D. 36 - Interconnection of the virtues

Division of the text

After having considered the virtues and the gifts in common, here he considers their interconnection. Now, this part is divided into two:

in the first, he considers the interconnection of the virtues;

in the second their connection to the commandments, by which the acts of the virtues are commanded, at since there are two commandments of charity, from which . . . hang the whole law and the prophets, we must address how this may be. (Sent. III, 36.3(137).1, referring to Matt 22:40.)

The first is divided into two:

in the first, he shows that the virtues are interconnected;

in the second, he shows that they are equal, at but it is a question whether one who possesses all the virtues has them in equal measure, or whether some flourish more and some less in someone. (Sent. III, 36.2(136).1.)

As regards the latter he does three things:

first, he proposes the question;

second, he lays out an opinion, along with its proof, at for it has seemed to some that some of them are had more and some less by someone; (Sent. III, 36.2(136).2.)

third, he lays out another opinion, which is the true one, at others say more truly that all virtues are joined and equal in anyone in whom they are. (Sent. III, 36.2(136).3.)

And as regards the last, he does three things:

first, he states his own opinion, along with its proof;

second, he answers the proof of the first opinon, at and so, when someone is said to be pre-eminent in some virtue . . . this is to be taken according to external uses; (Sent. III, 36.2(136).4.)

third, he confirms this by an authority, at according to this manner, namely according to the reasons for external acts, Augustine says elsewhere. (Sent. III, 36.2(136).5.)

Question 1

The connection of virtues and commandments

Here there are six questions:

first, whether the political virtues are interconnected;

second, whether the gratuitous virtues are;

third, whether the gifts are;

fourth, whether the virtues are equal;

fifth, whether the vices are interconnected and equal;

sixth, whether the commandments are connected in charity such that it is the measure in the commandment.

Article 1

Whether the political virtues are interconnected

To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 2, ad 6; ST I-II.65.1; De virtutibus card., a. 2; Quodl. XII, q. 15, a. 1; Sent. Ethic. VI, lect. 11.) It appears that the political virtues are not interconnected.

Obj. 1: For such virtues are acquired from their acts, as the Philosopher proves. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.1, 1103a16‒b7.) But their acts are not interconnected. Therefore neither are these virtues.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, when things are connected, they must be connected in some one thing. But the only single thing wherein the virtues are connected is prudence. But they cannot be connected in prudence, since it is, as it were, an art of things we can do, so it is not incongruous that someone have prudence as regards one matter, but not as regards another. Therefore it is not necessary that the virtues are interconnected.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as prudence orders all the moral virtues, so does wisdom order all the sciences, as the head of the sciences, as is said in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.7, 1141a20.) But the sciences are not interconnected simply because wisdom orders them in common. Therefore neither are the moral virtues interconnected simply because prudence orders them in common.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.7, 1123b5‒14.) one who is moderate as regards middling honors is not magnanimous. However, it is certain that he is virtuous as regards some other virtue, which has no name. Therefore the one virtue can be had without the other.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, holding to the mean in its proper matter pertains to every political virtue. But we see with our senses that some are moderate about the matter of one virtue who are not moderate about the matter of some other. Therefore one political virtue is had without another.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, Augustine says, in the Letter to Jerome, (Augustine, Epistulae (CCSL 44), epist. 167: Ad Hieronymum, para. 3, n. 10 (CCSL 44:596; PL 33:736).) that it is not a divine claim that says, he who has one has them all. Therefore, since every true claim is divine, as every true thing anyone says is from the Holy Spirit, according to Ambrose, (In fact, Ambrosiaster, Comment. in epist. 1 ad Corinth., 12:3 (PL 17:245).) it appears that this is not a true claim.

On the contrary, the Philosopher proves (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.13, 1144b21‒1145a7.) that no one can have prudence unless he has the moral virtues, and neither can anyone have the moral virtues unless he has prudence. Therefore to have one virtue one must have all of them at once.

Furthermore, Cicero says, if you abandon one of your virtues, you need to admit that you are not going to have any, (Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, bk. 2, ch. 14, n. 32.) and he is speaking of the political virtues, since he knew nothing about the gratuitous virtues. Therefore the political virtues are interconnected.

Furthermore, one who has chastity is chaste. But one who is chaste is virtuous. Now, he who is virtuous has no vice in him. Therefore he who has chastity lacks every vice, and thus appears to have every virtue. And the same account goes for the other virtues. Therefore he who has the one has them all.

I answer that virtue can be considered in two ways. In one way according to its imperfect existence, in virtue of which the seed beds of the virtues are present in us by our nature; and as such, a virtue is said to be a certain natural inclination to the act of the virtue. And in this way one virtue can be had without another. For some, from the nature of their makeup, are naturally apt to have liberality and some are prone to luxury, and this also happens in the other virtues. In another way, virtue is considered according to the perfected existence that it receives from habituation; and thereby it receives the name “political virtue.” And in this way the virtues must exist simultaneously. Three reasons [for this] can be drawn from the sayings of the philosophers.

The first is pointed out by the Philosopher in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.13, 1144b2‒5.) and is drawn from what perfects every political virtue. For in man is present a certain natural inclination to the act of prudence, which is called a natural virtue, which the Philosopher calls deinotes, which we ourselves can call “industry.” This of course can relate to both good things and bad, so it is not virtue, since virtue is what always renders one’s deed good. Whence, if it should always bring one’s judgment to rectitude, one must add something that prevents every error. Now, there are two sorts of error in judgment. One regards the end, as with someone who has the habit of a vice, who inclines to his act as to what is good in itself; and such an error in deeds is like an error about the first principles in speculative matters. The other error occurs in the pursuit of the end, which happens when someone who has a rectified conception about the end is led away by his emotions; this is like the saying that “delight corrupts a judgment of prudence.” And this error in deeds is like that in speculative matters regarding the discursive movement from principles to conclusion. Now, moral virtue prevents both errors, since it gives one an inclination to the right end, and controls one’s emotions. And this is why prudence cannot exist without moral virtue—I mean temperance, fortitude, and the like.

Similarly also, to the extent that one’s natural inclination to the things that belong to virtue is greater, so much more harmful is it without reason’s discernment being applied to it. For example, the faster a blind man runs, the more collisions he experiences. And therefore to perfect the moral virtue it must be directed by prudence; this is why prudence is placed in the definition of moral virtue, as is clear in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1107a2.) And therefore the moral virtues must be interconnected.

Another argument for their connection is taken from things that must be common to every virtue, yet each of which one virtue principally claims for itself. For example, fortitude claims the difficult for itself, temperance claims for itself the mean between excess and defect, which is the moderate, justice claims the right for itself, and prudence holds knowledge for itself. And therefore each of the named virtues receives its name from these conditions. Now, because what is greatest in any genus is the cause of the others, therefore the other virtues in a certain way participate in the conditions mentioned from the virtue that principally claims it for itself. For because the man of fortitude is the one who perseveres in the greatest difficulties, he will also easily persevere in other lesser difficulties. And Seneca appears to assign this cause, when he says that everything that is done well is done prudently, with fortitude, and temperately. (Seneca, Epistle 67.)

A third reason is taken from the end that every virtue intends. For every virtue works for the sake of the good of virtue. This is why if he intends the good of virtue, however it adorns the virtuous man, in no way does this deflect his intention away from it itself. Whence the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.1, 1121a30‒b10.) that the prodigal, who spends without minding the good, easily deviates into a much greater an evil.

Reply Obj. 1: When someone exerts himself in the act of any virtue, if he at the same time exerts himself in the act of a vice, he never acquires any virtue, since he does not acquire prudence. Whence to have one virtue, one must be well-oriented as regards all the things that enter into living one’s life; and thus, such virtues being acquired along with prudence, will cause the other virtues that concern things that do not so frequently enter into living one’s life. This happens from the fact that reason is habituated by the lower powers preexisting in it, and the lower follow it at a nod. And in this consists the entire notion of moral virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: The prudent man proceeds from the same principle as regards all the matters of the virtues—namely, from the intention of the good of reason. Whence prudence cannot be acquired according to one part of the matter of moral virtue and not according to another, as does happen in the arts as regards those matters on which they operate in the same way. For example, a cartwright makes a wheel from an almond tree in the same way as from an oak.

Reply Obj. 3: And through this, the solution to the third objection is clear, for the other sciences add special principles to the common principles of wisdom, and therefore one of them can be known without knowing the other. But the moral virtues do not add different principles beyond the principles of prudence; indeed, the principles of prudence are relative to the moral virtues, which principles are in fact the ends of the moral virtues, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.8, 1178a17.)

Reply Obj. 4: One who is oriented moderately as regards middling virtues does not always have an act of magnanimity, since its matter does not belong to him; yet he has the habit by which he is optimally oriented toward such things, if that matter were to be given him. And so it is with the liberal and the magnificent: for it is not a problem that one who has a virtue might lack the exercise of another virtue because he does not possess its matter.

Reply Obj. 5: That argument is based on natural virtues, as is clear from things said.

Reply Obj. 6: It is denied that it is a divine claim because it is not found in Sacred Scripture, such that it would be necessary that one agree with it.

Article 2

Whether the gratuitous virtues are interconnected

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: above, d. 27, q. 2, a. 4, resp. 3, ad 2; ST I-II.23.7; 65.2; De virtutibus card., a. 2.) It seems that the gratuitous graces are not interconnected.

Obj. 1: For Bede says (This claim is not found in Bede (Moos).) that the saints are more humble about the virtues that they do not possess than they glory in the virtues that they do. Therefore they possess certain virtues and not others.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is certain that many have faith who do not have charity. Now, each is a gratuitous virtue. Therefore and so on.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Christ had all the other virtues but he lacked faith and hope. Therefore one virtue can be had without another.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, perseverance is a virtue. But many have certain virtues wherein they do not persevere. Therefore one virtue can be had without another.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the married and the innocent can have chastity. But the married do not have virginity, and the innocent do not have penitence. Therefore it is not necessary that someone who has one of them has all of them.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, only an act of virtue is praiseworthy, and only vice is blameworthy. But in Sacred Scripture some are praised for one act, and blamed for another, as is clear in Revelation 2:3–4. Therefore one virtue can be possessed without another, whose opposite vice is possessed.

On the contrary, on the words I have done what is just and right (Ps 119:121), a Gloss says, the whole [is being named] from its part, insofar as he who has one virtue, has all virtues, and he who lacks one, lacks all.

The same can be taken from Jerome’s Gloss on Isaiah 16:11—which says, *my soul moans like a lyre for Moab—*where his Gloss says, a lyre does not give a harmonious sound if a chord is broken; so is the spiritual moan of the prophet if a virtue is lacking. (Jerome, Glossa Ordinaria (113:1258).)

Furthermore, he who has charity must have the other virtues; likewise, he who has the other virtues must have charity, which is the form of the virtues. Therefore he who has one virtue has all of them.

I answer that the gratuitous virtues, with respect to what is essentially related to virtue, have an interconnection. However, with respect to what is incidental to virtue as virtue—even if perhaps it is not incidental to a virtue insofar as it is this sort of virtue—there need not be interconnection.

Now, the reason for their interconnection can be taken from three things. First, from charity, which is the form of the virtues, with which all the virtues are infused simultaneously. The second is from grace, which is, as it were, a potential whole relative to the virtues, due to which in a certain way all the virtues flow as powers from the soul’s essence. Whence, just as all powers are together insofar as they are interconnected in one essence, so too all the gratuitous virtues are together insofar as they are interconnected in grace. The third is from general justice itself by which the impious are made just, which leaves nothing imperfect; for it is impious to hope for [only] half of salvation from God, as the saints say. (See De vera et falsa poenitentia (attributed to Augustine), ch. 6 (PL 40:1118).) Whence, when someone is made just, all the virtues are infused into him together.

Reply Obj. 1: The words of Bede should be understood to be about the exercise of the virtues, not as regard their habits. For diverse saints exceed each other in diverse ways in the exercise of the diverse virtues; according to this it is said of every confessor that there is not found one like him who preserved the law so excellently. (Sir 44:20.)

Reply Obj. 2: Just as the moral virtues have the perfect notion of virtue only when they are directed by prudence, so too do the gratuitous virtues only when they are formed by charity. This is why above, in Distinction 23, (In III Sent., d. 23, q. 3, a. 1, resp. 1.) it was said that unformed faith is not the virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: Whatever belongs to the perfection of faith was in Christ—namely, vision; for this through itself pertains to virtue. However, there was no imperfection in Christ, which is incidental to virtue, even though it belongs to faith through itself.

Reply Obj. 4: Perseverance is in a certain way a special virtue—insofar as it signifies one’s intention to hold fast, so that one might not fall away from right reason on account of sorrow, as is said in the Ethics 7; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.7, 1150a14‒b15.) and thus it is necessarily together with the other virtues. In another way, it is something incidental to the virtues, insofar as it signifies the continuation of virtues all the way to the end; and in this way it is not necessarily together with the other virtues.

Reply Obj. 5: Virginity does not signify a virtue, but something incidental to a virtue. Whence it can be given up without sin. However, penitence, if it is the special virtue, can be present even in the innocent in a conditional way—namely, such that, if they were to sin, they would repent, as the Philosopher says about shame in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.9, 1128b29‒32.)

Reply Obj. 6: One praises not only an act that comes from virtue, but also an act that is for the sake of virtue, by which good things come about, even if not in a good way. Likewise, one blames not only a mortal sin that expels a virtue, but also a venial sin, which can be present alongside a virtue.

Article 3

Whether the gifts are interconnected

To the third we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST I-II.68.5.) It appears that the gifts are not interconnected.

Obj. 1: For to one is given through the Spirit the utterance of wisdom, and to another the utterance of knowledge according to the same Spirit (1 Cor 12:8). But wisdom and knowledge are gifts. Therefore one gift is given to one, and another to another, so they are not interconnected.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Gregory says in Morals on the Book of Job (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 1, ch. 32, n. 45 (CCSL 143; PL 75:547).) that one’s wisdom is less if one lacks understanding. Therefore wisdom can be possessed without understanding.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Augustine says, in On the Sermon on the Mount, (Augustine, De sermone Domini in monte, bk. 1, ch. 4, para. 11 (CCSL 35; PL 34:1234).) that gradual progress occurs from one gift to another. Now, this would not happen if they necessarily exist together. Therefore the gifts are not interconnected.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a perfection transcending the genus of virtue is more distant from the common state of the virtues than is a perfection that remains in the genus of the virtues. But one who has the virtues need not have them in the virtues’ perfect state—which perfection remains in the genus of virtue. Therefore much less must one have the perfection of the gifts, which transcend the genus of virtues, and thus the gifts are not interconnected to each other in grace, charity, or justification, nor is there something else wherein they are interconnected; so they are not interconnected.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, some gifts perfect one in the active life, and some in the contemplative. But many are perfected in the active life who have not yet attained the grade of the contemplative life. Therefore the gifts are not all had simultaneously.

On the contrary, whatever is necessary for salvation must be together with grace. But the gifts are necessary for salvation, which is clear from a Gloss on Matthew 6, which says that it is in the gifts that we carry out the commandments, wherein we come to beatitude. Therefore it appears that the gifts are interconnected in grace, as was the case with the virtues.

Furthermore, the gift of wisdom is caused by charity, as is clear from things said in the previous Distinction. Therefore whoever has charity has wisdom. But wisdom is placed in the final grade [of the gifts]. Therefore one who has it, has all the other gifts, and thus all the gifts are interconnected in charity.

Furthermore, general justice takes away the defects that imply sin. But the gifts are given against such defects—for example, counsel against haste, as Gregory says, (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 2, para. 49, n. 77 (CCSL 143; PL 75:592).) and fear against the swelling of arrogance. Therefore when the soul is being made just, simultaneously all the gifts are being infused.

I answer that, as was said in Distinction 34, (Above, d. 34, q. 3, a. 1.) a gift transcends virtue in this: that it works above the human mode, which mode is caused by a higher measure than is the human measure. Now, the human mind is supported by this measure—which is God—through charity. And therefore the gifts have this mode from charity itself as regards absolute being, which we call someone’s “being” insofar as they perfect one in the things necessary for salvation. But as regards perfected being, insofar as the gifts extend to higher things, which occurs through a gratuitously given grace, they need not be interconnected.

Reply Obj. 1: The gifts of wisdom and knowledge are not being spoken of there simply speaking, but the preaching of wisdom and knowledge. And this pertains to the perfection of the gifts, namely, such that a man is so abundant in wisdom and knowledge that it is not just for himself alone, but it overflows to others through his preaching. Whereby it is placed among the gifts that are given gratuitously.

Reply Obj. 2: Gregory’s words argue for the interconnection of the gifts. For he wants to show that the perfection of one gift is not without the other; whence a wisdom that is without understanding is dull, and does not have the notion of the gift.

Reply Obj. 3: That grade or progress attends to the use of the gifts, just as it is also said that faith precedes and begets the other virtues, with which it is nevertheless sometimes simultaneously infused.

Reply Obj. 4: The perfection of the virtues according to intensity is not necessary for salvation, as is the perfection that is from the gifts, namely, such that one has God as his rule in all things.

Reply Obj. 5: Although not everyone who is in the active life attains the perfect state of contemplation, still every Christian who is in the state of grace must participate in something of contemplation. For this is a command to all: be still, and know that I am God (Ps 46:10)—which pertains also to the third precept of the law.

Article 4

Whether all the virtues are equal

To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallels: In II Sent., d. 42, q. 2, a. 5, ad 6; ST I-II.66.1-2; De malo, q. 2, a. 9, ad 8; De virtutibus card., a. 3.) It appears that the virtues are not equal.

Obj. 1: In 1 Corinthians 13:13 it is said that charity is greater than faith and hope. But each of these is a virtue. Therefore one virtue is less than another.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the quantity of a virtue is measured by its object. But one virtue extends to more objects than does another. Therefore one virtue is greater than another.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a habit is a capacity for an action. But a man is sometimes more capable of the act of one virtue than of the act of another. Therefore he has the one virtue more intensely than the other.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, above in Distinction 25 (Sent. III, 25.5(90).1.) it was said that faith, hope, and charity are equal to their activity. But not all the activities of the virtues are equal. Therefore neither are all the virtues.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, of every saint it is written, there is not found one like him, who preserved the law so excellently. (Sir 44:20.) Now, this can only happen because one man exceeds another in one [virtue], and another in another. Therefore in one man the virtues are not equal, otherwise one who exceeds in one would exceed in all.

On the contrary, in Revelation 21:16 it is said that its length and breadth and height are equal, where the Gloss says (Glossa Ordinaria (PL 114:747).) it is signifying that the gratuitous virtues are equal.

Furthermore, whatever causes the habits can also augment them, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.2, 1104a27‒b3.) But all the habits of the virtues are infused simultaneously with grace. Therefore they are increased with the increase of grace. But whatever things are together intensified and reduced are equal. Therefore all the virtues are equal.

Furthermore, the quantity of the merit, and consequently the quantity of the reward, follows on the quantity of the virtue. Therefore if one virtue is greater than another, a greater or a lesser reward would be owed for the same thing to one who has the greater or vice versa. And this is impossible, since there is only one reward.

I answer that there is equality according to absolute quantity, and equality according to comparative quantity, which is also called an “equality of proportion.” The latter is clear in the fingers of the hand, which are not equal according to absolute quantity—since one when superposed on the other exceeds it—yet they are equal according to proportion, since just as the quantity of one finger suffices for its office, so too does the quantity of another finger for its office. This is also why the fingers grow proportionally.

Therefore a virtue’s absolute quantity can be considered in reference to three things: first, to its dignity; second, to the objects to which it extends; third, to its intensity, which is known in its efficacy and mode of acting. And it happens in these three modes that one virtue exceeds another, absolutely speaking, because one is of greater dignity than another, such as charity is greater than faith, and prudence than temperance. Again, one virtue can have more objects than another, such as prudence more than temperance. And again, one virtue according to its own species requires a greater intensity than another, since to the degree that the object is more difficult, so much more must one strive against it, and more intensely does one move into it.

But according to comparative quantity they are equal, because in these three things they stand proportionally to their own objects. And therefore they grow proportionally.

Reply Obj. 1–2: The solution is clear from the things said.

Reply Obj. 3: The fact that a man is capable of the act of one virtue more than the act of another is not always due to a diversity of the habits, but from a diversity of natural disposition, or even from practice.

Reply Obj. 4: By “activity” there is meant the exterior act, which is completed through the moral virtues, which must be proportionally equal to the theological virtues, as was said. Or it could be said that this is understood of the activities that follow essentially on the virtues, such as the interior acts, which also must be equal according to proportion, but not according to the exterior acts, which can be either better expedited or more hindered, on account of certain accidents.

Reply Obj. 5: This is said in reference to the practice of the virtues and their use, not in reference to the habits.

Article 5

Whether the vices are interconnected

To the fifth we proceed thus. (Parallels: In IV Sent., d. 16, q. 2, a. 1, resp. 2; ST I-II.73.1.) It appears that the vices are interconnected.

Obj. 1: For whoever keeps the whole law but fails in one point has become guilty of all of it (Jas 2:10). But one becomes guilty of all the commandments only through sin. Therefore he who has one sin has all sins.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the soul sin appears to be nothing but the lack of virtue. But through one mortal sin one lacks all the virtues. Therefore he who has one sin has all.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as the virtues come from the good love of God, so too do all sins come from an inordinate love of self, according to Augustine. (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 14, ch. 28 (CCSL 48; PL 41:436).) But the virtues have an interconnection because they come together in charity. Therefore sins too will have an interconnection because of the inordinate love from which they arise.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, virtue and vice are immediately opposed, at least according to theologians. But no virtue is present in one who has any sin. Therefore all the vices opposed to the individual virtues are present, and thus the same thing as before.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, man is more prone to sin, at least in the state of corrupted nature, than to virtue; for virtue is concerned with something difficult. But he who has one virtue has all. Therefore much more so, he who has one vice has all.

On the contrary, sin happens in an infinity of ways, according to Dionysius and the Philosopher. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch, 4, n. 30 (PG 3:730); Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106b28‒29.) But it is impossible that an infinity be present in the one thing. Therefore all sins cannot be interconnected.

Furthermore, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 4 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.5, 1126a10‒13.) that evil, if it were integrated together, would become unbearable, and would corrupt its very self. But if all sins were present in one man, there would be an integrated moral wickedness. And this cannot stand.

Furthermore, contraries cannot possibly be in the same thing. But one vice is contrary to another, like prodigality to stinginess. Therefore it is impossible that sins be interconnected.

I answer that there are two things in a sin, namely, a turning away from, and a turning toward. On the side of the turning away, sins do have an interconnection, inasmuch as they turn away from the unchangeable good. But on the side of the turning toward, in no way can they have an interconnection, as the virtues do. For the virtues have an ordered existence, since in the very ordination of the powers consists the notion of virtue; on the other hand, sins occur outside of intention and incidentally, and therefore they do not trace back to a rectified order, nor can they be interconnected in something one. And furthermore, sins are from activities, and they happen in every way, nor are they from an infusing principle, as are the virtues.

Reply Obj. 1: This should be understood in reference to giving up the highest good, from which every sin turns away; and with this given up, whatever one had of virtue now perishes, and all the merits of the virtues are killed.

Reply Obj. 2: “Sin” sometimes names an act, but sometimes it names the stain that is the lack of grace and virtue, through its relation to the antecedent act. And sometimes it also names the guilt, which is an obligation to punishment on account of the inordinately committed acts. And therefore according to diverse acts there are diverse stains, and diverse guilts, even though it is the same virtue or grace that one is lacking.

Reply Obj. 3: The virtues come from charity according to a rectified order, and therefore they have a consonance and interconnection. But the vices follow from inordinate love outside order, and therefore they hold a contrariety with each other and are divided in multifarious ways.

Reply Obj. 4: The immediate opposition of virtue and vice is understood according to theologians in reference to their acts, not in reference to their habits. For through a single act of mortal sin someone kills all the habits of the virtues, yet through that act no habit is begotten in him; whence at that point he lacks both habits. However, it is not problematic that one who performs an act of luxury, and thereby lacks the habit of mildness, might also perform an act of mildness—of course not one coming from the virtue, but one like one, just as acts ordered toward virtue are called “acts of virtue.”

Reply Obj. 5: Because of the very fact that man is more prone to sinning, not as many things are required for one sin as are for one virtue. And therefore it is not necessary that someone who has one sin has all of them, as someone who has one virtue has all of them. However, as to whether all sins are alike, consult Book II. (In II Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 5.)

Article 6

Whether a commandment contains the requirement that it be fulfilled charitably

To the sixth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II.100.10; De veritate, q. 23, a. 7, ad 8; q. 24, a. 12, ad 16; De malo, q. 2, a. 5, ad 7.) It seems that included in every commandment is that it be fulfilled out of charity.

Obj. 1: For just as virtues are connected to each other in charity, so too are all commandments reducible to charity. But the virtues are connected to each other in charity because they are formed by charity. Therefore the commandments, too, are reduced to charity because acting charitably falls within a commandment.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it says in Deuteronomy 6:5: You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength. And it is obvious that an act of charity is being commanded here. But works that are commanded are done in the right way from the act of charity. Therefore the charitable manner of acting is contained in the very commandment.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it says in Matthew 19:17: If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments. But no one can enter into life without charity. Therefore, contained in a commandment is the requirement that it be done out of charity.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as moral deformity in works is opposed to a right formation of works, so prohibition is opposed to commandment. But deformity in works falls under prohibition; therefore a right formation, which happens through a charitable way of acting, falls under commandment.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it is through charity that acts of commandments are ordered to their due end. But this ordination itself falls under commandment, as is evident from what the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 10:31: Do all things for the glory of God. Therefore, doing acts out of charity also falls under commandment.

On the contrary, nothing falls under commandment unless it is in our power. Hence Jerome anathematizes those who say that God has commanded something impossible for man. But to have charity is not in our power. Therefore doing acts out of charity does not fall under commandment.

Furthermore, anyone who omits what belongs to the substance of a commandment commits a sin. But a person who loves God with a natural love, or who does works of mercy yet lacks charity, does not commit a sin by doing these actions. Therefore acting from charity does not fall under commandment.

Furthermore, in the state of innocence, even if a person had not been given grace, he would still have had the ability to stand firm in the good allotted him. But this would not be the case if acting from charity fell under commandment, since then he would have fallen into sin whenever he kept commandments without fulfilling that condition. Therefore acting from charity is not in a commandment.

I answer that there are four opinions about this matter.

The first opinion is that acting in a charitable way does fall under commandment, however, since that commandment is affirmative, it does not oblige one to act all the time, although it is always obligatory. And thus a person is not bound to fulfill the commandments out of charity except at the time that he has charity; and in this way, he is not obliged to do something impossible. But this explanation does not seem sufficient, because if acting from charity belongs to the substance of the commandment, then the obligation to the act and to the way of doing it will run parallel. Now, it does happen that there will be a time when a person must honor his parents even when he does not have charity. And by this opinion it seems that he would then be bound to fulfill it out of charity.

And therefore others say that the obligation of a commandment and the obligation of doing it from charity keep an equal step, so that whenever a person is bound to fulfill a commandment, he is bound to fulfill it from charity. And they hold that this does not mean that God commands something impossible, because, although a human by himself cannot have charity, nevertheless he can do something for which he will receive charity from God—for, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 3, the things we do through our friends are in a way done by us. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.3, 1112b27.) But this opinion cannot stand, since if it were true, it would follow that someone in a state of mortal sin, in doing any act of the genus of good acts that would fulfill a commandment in the substance of the work done, would be committing a sin of omission insofar as was omitting to act out of charity—which is false.

And therefore, still others say that acting out of charity in no way falls under commandment, and that a person without charity can fulfill a commandment of the law. But this opinion seems to border on the Pelagian heresy, which claimed that all commandments could be fulfilled without grace.

Therefore, others hold a middle way, and say that the way of acting from charity in a certain way falls within the commandment, and in a certain way does not. For we are said to be “bound to the commandments” in two ways. In one way, we are bound such that unless we fulfill what we are bound to do, we are guilty of an omission of or a transgression against the thing commanded; and under this aspect, we are bound only to the substance of the commandment, not to the way in which it is carried out. In another way, we are bound such that if we do not fulfill what we are bound to, we do not receive the fruit of the commandment; and so, under this aspect, we are bound to the substance of the work as well as the way of doing it, for without doing it this way, a person will not arrive at life, no matter how much he carries out the substance of the work.

And this opinion seems more reasonable than the others. For a commandment may obviously be considered in two ways. In one way, it may be considered insofar as it is imposed on someone as something necessary to fulfill; and in this way, nothing ought to be imposed on anyone except what he is capable of fulfilling immediately—and if he does not fulfill it, he is punished, since this is how law has compelling force, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.9, 1180a21.) In another way, a commandment may be considered as to the intention of a lawgiver who intends to lead men to virtue through the law’s commandments, as it says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.1, 1103b3.) And thus, a virtuous way of doing it is included in the precept, according to the lawgiver’s intention, but not according to the binding force of the law.

Reply Obj. 1: In a way, the commandments are interconnected through charity as in an end common to them all, since it is through charity that someone receives the fruit of a commandment that he has kept.

Reply Obj. 2: By that commandment an act of charity is commanded—not meaning an act that is from charity, but an act similar to that of charity, as is an act of natural love. Or if an act of charity is being commanded there, then that commandment is more for showing what we ought to tend to, than for placing us under an obligation to do it, as was said above in Distinction 27. (Above, d. 27, q. 3, a. 4.)

Reply Obj. 3: This argument has to do with the lawgiver’s intention, rather than the binding force of the law.

Reply Obj. 4: To do a morally deformed act or to refrain from doing it, is in our power, but it is not within our power to do a rightly formed act. And therefore the same argument cannot be used for both.

Reply Obj. 5: Acting from charity implies more than a mere relation of a given work to the due end; for it implies that this act proceeds from the habit of charity, which is lacking in many who nevertheless refer their particular acts to God.

Exposition of the text

Where there is charity, what can possibly be wanting? (Sent. III, 36.1(135).2, quoting Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus, tract. 83, para. 3 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1846).) Therefore all other virtues are superfluous? To this I say that this is said on account of the necessary interconnection of the other virtues, of which it is in a certain way the cause.

It follows that the fortitude of the other is less prudent. (Sent. III, 36.2(136).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 4, n. 6 (CCSL 50; PL 42:927).) This is said inasmuch as something overflows from one virtue into another, as was said.

But because they were not established for the sake of justification, which charity brings about, but as a prefiguring of what was to come, and they were imposed as a burden, once truth came shining out, they ceased as if a shadow. (Sent. III, 36.3(137).1.) We should speak about this in Book IV, Distinction 1.

In the same way, in the Lord’s sermon on the mount eight virtues are set forth, and all the rest are referred to these. (Sent. III, 36.3(137).1.) This is speaking about the beatitudes, which are called “virtues” insofar as they are acts of virtues.

Because they are fulfilled through charity. (Sent. III, 36.3(137).1.) It appears he is saying two contrary things: namely, that charity is the principle and the end of the commandments. And I say to this that this is not problematic, since just as in natural things the form and the end fall are found in the same thing, so it is in moral matters. For a habit, which is the principle of the act as commanding it, is also in a certain way its end, insofar it uses the commanded act for its proper end.

Charity . . . possesses the entire greatness and breadth of God’s utterances. (Sent. III, 36.3(137).2, quoting Augustine, Sermones ad populum, serm. 350 (PL 39:1534).) According to this it seems that the prolixity of Sacred Scripture is superfluous. And I say to this that all the divine utterances are contained in the precept of charity as in a root, but it was necessary they be made distinct through its branches.