D. 30 - Order of charity as regards merit

Division of the text

Here it is usual to ask what is better and of greater merit, to love one’s friends or to love one’s enemies. (Sent. III, 30.1(111).1.) After the Master has determined the order of charity with respect to diverse objects of love as to the quantity of love, here he considers this order as to the efficacy of meriting.

This consideration is divided into two parts.

In the first, he pursues his intention;

in the second, he raises a doubt from what has been said, at but what follows troubles us more. (Sent. III. 30. 1 (111). 4.)

The former is divided into two parts.

In the first, he poses the question;

in the second, he answers it, at but this comparison is tangled. (Sent. III, 30.1(111).1.)

And concerning the answer, he does three things.

First, he answers the question.

Second, he gives an objection to the contrary, at but Augustine appears to feel that it is a greater thing to love an enemy than a friend. (Sent. III, 30.1(111).2.)

Third, he solves the objection, at someone may not be willing to simply grant this . . . if so, let him determine these things in accordance with the understanding set out earlier. (Sent. III, 30.1(111).3.)

But what follows troubles us more. Here he does three things.

First, he raises a doubt.

Second, he sets down a faulty solution, at some, who wish to hold simply what is said here, interpret that precept and say that to love all men, even an enemy, is given as a commandment to those who are perfect. (Sent. III, 30.1(111).5.)

Third, he sets down his own opinion, at but it is better to understand that it is commanded to all by that commandment to love all, even their enemies. (Sent. III, 30.1(111).6.)

Question 1

The efficacy of meriting

Here in this Distinction, we will inquire into five things:

first, whether all are bound to love enemies;

second, whether all are bound to show them signs of love;

third, what is of greater merit, to love an enemy or to love a friend;

fourth, what is of greater merit, to love God or to love one’s neighbor;

fifth, whether the whole power of meriting is based on charity.

Article 1

Whether all are bound to love enemies

To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.25.8; 83.8; De caritate, a. 8; De duabus preceptis, ch. 2; De perfectione vitae spir., ch. 14; Super Rom. 12, lect. 3.) It seems that not all are bound to love enemies.

Obj. 1: For on the verse love your enemies (Luke 6:27), a Gloss says: this belongs to the perfect. (Jerome, Commentarii in euangelium Matthaei (CCSL 77), bk. 1, ln. 695.) But not all are bound to those things that belong to perfection, as was said above. Therefore not all are bound to love enemies.

Obj. 2: Further, men are not bound to more things under the New Law than under the Old, as is evident from Mark 8:6, where the Gloss, on the lines and taking the loaves, says: he does not preach anything other than what was written, but he shows that the law and the prophets are heavy. (Glossa Ordinaria (PL 114:136).) But under the Old Law men were not bound to loving enemies, for in Matthew 5:43 we read: you have heard that it was said, 'You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.' Therefore neither are we bound to love enemies.

Obj. 3: Further, nature does not incline to something contrary to charity. But every nature is inclined to detest its contrary. Since therefore an enemy, precisely as enemy, is contrary to us, it seems that we are not bound, from charity, to love enemies.

Obj. 4: Further, we do not love those for whom we desire evils and about whom we rejoice in evils [that befall them]. But it is permissible to desire evils for enemies and to rejoice over their evils. Hence in Sacred Scripture, imprecations against enemies are frequently given, and the destruction of hostile forces is narrated for the consolation of the faithful. Therefore we are not bound to love enemies.

Obj. 5: Further, charity conforms man’s will to the divine will. But there are some whom God hates, as is said in Malachi 1:3: I have hated Esau. Therefore it is permissible to hate enemies.

Obj. 6: Further, this [hatred] seems to be clearly expressed in Psalm 139:22, which says, I hate them with perfect hatred. But every perfection comes from charity. Therefore not only does charity not make one love enemies, it makes one rather hate them.

On the contrary, you shall not take vengeance or bear a grudge against any of your people, but you shall love your neighbor as yourself (Lev 19:18).

Furthermore, do not rejoice when your enemies fall (Prov 24:17).

Furthermore, charity looks to the image of God in man, according to which image it is possible for any man to share with us in the life of grace, as was said above. But this image is found in enemies. Therefore we are bound from charity to love enemies.

I answer that we are bound to love someone according as he shares something in common with us. Now our enemy has in common with us a sharing in human nature, on the basis of which it is possible for him to have in common with us a sharing in the divine life. Accordingly, we ought to love him in regard to things that pertain to his nature and to the possession of grace, whereas we ought not to love the enmity he has against us, since according to it he has something in common neither with us nor even with himself, but is rather contrary [both to us and to himself], as was said also concerning other sins.

Reply Obj. 1: Loving enemies to the extent of showing signs of benevolence to them belongs to perfection, and not all are bound to do this. But to desire for one’s enemy that he receive God’s grace and inherit eternal life, which is charity’s special concern, is something everyone must do.

Reply Obj. 2: Even under the Old Law men were bound to love their enemies, as is evident from the authority of Leviticus brought forward. Hence the saying, you shall hate your enemy, is not taken from the law, since this is nowhere found in the text of Scripture, but was added on from the perverse interpretation of Jews who, on the basis of the fact that love of neighbor was commanded, concluded [falsely] that enemies were to be hated. What the New Law did add, however, is the counsel to show signs of benevolence to an enemy.

Reply Obj. 3: Nature inclines to hating an enemy not insofar as he is similar to us as regards agreement in nature or receptivity to grace, but insofar as he is dissimilar. Now this dissimilarity comes about insofar as he is exercising enmity toward us, which ought to displease us exceedingly.

Reply Obj. 4: Charity looks to certain goods per se, that is, to the goods of grace, but looks to certain other goods incidentally, insofar as they are ordered to those per se goods.

Now temporal goods, which charity looks to per accidens and secondarily, can impede each other in various ways, since one man’s prosperity may lead to another’s adversity. Hence, since charity has an order, and since anyone ought to love himself more than another, and neighbors more than strangers, and friends more than enemies, and the common good of many more than the private good of one, someone can, while preserving charity, desire temporal evil for someone and rejoice if it happens—but not precisely as that person’s evil, but rather, as an evil that prevents other evils from occurring to another, whether of the community or of the Church, whom he is bound to love more. Something similar can be said about [desiring or rejoicing in] the evil of someone who falls into temporal evil, insofar as the evil of punishment frequently impedes the evil of [further] guilt on his part.

The goods of grace, on the other hand, do not mutually impede each other, since spiritual goods can be integrally possessed by many. Consequently, with respect to these goods it is impossible for anyone, while preserving charity, to desire [corresponding spiritual] evils for another or to rejoice about such evils, except insofar as the goodness of divine justice, which one is bound to love more than any man, shines forth in the evil of guilt [that God has permitted] or of someone’s punishment of damnation. But this is not to rejoice about evil per se, but rather about a good to which an evil is conjoined.

Reply Obj. 5: God, too, does not will someone’s evil, speaking of the evil of guilt, but only permits it; and this permission is good. Now, when it comes to the evil of punishment, of which he is the author, again God wills it not insofar as it is evil—since he does not rejoice in punishments—but insofar as it is just.

Reply Obj. 6: The Psalmist did not hate them with a perfect hatred except insofar as they were enemies of God; but that they are such is the result only of their sinning. Hence, in them whom he hated with a perfect hatred, the Psalmist hated nothing except their sin.

Article 2

Whether all are bound to show signs of friendship to enemies

To the second we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.25.9; 83.8; De caritate, a. 8; De duabus preceptis, ch. 2; De perfectione vitae spir., ch. 14.) It seems that all are bound to show signs of friendship to enemies.

Obj. 1: For acts of kindness and help to friends are the signs of friendship par excellence; but a man is bound to do such things for his enemies, as it says in Proverbs 25:21: if your enemies are hungry, give them bread to eat. Therefore one is bound to show signs of friendship to enemies.

Obj. 2: Further, the Church prays for enemies, as is evident from a Gloss on Matthew 5 and from the Collect Pietate tua, where we find the phrase to give abundantly true charity to our friends and enemies. (In the Dominican missal, among orationes votivas ad diversa, or. 36: pro vivis et defunctis.) But prayer is the foremost act of kindness and help that someone can bestow. Hence, since an act of the Church belongs to any member of the Church, it seems that anyone who is a member of the Church is bound to be a benefactor to enemies.

Obj. 3: Further, no one ought to have a pretended love. But a love that does not show itself in works is not true love, since love is proved by outward deeds, as Gregory says, (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in evangelia, bk. 2, hom. 30, para. 1 (CCSL 141:256; PL 76:1220).) and since in 1 John 3:18 it is said: let us love, not in word or speech, but in truth and action. Therefore since each man ought to love his enemy, it follows that each man is bound to extend works of love to him.

Obj. 4: Further, in Matthew 5:44 it is commanded simultaneously that we love enemies and do what benefits them. For the same reason, therefore, men are obliged to do both [if they are obliged to do either]. But all are bound to the first; therefore also to the second.

Obj. 5: Further, to refuse a man signs of familiarity and acts of kindness and help is to take a sort of vengeance upon him. But man is bound not to avenge himself, as is clear from Romans 12:19: beloved, never avenge yourselves. Therefore one is bound not to withdraw his acts of kindness and help from enemies.

On the contrary (6), a Gloss on Matthew 5:44 says that to do acts of kindness to one’s enemies and to pray for them is the peak of perfection. But not all are bound to those things that belong to perfection. Therefore neither are all bound to offer acts of kindness to enemies.

Furthermore (7), in the Old Law the sons of Israel were frequently commanded to pursue their enemies to the death, and not to enter into a covenant with them. Therefore they were not bound to do acts of kindness to enemies. Therefore neither are we bound to do so now.

Furthermore (8), we see that even now the Church suggests that war should be waged against tyrants and infidels; hence it is permissible to do evil to enemies. Therefore much less is it necessary to do them acts of kindness.

I answer that charity’s effect ought to correspond to charity’s affection. Hence, insofar as someone is bound to have the affection of charity toward an enemy, so also is he bound to extend to him its effect. Now charity, as was said, (Above,* d. 28, a. 4; d. 30, a. 1, ad 4.)* considers the goods of grace, which all the living share in common, actually or potentially. Consequently, the friendship of charity is more common and more extensive than any other kind of friendship, since other kinds extend to fewer, inasmuch as they are founded upon some sharing in common which does not include everyone. Now in all things, that which is common is more vehement, but that which is proper embraces more in act; and the perfection of the common consists in its extension to those things that the proper embraces, as the genus is perfected through the addition of the difference. For example, being inheres in a thing more vehemently than being-alive; and yet being-alive embraces something in act that being only has in potency, so that being has its perfection insofar as it is extended to life.

In keeping with this principle, therefore, charity more vehemently desires for someone the goods of grace, with which goods it is chiefly concerned, than any other friendship desires for someone the goods corresponding to that friendship. All the same, that charity should extend itself to those goods [to which the other friendships extend, like doing acts of kindness and assistance] does not pertain to its necessity, but rather to its perfection. And therefore anyone is bound of necessity to desire eternal goods for one who hates him, but he is not bound to desire temporal goods for him; yet it belongs to charity’s perfection that it should extend even to such things as these, too. But since in the order of generation the removal of evil precedes the attainment of good, it follows that no one’s affection desires a good for someone for whom he desires an evil, insofar as it is evil. Hence, although it belongs to charity’s perfection that we desire temporal goods for enemies, nevertheless it is a matter of necessity that we not desire evils for them precisely as evils, but incidentally, as was said before.

And something similar holds concerning the effect, since a man is bound—in accordance with place, time, and his condition—to cooperate in doing, even for an enemy, things having to do with eternal life, at least by praying for all men in common, not excluding an enemy from his prayers, although perhaps he does not make special mention of him, even as he need not offer a special prayer for everyone toward whom he has charity, but prayer with a common intention suffices. In regard to other [that is, temporal] goods, a man is not bound to cooperate with an enemy, unless the enemy be under a pressing necessity; to extend even to such goods belongs rather to charity’s perfection. Yet a man is bound not to do any evil to an enemy, except insofar as it would impede a greater evil or promote a greater good, as the good of justice or something of this sort.

Reply Obj. 1: Friendly acts of kindness and help proceed from liberality, (Reading liberalitate for liberatione, following Moos.) not from obligation. Necessity, however, makes all things common; and therefore in cases of necessity, even enemies are to be aided. But this is rather an effect of justice than of friendship.

Reply Obj. 2: Prayer is about goods that pertain to the sharing in common of spiritual life—the sharing that charity chiefly considers. Accordingly, one cannot make the same argument for this and for the other goods.

Reply Obj. 3: There is no dissimulation in love when as much is shown forth in deeds as is had in affection.

Reply Obj. 4: Those two [loving and doing acts of kindness] run with an equal step, as was said.

Reply Obj. 5: It would be revenge to deny signs of familiarity to a man when necessity beckons, or if he should beg one’s pardon, or when a man who was considered an enemy should bear himself familiarly toward one, if it may be presumed that he is not dissimulating or doing it in mockery, since under such circumstances he loves, and is to be counted among one’s friends. But it belongs to perfection that someone should carry himself beyond this to the point of familiarity with an [actual] enemy.

Reply Sed Contra 6: The Gloss speaks about the sort of benefitting that follows upon perfect charity, according to which it moves ahead into the sorts of behavior that belong to other particular friendships.

Reply Sed Contra 7: It was commanded of old that they should pursue enemies and should not form a covenant with them insofar as they were drawn into idolatry through their friendship, and insofar as they were executors of divine justice, acting from the command of him who had authority [over life and death], but not in such a way that they should do it from revenge.

Reply Sed Contra 8: It is in this way that the Church promotes war against enemies—either that such war might bring about justice or that it might thwart a greater evil or lead to a greater good.

Article 3

Whether it is of greater merit to love a friend or an enemy

Proceeding to the third, it seems to be of greater merit to love an enemy than a friend. (Parallels: ST II-II.27.7; De caritate, a. 8.)

Obj. 1: For in Matthew 5:46, the Lord says, if you love those who love you, what reward do you have? But merit is spoken of in connection with reward. Therefore it is of greater merit to love an enemy than a friend.

Obj. 2: Further, that which belongs to perfection is of greater merit, since perfect charity merits more than imperfect charity. But to love an enemy belongs to perfect charity, whereas to love a friend does not. Therefore to love an enemy is of greater merit.

Obj. 3: Further, where there is greater difficulty there is greater merit, since it pertains more to virtue, which is about difficult matters. But to love an enemy is more difficult than to love a friend; therefore it is of greater merit.

Obj. 4: Further, according to Gregory, services are more pleasing to the extent that they are less owed. But one owes love to an enemy less than one owes it to a friend. Therefore it is more pleasing to God and more meritorious.

Obj. 5: Further, the power of meriting is from grace. But grace alone moves us to love our enemies, whereas nature together with grace moves us to love our friends. Therefore it is more meritorious to love an enemy than to love a friend.

On the contrary (6), the better an act is, the more meritorious, too. But it is better to love a friend than an enemy, since it is an act falling more under love’s proper matter. Therefore it is better to love a friend than an enemy.

Furthermore (7), when necessity presses, a lesser good is to be dismissed for the sake of a greater good. But love of enemies would be dismissed more readily than love of friends, which is evident from the effect that is proportioned to the affection, since whenever we cannot aid friends and enemies when both are under extreme necessity, we are bound more to aid friends than enemies. Therefore to love a friend is better than to love an enemy.

Furthermore (8), that which is common and first according to nature is better than that which is superadded, just as “being” is better than “living,” if the latter be considered apart from being, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5, n. 3 (PG 3:818).) But to love a friend is the common and first foundation of charity, to which the love of enemies is superadded. Therefore to love a friend is better than to love an enemy.

I answer that the aforesaid comparison of loves can be understood in two ways: with respect to action and with respect to habit.

If it be understood with respect to action, it should be known that when we are seeking which is the better and more meritorious of two acts, the question has to be understood of those things when speaking of them per se, according to their genus. For it can happen that what is less good or less meritorious according to its genus is rendered more good or more meritorious by some additional factor attaching to it, as a small work done from great charity is more meritorious than a great work done from small charity.

Now, the goodness of an act is measured by two things from which it receives goodness—namely, from the term or object, and from the principle, which is the will. However, an act has the species of goodness from the term, while it has the notion of meriting from the will, since it is in the power of the one doing it precisely on account of its proceeding from the will. Therefore if we compare the love of friend and of enemy with respect to the terms or objects, it is better to love a friend than an enemy, since a friend is an object more suited to the nature of love than an enemy. On the other hand, if we compare the two aforesaid loves to the principle [of the act of love], which is the will, there must be greater merit where there is greater effort of will, since the greater the will’s effort, the more fervent is the will concerning the end on account of which it attends to something that, taken in itself, is more repugnant to the will—although the will is more remiss, at times, about that to which it is more impelled [by nature]. Merit, however, consists in the fact that the will is affected [in a certain way] toward the end.

And therefore, if we compare the acts of such loves, the love of enemies is more meritorious insofar as it is just this sort of thing [that is, a love of enemies], since insofar as it is, it requires a greater effort and a greater fervor about the [ultimate] end, even though the love of a friend is more intense about its object. But the love of a friend is better with respect to the essential goodness that accompanies the species of an act, since an act has its species from its object.

However, if the aforesaid loves are compared with respect to the habit, in this way the question posed must be understood either in regard to the love of enemies that is a matter of necessity—and from this vantage there is no question of comparison, since the same habit is equal with respect to both enemies and friends—or in regard to the love of enemies that pertains to perfection, in which case “love of enemies” includes love of friends, but not conversely; and from this vantage, the love of enemies is better.

Reply Obj. 1: While the love by which only friends are loved does not proceed from grace, and therefore cannot be meritorious nor have a reward, nevertheless if the act of love by which we love friends is informed by grace, it is meritorious and does have a reward.

Reply Obj. 2: Not every way of loving one’s enemies belongs to perfection; but insofar as loving one’s enemies does belong to perfection, it is made more meritorious according as it requires a greater effort.

Reply Obj. 3: Difficulty does not make for merit except to the extent that it causes the need for a greater inclination and effort of will toward something.

Reply Obj. 4: A debt only diminishes the notion of merit to the extent that it diminishes the notion of the voluntary, inasmuch as a debt implies a certain necessity. But if a debt is paid back voluntarily, there will be as much merit in that act of repayment as there is the notion of the voluntary.

Reply Obj. 5: Nature is not contrary to grace. Hence, an admixture of nature with grace does not cause any lessening in the effects of grace, for such a lessening can only be caused by the admixture of grace’s contrary.

Reply Sed Contra 6: An act has goodness both from the object and from the end; and the goodness that is from the object is material with respect to the goodness that is from the end, to which the will looks; and merit consists rather according to that [aspect, the end].

Reply Sed Contra 7: In things that are related by the addition of one to the other, there is a consequence in the contrary, not a consequence in it, as is evident in “man” and “animal.” For just as “man” is related to “animal,” so “not-animal” is related to “not-man.” Hence, since the effort that is found in the love of enemies is related to the effort found in the love of friends as something added to it, it follows that just as loving an enemy is of greater merit insofar as it takes a greater effort, so to dismiss the love of friends is more evil.

Reply Sed Contra 8: That argument runs along the lines of the goodness an act has from the proper notion of its species, which is from the object.

Article 4

Whether to love one’s neighbor is more meritorious than to love God

To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST II-II.27.8.) It seems that to love one’s neighbor is more meritorious than to love God.

Obj. 1: For we do not merit by doing natural things; but to love God is natural, since love of the highest good is naturally in all, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 10 (PG 3:707).) Therefore to love God is less meritorious than to love one’s neighbor, which is not so natural.

Obj. 2: Further, what is more fruitful and laborious seems to be more meritorious. But those things that pertain to the active life are more laborious and fruitful than those which pertain to the contemplative life; therefore they are more meritorious. But love of one’s neighbor pertains to the active life, whereas love of God pertains to the contemplative. Therefore it is more meritorious to love a neighbor than to love God.

Obj. 3: Further, just as loving one’s enemy is placed in the ultimate degree of charity, so loving God is placed in the first degree. But loving one’s enemy is more meritorious than loving a friend. Therefore, by the same reasoning, it is more meritorious to love one’s neighbor than to love God.

Obj. 4: Further, that which presupposes another, and not conversely, seems to be more perfect. But love of one’s neighbor presupposes love of God, since God is the reason for loving one’s neighbor. Therefore love of one’s neighbor is more meritorious than love of God.

Obj. 5: Further, an act for which a greater effort is required must be more meritorious. But a greater effort is required to love an enemy than to love God. Therefore love of one’s neighbor, at least with respect to love of enemies, is more meritorious than love of God.

On the contrary, that on account of which anything is such, is itself more such. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.2, 72a29; Aquinas, Post. Anal., bk. 1, lect. 6, n. 3.) But love of one’s neighbor is not meritorious except insofar as it is ordered, either actually or habitually, to God. Therefore love of God is more meritorious.

Furthermore, when charity is more intense, it seems to be more meritorious. But charity loves God more intensely than it loves the neighbor. Therefore in this [difference of intensity], it merits more.

Furthermore, a virtue works more efficaciously concerning its own object, the more that object is proper to it and per se. But the per se object of charity is God, whereas the neighbor is not its object except secondarily, just as magnitude is only a secondary object of sight, whose per se object is color. Therefore since meriting is an effect of charity, it seems that even as sight knows color better than magnitude, since it is not deceived about color as it can be about magnitude, so too charity merits more by the love of God than by the love of one’s neighbor.

Furthermore, what is more difficult seems to be more meritorious. But loving God seems to be more difficult than loving one’s neighbor, for it is said in 1 John 4:20: he who does not love his brother whom he has seen, cannot love God whom he has not seen. Therefore love of God is more meritorious than love of one’s neighbor.

I answer that love of God is the cause and reason for love of neighbor. Hence love of God is included in love of neighbor as a cause is in its effect by causal power, and the love of neighbor is included in the love of God as an effect is in the power of its cause. Nevertheless, the motion of love that has its term in the neighbor is other than that which rests in God, even as the acts by which principles and conclusions are considered are different acts, although in the aforesaid way they mutually include one another.

When therefore we compare these two motions from the two sides, as was said above, we find the love of God more powerful than the love of neighbor, that is, both with respect to the object, which more suits the nature of love, and with respect to the will, which has a prompter and more intense affection for God than for the neighbor. As a result, the motion of love toward God is better and more meritorious than the motion of love toward the neighbor, unless the love of a neighbor should [in a given act] proceed from a greater love of God than a love borne immediately toward God in another act—which happens at times, but not always, since the least love of charity toward God is enough to extend one’s affection toward the neighbor as well.

Reply Obj. 1: Whatever things are purely natural are not meritorious, but whatever things proceed from nature perfected by charity and grace are meritorious; nor does nature diminish the notion of merit, as was said. (Above, a. 3.)

Reply Obj. 2: Even supposing that the activity of the active life is more meritorious than the activity of the contemplative life—which perhaps is not true, as will be said below (Below,* d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, resp. 2.)*—still the love of neighbor need not be more meritorious than the love of God, since the love of God is the source of whatever pertains to each life, as was said. Or otherwise it could be said that, in terms of the interior act, love of God and love of neighbor pertain to the contemplative life (for which reason Gregory, commenting upon Ezechiel, (Gregory, Homiliae in Hiezechihelem prophetam, bk. 2, hom. 2, n. 8 (CCSL 142; PL 76:953).) says that the contemplative life perseveres in the love of God and neighbor), but that, in terms of exterior acts, each pertains to the active life, although an act of this sort is expended only toward neighbors because God does not need our works.

Reply Obj. 3: Love of enemies was not earlier argued to be more meritorious than love of friends except insofar as it was posited to have proceeded from a stronger force, which strength was viewed according to how much more intensely the will adhered to God. Hence it does not follow that love of neighbor is more meritorious than love of God, unless the one who loves his neighbor should at the same time love God more.

Reply Obj. 4: Love of neighbor presupposes love of God, not as the more perfect presupposes the less perfect, as was the case in the other degrees, but rather as an effect presupposes the cause; and therefore the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 5: The effort of will in question is not to be taken as referring to anything else but this: that the will have more vehement affection for God, as was said before, since whoever strives toward anything does so only to the extent that he desires the end.

Reply Sed Contra: However, what is given as an argument to the contrary—that it is more difficult to love God than neighbor—is to be understood not of natural love, by which all love him, but of freely-given love [that is, charity]; and even this is called more difficult not as if it were more laborious, for it is sweeter, but because it more greatly exceeds the powers of nature, since it is directed toward a loftier object.

Article 5

Whether merit consists chiefly in charity

To the fifth we proceed thus. (Parallels: In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 4, resp. 4; q. 5, a. 1; ST I-II.114.4; De veritate, q. 14, a. 5, ad 5; De potentia, q. 6, a. 9; Super Rom. 8, lect. 5; Super 1 Tim. 4, lect. 2; Super Heb. 6, lect. 3.) It seems that merit does not consist chiefly in charity.

Obj. 1: For grace is said to be the principle of meriting. But charity is not the same as grace. Therefore merit does not consist chiefly in the force of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, no one merits unless he is justified. But to justify is the function of faith, as is evident from Romans 5:1. Therefore the power of meriting is especially to be found in the presence of faith.

Obj. 3: Further, an act is meritorious as well as praiseworthy through order to its rightful end. But it belongs to any virtue to make an act praiseworthy—and therefore to make it meritorious, too. And thus it seems that merit does not consist [uniquely] in the force of charity.

Obj. 4: Further, that which makes for a lessening of merit does not seem to be the root of meriting. But charity makes for a lessening of merit, since it makes all things easy, not only on account of its being a habit, but also just because it is love, as is evident from the aforesaid. Since therefore difficulty makes for merit, it seems that charity is not the root of meriting.

Obj. 5: Further, if charity were the root of meriting, there would be equal merit wherever there was equal charity. But sometimes a person with little charity does some act in which he merits more than does another, who has great charity, in a small act that he does. Therefore charity is not the root of meriting.

On the contrary, to be that without which no merit avails seems to be the root of meriting. But charity fits this description, as is evident from 1 Corinthians 13:1–3. Therefore charity is the root of meriting.

Furthermore, that which is opposed to every demerit seems to be the root of meriting. But charity fits this description. Therefore it is the root of meriting.

Furthermore, we merit from the fact that we are conjoined to God. But this conjunction is brought about by charity. Therefore charity is the root of meriting.

I answer that, as was said above, (In III Sent., d. 18, a. 2.) that merit properly signifies what someone exhibits so that he might make something, that is, the reward of merit, his own. Hence, for merit two things are chiefly required: one is that it be exhibited and not extorted; and since nothing can be exhibited except what is in the power of the one exhibiting, therefore it must be voluntary, since it is the will that makes us lords of our acts. The other thing required is that what is exhibited be sufficient for making one’s own that for which it is exhibited.

And from each side, the preeminent principle of meriting is from charity. For charity is in the will as in a subject, perfecting it with respect to its first and chief act; and again, since it is the love of God, it makes the very beloved, who is the reward, to be its own, insofar as it brings about union with the beloved. And therefore preeminent principle of merit is found in charity, while in other things [a principle of merit is found] insofar as they are informed by charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Grace causes merit as the remote principle that constitutes us in spiritual being, without which we cannot merit anything spiritual; but charity is as the proximate principle.

Reply Obj. 2: Faith does not justify unless it is informed by charity. But justification is especially attributed to faith, since the first thing in which a just man is distinguished from an unjust man is the act of faith, even as the first thing in which a living creature is distinguished from a non-living creature is the act of the nutritive power; and therefore “living” is said according to the presence of that power, and “sensing” is said according to the presence of the sense of touch, which is the first sense, as is said in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.2, 413b4; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 2, lect. 3, n. 260.)

Reply Obj. 3: Acts of other virtues are not meritorious except insofar as they are informed by charity, just as neither are acts of virtues praiseworthy except insofar as they are voluntary.

Reply Obj. 4: Difficulty does not make for merit, except perhaps in the sense that enduring it can lessen one’s punishment for sins in the manner of a certain exchange. But difficulty does not contribute to the merit that is ordered precisely to the attainment of the good in relation to which merit, properly speaking, exists, except insofar as some difficulty causes the need for greater effort, which can only result from a greater inclination of the will to that good. And since habit and love bring about facility in acting from the fact that they cause a greater inclination of the will, therefore such facility does not diminish the notion of merit.

Reply Obj. 5: Virtuous habits, although they incline the will, do not compel it. And therefore it can happen that one who has a greater habit sometimes produces less intensity in an act, even as he may sometimes produce no act at all. And then a less intense act proceeding from a greater charity is less meritorious with regard to the accidental reward, which is given in view of the act itself, but more meritorious with regard to the essential reward, which is given in view of the capacity for acting, which is from the habit of charity.

Exposition of the text

Whether one and the same movement is toward the friend and the enemy. (Sent. III, 30.1(111).1.) This is impossible, unless the one be loved on account of the other, and is referred to that other by actual consideration.

The other toward the friend, and this seems more fervent. (Sent. III, 30.1(111).1.) This statement is to be understood with respect to the object itself; but with respect to the end, the one who acts with greater effort, precisely as having such effort, loves more fervently.

When they say in the Lord’s Prayer: 'Forgive us our debts, even as we forgive our debtors.' (Sent. III, 30.1(111).2.) It seems that whoever holds a grudge sins by saying this prayer. In response, it should be said that such a man does not sin, because he does not say the prayer in his own person but in the person of the Church; or if in his own person, he says it not in respect to what he does, but in respect to what he desires to arrive at.