It seems that we cannot have charity toward evil men.

Obj. 1: For charity requires sharing in the divine life, which comes about through grace, as was said. (In II Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 2.) But this divine life is not in sinners. Therefore they are not to be loved from charity.

Obj. 2: Further, just as likeness is the cause of love, so unlikeness is the cause of the contrary. But evil people are unlike good people. Therefore they are not to be loved from charity.

Obj. 3: Further, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.3, 1165b27.) friendship cannot exist between those who do not rejoice in the same things. But the good and the evil do not rejoice in the same things, but in contrary things. Therefore they cannot have friendship with each other.

Obj. 4: Further, friendship involves a return of love, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.2, 1155b28.) But those who are evil do not love us in return; instead, they hate those who are good. Therefore neither ought good people to love evil people from charity.

Obj. 5: Further, it is characteristic of friends to extend their friendship to the same people. If, therefore, those who are good loved those who are evil from charity, the latter, too, would love themselves. This, however, is false, since the Philosopher proves in the Ethics 9 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.4, 1166b27–33.) that no evil person is a friend to himself. Therefore evil people are not to be loved from charity.

On the contrary, love your enemies (Matt 5:44). But everyone who is responsible for enmity is evil. Therefore evil people are to be loved from charity.

Furthermore, whatever people are supposed to be the objects of our beneficence are to be loved from charity. But we ought to benefit evil people by converting them and by aiding them in their necessities. Therefore evil people are to be loved from charity.

I answer that in evil people there are two things to be considered: the nature by which they are men, and the malice by which they are evil. Since by their very nature they bear in themselves the image of God and are capable of receiving divine life, they are therefore to be loved from charity in terms of that nature. Their malice, however, is contrary to divine life, and it is therefore to be hated in them. Hence Augustine says, men are to be loved in such a way that their errors are not also loved. (In fact, Prosper of Aquitane, Liber Sententiarum, ch. 2 (CCSL 68A; PL 45:1859).)

Reply Obj. 1: Charity does not require actual communication in divine life; it is enough that the communication exist in potency, since what is in potency already in a certain way is.

Reply Obj. 2: We ought to hate in evil people that according to which they are unlike us and ought to do all in our power to destroy it. And to do this is precisely to love their nature, because their malice is repugnant to the good of nature.

Reply Obj. 3: While evil people do not rejoice in the same things right now, still it is possible that they may come to rejoice in the same things the good rejoice in. For this reason, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.3, 1165b18–22.) that friendship should not be immediately broken off with one who, having been good, becomes evil, but on the contrary we should help such ones recover the good of virtue even more than we would help them recover lost temporal goods.

Reply Obj. 4: While evil people do not actually return love right now, nevertheless they are naturally capable of returning love, especially in the future life; and it is the sharing of that life that charity especially takes into consideration. Hence returning love for love can certainly take place, even among those who were never acquainted with each other in this life.

Reply Obj. 5: An evil person is divided in himself, because owing to his affection for malice he fights against the goodness of his nature; and it is in view of this inner strife that he is said to “hate himself.” We, however, ought to love evil people with respect to the nature they have, not with respect to their malice.

Article 5

Whether demons are to be loved from charity

To the fifth we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 31, q. 2, a. 3, resp. 1; ST II-II.25.11; De caritate, a. 8, ad 9; Super Rom. 13, lect. 2.) It seems that demons are to be loved from charity.

Obj. 1: For Leviticus 19:18 states: love your neighbor, on which a gloss reads: neighbor should not be understood in terms of nearness of blood but in terms of the fellowship of reason. But demons and the damned have fellowship with us in reason; they should therefore be loved from charity.

Obj. 2: Further, it was said in the preceding article that we ought to love evil people in view of their nature, which is good in them. But, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 23 (PG 3:726).) a good nature is to be found in demons, too, since they did not forfeit their natural goods through sin. They should therefore be loved from charity.

Obj. 3: Further, every rational creature that God loves, he loves from charity. But God loves demons, because he loves all that he has made. He therefore loves them from charity, since they are rational creatures. And for the same reason we, too, ought to love them from charity.

Obj. 4: Further, we ought to love from charity whatever contributes to the increase of our merit and to the glory of God. But insofar as they tempt us [and we resist], demons profit us, as was said in Book II; (In II Sent., d. 6, a. 5.) and again, God’s glory is manifested in them. Therefore, they should be loved from charity.

On the contrary, there should be sharing among friends. But all manner of interaction with demons is forbidden to us, for in Isaiah 28:14, those who are said to have formed a pact with death and hell are reprehended. Therefore demons are not to be loved from charity.

Furthermore, Augustine says (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine (CCSL 32), bk. 1, ch. 30.) that a neighbor is loved from charity either because he is just, or in order that he might become just. But the demons are neither just nor able to be just; therefore they are not to be loved from charity.

I answer that, as was said before, that something is loved from charity in two ways: in one way, as its direct object; in another way, as something that the love included in charity somehow aims at, insofar as such an indirect object is ordered to something belonging to the direct objects of charity. In the first way, demons are not to be loved from charity, since neither in act nor in potency do they share with us in the divine life; and the same holds for the damned. Hence the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.3, 1165b18.) that friendship is to be broken off with those who are incurable on account of abundant malice. Now, there are some people in this life who seem incurably bad if mere human powers are taken into account, and yet are not really incurable if one takes into account the order of divine mercy by which they can be rescued; yet they would remain incurable after this life, if they died without repentance. Now charity looks to what is divine, whereas [natural] friendship looks to what is human. For this reason, political friendship is broken off with those who, according to human considerations, have become incurable, which does occur sometimes in this life; but charity is not broken off with anyone in this life, no matter how evil he may be, since at least according to the order of divine mercy there remains some possibility of the life of grace for him. But after this life, when such a possibility ceases, charity does not abide for the one who is evil; and therefore neither the damned nor the demons are to be loved from charity in the first way described.

In the second way [having to do with charity’s indirect object], however, the nature of the demons can be loved from charity, insofar as this nature is God’s creature; but not the demons themselves, since this name “demon” chiefly designates their vice.

Reply Obj. 1: This gloss should be understood in regard to that fellowship of reason in which an order to the life of grace remains, since charity requires sharing of this kind.

Reply Obj. 2: As long as they are in this life, a potential for grace remains in sinners, at least by reason of their nature; but no such potential remains in the damned and in the demons. Hence the same argument does not apply.

Reply Obj. 3: God loves the nature of the demons, not as though he has charity for it, but insofar as it is his effect. And this is the way we, too, ought to love it.

Reply Obj. 4: The fact that demons are useful to us in our meriting and that their acts and life redound to the glory of God is incidental and beyond their intention; and no judgment about anything should be based on what is incidental.

Article 6

Whether man ought to love himself from charity

To the sixth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.25.4; De caritate, a. 7.) It seems that a man ought not to love himself from charity.

Obj. 1: For, as Gregory says, charity cannot exist between fewer than two. (Gregory the Great, Homilae in Evangelia, bk. 1, hom. 17, para. 1 (CCSL 141:117; PL 76:1139).) Therefore it cannot exist in someone with regard to himself.

Obj. 2: Further, friendship requires reciprocal love, sharing of life, and other such things, which cannot exist in a man with regard to himself. But charity is a certain friendship. Therefore, there is no charity in a man with regard to himself.

Obj. 3: Further, charity is a certain love, and love is a unitive power, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 15 (PG 3:714).) Seeing that union pertains only to diverse things, it seems there cannot be charity toward oneself.

Obj. 4: Further, friendship, like justice, consists in equality, as is said in the Ethics 8. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 8.6, 1158b1.) But justice does not exist with regard to oneself, properly speaking, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.11, 1138a5–10.) Therefore neither is there friendship or charity toward oneself, properly speaking.

Obj. 5: Further, nothing reprehensible comes from charity. But to love oneself is reprehensible, as 2 Timothy 3:2 says: people will be lovers of themselves. Therefore a man does not love himself from charity.

On the contrary, a man ought to love his neighbor as himself. But he ought to love his neighbor from charity; therefore himself, too.

Furthermore, charity gives rise to mercy. But man ought to be merciful first toward himself [and only in second place, toward his neighbor]. Therefore he ought also to love himself first from charity.

I answer that the progression of love bears a likeness to the progression of knowledge. Now, in things known there is found something that the knower’s intellect first fixes upon, such as first principles, and from these it is led on to other things. And insofar as it stands in the principles, knowledge receives the name of “understanding,” while insofar as it is led to conclusions that are known from the principles, it receives the name of “science.” But since the knowledge of principles is in the conclusions as a cause is in its effect, and conversely the knowledge of the conclusion is in the principles as an effect is in its cause, conclusions are therefore also said to be “understood,” and principles are said to be “known.”

In like manner, too, a lover’s affection is first fixed upon the lover himself, and is extended from him to others, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9: from the affections a man has for himself come those that are for his friend, he relating to the friend as to himself. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.4, 1166a1.) On account of this, it even stands in the commandment of the law that “one should love his neighbor as himself.” Nor is this to be wondered at, since things that are united bear a likeness to things that are one. And although the name “friendship” is given, properly speaking, to a love that diffuses itself to others, nevertheless even the love one has for oneself can be called friendship and charity, insofar as the love one has for another proceeds by way of likeness to the love one has for oneself.

Reply Obj. 1: Gregory is speaking with respect to the first imposition of the name “charity.”

Reply Obj. 2: That reasoning holds concerning friendship insofar as it implies a love diffused to others.

Reply Obj. 3: Those things which are already one by nature can still be made one at the level of affections. Consequently, there can be love, even properly speaking, toward oneself.

Reply Obj. 4: Friendship consists in an equalizing with regard to affection, whereas justice consists in an equalizing of things. But even as diverse things can be taken as one by means of the soul’s activity, so the same thing can be taken as many, which occurs when the soul’s act is turned back upon the agent himself. Accordingly, in regard to oneself there can be friendship more than there can be justice—although it is possible to apply the term “justice” metaphorically to a man with regard to himself, in view of the fact that within a man things really diverse are found, namely diverse powers, whose equalization in that which belongs to each one brings about a metaphorical justice, as is said in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.15, 1138b6.)

Reply Obj. 5: To love oneself with respect to the exterior man deserves great reproof, but to love oneself with respect to the interior man deserves much praise; and this [kind of love] belongs to charity.

Article 7

Whether our bodies are to be loved from charity

To the seventh we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.52.5; De caritate, a. 7.) It seems that our bodies are not be loved from charity.

Obj. 1: For charity does not flee from involvement with that to which charity is extended. Yet charity makes one flee from involvement with the body, as is clear from Romans 7:24: Who will rescue me from this body of death? Therefore the body is not to be loved from charity.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9 that it is reprehensible for a man to love himself with regard to what is exterior in himself. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.8, 1168b15.) But our body is the most exterior [part of us]. Therefore it is reprehensible to love our body; and so it is not loved from charity.

Obj. 3: Further, our beatitude will consist in the enjoyment of God. But our body cannot participate in that enjoyment; hence it is no participant of our beatitude. Therefore it is not to be loved from charity.

Obj. 4: Further, the part is not set down in numerical distinction against the whole. But our body is a part of us. Therefore our body ought not to be set down as something lovable distinct from ourselves.

Obj. 5: Further, we ought to love our neighbor as ourselves. But the neighbor’s body is not set down as something lovable distinct from the neighbor. Therefore our bodies, too, ought not to be set down as something lovable distinct from ourselves.

On the contrary, husbands should love their wives as they do their own bodies (Eph 5:28). But they ought to love their wives from charity; therefore also their own bodies.

Furthermore, everything capable of being made blessed is to be loved from charity. But the body is capable of being made blessed. Therefore it is to be loved from charity.

I answer that our body is one of four things which are to be loved from charity. For, as is clear from what has been said, the love of charity has for its foundation chiefly the sharing of the blessed life, and of the life of grace insofar as it is ordained to that goal. Now this [blessed] life has a threefold relation to the possessor of charity. In one way, it exists in someone as in a source diffusing that life into others; this is how it is in God. In another way, it exists in the [human] lover as the one who participates in that life, which occurs in two ways—chiefly in regard to the soul, and secondarily in regard to the body, through a certain overflowing into the body of what is in the soul. Lastly, this blessed life exists in others, too, as co-participants with us; this is how it is in our neighbor. Accordingly, there are four things that are to be loved from charity: God, the neighbor, ourselves, and our body.

Reply Obj. 1: Charity does not flee from involvement with the body insofar as the body is capable of glory, but only insofar as it is subject to the misery that impedes this glory.

Reply Obj. 2: For a man to love himself according to his exterior nature in things repugnant to reason is reprehensible; but it is worthy of praise for a man to love himself in things wherein his exterior nature harmonizes with his interior.

Reply Obj. 3: While the body does not enjoy God immediately, nevertheless there will be a certain overflowing of glory into the body from the soul enjoying him.

Reply Obj. 4: Each man is properly said to be what is most noble in him, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.8, 1168b31–33.) Hence, “love of oneself” is understood with respect to those things that pertain to the soul; and therefore “love of one’s body” is distinguished from “love of oneself” not as a part is distinguished from a whole, but as a part from another part.

Reply Obj. 5: The neighbor’s body and soul stand in the same relationship to the one having charity, as far as the blessed life is concerned—namely, both his body and his soul are destined to share in that beatitude. For this reason, the neighbor’s soul and body are not distinguished as altogether diverse objects of love.

Exposition of the text

No precepts need to be given concerning the second and fourth of these [that is, ourselves and our body.] (Sentences III, 28.1(104).2, citing Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 23, n. 22 (CCSL 32; PL 34:27).) On the contrary: law ought universally to direct a man concerning everything that pertains to the virtues. Moreover, the love of God was likewise naturally implanted in all things. It should be said in reply that speculative knowledge is related to things to be known in just the way that the law stands to things to be done. Hence, just as in a speculative science instruction is not given about principles per se known, since they are known to us by nature, but only about conclusions known through them, so neither does the law make an explicit determination about the love of self to which nature inclines, but rather does this about the love of neighbor arising out of that love as conclusions arise from principles. Now, while it is true that the love of God is naturally implanted in us, we do not love God by this natural love in the same way as we love him by charity, as was said above. Furthermore, from the very fact that we are commanded to love God spiritually, we are taught to love ourselves spiritually as well.

No one has ever hated his own flesh. (Sent. III, 28.1(104).2, citing Ephesians 5:29.) On the contrary: Many commit suicide owing to their abundant malice, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.4, 1166b8–9.) It should be said in reply that each and every man naturally loves his bodily life; but the fact that some long for bodily death occurs incidentally, either insofar as bodily life is an impediment to some good they love more than bodily life, as happens in those who seek another life after death, or insofar as evils in some way accompany their bodily life, which evils they judge it better to be without rather than to continue having bodily life.

The question arises here concerning angels. (Sent. III, 28.2(105).1, citing Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 30, n. 32 (CCSL 32; PL 34:29).) It seems that love for the angels and for the Blessed Virgin and for Christ as man are not contained in love of one’s neighbor, but rather should be reduced to the love of God, seeing that they are above us. It should be said in reply that God is above us as the one who pours eternal life into us. In this way, of course, neither angels nor the Blessed Virgin nor Christ as man are above us, since even as the Trinity alone created us to the life of nature, so It alone sanctifies us by the life of grace and will beatify us by the life of glory. They, on the other hand, are to be loved as participating together with us in the eternal life that comes from God; and so far as this is concerned, they are alongside us, even though in their fuller participation they are above us.