D. 35 - Gifts of the Holy Spirit: wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel
Division of the text
After the Master has considered the gifts, here he shows the difference between the gifts that most appear to fit together: that is, wisdom, knowledge, and understanding. And this is divided into two parts:
in the first he designates the difference among them;
second, he removes a certain doubt, at and it is to be noted that the understanding and knowledge which are called gifts of the Holy Spirit are other than the understanding and knowledge which are naturally in man’s soul. (Sent. III, 35.3(134).1.)
As regards the first, he does two things:
first, he designates the difference between knowledge and wisdom;
second, that between wisdom and understanding, at after showing the difference between knowledge and wisdom. (Sent. III, 35.2(133).1.)
And it is to be noted, and so on. (Sent. III, 35.3(134).1.) Here he removes a certain doubt:
first, one about knowledge and understanding;
second, one about wisdom, at it is also to be known that, as Augustine says, the wisdom of which we now speak is not 'that wisdom of God which is God.' (Sent. III, 35.3(134).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 14, ch. 1, n. 3 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1037).)
Here there are two questions:
first, about the active and contemplative lives; (Q. 1.)
second, about the gifts that are perfective of each life. (Q. 2.)
Question 1
The active and contemplative life
As regards the first, four things are asked about:
first, the division of life into active and contemplative;
second, the contemplative life;
third, the active life;
fourth, the relation of the one to the other.
Article 1
Whether life is fittingly divided into the active and the contemplative
To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.179.1-2; Sent. Ethic. I, lect. 5.) It appears that life is not fittingly divided into the active and contemplative.
Obj. 1: For, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 2, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 415b14; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 2, lect. 7, n. 319.) for living things, living is being. But the contemplative and the active do not manifest a difference in existing, but more a difference in doing. Therefore they are not differences of life.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Philosopher says, in On the Soul 2, that living in virtue of this principle, that is, the vegetative soul, is present in [all] living things. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.2, 431b1; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 2, lect. 3, n. 258.) But the vegetative soul in no way participates in contemplation, nor does action belong to it, as is said in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.12, 1144a9‒10.) Therefore life is unfittingly divided through the active and the contemplative.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, in the Book of Causes (Proclus (Pseudo-Aristotle), Liber de causis, prop. 18.) it said that life is a continuous motion from the eternal being. But “motion” indicates an operation. Therefore, since every operation is an action, it appears that every life is active; so “active” will not differentiate “life.”
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Philosopher says, in On the Soul 2, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.2, 431a23; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 2, lect. 3, n. 255.) that living is divided into four: that is, to nourish, to sense, to move relative to place, and to understand. Therefore it is not sufficiently divided by means of these two differences: the active and the contemplative.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, Augustine, in the City of God, (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 19, ch. 3 (CCSL 48; PL 41:625).) adds a third member to this, namely, a composite of both. Therefore it appears that it is not sufficiently divided by the active and the contemplative.
On the contrary, there are many authorities of the saints who say (Ambrose, Expositio euangelii secundum Lucam, bk. 7, n. 85 (CCSL 14; PL 15:1808); Augustine, Sermones ad populum, serm. 103, 104 (PL 38:614‒18); Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 6, para. 37 (CCSL 143; PL 75:764).) that two lives—the active and the contemplative—are signified by Martha and Mary in Luke 10.
Furthermore, a man’s life follows that due to which a man is a man. Now, this is intellect. Therefore, since intellect is divided into the active and the contemplative, that is, the speculative and the practical, it appears that human life should be divided into these two.
Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 9, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.12, 1172a1‒9.) that is said to be someone’s “life” to which one devotes the greatest care, like fighting for soldiers, and drinking for the drunkard; this is why they also wish to live in such things with their friends. But within that to which someone is most devoted is found what he lays down as the end of his life. Therefore, since happiness is given as the end of human life, which, according to the philosophers, is divided into the civil and the contemplative, as is clear in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7‒8, 1177a12‒1179a33.) it appears that human life should also be divided into the active and contemplative.
I answer that the name “life” appears to be derived from a thing’s being able to move by itself. And therefore some things are said to be alive primarily from the fact that they are seen to move by themselves, such as plants through the motion of growth, and animals through their motion from place to place. On the other hand, things that are seen not to move unless they are moved by other things are said to be dead, or to lack life, such as stones and wood. Whence also, through a certain transposition, those things are said to be “alive” that have a principle of motion within them, even though they do not move themselves; for example, springs are called “living” by the impetus of their motion out of the earth, whereas immobile waters gathered in puddles are called “dead” waters.
Beyond this, the name “life” is attributed to all activities that someone exercises from himself without being moved by another, even if the motions are not present, just as the name “motion” is customarily extended to any activity at all, as sensing and understanding are called “motions.” And in reference to this, not only are things that move by themselves, whether through growth or locally, said to “live,” but all things that desire, sense, or understand by themselves are as well. For these are said to be activities of life.
Now, although many of the activities described might be in something, still its “life” is said in reference to what is principal in it, just as the life of animals is said to be in sensing, even though they also nourish themselves, and that of men is in understanding, even though they also sense. And this should be taken not only in reference to natural powers, but also in reference to additional habits. Whence the life of each man is said to consist in that towards which he exerts the highest care and devotion, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.12, 1172a1‒8)
And in so taking “life,” it is divided into the active and the contemplative. For an ordered human life—for we do not intend [to consider] here a disordered life, like the life of pleasure, which is not human but bestial—consists in the activity of the intellect and reason. But the intellectual part of the soul has two activities, one that belongs to it in virtue of itself, and the other that belongs to it insofar as it rules the lower powers. Therefore there will be two human lives: one that consists in the activity that belongs to the intellect in itself—and this is called “contemplative”—and the other that consists in the activity of the intellect and reason insofar as it orders, rules, and commands the lower part—and this is called the “active life.”
Whence, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.4, 1140a2‒10.) “acting” properly names the activity commanded by the will, one happening within the very one doing it, not what goes forth as changing exterior matter; for this latter would be “making,” which is the activity of mechanical art. For the moral virtues, which perfect one in the active life, are said to be about things that can be done.
Reply Obj. 1: A thing’s essence is known from its activity, and therefore from the activities to which the name “life” belongs primarily the name has been extended to its very existence, insofar as for other things [their existence] is effective of such activities.
Reply Obj. 2: Someone is said to live in virtue of its vegetative soul not as though his life consists in the activities of it alone, but because its activities are the first activities of life in us. In this way sensation too is said to be present in animals in virtue of touch.
Reply Obj. 3: That authority should be understood of the life by which the heavenly bodies are asserted by some to be alive, insofar as they are moved by themselves; this opinion the one who wrote that book appears to follow.
Reply Obj. 4: The Philosopher has distinguished life insofar as it is common to all living things, but right now we are speaking of the division of human life.
Reply Obj. 5: That third member is added by Augustine not as regards a diversity of life, but more in reference to a diversity of those who live life. For there are some who apply themselves principally to the exercises of the active life, even though sometimes they also perform acts of contemplation, and some who, having set aside the cares of the active life, are studious principally for contemplation, and still others who apply themselves to both. Yet there are also certain activities that require both, such as preaching and teaching, which were begun in contemplation and end in an action, as from a cause things go into effect. And this mean is included within the extremes.
Article 2
Whether the contemplative life consists only in the act of the cognitive part of the soul
Quaestiuncula 1
To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST II-II.180.1; 180.2.ad 1; 189.7.ad 1.) It seems that the contemplative life consists only in cognitive activity.
Obj. 1: For the end of contemplation is the truth. But the truth pertains only to cognition. Therefore the cognitive life consists only in the activity of the cognitive part of the soul.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the saints say the contemplative life is leisurely, and the Philosopher even calls it “unoccupied,” in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7, 1177b4‒24.) But the will is a motive power. Therefore, since motion is opposed to leisure and lack of occupation, it appears that the contemplative life does not consist in an act of the affective part, but only in the act of the cognitive part.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, activities are proportioned to habits. But the gifts that perfect one only in the contemplative life pertain to cognition, namely, wisdom and understanding. Therefore the contemplative life consists only in cognition.
On the contrary, Isidore says in the book On Differences (Isidore of Seville, De differentiis rerum, siue Differentiae theologicae uel spiritales (Liber differentiarum II), ch. 32, n. 130 (CCSL 111A:84; PL 83:90).) that the contemplative life is vacant of any business, fixed only on the love of God. But love pertains to the affective part. Therefore the contemplative life does not consist only in cognition.
Furthermore, to taste pertains to one’s affect, just as to see pertains to one’s intellect. But Gregory says (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Hiezechihelem prophetam, bk. 1, hom. 3 (CCSL 142; PL 76:809).) that the contemplative life, by its intimate flavor, tastes already the rest that is to come. Therefore the contemplative life does not consist only in cognition.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that it consists in the activity of reason. (Parallels: In IV Sent., d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, resp. 2, ad 1; a. 2, resp. 1, ad 2; ST II-II.180.3.) For the contemplative life is a human life. But a life is human in virtue of a human activity. Therefore, since an activity is human in virtue of reason, due to which a man is said to be man, it appears that the contemplative life consists principally in the activity of reason.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the contemplative life consists chiefly in the cognition of divine things. But the invisible things of God are known through things he has made (Rom 1:20). But to know things in virtue of other things belongs to reasoning. Therefore the contemplative life chiefly consists in the activity of reason.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Richard of Saint Victor says, in the book On Contemplation, what has flown by our contemplation changes in many ways; now from lower things it ascends to the highest, now from higher things it has descended to the bottom; and now it runs from the part to the whole, now from the whole to the part; now it draws its argument from the greater, now from the lesser. (Richard of Saint Victor, De contemplatione (Beniamin maior), ed. J. Grosfillier, 2013, p. 100) pt. 1, ch. 5.) But this discursive motion appears to pertain to reasoning. Therefore the contemplative life consists principally in the act of reason.
On the contrary, Bernard, in On Consideration 2, says that contemplation is distant from consideration in the fact that consideration is more related to inquiry, whereas contemplation is the mind’s true and certain gaze. (Bernard, De consideratione libri v, vol. 3, bk. 2, para. 5, p. 414 (PL 182:785).) But to gaze belongs to intellect, whereas to make inquiry belongs to reason. Therefore the contemplative life consists in the act not of reason, but of intellect.
Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.8, 1178b8‒23.) in virtue of the contemplative life we have something in common with God. But we do not have something in common with him in virtue of the inquiry of reason, but rather in virtue of the intellect’s gaze. Therefore the contemplative life does not consist in the act of reason, but only in the act of intellect.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that every act of the intellect pertains to the contemplative life. (Parallel: ST II-II.180.4.) For as the active life stands to things that can be done, so does the contemplative life stand to things that can be contemplated. But all actions about things that can be done pertain to the active life. Therefore all acts of the intellect concerning intelligible things pertain to the contemplative life.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the contemplative life, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7, 1177a25.) consists in the consideration of philosophy. But philosophy is concerned with all beings. Therefore every activity of the intellect pertains to the contemplative life, since the intellect is not concerned with non-beings.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Richard of Saint Victor (Richard of Saint Victor, De contemplatione (Beniamin maior), pt. 1, ch. 6, p. 102.) lists six species of contemplation. The first is when, considering sensible things in the imagination, we admire the divine wisdom in them. The second is when we make an inquiry about their reasons. The third is when we ascend from visible things to invisible things. Fourth, when we set aside the imagination and turn only to intelligible things. The fifth is when we consider things that we know from divine revelation, but with human reason. Sixth, when we consider even those things that human reason appears to contradict. But these species embrace every activity of the intellect. Therefore every activity of the intellect pertains to the contemplative life.
On the contrary, Isidore, in On the Highest Good, says, upon renouncing the world, the contemplative life is delighted to live for God alone. (Isidore of Seville, Sententiae, bk. 3, ch. 15 (CCSL 111:241; PL 83:690).) But one does not live for God alone except when one thinks on God alone. Therefore not every activity of the intellect pertains to the contemplative life.
Furthermore, the contemplative life and contemplative happiness appear to concern the same thing. But contemplative happiness occurs only in the consideration of the noblest intelligible, which is certainly God, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7, 1177a15.) Therefore the contemplative life consists only in the consideration of God.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that life, in the way we are now speaking, consists in the activity to which someone has principally sold himself; by reason of which activity, all things that can impede him he sets aside; and moreover, the things that help it, he seeks and pursues. Now, this can only occur through the will, to which, among human activities, belongs the acceptance of one of thing before others, whatever it might be. However, the will, since it is the mover of all the soul’s powers, must relate to all the powers’ acts and objects insofar as they carry the notion of the good. For the appropriate act of any power is its good. And therefore the contemplative life consists in the act of the cognitive power that has been already accepted by the affective power.
But because an activity is in a way a middle between the one doing it and its object—as the perfection of the very one doing it and the thing perfected by the object that specifies it—the activity of the cognitive part can be desired from two sides. In one way, as the perfection of the knower, and this desire for cognitive activity comes from a love of self; and this is how the affection was in the contemplative life of the philosophers. In the other way, insofar as it is terminated in the object—and in this way the desire of contemplation comes from a love of the object; for where the love is, there the eye is, and where your treasure is, there will your heart be also (Matt 6:21). And this is how the contemplative life of the saints, of which we are speaking now, has its desire.
But nevertheless contemplation consists essentially in the act of the cognitive part, requiring charity in advance, for the reason explained before. This is why Gregory says, in On Ezekiel, that it belongs to the contemplative life to hold on with the whole mind to the charity of God and neighbor, and to rest from exterior activity, such that nothing is any longer pleasing to do but rather, having trampled on all cares, the mind is inflamed to see the face of its Creator. (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Hiezechihelem prophetam, bk. 1, hom. 2 (CCSL 142; PL 76:953).)
Reply Obj. 1: The end of contemplation as contemplation is only the truth, but insofar as contemplation receives the notion of a life, in this way it is imbued with the notion of being desired, and of the good, as was said.
Reply Obj. 2: The will is the mover not only as regards exterior motions, which are opposed to being unoccupied, but even as regards interior motions, and even of the intellect itself. These, of course, are called “motions” equivocally, as is clear in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.6, 431a6‒7; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 3, lect. 12, n. 766).) for they are acts of the perfected, and they are more like rest than like motion. And on account of this, one who acts according to his intellect is said to be unoccupied with exterior action, as is clear in the authority noted.
Reply Obj. 3: The acts of a contemplative habit, even though they are in the cognitive part, nevertheless can be commanded or accepted by the will. And in this way the contemplative life consists in them.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the contemplative life consists in that activity that a man puts before the others; this is why it has the notion of an end relative to other human activities, since the others are exercised for the sake of it. Now, just as reason’s inquiry progresses from the intellect’s simple gaze, since one starts the inquiry from principles that one holds in understanding, so too it terminates at the intellect’s certitude, when the conclusions discovered are traced back to their principles, wherein they have their certitude. And therefore the contemplative life consists principally in the activity of the intellect, and this very name “contemplation” indicates this, since it signifies a vision. Yet a contemplative uses the inquiry of reason so that he might come to the vision of contemplation, which he principally intends. And this inquiry, according to Bernard, (Bernard, De consideratione libri v, Bernardi opera, vol. 3, bk. 2, para. 5, p. 414.) is called “consideration.”
Reply Obj. 1: Insofar as he is contemplative, a man is in a way above man, for in the simple vison of the intellect a man is united with the higher substances, which are called “intelligences” or “angels.” This is like the way animals are united with men in their estimative power, which is the highest power in them, in virtue of which they do something like the works of reason.
Reply Obj. 2: Although visible created things are the path for coming to the contemplation of divine things, nonetheless contemplation does not consist principally in this path, but in the terminus of the path, as was said.
Reply Obj. 3: Richard does not intend to say that the contemplative life consists principally in these discursive reasonings, but that it uses them for its own end, as was said.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the contemplative life of the saints presupposes the love of the very thing contemplated, from which it proceeds. Whence, since the contemplative life consists in the activity that someone intends most, it must be most concerned with the contemplation of the beloved, and this is God. This is why it consists principally in the activity of the intellect concerned with God. Whence Gregory, in On Ezekiel, says that the contemplative life longs only for seeing its principle, God.
Nevertheless, the contemplative also considers other things inasmuch as they are ordered toward the contemplation of God, as toward an end—for example, created things, wherein the divine majesty and wisdom are admired; God’s blessings, which inflame our love of him; and our own sins, the washing away of which cleanses our hearts so that we can see God. This is also why the name “contemplation” signifies that principal act by which someone contemplates God in his very self, whereas “speculation” more names that act by which someone looks upon divine things within created things, as though in a looking glass (speculum).
And likewise the contemplative happiness that the philosophers treated also consists in the contemplation of God. For, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7, 1177a12‒19.) it consists in the act of the highest power in us, namely the intellect, and in the noblest habit, namely wisdom, and in the most dignified object, which is God. This is also why the philosophers reserved the last period of their lives for contemplating divine things, as is said, spending the previous time on the other sciences so that from them they might become more capable of considering divine things.
Reply Obj. 1: The acts of the active life do not have an order from their very selves, as do the acts of the contemplative life. Whence it cannot be said, simply speaking, that the active life consists principally in one of them; rather, relative to the person, it consists principally in that wherein he exerts himself more; for example, one person might focus more on the works of justice, but another on the works of temperance, and so on for the others.
Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher there is taking “philosophy” strictly for wisdom about divine things, which is also called by the special name “first philosophy.”
Reply Obj. 3: Although the contemplative sometimes considers those things, nonetheless the contemplative life does not consist in them principally.
Article 3
Whether the active life consists only in things that are relative to others
Quaestiuncula 1
To the third we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.180.2; 181.1; Contra retrahentes, ch. 7, ad 7; Sent. Ethic. X, lect. 12.) It appears that the active life does not consist principally in things that are relative to others.
Obj. 1: For the active life is ordered to the contemplative insofar as it disposes a man for an act of contemplation. But through the virtues that order a man with respect to himself a man is most disposed to contemplation, like through chastity, as the Commentator says in the Physics 7. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 7, text. 20.) Therefore the active life consists chiefly in things that belong to a man with respect to himself.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the contemplative life consists principally in contemplation of what is loved most. Therefore something similar is true for the active life too. But a man ought to love himself more than others in matters that pertain to virtue, as was said above. (Above,* d. 29, q. 1, a. 5.)* Therefore the active life also consists more in the fact that a man orders himself, than in that he intends things for others.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the active life appears to consist chiefly in the things wherein it is divided from the contemplative life. But it has in common with the contemplative life things that are relative to others, since it appears to pertain to the same life both to contemplate and to teach things contemplated. Now, the active life does not have in common with the contemplative life the moderation of one’s own emotions. Therefore the active life consists chiefly in things that are relative to oneself.
On the contrary, Isidore, in On Differences, says that the active life is that which is focused on the works of justice and the service toward one’s neighbor. (Isidore of Seville, De differentiis rerum, siue Differentiae theologicae uel spiritales (Liber differentiarum II), ch. 32, n. 130 (CCSL 111A:84; PL 83:90).) But each of these appears to pertain to others. Therefore the active life consists chiefly in things that are relative to others.
Furthermore, the active life is said to be fecund; this is why it is signified by Leah. But this fecundity consists only in activities that occur relative to others. Therefore the active life consists chiefly in these things.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that cognition in no way pertains to the active life. (Parallels: ST II-II.181.2; Sent. Ethic. X, lect. 12.) For just as the contemplative life relates to cognition, so does the active life relate to action. Therefore, by crisscrossing this proportion, as the contemplative life relates to action, so does the active life relate to cognition. But no action pertains to the contemplative life. Therefore no cognition pertains to the active life.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the active life consists entirely in activities of the moral virtues, the knowledge about which confers little or nothing, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.2, 1103b28‒30.) Therefore it appears that no cognition pertains to the active life.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, if any cognition pertains to the active life, the consideration of one’s own proper acts would chiefly appear to be it. But to consider the sins that one has committed pertains to the contemplative life, as Bernard says, (Bernard, De consideratione libri v, Bernardi opera, vol. 3, bk. 5, para. 32, p. 493.) which he lists as the second species of contemplation, by which someone thinks about God’s judgments and his own sins. Therefore no cognition pertains to the active life.
On the contrary, the gifts of counsel and knowledge pertain to the active life, which indeed indicate cognition. Therefore some cognition is in the active life.
Furthermore, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.8, 1178a16.) that prudence is kindred with moral virtue. But prudence brings in cognition. Therefore, since the active life is occurs in the moral virtues, it appears that there is something of cognition in the active life.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that the active life cannot be together with the contemplative. (Parallels: ST II-II.180.2; 181.1.ad 3; 182.3; Contra retrahentes, c. 7, ad 7.) For the life of which we are speaking consists in what a man is most dedicated to. But it is impossible that a man apply his greatest dedication to two things. Therefore it is impossible that the active and contemplative life be together in a man.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the active life is signified by Martha, who is disturbed about many things, according to Luke 10:41. But a disturbance is opposed to the lack of occupation that contemplation requires. Therefore the active life is not together with the contemplative.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the active life introduces one to the contemplative life. This is why Gregory says, he who desires to ascend to the fortress of contemplation must first exercise himself in the field of action. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 6, ch. 37, n. 59 (CCSL 143; PL 75:763).) But what introduces one to something is not necessary when that thing arrives, for, according to Bernard, what need is there for steps when one already holds the throne? (Bernard, De consideratione libri v, Bernardi opera, vol. 3, bk. 5, para. 1, p. 467.) Therefore the active life is not together with the contemplative.
On the contrary, Augustine says in the City of God (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 19, ch. 3 (CCSL 48; PL 41:625).) that there is a certain tribe of men [whose lives are] composed of the leisurely and the active, and he is speaking of the leisure of contemplation. Gregory also, in On Ezekiel, (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Hiezechihelem prophetam, bk. 2, hom. 2 (CCSL 142; PL 76:955).) says that often the mind is usefully bent back from the contemplative life to the active. Therefore the contemplative life and the active life can be together.
Furthermore, the Blessed Virgin lived both lives, and this is why, according to Anselm, (Anselm, Homiliae et exhortationes, bk. 10 (PL 158:644).) in her assumption one reads the good news about Martha and Mary, who signify the active and contemplative lives. But the Blessed Virgin was then only a wayfarer. Therefore in someone on the path of this life there can be both the active and contemplative lives together.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that the active life consists in all things that can be done, whether relative to oneself or relative to others, but it consists principally in things that are relative to others. For the good of the many, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 1, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.1, 1094b9‒10.) is more divine than the good of the one; this is also why he says in the Ethics 5 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1129b17.) that justice, which is relative to others, is the most beautiful of the virtues. However, just as the contemplative life consists principally in the best thing that can be contemplated, so too the active life consists principally in the best thing that can be done.
Reply Obj. 1: Through things related to himself, as regards the contemplative life, a man disposes only himself, although through things related to others, a man disposes both himself and others—which is more divine.
Reply Obj. 2: In this very fact that a man is devoted to the well-being and governance of others, he loves himself more, and claims for himself the better part. For it is more divine to cause one’s own and others’ good activity, than to cause only one’s own, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.10, 1180a29.)
Reply Obj. 3: Teaching is of two sorts. Some teaching is ordered only to the cognition of the truth; and this, although it is directed to others, yet does not depart from the boundaries of the contemplative life. But some teaching is ordered to persuading us to good conduct, and this is called preaching; and this pertains to the active life. Whence Gregory says, he who directs himself to the labor of preaching sees less, and begets more; (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143), bk. 6, ch. 37, ln. 183.) and in this way it is signified by Leah, who was fertile, and bleary-eyed. Or it could be said that teaching can be considered in two ways: in one way, insofar as it is for the sake of exercising one’s cognition, and the advancement of the very one teaching—and thus it pertains to the contemplative life—or in another way, insofar as it intends the good of another. However, in this latter way even the things that belong to speculative cognition are exercised by way of the disposition of temporal matters, which includes one’s neighbor—and this belongs to the active life. And therefore Gregory says, in On Ezekiel, that the active life is to offer bread to the hungry, [and] to teach the word of wisdom to the ignorant. (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Hiezechihelem prophetam, bk. 2, hom. 2 (CCSL 142; PL 76:953).)
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that cognition is of two sorts. One is speculative, the end of which is the truth, according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 2. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1, 993b21.) The other has its end in activity, which is the cause and rule of things that come from man.
Now, some of the things that come from man are called “producable”; these are things that arise from a certain change of external matter, as happens in the works of a mechanical art. But some actions do not go out of a man to change external matter, but consist in the moderation of one’s own proper emotions and actions. Now, practical cognition directs one relative to both of these. Whence, not all practical cognition is found essentially in the active life, but only that which directs one’s actions in deeds of moral virtue. For this cognition is required for choice, wherein moral virtue principally consists.
However, contemplative cognition does not essentially engage in the active life, since the truth would never be sought for its own sake in human actions, because they have only a contingent truth. This is also why in the moral sciences the end is not cognition, but action, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.2, 1103b28.) But nevertheless contemplative cognition of eternal things sometimes pertains to the active life, not such that it belongs to its essence, but because it needs it as its cause, when the reasons for how one should live are drawn from our contemplation of eternal things. For just as the intellect is both the principle and the terminus of reasoning, so too is the contemplative life relative to the active. And this is why Gregory says, in On Ezekiel, that through the contemplative life lifting the mind, the active life is held more perfectly. (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Hiezechihelem prophetam, bk. 2, hom. 2 (CCSL 142; PL 76:955).)
Reply Obj. 1: Action does not direct contemplation the way that active cognition directs action, so the account is not similar.
Reply Obj. 2: To have speculative knowledge about things that do not come from man does nothing for moral virtue, but to have such knowledge about things that do come from man confers a little bit. But practical knowledge confers a great deal, since it is the rule of action.
Reply Obj. 3: The past has already entered into the necessary, so a consideration of past sins pertains more to contemplation than to the practical life.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that in all natural dispositions it happens that the disposition in its perfected existence attains that to which it disposes; it even was this in a certain inchoate way when the disposition was tending to the perfection, as is clear with fire’s heat and form. For when the heat is completed in the terminus of the alteration, the form of fire is brought forth, and the heat remains together with the form of the fire. But while the alteration was occurring the form of the fire was not yet present, except in a certain inchoate way.
Now, the active life is the disposition to the contemplative life. This is why Isidore, in On the Highest Good, says that he who progresses in the active life climbs quickly to contemplation. (Isidore of Seville, Sententiae, bk. 3, ch. 15 (CCSL 111:241; PL 83:690).) And therefore as long as a man has not reached perfection in the active life, the contemplative life can be in him only imperfectly, in an inchoate way. For then a man is undergoing the difficulty within the acts of the moral virtues, and must focus all his solicitude on them; whence he is drawn back from a devotion to contemplation.
But when one is already perfected in the active life, then he readily has the activities of the moral virtues, so that he is not impeded by them from freely occupying himself with contemplation. Yet insofar as a man is more or less perfect in the active life, he can be occupied with many or fewer things of the active life, together with the contemplative life. And because it belongs to prelates to be perfected in both lives—as those who are intermediate between God and the people, receiving from God through contemplation and passing it on to the people through action—therefore they must be perfected in the moral virtues. This is likewise the case for preachers. Otherwise one unworthily assumes the office of prelate or preaching.
Reply Obj. 1: A man can principally intend diverse things at diverse times, but not simultaneously.
Reply Obj. 2: In the active life, no disturbance befalls someone after he has reached the perfection [of that life], since then one acts with delight and easily, without being disturbed.
Reply Obj. 3: Dispositions that essentially have an imperfection connected with them do not remain along with that to which they dispose one, just as faith does not remain along with vision. But other dispositions can remain together with it, as was said; and so it is with the active life.
Article 4
Whether the active life is nobler than the contemplative
Quaestiuncula 1
To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.152.2; 182.1; 188.6; SCG III.63, 133; De virtutibus, a. 12, ad 24; Sent. Ethic. X, lect. 10‒12.) It appears that the active life is nobler than the contemplative life.
Obj. 1: For Cicero, in On Duties, (Cicero, De officiis, bk. 1, ch. 43, n. 154.) manifests the preeminence of justice over the other virtues, since the acts of other virtues are interrupted for the sake of exercising its act. But likewise someone is called back from the leisure of contemplation so that he might produce fruit through the labor of action. Therefore the active life is of greater dignity than is the contemplative.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the good of the nation is more divine than is the good of the one. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.2, 1094b9‒10.) But the contemplative life consists in the good of one man, and the active life in the good of the many. Therefore the active life is nobler than the contemplative life.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, in all arts and powers what commands is nobler than what is commanded. But the political art, which pertains to the active life, commands all the disciplines and arranges matters that pertain to the contemplative life, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.2, 1093b27‒1094a3.) Therefore the active life is of greater dignity than the contemplative life.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 3, para. 2 (PG 3:166).) nothing is more divine than becoming one who cooperates with God. Now, this occurs through the exercise of the active life, by which a man is devoted to leading others back to God. Therefore it appears to be the noblest.
On the contrary, the Lord says, in Luke 10:43, Mary has chosen the best portion. (RSV says “the good portion.”) Now, the contemplative life is signified by Mary. Therefore the contemplative life is nobler than the active.
Furthermore, to the degree that someone’s life is more like the heavenly life, so too is it nobler. But the contemplative life is more like the heavenly life than is the active, since in the heavenly life, as Augustine says, (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 22, ch. 30, n. 9 (CCSL 48; PL 41:804).) we will be at leisure and we will see, we will see and we will love, we will love and we will praise—which pertains to the contemplative life. Therefore the contemplative life is nobler than the active.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that the contemplative life is of even greater merit than the active life. (Parallels: above, d. 30, a. 4, ad 2; ST II-II.182.2; Quodl. I, q. 7, a. 2; III, a. 3, ad 6.) For Gregory says, in Morals, the contemplative life is of greater merit than is the active, since the active labors in performing a present deed, whereas the contemplative already tastes the rest to come in its intimate flavor. (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Hiezechihelem prophetam, bk. 1, hom. 3 (CCSL 142; PL 76:809).)
Obj. 2: Furthermore, as was said above, (Above, d. 30, a. 4.) merit consists more in loving God than in loving neighbor. But in the contemplative life a man more focuses on loving God, whereas in the active life he more focuses on loving his neighbor. Therefore the contemplative life is of greater merit than is the active.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, to the degree that something is more blessed by God, so too is it of greater merit. But according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.9, 1179a23‒29.) God blesses most those devoted to contemplation, as those who are most like himself. Therefore it appears that the contemplative life has more merit than the active life.
On the contrary, a man’s entire merit consists in the divine acceptance [of it]. But Gregory says, in On Ezekiel, that no sacrifice is more accepted by God than the governance of souls. (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Hiezechihelem prophetam, bk. 1, hom. 12 (CCSL 142; PL 76:932).) Therefore, since this pertains to a work of the active life, it appears that the active life has greater merit.
Furthermore, merit is divided against reward. But the contemplative life has more the notion of a reward than does the active, since the contemplative is fed by the Lord, whereas the active feeds [others], as Gregory says. (Not found in Gregory; rather, see Augustine, Sermones ad populum, serm. 114, n. 1 (PL 38:616).) Therefore the active has more merit.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that the contemplative life is not longer lasting than the active. (Parallels: ST I-II.67.1.ad 2; 68.6.ad 3; II-II.181.4; SCG III.63; De veritate, q. 11, a. 4, ad 1.) For the active life was perfected in Christ. But he himself was a perfect comprehensor. Therefore the active life will remain in heaven, and so is not shorter-lasting than the contemplative life.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, men will be equal to the angels in heaven. But in the angels are found both lives, since some stand before [God], which pertains to contemplation, but some are his ministers, which pertains to action. Therefore both lives will also be found in men in heaven, so the same thing as before.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, in heaven the cardinal virtues will remain, and they will have certain acts; the same is true also of all the gifts. But the cardinal virtues perfect one in the active life, as do certain gifts. Therefore in heaven the active life will remain, so the same thing as before.
On the contrary, Mary has chosen the best portion (Luke 10:42), (RSV says, “the good portion.”) where a Gloss says, here the contemplative life begins, and in heaven it is perfected, whereas the active life ceases with the body. (source)
Furthermore, the Philosopher says, in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7, 1177a21.) that the contemplative life is longer-lasting than the active.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that the notion of the good is of two sorts. For something is called “good” that should be desired for its own sake—and in this way the contemplative life is simply speaking better than the active, insofar as it is more like that life which we strain to reach through the active and contemplative lives. This is also why the contemplative life is the end of the active, and is closer to the ultimate end. But something is also called “good” as something that should be chosen for the sake of something else—and in this way the active life stands ahead of the contemplative. For the contemplative life is not ordered to something else within the one who has it, since eternal life is not but a consummation of the contemplative life available in a certain way within the present [life] through a contemplative life. This is why it is certain it would be ordered to something else only insofar as one man’s good is ordered to the good of the many—to which the active life is more closely related than the contemplative. Whence the active life, inasmuch as it is devoted to the well-being of one’s neighbors, is more useful than the contemplative. But the contemplative is of greater dignity, since dignity signifies a thing’s goodness as for its own sake, whereas utility signifies its goodness as for the sake of another. But an active life that is not ordered to another, but ordered only to itself, is neither of greater dignity nor of greater utility than is a contemplative life; indeed, it is compared to the contemplative as the useful to that for which it is useful.
Reply Obj. 1: The contemplative life is interrupted on account of the active only for a time, not simply speaking—or else by reason of its utility, not by reason of its dignity.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as the good of one consists in action and contemplation, so too does the good of the many, to the degree that it is possible for the multitude to have leisure for contemplation. But the good of the multitude is attained through the rulership of an active life; this is why this does not prove that the active life is of greater dignity, but that it is of greater use.
Reply Obj. 3: The political art, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.13, 1145a8‒12.) gives no command to wisdom or to things that pertain to the contemplative life; rather, it commands certain things for its sake, just as it also commands certain things for God’s sake, for whom it commands that worship be shown in this way or in that.
Reply Obj. 4: This should be understood to be by reason of its utility that arises for others.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that merit depends on the root of charity. Whence it sometimes happens that in the active life someone merits more than in the contemplative life, or vice versa, insofar as he has a greater or a lesser charity. Nevertheless, since it is being asked which of the two is of greater merit in its genus, this should be understood inasmuch as it pertains to the notion of the acts themselves, not with reference to the ones doing them.
Therefore merit is of two sorts: namely, the merit of the forgiveness of fault, and the merit of the attainment of glory. As regards the first, the active life is said to be of greater merit than the contemplative, insofar as it is more laborious; whence it has more of the notion of making satisfaction. However, as regards the merit of the attainment of glory, in this way the contemplative life is of greater merit than the active life, with respect to its purity. For it does not mix as much with the dust of the earth as does the active life.
But as regards the intensity of the merit, it appears that the contemplative life is again of greater merit than is the part of the active life devoted to its own moderation, but it is of lesser merit as regards that part that watches over the progress of others. For this very thing appears to be of a stronger charity in its genus: that a man, having set aside the consolation that refreshes him in the contemplation of God, seeks God’s glory by the conversion of others. For even in human friendship a true friend seeks more the good of his friend than the delight of his presence.
Reply Obj. 1: The contemplative life, Gregory says, is of greater merit because it has less admixture of the impurity of demerit.
Reply Obj. 2: It comes from the love of God that a man, having setting side his own consolation, is devoted to fulfilling the will of God in the salvation of others. This is why Gregory, in On Ezekiel, says, it is not a small consolation to the loving soul if, while it is drawn away, it gathers in many [other souls]. (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Hiezechihelem prophetam, bk. 2, hom. 3 (CCSL 142; PL 76:962).)
Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher is speaking of the contemplative life in comparison to an active life that is wrapped up in human affairs, but not in reference to one that focuses on the well-being of his neighbors.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that just as it was said that the gifts and virtues that perfect one in the active life remain in heaven, but not as regards their same acts, something similar should be said of the active life itself. This is why the active life will not remain as regards those acts that it has now, by which it is disturbed about one’s neighbors’ needs and one’s own emotions. For then one will not longer be providing food to the hungry, as is added in the Gloss noted above. However, it will remain in heaven in its other acts, the ones that will belong to the virtues and the gifts.
However, the contemplative life is nonetheless longer lasting than the active life, because it remains even as regards the acts that it has on the path of this life—though the acts in the state of the path are imperfect, whereas in heaven they will be perfected. This is why Gregory, in On Ezekiel, says of the contemplative life that even while we exert ourselves, we accomplish scarcely anything, or very little. (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Hiezechihelem prophetam, bk. 2, hom. 2 (CCSL 142; PL 76:953).)
Reply Obj. 1: Christ is not like the others, since he was a true wayfarer and comprehensor. Whence he was at the same time in perfect act as regards both lives, even as regards the contemplative act of the path.
Reply Obj. 2: By the order of nature the angels are intermediate between God and men, and therefore a ministry of protection and such befit them, but not the souls of the saints.
Reply Obj. 3: This is clear from what was said in the body.
Reply Sed Contra: the replies to the others are clear from what has been said.
Question 2
The gifts of wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel
Next, one asks about the gifts perfecting one in each life:
first, the gift of wisdom;
second, the gift of understanding;
third, the gift of knowledge;
fourth, the gift of counsel.
Article 1
Whether wisdom is a gift
Quaestiuncula 1
To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I.1.6.ad 3; II-II.45.1.) It appears that wisdom is not a gift.
Obj. 1: For in the text wisdom is called the “knowledge of divine things.” (Sent. III, 35.1(132).3.) But this appears to belong to faith, the object of which is the first truth. Therefore, since faith is not a gift but a virtue, it appears that neither is wisdom.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the text says (Sent. III, 35.1(132).4, referring to Job 28:28.) that wisdom is the worship of God, and this is taken from Job 28, according to an alternate translation. But latria, which is the name for worship, is a virtue, not a gift. Therefore wisdom is not a gift.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, no gift is possessed by acquisition. But wisdom is had by acquisition, since the Philosopher names wisdom “first philosophy,” (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2, 982a4‒8.) which is had through teaching. Therefore wisdom is not a gift.
On the contrary, in Isaiah 11:2 it is counted among the other gifts.
Furthermore, gifts are higher than virtues. But among all the habits, wisdom appears to be the noblest, the greatest of those that pertain to knowledge, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7, 1177a19‒20.) Therefore wisdom should be called a “gift” most of all.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that wisdom is not only about divine things. (Parallel: ST II-II.45.1.ad 2.) For, as the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 1, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2, 982a13; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 1, lect. 2, n. 38.) the wise man must be the most certain about all things. Therefore it is not concerned only with divine things.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it pertains to the wise man to determine the mean in the moral virtues, as is clear by the Philosopher’s definition of virtue in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106b37.) But we cannot do anything about divine things. Therefore, since the mean of moral virtue concerns things that we can do something about, it appears that wisdom is not only about divine things.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, wisdom appears to be about the things that mechanical art concerns: like a wise master builder I laid a foundation (1 Cor 3:10). (RSV says “skilled” for “wise.”) Therefore it is not only about divine things.
On the contrary, wisdom is about the highest causes, according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 1. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1, 981b28; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 1, lect. 1, nn. 34‒35.) But the highest causes are divine. Therefore it is only about divine things.
Furthermore, the Philosopher in the Ethics 6 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.7, 1141a20.) says that wisdom is, as it were, the head of the sciences. But the head of all knowledge is a knowledge that is about divine things. Therefore wisdom is about divine things.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that wisdom is not in the intellect, but more in the affection. (Parallel: ST I.64.1; II-II.45.2, 3.) For wisdom (sapientia) is like her own name, as is said in Sirach 6:22. But its name is derived from “flavor” (sapore). Therefore, since flavor pertains to taste, which is extended to affect—just as “vision” is extended to understanding—it appears that wisdom is in the affection.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the text says (Sent. III, 35.1(132).4, quoting Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, on Ps 135:9, para. 8 (CCSL 40; PL 37:1760).) that wisdom is in the knowledge and love of what endures without change, which is God. But love pertains to one’s affection. Therefore wisdom is in one’s affection.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the seventh beatitude, wherein is said, blessed are the peacemakers, is traced back to wisdom. But peace pertains to one’s affect. Therefore so does wisdom.
On the contrary, in the text (Sent. III, 35.1(132).2.) it is defined through cognition.
Furthermore, every intellectual virtue is in the cognitive part of the soul. But the Philosopher (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.6, 1141a5‒8; 6.7, 1141a9‒19.) lists wisdom as an intellectual virtue. Therefore so too is the gift of wisdom, which corresponds to this, in the cognitive part.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that wisdom, according to the name’s usage, appears to indicate a certain full eminence in knowing, such that in its very self it holds a certainty about great and wondrous things that are unknown to others, and it is able to make a judgment about all things, because everyone judges well what he knows, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.2, 1094b28.) and also to order them by that eminence in knowing.
Now, in some this fullness from study and teaching, if joined to a liveliness of intellect, and this is the wisdom the Philosopher lays down as an intellectual virtue, in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.6, 1141a5‒8.) But in others this fullness occurs because of a certain kinship with divine things, as Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 2, n. 9 (PG 3:647).) of Hierotheus, who learned divine things by undergoing divine things. And about such men the Apostle says, the spiritual man judges all things (1 Cor 2:15), and his anointing teaches you about everything (1 John 2:27).
Reply Obj. 1: The wisdom that is the intellectual virtue is related to the understanding of principles, since it in a certain way comprehends the latter, as is said in the Ethics 7, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.7, 1141a19‒20.) insofar as [wisdom] concerns itself with the highest and most difficult matters, based on the principles; and it in a certain way it orders them, insofar as it traces them all back to one principle; and it belongs to it to dispute with those who deny these principles. So in the same way the wisdom that is the gift is related to faith, which latter is the simple cognition of the articles, which are the principles of the whole of Christian wisdom. For the gift of wisdom progresses to a sort of Godlike contemplation, and in a certain way to an explication of the articles that faith holds in a certain veiled manner, according to the human mode. Therefore wisdom is a gift, but faith is a virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: Wisdom is not called “piety,” meaning latria, in its essence, but as its cause, since wisdom immediately inclines one to latria.
Reply Obj. 3: There is an equivocation on “wisdom,” as was said.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that as has been said, it pertains to the wise man to judge and to order. Now, a judgment can be made about some things only through other things that are their law and rule. However, higher things must always be the rule of lower things, and therefore one must make a judgment about lower things through the higher. This is why, although one’s intention sometimes begins from the lower things and tends toward the higher, still the judgment is never perfected except through the higher things in which the lower are resolved. And therefore the wise man must be a knower of the highest things. Now, a thing is called “highest” in two ways. In one way it is “highest” simply speaking, because it is preeminent above all things; and in this way divine things are highest. Whence one who is called “wise” simply speaking must be instructed in divine things. But in the other way, a thing is called “highest” in a certain genus, and he who has been instructed about this is called “wise” not simply speaking, but in that genus. For example, among things made by art, the highest thing is using things according to that for the sake of which they are made; so one who has the utilizing art, which is called “architectonic,” is called the “wise man” among the individual artisans of that art.
And in that way the man prudent in human matters, to which he gives commands, is called “wise.” And because by delights and other emotions the estimation of prudence becomes corrupted, as is said in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.5, 1140b13‒15.) this is why, according to Seneca (Seneca, Epistle 59.) and other moral philosophers, the name “wisdom” has been extended to temperance and the other moral virtues insofar as they restrain the emotions—and thereby preserve prudence. Whence they say that the wise man is imperturbable, and the like.
Therefore it is clear that the wisdom that is called “wisdom” simply speaking, whether the intellectual virtue or the gift, is principally about divine things. And insofar as he can make judgments about all other things, the wise man is said to be the most certain of all.
Reply Obj. 1–3: And through this, the answers to the objections are clear.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that as was said, the gift of wisdom has an eminence of cognition through a certain union with divine things, to which we are not united except through love, so that one who adheres to God is one spirit with him (1 Cor 6:17). Whence too the Lord, in John 15:14, says that the secret things of the Father he had revealed to his disciples insofar as they were his friends. And therefore the gift of wisdom presupposes love as a principle, and in this way it is in the affection. But as regards its essence, it is in the cognition; this is why its act appears to be—both here and in the future—the contemplation of beloved divine things, and the judgment, through them, of other things, not only in speculative matters, but even in things to be done, wherein the judgment is drawn from their end. And this is why Gregory (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143), bk. 2, para. 49, n. 77 (CCSL 143; PL 75:592).) places wisdom in opposition to foolishness, which indicates an error about the intended end.
Reply Obj. 1: “Wisdom” indicates flavor in reference to the preceding love, not in reference to the subsequent cognition—unless by reason of the delight that accompanies the actual cognition itself. Or it can be said that the statement in Sirach is not understood in reference to the name’s likeness with “flavor”—since that likeness, although it is present in the Latin tongue, yet is not in other languages; but rather it is speaking in reference to what is being signified, which all men conceive in the name “wisdom” in any language.
Reply Obj. 2: This is clear from what was said in the body.
Reply Obj. 3: That peace-making pertains to the effect of wisdom’s ordering—since everyone ordering things intends peace—and not in reference to its essential act itself.
Article 2
Whether understanding is a gift
Quaestiuncula 1
To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel: ST II-II.8.1.) It seems that understanding is not a gift.
Obj. 1: For no gift—the way we are now speaking of a “gift”—is in us by nature. But understanding is naturally planted in us. Therefore understanding is not a gift.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, things that have one division appear to have one notion. But understanding is sometimes divided against will, and sometimes against reason. But the will is not a gift, and neither is reason. Therefore neither is understanding.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Gregory says, (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143), bk. 1, ch. 32 (CCSL 143; PL 75:547).) in the beginning of the Morals on the Book of Job, that understanding feeds one in its day, when it illuminates the mind about things heard. Therefore understanding comes from hearing, just as faith does. But faith is not a gift, but a virtue. Therefore understanding is not a gift.
On the contrary, Isaiah 11:2–3 counts the spirit of understanding among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit.
Furthermore, the proper notion of the gifts, as was said before, is that through them someone acts above the human mode. But the activity of understanding is especially above man, as is said in the Ethics. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.9, 1179a23‒25.) Therefore it most of all should be called a “gift.”
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that the gift of understanding does not have an act on the path of this life. (Parallel: ST II-II.8.3.) For “understanding” indicates a certain cognition without obscurity; this is why Isaac saysthat where understanding is obscure, reasoning arises. (J. T. Muckle, "Isaac Israeli Liber de definicionibus," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 11 (1937‒38): 299–340.) But it is impossible that, in the state of the path of this life, we might know without the obscurity of a phantasm, as the Philosopher shows in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.8, 432a8; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 3, lect. 13, n. 791.) Therefore understanding has no act on the path.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Dionysius says, in the Celestial Hierarchy, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 1, para. 2 (PG 3:122).) that it is impossible for us to illuminate a divine ray otherwise than if it be veiled by a variety of sacred veils. But wherever knowing occurs through such veils, they must be a gathered together, and this does not pertain to understanding but to reasoning. Therefore it is not possible for us on the state of the path to have an act of understanding.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the act of understanding is to see God, for this is placed in the sixth beatitude, which is traced back to understanding. But no one standing in this mortal flesh can see God. Therefore on the state of the path we do not have the use of understanding.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, Augustine says, in a certain sermon on fear, (Augustine, Sermones ad populum, serm. 347, ln. 19 (PL 39:1526).) that that is called “understanding” wherein our hearts are cleansed from all weakness, so that a pure intention might be directed to the end. But it is impossible, while in the state of the path, for our hearts to be cleansed from every weakness. Therefore it is impossible to have an act of understanding in the state of the path.
On the contrary, a habit is ordered to its act. Therefore if we could not have any act of understanding on the path of this life, the gift of understanding would be given to us in vain.
Furthermore, the sixth beatitude is traced back to the gift of understanding. But in it is placed both something pertaining to the state of the path, and something pertaining to the state of heaven. Therefore understanding has an act in us both as regards the state of the path and as regards the state of heaven.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that understanding does not differ from wisdom. (Parallels: ST I-II.68.4; II-II.8.6.) For a whole is not essentially distinguished from its part. But understanding appears to be a whole relative to wisdom, which latter is only about God, while understanding is about God and created spirits. Therefore understanding does not differ essentially from wisdom.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, wisdom, as the Master says in the text, (Sent. III, 35.3(134).1.) experiences delight about divine things. But this same thing appears to pertain to understanding, for in the consideration of understanding there is the greatest delight, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7, 1177a22‒27.) Therefore understanding does not differ from wisdom.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, diverse habits are not ordered to the same act, since habits are distinguished through their acts. But both wisdom and understanding are ordered to contemplation. Therefore, since contemplation is one act, it appears that wisdom and understanding are one habit.
On the contrary, they are divided from each other in Isaiah 11:2–3.
Furthermore, the gifts correspond to the virtues. But understanding and wisdom are different virtues, as is clear in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.3, 1139b16‒35.) Therefore also the one gift is different from the other.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that understanding, according to its name, indicates a cognition reaching to the intimate parts of a thing. Whence, although sensation and imagination are occupied with the accidents that are, as it where, surrounding a thing’s essence, understanding reaches its essence. This is why, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.6, 430b28; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 3, lect. 11, n. 762.) the object of understanding is what [a thing is].
But in the apprehension of this essence there is a difference. For sometimes the essence itself is apprehended through its very self, [but] not such that the understanding enters it from the very things that are, as it were, involved in the essence itself; and this latter is the separated substances’ mode of understanding, which is why they are called “intelligences.” But sometimes the understanding reaches the intimate parts only through things surrounding it, as though through certain doorways; and this is the mode of apprehending found in men, which progresses from effects and properties toward the cognition of a thing’s essence. And in this some [mental] discourse must occur, which is why man’s apprehension is called “reason,” even though it ends in understanding, insofar as the inquiry leads one to the thing’s essence. Whence, if some things are immediately apprehended without the discourse of reasoning, we do not say that one reasons to these, but rather that he understands them—like the first principles, which someone immediately accepts when they are heard. Therefore in the first mode, “understanding” is a power, but taking it in the second mode, it is called the “habit of the principles.” However, just as the human mind does not get to the essence of a thing except through its accidents, so too it does not get to it in spiritual things except through bodily things, and the likenesses of sensible things, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 1 (PG 3:122) and Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 1, para. 2 (PG 3:374).)
Whence faith, which makes one hold on to spiritual things in a mirror and by an enigma, as though wrapped in a veil, perfects the mind in a human mode, and therefore it is a virtue. But if by a supernatural light the mind is so far elevated that it is introduced to the sight of the spiritual things themselves, this is above the human mode. And the gift of understanding accomplishes this, illuminating the mind about the things that have been heard, just as things heard are immediately shown it according to the mode of first principles. And therefore understanding is a gift.
Reply Obj. 1–3: And through this, the replies to the objections are clear.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that understanding approaches spiritual things in two ways: in one way, by way of removal, when it removes from spiritual things the path it finds in bodily things. In the other, insofar as it goes further, fixing its gaze on spiritual things themselves.
Therefore in the state of the path of this life, understanding approaches spiritual things in the first way, especially as regards divine things. For human cognition is perfected according to the state of the path in this: that we understand God as separated from all things, above all things, as Dionysius says in the Mystical Theology. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Mystical Theology, cc. 4, 5 (PG 3:1039).) And Moses attained this, who is said to have entered the cloud wherein God was, in Exodus 19:20. And on account of this also, in reference to the state of the path of this life, purity is associated with the sixth beatitude, which pertains to the purification of the understanding from all bodily things.
But we cannot attain the second mode in the state of the path, especially as regards God; rather, this will be ours in heaven. This is why Gregory, in On Ezekiel, says that as longs as one lives in this mortal flesh, no one so progresses in the virtue of contemplation that it fastens the eyes of his mind on the light’s already uncircumscribed ray itself; rather, whatever of it is beheld in some measure is not the light itself, but is something inferior to it. (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Hiezechihelem prophetam, bk. 2, hom. 2 (CCSL 142; PL 956).) Nevertheless, this fulfills the desire of the weak mind since, according to the Philosopher in On the Parts of Animals 11, the lover is more delighted in a meager comprehension of his beloved than in a great comprehension of other things. (Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals 1.5, 644b24‒30.) Therefore, as he himself says, that small bit that we can known about the separated substances is more desired and delightful than whatever we might know of other realities.
Reply Obj. 1: The shadow that is in our intellect on the state of the path impedes us from being able to fasten the eyes of our mind on the divine essence.
Reply Obj. 2: Dionysius is speaking in reference to the principle of the revelation of divine things, wherein as through a sermon they are proposed to us in signs and figures. But beyond that, the mind is illuminated about the things that have been heard, through the gift of understanding.
Reply Obj. 3: We are not able, in the state of the path, to see God by fastening our gaze on his essence, but we are in another way, as was said above in the body.
Reply Obj. 4: Augustine is calling a “human weakness” the bodily phantasms, which one must remove, by means of the intellect, when reaching toward God.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that “understanding” appears to name simple apprehension, whereas “wisdom” names a certain fullness of certitude for making judgments about the things apprehended. And therefore understanding appears to pertain to the path of discovery, but wisdom to the path of judgment. But judgment cannot be made of things apprehended except through the highest things, to which the wise man is united in his mind in such a way that he is, as it were, placed on a height so as to make judgments about all things; and this union to divine things happens through love. Therefore wisdom is principally about divine things, and has a delight about them caused by love. But understanding is indifferently about all spiritual things that have been apprehended, and does not indicate, in and of itself, the delight caused by the love of the things apprehended.
Reply Obj. 1: Understanding and wisdom do not consider God in the same way—and therefore wisdom is not included in understanding—but in different ways, as was said in the body.
Reply Obj. 2: The delight that is in the act of understanding is caused by the congruence of the activity with the one doing it, not from the love of the things that the activity is concerned with, as is the case with wisdom.
Reply Obj. 3: In contemplation, the apprehension that comes from understanding and judgment which is through wisdom is necessary. And therefore the two gifts are necessary.
Article 3
Whether the gift of knowledge is only about human things
Quaestiuncula 1
To the third we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST II-II.9.2.) It appears that the gift of knowledge is not only about human things, but also about divine things.
Obj. 1: For Augustine says, in the text, (Sent. III, 35.1(132).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 14, ch. 1, n. 3 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1037).) that knowledge is a gift whereby the faith is defended and strengthened. But faith is about divine things. Therefore knowledge is about divine things.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, knowledge the gift is higher than knowledge the virtue. But knowledge the virtue is about divine things—for example, metaphysics or even theology. Therefore knowledge the gift is also about divine things.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the head is of the same form as its members. But the wisdom that is about divine things is called the head of the sciences in the Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2, 983a5‒10; Nicomachean Ethics 6.6, 1141a20; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 1, lect. 3, n. 64.) Therefore knowledge is about divine things.
On the contrary, through knowledge we know how to interact in the midst of a depraved and perverse nation, as is said in the text. (Sent. III, 35.1(132).4, referring to Phil 2:15.) But this does not pertain to divine things, but to human. Therefore knowledge is not of divine things, but of human.
Furthermore, two habits are not needed for the same thing. But wisdom is ordered to divine things. Therefore knowledge is not about divine things.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that knowledge is not only practical, but also speculative. (Parallel: ST II-II.9.3.) For to the degree that any cognition is higher, it extends to more things. But knowledge the gift is higher than the knowledge that is an intellectual virtue. Therefore, since the knowledge that is an intellectual virtue extends to both things that can be done and things that can be contemplated, it appears that much more so can the knowledge that is a gift.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 1 (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2, 982a15; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 1, lect. 2, n. 40.) shows that speculative knowledge is nobler than practical knowledge, insofar as speculative matters are sought for themselves, unlike practical matters. But the knowledge that is a gift should be the highest knowledge. Therefore it is more speculative than practical.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, knowledge perfects one’s lower reason, as Augustine says, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 12, cc. 7, 14 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1003, 1009).) but the lower reason is divided against the higher reason. But the higher is both speculative and practical, since, according to Augustine, it clings to beholding eternal things, which belongs to speculation, and to counsels, which belongs to action. Therefore something similar is true of the lower reason. Therefore wisdom and knowledge are speculative and practical.
On the contrary, Augustine says *(Augustine, On the Trinity (CCSL 50A), bk. 12, cc. 14, n. 22 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1009).
)*that the action whereby we use temporal things properly is connected to [the gift of knowledge. But the use of temporal things pertains to the practical. Therefore the knowledge of which we are speaking here is practical.
Furthermore, all say that knowledge the gift directs piety. But piety pertains to the active life. Therefore so does knowledge, and thus it is practical.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that there is no element of harmful curiosity in the knowledge of human things. (Parallel: ST II-II.167.1.) For to know bad things most of all appears to be bad. But the knowledge of bad things is good, otherwise it would not be present in God. Therefore in knowledge there can be any aspect of harmful curiosity.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, to the degree that someone approaches his perfection more, so much more is he praiseworthy. But man is perfected through the knowledge of anything, since it draws him from potency to act, as our intellect is in potency as regards all intelligible things, as is said in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5, 430a14‒15; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 3, lect. 10, n. 728.) Therefore there can be no sin in knowledge.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, one cannot find excess in the mean, just as no one can be excessively chaste. But knowledge consists in the mean, since it is an intellectual virtue, as was said in Distinction 33. (Above, d. 33, q. 1, a. 3.) Therefore there can be no excessiveness in knowing, and thus there can be no harmfulness of curiosity.
On the contrary, one is punished only for sin. But Jerome heaps upon himself punishments for the fact that he used to study the books of Cicero. (Jerome, Epistulae, epist. 22, para. 29; epist. 48, para. 4 (CSEL 54:189, 349; PL 22:416).) Therefore there can be a sin in the knowledge of human things.
Furthermore, spending time on useless things appears not to be possible without sin. But certain sciences, such as mathematics, appear to be of little or no use for living well, to which latter a man ought to apply his entire self. Therefore it appears that one sins in studying these things.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, of two things dividing something common, that which adds some excellence above the common notion takes its proper name from that added difference, whereas that which adds no difference of dignity retains the common name. This is clear in property and definition, for the essential property is called the “definition,” but a non-essential property is called by the common name “property.”
It is similar in this case. For every certain cognition of something, and especially if it is of something complex and possessed through a synthesis of reason, is called “knowledge.” (Or "science.") But one that is about the highest things, as the science that orders and judges the others, takes on a proper name, and is called “wisdom,” whereas the other sciences that are under it simply retain the name “science.” And taking “science” in this way, it is only about created things, whereas wisdom is about divine things, whether we are speaking about the intellectual virtues or about the gifts.
Reply Obj. 1: The cognition of divine things is both nourished and defended even by human things, since his invisible nature . . . has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made (Rom 1:20).
Reply Obj. 2–3: These are clear from things said.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that, just as it is in the body’s senses the sense related to being—namely, touch—is in all one’s members, but the senses related to well-being are in the heart alone, through which the other members are ruled, so is it the case with the gratuitous gifts that are given within the Church. For some are necessary for salvation, and these must be given to all Christ’s members—and of this sort are the ones that pertain to the grace that makes one pleasing, (Or "sanctifying grace.") such as the virtues and the gifts. But some are for the sake of well-being, such as the graces that are given gratuitously, such as the working of miracles and the like; these are not given to all Christ’s members, but only to those who need them to build up our faith.
Therefore, since knowledge is a gift, and it is about created things, it is necessary that it belong to the notion of knowledge that it be only that cognition necessary for salvation. Now, the cognition of things as regards their natures and “whatnesses” is not necessary for salvation, but only the cognition of things that one ought to do or avoid. Also, contemplative knowledge itself does not pertain to the notion of the gift of knowledge, but practical knowledge alone does, by which a man conceives some certitude about things to be done, due to the presence of the Spirit. And in this it differs from prudence, which does not make its judgment with certainty, but more with an estimation about the things that are to be done. This is also why this gift holds its name from the certainty of its judgment. But the knowledge that is ordered to the defense of the faith pertains to a gratuitously given grace, of which 1 Corinthians 12:8 speaks: to another [is given] the utterance of knowledge according to the same Spirit; and this is not about a needed gift, but about the perfection of our faith. Whence Augustine says, in the text, (Sent. III, 35.1(132).3, citing Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 14, ch. 1, n. 3 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1037).) that many who have faith are not very strong in this knowledge.
Reply Obj. 1: Higher knowledge need not extend to more things than those to which it is ordered. And in this way knowledge the gift extends to more than the acquired knowledge of human deeds, for in many things the one falls short where the other is directive.
Reply Obj. 2: The gifts need not be more perfect than the virtues with respect to all conditions, but only in its mode of operating, which is above man, as was said.
Reply Obj. 3: It is not unfitting for one power to be perfected by diverse habits. Whence even the lower reason, which can be both speculative and practical, is perfected by the gift of knowledge as regards things that can be done, but by the speculative sciences insofar as it is speculative. Now, wisdom perfects the higher reason relative to both, since the higher notions—to the contemplation of which wisdom adheres—are also the rules of our actions. Whence insofar as it assumes them as rules for action, so too it extends as far as practice.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that knowing, taken just in itself, is never bad, and consequently neither is learning, since that whose coming to be is bad is itself bad. But a sin can occur incidentally in knowing, or learning, or considering. However, this accident can arise either on the part of the knowable thing, or on the part of the one knowing it.
On the part of the knower there are two accidents. One when, on account of one’s devotion to some knowledge, one is impeded from performing a duty to which he is bound; for example, if a judge, because of his devotion to geometry, stops expediting cases, or a priest from hearing confessions when he is bound to hear them. Another is when, on account of the delight in some knowledge, one comes to have contempt for something for which one should have reverence; this is what happened to Jerome, because he was so delighted in the ornate words of Cicero that the uncultivated language of the prophets was foolish to him, as he himself says. This also happens to those who so adhere to human reasonings that they give up the faith and attack it.
But on the part of the knowable thing, there are three accidents. One is when the knowable thing easily inclines one to evil, and moreover, it in itself is of little use; and on account of this magical knowledge is forbidden, lest a man fall in the exercise of such. Another is when the knowable is above the power of the knower, as Sirach 3:21 says, seek not what is too difficult for you. The third is when it is in itself of no use, as in the contingent deeds of men; this is also why those are called “curious” who scrutinize the consciences of their neighbors. Now, in all three cases it is possible that what is curiosity for one man is not curiosity for another, since something can be above the intellect of one but not above the intellect of the other; and something can be useful for one that is not useful for another; and something can easily lead one into sin that does not so lead another.
Reply Obj. 1–3: And through this, the replies to the objections are clear.
Article 4
Whether counsel is a gift
Quaestiuncula 1
To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST II-II.52.1.) It appears that counsel is not a gift.
Obj. 1: For someone cannot have a gift from his very self. But everyone has counsel from himself, since counsel is an inquiry, as is said in the Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.3, 1112b23.) and anyone can make an inquiry. Therefore counsel is not a gift.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as one can make an inquiry in practical human cognition, so too in speculative cognition. But there is nothing that indicates an inquiry in the gifts pertaining to the contemplative life. Therefore, since “counsel” indicates inquiry, it appears that counsel should not be considered a gift that directs one in the active life.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the gifts extend to things that are necessary for salvation, as was said. But counsel, as it is commonly said, directs one in things that not all are bound to doing. Therefore counsel is not a gift.
On the contrary, Isaiah 11:2–3 counts it among the gifts.
Furthermore, the gifts correspond to virtues. But there is a virtue ordered to deliberating well, namely, good consideration, which the Philosopher considers in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.9, 1142a32‒b4.) Therefore it appears that there ought to be a gift that perfects us as regards deliberating well.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that counsel the gift does not differ from the gift of knowledge. (Parallels: ST II-II.52.2.ad 3.) For knowledge is that whereby we conduct ourselves rightly in the midst of a depraved and perverse nation. (See Phil 2:15.) But this cannot occur without counsel. Therefore counsel is not distinct from knowledge.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the gifts that pertain to activity, the same gift corresponds to all the virtues concerned with one matter, such as piety with all the virtues concerned with interactions. But prudence and good consideration concern one matter, since they are about reason’s act in things that can be done. Therefore, since knowledge corresponds to prudence, but counsel to good consideration, it appears that counsel and knowledge are one gift.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as good consideration serves under prudence, so too does conscience. But besides the gift of knowledge, which corresponds to prudence, there is no other gift that corresponds to conscience, pertaining to judgment. Therefore neither should there be a gift other than knowledge that corresponds to good consideration.
On the contrary, in Isaiah 11:2–3, the one is counted as different from the other, which would not be so if they were one gift.
Furthermore, just as in speculative concerns there is a path of discovery and judgment, so there is in practical concerns. But in the gifts pertaining to the contemplative life one gift corresponds to discovery, that is, understanding, and another corresponds to judgment, that is, wisdom. Therefore also in the gifts that direct one in the active life, besides knowledge, which corresponds to judgment, there will be another gift that pertains to discovery, and this is counsel.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that there will be no act of counsel in heaven. (Parallel: ST II-II.52.3.) For counsel, according to Gregory, (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 2, ch. 49 (CCSL 143; PL 75:592).) fortifies the mind against premature action, and Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 22 (PG 94:939).) that counsel is taken by one in doubt. But in heaven there will be neither premature action nor doubt. Therefore neither counsel.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, counsel indicates inquiry and discursive thinking, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.3, 1112b20‒1113a3.) But in heaven, according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Trinity (CCSL 50A), bk. 15, ch. 16, ln. 26) our thoughts will not fly about; rather, we will use Godlike intellects, like those of the angels. Therefore in heaven there will be no act of counsel.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, for the same reason the act of knowledge would be there, and one cannot say in what the act of one would differ from that of the other there. For there will be no discovery there. Therefore there will be no act of counsel there.
On the contrary, what is directive of an act is nobler than what carries it out. But in heaven there will be acts of fear, fortitude, and piety, which carry things out in the active life. Therefore much more so will there be acts of knowledge and counsel, which are directive gifts.
Furthermore, the saints in heaven will be like God. But there is counsel in God: let your counsel be true (Isa 25:1), according to another version. Therefore in the saints too there will be an act of counsel.
Response to Quaestincula 1
I answer that, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.3, 1112a31; 1112b32.) counsel (Or "deliberation.") is an inquiry about things that we can do, but not about all such things. For one does not doubt or make an inquiry about how the things that have already been determined should be brought about, like the shapes of letters; and thus there is no counsel about them. So too, since the end is the moving principle at work in all things that can be done, one does not take counsel about the end, any more than, in the other sciences, one makes an inquiry about the science’s principles.
But one does take counsel about things that are for the sake of the end. Now, in such things, someone deliberates rightly if he has pre-established the appropriate end, if he finds a means accommodated to the end, such that he does not do evil for the sake of good, and if the time is right for doing the things lest the time pass, due to too extended a deliberation. And good consideration is productive of this rectitude of counsel, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.9, 1142b16.)
But because the things men can accomplish are contingent, and can fall short of producing the intended end, reaching certitude in one’s counsel is not human, but divine; for it belongs to the divine to foresee with certainty the outcome of contingent things. And therefore to have this certitude the mind must be elevated above the human mode by an instinct of the Holy Spirit, for all who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God (Rom 8:14), and therefore there is a gift of counsel.
Reply Obj. 1: The gift of counsel is counsel not for the sake of seeking, but for the sake of finding.
Reply Obj. 2: The gifts directing one in the active life are concerned with contingent things, and therefore there is more inquiry here than in the contemplative life, which is about the eternal.
Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher in the Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.3, 1112b10.) counsel is taken in difficult matters, wherein we do not place our trust in ourselves. And on account of this, the gift of counsel is found chiefly in arduous things to which not all are bound, but not only in such things.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the habits that direct one in the active life are distinguished with respect to three things. First, with respect to their mode of operating; and in this way knowledge and counsel, which operate above the human mode, are distinguished from the virtues of prudence and good consideration, which operate in the human mode, as is clear from things that have been said. In another way, with respect to their acts, or the paths required for their direction, which are finding and making a judgment; and in this way counsel, which consists in finding, is distinguished from knowledge, which consists in making a judgment about the things found through counsel. In a third way, with respect to the mean; and in this way wisdom is distinguished from knowledge insofar as wisdom sometimes directs one in his actions through eternal notions, whereas knowledge does so through lower notions.
Reply Obj. 1: Two things are required for conducting ourselves well, as has been said, and therefore there must be two gifts.
Reply Obj. 2: The diverse virtues acting in reference to one genus of matter are distinguished according to the diverse parts of the matter, not according to the acts of the agent. And therefore from the unity of the act, one mode could be found to be higher than another, which belongs to one gift. But the directive virtues pertain to diverse acts on the part of the agent, and therefore diverse modes and diverse gifts elevating them to more dignified modes are required.
Reply Obj. 3: The judgment, which belongs to conscience, and the commanding of its application to the deed, which belongs to prudence, both pertain to one path, namely, adjudication. And therefore only one gift corresponds to them. But good consideration, which pertains to another path, corresponds to another gift.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that it was said, about the gifts for carrying things out in the active life, that their acts will remain [in heaven] according to the measure in which they had a mode that was above man in their acts, but not as regards their proper matter. For fortitude will endure no difficulty, as was said. It is the same with knowledge and counsel, since their acts will not remain in heaven, and neither will contingent doubtful things that can be done, the things about which we now make judgments and discoveries. This is why there need not be there any doubt or even discursive thought there. Rather, they will remain in that they will turn to the one from whom they had a certainty above the human mode in their judgment and discovery about these things, and their act of knowledge will be about the very one insofar as he is the rule in making judgment, and even their act of counsel will be about him insofar as he is the who illuminates them in discovery.
Reply Obj. 1–3: And through this, the solution to the objections is clear.
Exposition of the text
That by which that most wholesome faith . . . is generated. (Sent. III, 35.1(132).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 14, ch. 1, n. 3 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1037).) This should be understood in reference to the distinction of its articles, or in reference to the exhortation to faith, insofar as faith is from hearing—but not in reference to the habit of faith, which is from infusion.
But to abstain from evils is to walk cautiously 'in the middle of an evil nation.' (Sent. III, 35.1(132).4, quoting Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, on Ps 135, para. 8 (CCSL 40; PL 37:1760), also quoting Phil 2:15.) This belongs to fear as carrying it out, but to knowledge as directive of it.
The understanding and knowledge which are naturally in man’s soul, (Sent. III, 35.3(134).1.) as regards the seedbed of knowledge, not as regards the complete possession of it. Moreover, understanding is similarly from our nature.
Chapter 130 of 186