D. 34 - Gifts of the Holy Spirit: fear, fortitude, and piety
Division of the text
Having considered the virtues, here the Master begins to consider the gifts.
Now, this part is divided into three parts.
In the first, he considers the gifts in common;
second, he considers a certain gift—namely, fear—that carries a special difficulty on account of its multiplicity, at and because we have been given an occasion to treat fear, it ought to be known that there are four fears; (Sent. III, 34.4(126).1.)
third, he manifests the difference between some of the gifts on account of their greatest agreement, in Distinction 35, at after the above matters, it is to be diligently considered in what wisdom differs from knowledge. (Sent. III, 35.1(132).1)
The first part is divided into two:
first, he considers the gifts according to the truth;
second, he proposes a certain difficulty opposed to the truth just determined, at but this seems to be contradicted by what Bede says about fear of the Lord. (Sent. III, 34.3(125).2.)
As regards the first, he does two things:
first, he shows that the gifts are virtues, and that they remain in heaven;
second, he shows that they were in Christ most fully, at that these same gifts were also in Christ is shown by Isaias. (Sent. III, 34.3(125).1.)
But this seems to be contradicted by what Bede says about fear of the Lord. (Sent. III, 34.3(125).2.) Here he states the difficulty opposed to what was determined;
first, he makes the objection;
second, he solves it, at to which we say. (Sent. III, 34.3(125).4.)
Question 1
The gifts of the Holy Spirit in general
Here six questions are asked:
first, whether the gifts are virtues;
second, what is their number;
third, whether they will remain in heaven;
fourth, how they are related to beatitude;
fifth, how they are related to the fruits [of the Holy Spirit];
sixth, how they are related to the petitions.
Article 1
Whether the gifts are virtues
To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II.68.1; Super Isaiam 11; Super Gal. 5, lect. 6.) It appears that the gifts are virtues.
Obj. 1: For Gregory says in the Morals on the Book of Job (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 1, para. 27, (CCSL 143; PL 75:544).) that by Job’s seven sons are understood seven virtues—namely, wisdom, understanding, knowledge, counsel, and the rest. Now, these are called the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. Therefore the gifts are virtues.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Gloss on James 1:17 says (Glossa Ordinaria (PL 114:672).) that by the perfect gift, which he says is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, is understood the gratuitous gifts. But virtues are contained among the gratuitous gifts, since God pours them into us without any previous merits, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Trinity (CCSL 50A), bk. 13, ch. 17 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1031); De dono perseverentiae (PL 45:1034).) Therefore the gifts are virtues.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, to get to the properties of spiritual realities, one must go through their names. But nearly all the names of the gifts pertain to certain virtues, since piety pertains to justice, fortitude is one of the four cardinal virtues, counsel pertains to prudence, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.5, 1140a25.) and the Philosopher asserts that knowledge, understanding, and wisdom are intellectual virtues. Therefore the gifts are not distinct from the virtues.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the definition belongs to the thing it defines. But the definition of virtue that Augustine states—virtue is the good quality of the mind by which one lives rightly, by which one uses nothing bad, [and] which God works in us without us (Augustine, De libero arbitrio, bk. 2, ch. 19 (CCSL 29; PL 32:1268).)—befits the gifts. And so do all other commonly assigned definitions of the virtues. Therefore the gifts are virtues.
Obj. 5: One might say that the gifts differ from the virtues in that a gift is something more perfect than virtue.
On the contrary, according to the Apostle, (1 Cor. 13:13.) and Augustine, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 18 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1082).) among all the other gifts of God the more excellent gift is charity. But charity is asserted to be a virtue. Therefore a gift is not more perfect than a virtue.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, Macrobius distinguishes (Macrobius, Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis, bk. 1, ch. 8, para. 11, p. 39.) four grades of virtues—namely, the political, the purgative, and that of the purified soul, and the exemplar, and each subsequent grade is above the other. Yet in all these grades the name “virtue” is retained. Therefore the gifts cannot differ from the virtues as being above virtues.
On the contrary, things that are divided by opposition are not the same thing. But Gregory, at the beginning of Morals, (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 1, ch. 27, n. 38 (CCSL 143; PL 75:544).) divides the gifts from the virtues, saying that the seven gifts are signified by Job’s seven sons, and the virtues are signified by his three daughters. Therefore the gifts are not virtues.
Furthermore, things that do not belong to one division are not the same. But virtue is divided into its species in a different way than are the gifts. Therefore a virtue is not the same as a gift.
Furthermore, fear is placed among the seven gifts. Yet it cannot be said that it is a virtue, because it is neither theological nor cardinal. Therefore the gifts are not virtues.
I answer that different people have considered this question in diverse ways.
For some, moved by the diversity of the names, assigned as the difference between the virtues and the gifts the fact that the gifts are named through their relation to God as giving them, whereas the virtues are named through their relation to specific works and specific matters. And therefore they place the gifts in the higher part of the soul, but the virtues in its lower part.
But this cannot stand, because the relation of the gifts to God their giver can only be the relation to their efficient cause, or to their object, or to their end. Now, the relation to God as their object cannot distinguish the gifts from the virtues, since not all the gifts have God as their object. For knowledge is about temporal things, and fortitude is about difficult things. Moreover, the theological virtues more than the gifts have God for their object. Likewise also neither is their relation to God as to their efficient or final cause, since this is common to all the infused habits, and one does not designate a difference in what is held in common. For it cannot be said that the gifts proceed from God more immediately than do the virtues, since charity, which is a virtue, is the gift in which all the other gifts are given to us. And therefore others say that the gifts are more in the reason, whereas the virtues are more in the will. For only two of the virtues are found in the reason or intellect, namely faith and prudence, but four of the gifts are.
But neither can this stand, since the difference that divides a genus is the same as what constitutes its species. Whence, if the infused habit is divided into the virtue and the gift through being in reason and will, then being in reason must be the constitutive difference or like a constitutive difference of gift, and being in the will must be that of virtue. And then one must say that this is so in all the things contained under them, and in no others—which appears to be false.
And therefore others say that the virtues are for acting rightly, but the gifts are for resisting temptations.
But this too is null, because just as it is the same natural quality by which a fire heats and by which it resists all cooling, so too it is the same habit by which someone does good things and fights back against contrary deeds. For according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.3, 1104b5.) an activity following its proper habit is delightful, and what is contrary to that activity is repugnant to it.
And therefore others say that the virtues are for purifying the soul from sins, whereas the gifts are for healing the soul from things that follow on sin. This view rests on the words of Gregory, (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 2, ch. 49, n. 77 (CCSL 143; PL 75:592).) who says that wisdom is given against foolishness, understanding against dimness, and so on for the others, which name not the sins but things that follow on sin.
But this too seems not to be enough, for in an act of sin there follows a stain and guilt, which are removed by grace, and also a disposition or habit, which are taken away by contrary habits. And thus, it appears that the gifts cannot be specifically for removing the consequences of sin. And furthermore, all the things Gregory speaks of are taken away by the virtues, since prudence or foresight takes away precipitousness, humility takes away arrogance; and thus the proper difference between the virtues and the gifts cannot be in reference to this.
And therefore others say that the virtues are for the sake of conforming us to Christ in things that one performs rightly, whereas the gifts are for conforming us to him in things that one suffers with fortitude.
But this too seems null, by what was said, because in Christ’s Passion the things most proposed by the saints for our imitation are his charity, humility, and patience, which are virtues, and more so than his wisdom and knowledge, which are gifts. Whence this appears to be a certain invention, and not something concordant with the reality.
And this is why others say that the gifts are given for higher acts than the acts of the virtues, and among all of these opinions this appears to be the true one. Whence, to understand this, note that virtue can be found in all things insofar as they have certain proper activities wherein they are perfected to doing them well by their proper virtue. Yet when speaking about virtue in moral matters, we understand human virtue, which perfects one for performing human activities well. Now, the activity of man can be spoken of in three ways. First, from reference to the power eliciting and commanding the activity, such as the activity of reason or of any power that obeys reason, since a man has it that he is a man from his reason, whereas to be nourished and to see are not the activities of a man as man, but as alive or an animal. And in reference to this, all habits perfecting any activities wherein man is not like the beasts can be called “human virtues.” Second, an activity can be called human from its matter or object, as those human activities that have the emotions for their matter, for in this way the moral virtues are properly called the “human virtues.” This is why the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7, 1177b28‒1178a8.) that an act of contemplative virtue is more divine than human, because it has necessary and eternal things as its matter, not human things. Third, an activity is called “human” from its mode, namely, because in human activities, whether in the first or second way, a human mode is also preserved. However, if things that belong to man someone performs in a superhuman mode, it will not simply speaking be a human action, but in a way a divine action. Whence the Philosopher, in the Ethics 7, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.1, 1145a20.) divides heroic virtue—which he calls “divine” insofar as a man becomes like God through the virtue’s excellence—against virtue simply speaking.
And following this, I say that the gifts are distinguished from the virtues in that the virtues perfect one for action in a human mode, but the gifts do so for action beyond the human mode. This is clear in faith and understanding. For the connatural mode of human nature is that one perceive divine things only through a reflection in created things and the enigmas of likenesses, and thus, the faith that is said to be a virtue perfects one for perceiving divine things. But the gift of understanding, as Gregory says, (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 1, ch. 32, n. 44 (CCSL 143; PL 75:547).) illuminates the mind about things heard so that a man might even in this life receive the first fruits of the future manifestation. And even the name “gift” is consonant with this. For that should properly be called a “gift” which belongs to the one who has it only from the liberality of the one who gives it, and not due to any prior condition.
Reply Obj. 1: The gifts can be called “virtues” insofar as they perfect one for doing well, and they can be called “human” insofar as the actions that are elicited by the gifts are not common to men and beasts. But they are above the virtues insofar as they perfect one beyond the human mode.
Reply Obj. 2: The notion of a gift is not preserved in all respects in even the infused virtues, inasmuch as it is not preserved in the gifts mentioned. For the mode of action present in the virtues is according to the human condition, even though the substance of the habit is from divine favor. And thus in a certain way a virtue can be called a “gift.”
Reply Obj. 3: Because things that are above us we can know only from things that are [more known] to us, therefore the names of the gifts are taken from things that fit the virtues—even though the things that belong to the virtues are in the gifts in a more eminent mode than they are in the virtues. Whence the names mentioned are said equivocally of the virtues and the gifts.
Reply Obj. 4: In all the definitions given for the human virtues is either expressed something that pertains to the human mode, or in the act itself from which the definition of the virtue is drawn there is understood a mode of acting that is proportionate to man. Whence those definitions do not befit the gifts insofar as they are given for the virtues.
Reply Obj. 5: The will in us does not have any imperfection from its notion as regards the mode of its activity, as does the intellect, which knows through what it receives from the phantasms. Whence in the state of the path of this life we love, but do not see, God through his essence. And therefore above the virtue that is in the will, one cannot receive any gift perfecting one to act in a nobler mode than is the mode of virtue. And thus, since a gift is above virtue only by reason of its mode, it will not be unfitting that the virtue that perfects the will as regards what is above it is of greater dignity than any gift.
Reply Obj. 6: The gifts of which we are now speaking are the divine virtues. This is why they are traced back to the exemplary virtues that [Macrobius] places in God, which are not the same in species as the political virtues, but are above them, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 7. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.1, 1145a24.)
Article 2
Whether there should be more than seven gifts
To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST I-II.68.4; II-II.8.6; Super Isaiam 11.) It seems that there should be more than seven gifts.
Obj. 1: For the gifts perfect one according to a mode higher than virtue. Therefore the individual gifts should correspond to the individual virtues. But among the theological virtues, only to faith do any of the gifts seem to correspond, namely, understanding and wisdom. Therefore it appears that there should be gifts that correspond to hope and love.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, man is weakened more about the things that belong to temperance than about the matter of any other virtue. But the gifts are given to take away the imperfection that is found in the acts of the virtues due to the condition of human nature. Therefore there should be some gift that corresponds to temperance.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, among the gifts there are listed three that pertain to an activity, such as piety, fortitude, and fear. But counsel, which is directive of fortitude, is connected to it, and so is knowledge to piety. Therefore there should be assigned something directive of the other [that is, fear].
Obj. 4: Furthermore, piety, latria, friendship, and many others are traced back to justice as its parts. Therefore the reason why piety is asserted to be a gift equally could be given for all the other parts of justice.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, not only does counsel pertain to prudence, but so does judgment, as was said above. Therefore just as counsel is said to be a gift, so too should judgment be.
On the contrary (6), it appears that there should be fewer. For to the degree that any cognition is higher, so much more universal is it, and less manifold. But the gifts are above the virtues. Therefore, since faith and prudence are virtues pertaining to cognition, there should not be four gifts corresponding to cognition.
Furthermore (7), a gift, as was said, appears to be something higher than the good of a virtue. But fear does not appear to signify something eminent. Therefore it does not appear that it should be counted among the gifts.
Furthermore (8), a species cannot be higher than its genus, and neither can something be higher than its very self. But a gift is something higher than a virtue. Therefore, since piety is a part of justice, and fortitude is a certain cardinal virtue, it appears that neither should be called a “gift.”
I answer that, as is clear from things already said, there are three kinds of virtues. For there are intellectual virtues, theological virtues, and moral virtues, in all of which there is found this in common: that they perfect one, in a human mode, as regards his acts.
Whence, since a gift elevates one to an activity that is above the human mode, as regards the matters of all the virtues there must be some gift that has a certain excelling mode within that matter. Yet it is not necessary that there are as many gifts as there are virtues, since in every genus containing many things it is fitting that there be one that is the highest. And thus, relative to the many virtues that are of one coordination, one can bring in one gift excelling [them]. And as it was said above, many virtues—even ones that concern diverse matters—are assigned as parts of one virtue, insofar as they have a share in its matter.
Now, human activity, relative to which a virtue perfects one in a human mode, either pertains to contemplation, according to which it looks upon necessary and eternal things, or it pertains to action, according to which contingent things are arranged, which are things subject to free decision.
However, in human contemplation there is a double path: one according to which one comes to an awareness of necessary and eternal things, which pertains to discovery, and another according to which things are ordered from first principles, which pertains to judgment. Now, in the first path one progresses in the human mode from sensation to memory, from memory to experience, and from experience to first principles, which are known immediately when the terms are known. And understanding, which is the habit of the principles, perfects this process. Furthermore, one advances in the same path by making an inquiry from these principles to their conclusions. And another intellectual virtue perfects one with respect to this, and this is called “knowledge” relative to the things that are subject to reason, whereas faith, which is the beholding of divine things in a mirror and in an enigma, perfects one in things that are above reason. Now, that spiritual things might be seized, as it were, in their bare truth is above the human mode; and this the gift of understanding brings about, which illuminates the mind about things heard through faith, as Gregory says. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 1, ch. 32, n. 44 (CCSL 143; PL 75:547).) However, in the other path of contemplation, the human mode is that, from a simple beholding of the first principles and highest causes, a man makes a judgment about, and orders lower things; and this is brought about by wisdom, which the Philosopher placed as an intellectual virtue in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.3, 1139b16.) since ordering belongs to wisdom, as is said in the beginning of the Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2, 982a18; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 1, lect. 2, n. 42.) But that a man might be united to those highest causes, having been transformed into a likeness of them, through the mode by which anyone united to the Lord becomes one spirit with him (1 Cor 6:17), so that in this way, as it were, from his innermost part he makes a judgment about and orders other things—not only of things that can be known, but even of human deeds and emotions—this is above the human mode. And this is brought about by the gift of wisdom. However, on the side of action two things are found, to direct, which pertains to cognition, and to bring things about, which belongs to affection.
Now, in practical cognition—which directs one in moral actions—a double path is found just like there was in the cognition of contemplation: namely, discovery and judgment. Now, in discovery the human mode is that one proceeds by inquiring and conjecturing about things that usually happen, since a moral consideration is made from such things and about such things, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.9, 1142a32‒35.) And this discovery is perfected according to this mode through eubulia, which is good deliberation. But that a man receive what should be done as if with certainty, having been taught by the Holy Spirit, is above the human mode. And the gift of counsel perfects one with respect to this. However, in the other path the human mode is that a man, from things that frequently tend to happen, makes a probable judgment about things discovered through counsel; this occurs through good sense and fairness. And beyond this, one imposes the order of this judgment on lower things, which occurs through prudence, which gives commands. But that a man come to a conviction with certitude about things that come up that are to be done is something above man; and this occurs through the gift of knowledge, which teaches us how to act in the middle of a depraved and perverse nation. Whence also the very name indicates its certitude.
However, carrying out the active life consists in two things: namely, in one’s activities, by which interactions with others occur, and in one’s emotions, by which a man is disposed as regards himself.
Now, the activities wherein sharing or interaction with others occur are regulated according to a human mode either on account of the one with whom one interacts, as when something owed him is given him, and justice accomplishes this; or on account of the one who shares with another things that are his, insofar as his own goodness shines forth in this interaction, as the measure of these interactions. And this sharing is either insofar as a man presents his own things—which liberality brings about in moderate matters, and magnificence in the greatest gifts and expenses—or insofar as he gives his very self to another. And this latter is done either through cognition—so that he is thereby known to be the sort of person he is, either through his words and deeds, which is what the virtue the Philosopher calls “truthfulness” accomplishes, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.7, 1108a18‒24.) or through his affect, inasmuch as he shows himself to be delightful to his companions, as in games, which quick-wit accomplishes, or in common life, which friendliness accomplishes—this the Philosopher posits (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.6, 1126b11‒1127a8.) as the virtue through which a man conducts himself in an appropriate way with everyone, in his words and deeds. But when the notion of interaction or sharing is not being considered in reference to all the things described—in reference to the goodness of the one sharing, or the good for whom he is sharing, such that it is limited within these termini: so that one man bestows on another only as much as he ought, or as much as is expedient to the one bestowing it—but rather relative to God, insofar as a divine good is received, which good shines forth on oneself or one’s neighbor, this is above the human mode. And this occurs through the gift of piety. However, the emotions pertain either to the concupiscible or irascible parts.
Therefore in directing the irascible emotions according to the human mode, the good of reason is taken as the measure or rule. For the irascible emotions are traced back to three. The first is hope, which looks to the attainment of an arduous good; this [emotion] is directed by a man who has assessed his own powers according to their measure, straining himself toward arduous deeds of virtue. And this is done through magnanimity, which is concerned with great honors, and through that nameless virtue concerned with lesser honors; for virtue deserves honor. The second [irascible emotion] is fear and rashness, which look to an imminent and difficult evil; and we are directed in these emotions in such a way that someone will approach or flee such things in accordance with the magnitude of one’s powers; and this pertains to the virtue of fortitude. The third is anger, which arises because of a prior injury; we are directed in this in such a way that a man is not excited to a vengeance that exceeds the magnitude of the offense and the order of the just. Mildness brings this about. But that a man in all these things receive divine virtue for his measure, such that he strains himself toward arduous deeds of virtue to which he knows his own powers are not sufficient, and to dangers that exceed his powers, and yet is not in dread while resting on divine aid, and not only not requiring vengeance for injuries suffered, but even intending that [one’s assailant] possess glory as repayment—this is above the human mode. And all of this is effected through the gift of fortitude.
However, in the concupiscible emotions—which are love, desire, and delight—we are directed to the good of reason according to the human mode insofar as a man has affection for as many temporal goods as he needs. This is done through temperance, which is concerned with the greatest delights and desires, and according to other things connected with them. But that a man judge all these things as dung, out of reverence for the divine greatness, is above the human mode. And this is perfected through the gift of fear. Whence the psalm says, my flesh trembles for fear of you (Ps 119:120).
But some consider the number of the gifts in reference to one’s propensity toward sin, in that a gift is for the sake of removing a deficiency of a power in which the virtue is present. Whence they say that against our propensity toward arrogance there is the fear that inclines one to humility; against our propensity toward envy, which cannot be compassionate with one’s neighbor, there is piety; against avarice, knowledge, to which it belongs to interact well with men; against sloth, there is fortitude; against wrath, which does all things incautiously, there is counsel; against gluttony, which dulls the senses, there is understanding; against luxury, there is wisdom, since when the spirit has been tasted, all flesh is tasteless.
But others consider the number in reference to what things Christ required for his suffering, and these were four: reverence toward his Father, who sent him, and thus there is fear; compassion or mercy toward those for whom he suffered, and thus there is piety; virility for enduring his sufferings, and thus there is fortitude; and the contemplation of the fruit of his Passion, and thus there is understanding. But counsel directs fortitude, knowledge piety, and wisdom understanding. And others consider the number in reference to the things that follow on sin. For hardness follows on sin in the concupiscible part in such a way that one will not aid his neighbor, and piety is opposed to this; timidity [follows on sin] in the irascible part, and fortitude is opposed to this—so too presumption, or rashness, opposed to which is fear. In the rational part, in reference to the end, dullness follows, so that [one’s sin] is not known, and understanding is opposed to this; foolishness follows on sin such that someone does not rightly have affection for the end, and wisdom is opposed to this. But relative to the things that are for the sake of the end, [a consequence of sin is] ignorance, by which a man does not know what is expeditious for accomplishing the end, and opposed to this is knowledge; and precipitousness, whereby a man is led, in things to be done, more by the impetus of emotion than by choice, and opposed to this is counsel.
And others take them still otherwise, saying that the gifts perfect us in the two lives. Wisdom does this in the contemplative life in the manner of one experiencing tastes, and understanding in the manner of one looking upon sights. But fear does this in the active life in reference to backing away from evil, but piety accomplishes this in reference to doing the good that all men tend toward, and knowledge directs it, and in reference to doing the good that not all men tend toward, fortitude accomplishes this, and counsel directs it. But the first explanation appears to follow better the proper notions of gifts.
Reply Obj. 1: Faith is in the intellect, whereas hope and charity are in the will, as was said before. Now, the human intellect has from its own nature an imperfection in the mode of understanding, since it cannot perceive spiritual things except by coming to them from things that are sensible; the will, on the other hand, does not have from its own nature any mode of imperfection, as was said. And therefore no gift acting in a more perfect mode corresponds to charity and hope, for the imperfection in the act of hope is not due to the way it functions, but more due to its distance from its object.
Reply Obj. 2: The perfection of temperance consists in withdrawing from its delights, and this is even how it receives its name. But the perfection of fortitude lies in enduring and in engaging things, and the perfection of justice lies in actions directed toward another. And therefore to justice there corresponds a gift ordered toward action, namely piety, and to fortitude corresponds a gift ordered toward enduring and engaging, which gift is given the same name. However, the gift of temperance is what signifies the withdrawal from something, namely fear, as was said before.
Reply Obj. 3: The same thing is directive of a withdrawal from a terminus and an approach toward the opposite terminus. Therefore fear, which signifies the withdrawal, does not have something specifically directive of it besides what directs in doing other things, which pertain to the approach to a terminus.
Reply Obj. 4: Because a gift elevates a man to what is above himself, thus there should fittingly be a gift, corresponding to justice, taken from that part of justice that is most supreme. Now, such is piety, which is owed to God, and to one’s fleshly father, or even to one’s fatherland.
Reply Obj. 5: The judgment of prudence is perfected by the gift of knowledge, as is counsel also through the gift of counsel.
Reply Sed Contra 6: Many other virtues pertain to cognition besides faith and prudence, as is clear of all the intellectual [virtues], so the argument proceeds from false premises.
Reply Sed Contra 7: Fear rings of a certain subjection of a man to God through a certain reverence. But the more a created thing is subjected to its Creator, the higher it is, just as the more matter is subjected to form, the more perfect it is. And therefore fear rings of excellence insofar as it indicates a reference to God; for in this way most of all it is a gift.
Reply Sed Contra 8: The piety that is the gift is above justice, and above all its parts, as is clear from the things said. And therefore it is not the same as the piety that is a part of justice.
Article 3
Whether the gifts remain in heaven
To the third we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST II-II.68.6.) It appears that the gifts do not remain in heaven.
Obj. 1: For the gift of fortitude appears to be ordered against difficulties. But in heaven there will be no difficulties. Therefore the gift of fortitude will not be there.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, piety is for the sake of showing compassion on one’s neighbor. But in heaven there will be no compassion. Therefore neither will there be the gift of piety.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, fear is for the sake of drawing one back from evil, and follows on faith. But in heaven, faith will be emptied out, and every evil will cease. Therefore there will be no fear there.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 22 (PG 94:946).) counsel is concerned with dubious things. But in heaven there will be no doubt. Therefore neither will there be counsel.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, as for knowledge, it will come to an end (1 Cor 13:8), for it teaches one how to interact in the midst of a depraved and perverse nation—which will absolutely not be in heaven. Therefore neither will the gift of knowledge be in heaven.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, all gifts, as was said, take away an imperfection that is in the virtues as regards their mode of acting. But in heaven there will be no imperfection. Therefore we will not need the gifts, but the perfected virtues themselves will be sufficient.
On the contrary, Christ was simultaneously a true wayfarer and a comprehensor. But in Christ the gifts were present the most excellent way, as is clear from what is said in Isaiah 11:2. Therefore they are not excluded by the comprehension of glory, and thus they will remain in heaven.
Furthermore, the gifts are more perfect than the cardinal virtues. But the latter remain in heaven. Therefore so much more so do the gifts.
Furthermore, through a gift a man is elevated above the human mode, as is clear from things said. But this will especially be the case in heaven, when we will be equal to God’s angels, as is said in Matthew 22:30. Therefore the gifts will remain in heaven.
I answer that the mode of each thing is fixed by its own proper measure. Whence the mode of an action is taken from whatever is the measure and rule of the action. And therefore, since the gifts are for doing things above the human mode, the actions of the gifts must be measured by a different rule than is the rule of human virtue. And this is the divinity itself as participated in, with its own mode, by a man—such that one acts no longer in a human way, but as if made a god by participation, as is clear from things explained above. And thus, all the gifts have in common the measure of their activity.
But they differ in the matter on which they act. For those that perfect one in the active life have in common matter with the moral virtues, whereas those that perfect one in the contemplative life have a common matter with the theological and intellectual virtues, in that the chief object of contemplation is God, who is the object of the theological virtues. Therefore those gifts that perfect one in the active life do not remain as regards the acts they have concerning their proper matter, just as neither do the cardinal virtues. For fear does not draw one back from anything harmful, nor does fortitude cause one to endure any difficulties. But they do remain as regards the acts that they have relative to God, who is the measure of action in such things, just as fear subjects a man to God through reverence. However, those gifts that perfect one in the contemplative life will remain both as regards the acts they have concerning their proper matter and as regards the acts they have with respect to their proper measure. But they will be perfected as regards their mode, since however much the gifts elevate one to a higher mode than is the common mode for man, still they will never be able to attain to the mode of heaven while on the path of this life.
Reply Obj. 1–5: and through this, the response to the objections is clear, as they proceed as regards the gifts that perfect one in the active life relative to the acts they have on their proper matter.
Reply Obj. 6: Those gifts that share with the virtues an object that will remain in heaven, will not remain distinct from those virtues in heaven; for they are distinct from them only inasmuch as perfection is distinct from imperfection in the activity’s mode. This is clear of understanding and faith, since the vision that succeeds faith pertains to the perfect gift of understanding, as is clear from a Gloss on Matthew 5. And the same is true for wisdom, through which we will be called “sons of God,” in relation to hope, which aspires to this height. But those gifts that have a common matter with the moral virtues that will not remain in heaven, will not remain relative to the acts that they have as regards that matter that they had in common with the virtues; rather, they will remain relative to the acts they have concerning their measure, which they do not have in common with the virtues. And therefore the acts of those gifts will remain distinct from the acts of the virtues that will be in heaven; and the acts of these gifts will be means between the acts of the theological virtues and the acts of the moral virtues, as the ones that will remain in heaven. For the acts of the theological virtues will be concerned with God in virtue of himself, such as the act of charity in loving him, but the acts of the gifts will be concerned with God insofar as he is the rule that directs one to action in all other things, such as fear will have reverence toward God, because of which in this life it will despise all the successes of the world. But an act of a cardinal virtue will be concerned with its proper end, which someone has attained from the meritorious acts of the virtues, such as the act of temperance is delighted without any harmful defect, as was said in the previous Distinction. (Above, d. 33, q. 1, a. 4.)
Article 4
Whether the beatitudes correspond to the individual gifts
To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II.69.1; II-II.8.7; 9.4; 19.12; 52.4; 121.2; 139.2; Super Isaiam 11; Super Matth. 5.) It appears that the beatitudes do not correspond to the individual gifts.
Obj. 1: For as was said above, the individual gifts do not correspond to the individual virtues. But the beatitudes are virtues, as a Gloss says: in the Lord’s sermon seven virtues are spoken of, and they are called 'beatitudes' because they make men perfect and good. Therefore the beatitudes and gifts do not correspond to each other.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, on the path of this life there cannot be the real beatitude, but only one in hope. But every meritorious act gives one hope for beatitude, since hope is something that arises from merits, as was said above. (Above, d. 26, q. 2, a. 1.) Therefore the beatitudes need not correspond to the gifts, which perfect one above the human mode, but rather to the virtues, however imperfect they are.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the beatitudes are stated in pairs, as is clear in Matthew 5:3: blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven, and this whole statement pertains to one beatitude. However, the gifts are stated individually. Therefore the gifts and the beatitudes do not correspond to each other.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, wisdom is counted as the first of the gifts. But poverty of spirit, which is the first listed of the beatitudes, does not correspond to wisdom. Therefore the beatitudes are not rightly made to correspond with the gifts.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, there are only seven gifts, but there are eight beatitudes. Therefore they do not correspond to each other.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, among the gifts four are listed pertaining to cognition. But among the beatitudes only one pertains to cognition, namely, that wherein it is said, blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God. Therefore the beatitudes do not correspond to the gifts.
Obj. 7: Furthermore, knowledge appears to direct in all the acts that pertain to the active life. Therefore that beatitude that says, blessed are those who mourn, corresponds to knowledge, as the Gloss says, (Glossa Ordinaria (PL 114:90).) no more than do any of the others.
On the contrary, there is what is said in a Gloss on Matthew 5, for there the individual beatitudes are adapted to the individual gifts.
Furthermore, beatitude, or happiness, is, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7, 1177a12.) the activity according to perfect virtue. But the gifts are the most perfect virtues, as is clear from things said before. Therefore the beatitudes also correspond to the gifts.
Furthermore, according to the masters, the gifts are asserted to be means between the virtues and the beatitudes. But the gifts correspond to the virtues, as is clear from things said earlier. Therefore so do the beatitudes correspond to the gifts.
I answer that some say that the beatitudes are certain habits that are more perfect than the gifts, just as the gifts are more perfect than the virtues. Whence, they say, the virtues perfect one for the sake of the first acts, the gifts for the sake of the second acts, but the beatitudes for the third acts. But one cannot easily assign a difference between the acts of the beatitudes and the acts of the gifts that would suffice to differentiate the habits. This is clear from the difference that they do assign, which is only one of increasing and decreasing intensity, which is not enough to diversify habits. Therefore we should speak otherwise, saying that the beatitudes are not distinct habits from the virtues and gifts, but rather are activities of the virtues perfected by the addition of the gifts—or rather, activities of the gifts themselves. And this is consonant with the statements of the saints, who call the beatitudes “virtues” in that mode of speaking wherein an act of virtue is called a “virtue.” It is also consonant with the Gospel itself, which among the beatitudes enumerates many things that manifestly pertain to the gifts or virtues. The Master also appears to agree with this, for he does not give us a special treatment of the beatitudes, as he does for the virtues and gifts. Now, the perfection of a virtue can be taken in three ways. The first is as regards the species of virtue, such as prudence, which directs the other moral virtues, and wisdom, which directs the other intellectual virtues. Whence the Philosopher asserts (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.8, 1178a9‒24.) that civic happiness is an activity of prudence, whereas contemplative happiness is one of wisdom. The second is as regards the state of perfection, toward which perfection a virtue attains through its growth; and this perfection too is required for happiness, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, 1098a18‒19.) since just as one day does not make a spring, so too it does not [make one] blessed. The third is with respect to mode, and in this way the gifts can be called “perfected virtues,” as is clear from things said, or even the virtues to which gifts are joined, insofar as one habit is helped by the addition of another. And in this way the beatitudes of which the Lord speaks in Matthew 5 are said to be activities of perfect virtue.
And because the gifts, as was said, have two acts, there are some that pertain to the path of this life and some that pertain to heaven. And therefore two things are placed in the individual beatitudes: one pertaining to the state of the path, and another pertaining to the state of heaven. Yet there is a difference in the things that pertain to the contemplative and active lives.
For the contemplative life begins even here, and is consummated in the future, so the acts that will be perfected in heaven in a certain way have their beginning in this life, but they are imperfect. Now, the gift of understanding, to which apprehending spiritual things belongs, attains the divine essence itself in heaven, by beholding it; whence, in the sixth beatitude, which pertains to the gift of understanding, it is stated in reference to the state of heaven: for they shall see God (Matt 5:8). But in the state of the path of this life, we see spiritual things, and especially God, more by knowing what they are not, rather than by apprehending what they are. And therefore as regards the state of the path, the heart’s purity is posited not only as being relative to the enticements of the emotions, which purity the gift of understanding does not accomplish, but rather presupposes, through the perfected active life, but besides this, this a purity from errors, phantasms, and spiritual forms; for Dionysius, in the Mystical Theology, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Mystical Theology, ch. 1, n. 1 (PG 3:998).) teaches one straining toward divine contemplation to withdraw from all such things. So too the gift of wisdom, to which belongs the spiritual things that the intellect apprehends to make a judgment whether to order or approve something, will infallibly and rightly judge and order all things that fall under it, whether they be apprehensions or activities. And in this a certain likeness of the Godhead will be apparent in a man, since the name “God” is taken from foreseeing and making a judgment—in virtue of which a man will manifestly be shown to be a son of God. This is why, in the seventh beatitude, which is traced back to wisdom, it says, for they will be called sons of God. However, in the state of the path of this life it does more as regards removing impediments, which can disturb the described order, which one is trying to attain. And therefore peace-making is mentioned in the seventh beatitude as regards the state of the path, through which one tries to quiet things disturbing that peace that is the terminus of the described order, both in one’s very self and even as regards others who are obedient to him in some way.
However, the end of the active life is not cognition but action, and therefore the acts of counsel and knowledge, which direct one in the active life, are not counted among the beatitudes. Rather, the beatitudes that are acts of those of those using the gifts are attributed in a Gloss on Matthew 5 to them insofar as the act of a habit being used is also in a way something of the directing habit.
However, to the gift of fear, as was said pertains contempt for all temporal goods on account of reverence for the divine majesty. Some of these are external—such as riches and honors—and contempt for these pertains to the first beatitude, wherein it is said, blessed are the poor in spirit. For poverty of spirit, as a Gloss says, has two parts: namely, to give up things, and contrition of spirit, that is, of arrogance. For in heaven there will be no act of fear as regards temporal goods, but there will be as regards what was the reason for despising such temporal goods. And therefore in this beatitude is placed, as regards the state of heaven, the dominion of the kingdom of heaven wherein are included heavenly riches and honors, from the consideration of which the temporal goods are despised. Other temporal goods are internal to man—namely, pleasures—and contempt of these pertains to the third beatitude, in which it is said, blessed are those who mourn. And a future consolation is asserted in reference to the state of heaven, relative to which temporal consolation would be despised. And because we need the direction of reason more as regards difficult matters, therefore the third beatitude is attributed to a directing gift, namely, knowledge; however, the first beatitude is attributed to an active gift, namely, fear, for giving up internal goods is more difficult than giving up external ones.
However, to the gift of fortitude pertains the joyful endurance of all difficult matters. Now, there are two sorts of difficulty. The one occurs in the labor of the one acting, and such endurance pertains to the fourth beatitude, in which it is said, blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness—that is, who endure all sorts of labors and difficulties in performing deeds of justice. But “being made full” is asserted as regards the state of heaven, wherein is embraced everything that restore those who labor. The other difficulty is in the emotions to be tolerated, the endurance of which pertains to the eighth beatitude, in which it is said, blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake. But because this righteousness manifests all the previous ones, no special reward is rendered it; rather, it is traced back to the heading—that is, to the reward placed in the first beatitude—to show thereby that the rewards of all the beatitudes are owed to it. And this is also why no special gift is attributed to it. But the fourth beatitude is attributed to the gift of fortitude. Now, it pertains to the gift of piety to perfect one in things that are related to others. But someone stands rightly toward another in two ways. In one way, such that troubles are not brought upon him, even if the latter beforehand caused them himself; and this pertains to the second beatitude, wherein it is said, blessed are the meek, as a Gloss says, who approach the dishonest, and conquer the evil with good. And because fighting one’s neighbor often happens for the sake of a peaceful possession of temporal goods, therefore in this beatitude, in reference to the state of heaven, is placed the possession of the earth, that is, by those who live. Someone stands rightly toward another in another way such that he can show him benefits, and this pertains to the fifth beatitude, wherein it is said, blessed are the merciful; and the reward of this is asserted to be a freedom from every misery in the sight of one who relieves the miseries of others. But because it is more difficult to benefit someone than not to harm him, therefore the second beatitude is attributed to an active gift, namely, that of piety, but the fifth is attributed to a directive gift, namely, to counsel, which, like piety, is related to others. For knowledge, like fear, does not indicate any order to another. However, the order of these beatitudes is taken in reference to the fact that man progresses more from exterior things to interior things: for exterior temporal goods are most extrinsic; and after this, the inborn emotions; and after this one’s own exterior activities, and because in them there is labor; and after this interior compassion; and after this apprehension; and after this setting things in order. But that emotion is placed last as though manifesting the others.
Reply Obj. 1: The beatitudes are called “virtues” insofar as they are acts of perfected virtues, that is, of the gifts. And therefore the beatitudes correspond to the gifts as activities correspond to their habits.
Reply Obj. 2: An imperfect virtue causes hope for future beatitude only by meriting it, whereas a perfect virtue does so through its merit of it and becoming like it. So too do we call “happy” children of good character, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 1, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.9, 1100a1‒4.) insofar as a certain sign of future happiness is apparent in them.
Reply Obj. 3: The habits of the gifts are the same while on the path of this life and in heaven, but the acts are not. And therefore the beatitudes are coupled, but the gifts are not.
Reply Obj. 4: The gifts are from God alone, and therefore they are ordered insofar as they are more perfect. For in this way they are closer to God. But the actions of the gifts, which are the beatitudes, are also from us, and therefore they are ordered insofar as they are prior relative to us, by which there is an ascent from lower things to higher things, and from imperfect things to perfect things.
Reply Obj. 5: The beatitudes need not correspond to the gifts individually, since to one gift two beatitudes correspond, and to one beatitude two gifts correspond—the one as directive, and the other as performative, as is clear from things said. But in this respect the beatitudes are said to correspond to the gifts: in that there is no beatitude that does not directly correspond to some gift, nor is there any gift to which there corresponds no beatitude.
Reply Obj. 6: The end of the active life is not knowledge, and therefore, since beatitude names a certain end, there cannot be placed in the active life any beatitude pertaining to cognition. Rather, such is placed only in the contemplative life, the perfection of which consists in cognition. But the gifts name habits, which are not ends, and in this way the account of the gifts and the beatitudes is not alike.
Reply Obj. 7: Although knowledge and counsel direct one in all the acts of the active [life], still, through a certain appropriation, some of them more than others are traced back to knowledge and counsel, as is clear from things said.
Article 5
Whether the fruits correspond to the gifts
To the fifth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II.70.3; II-II.8.8; Super Gal. 5, lect. 6.) It appears that the fruits do not correspond to the gifts.
Obj. 1: For, as Ambrose says, (Ambrose, De spiritu sancto, bk. 1, ch. 16, para. 158 (CSEL 79:82; PL 16:740).) the virtues are called “fruits” because they refresh their possessors with a holy and sincere delight. But the virtues do not correspond to the gifts, but come before them. Therefore neither do the fruits.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a “fruit” appears to sound like a reward. But the gifts do not pertain only to the reward, but even to the state of meriting. Therefore the fruits do not correspond to the gifts.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, “fruit” is said from fructification, or enjoyment. But only God should be enjoyed, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 5 (CCSL 32; PL 34:21).) Therefore there appears to be only one fruit, just as there is only one enjoyment, and thus, the fruits cannot correspond to the gifts, which are seven.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the fruits are distinguished according to the diverse states of virtues, as is clear from the Gloss on Matthew 13:8, (Glossa Ordinaria (PL 114:132).) since the thirty-fold fruit is owed to the married, the sixty-fold to the widowed, but the hundred-fold to virgins. Now, the gifts are not distinguished according to the diverse states, since the gifts can be had in some way in all states of life. Therefore the fruits do not correspond to the gifts.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, in Galatians 5:22–23 more than seven fruits are listed. Therefore, since the gifts are only seven, but the fruits are twelve, it appears that the fruits do not correspond to the gifts.
On the contrary, the beatitudes correspond to the gifts. But beatitude contains fruit, since it does not exist without delight, as is said in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.8, 1099a10‒30.) Therefore the fruits do correspond to the gifts.
Furthermore, Wisdom 3:15 says, the fruit of good labors is renowned. But there are no labors that are of greater dignity than that found in the works of the gifts. Therefore the fruits correspond to the gifts.
Furthermore, the delights of the virtues are called “fruits,” as is clear from the authority of Ambrose noted above. But there is not a lesser delight in the acts of the gifts than in the acts of the virtues. Therefore the fruits correspond to the gifts.
I answer that the name “fruit” is extended from bodily things to spiritual things. For in bodily things what is anticipated from things born from the earth is called a “fruit”; and therefore everything that someone attains from something as a reward of the labor he has exerted on it is called a “fruit.” Now, this is also true of what one anticipates primarily from anything, and in this way God is the fruit of our every deed. And again, what someone attains from his deeds, even when he is not acting primarily for the sake of this, is called its “fruit.” And in this way the delights that are found in good deeds are certain fruits of the good deeds—and in this way Ambrose is taking “fruit” in the authority noted, calling the virtues themselves the fruits, insofar as they delight. However, according to the Philosopher (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.4, 1113a31.) every activity coming from a habit that perfects the nature has a delight joined to it; this is why, since happiness or blessedness is activity according to perfect virtue, the delight itself is something formal that completes the beatitude. And therefore the fruits, which name the delight, correspond to the beatitudes just as the beatitudes correspond to the gifts.
Now, among the fruits some are counted essentially as a delight, such as joy, in reference to the union with and the presence of good things, and peace, in reference to the removal of impediments that disturb delight. And therefore these two fruits correspond to all the gifts and beatitudes. But some are asserted to be the reason for and cause of delight. Moreover, delight is found in the deeds of both the active life and the contemplative life.
But in the deeds of the active life the reason for the delight is of two sorts. In one way, due to the removal of things that impede the true delight of the spirit; for delight is caused by an unimpeded activity, according to the Philosopher. In another way, due to the presence of good things befitting the spirit.
However, the spiritual delight of the active life is impeded in two ways.
In one way, through contrary delights—namely, of temporal goods. For just as the actions are contrary so also are the delights, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.5, 1175b24‒1176a3.) Now, temporal delight is either in exterior goods, like riches and honors—and the modesty that is called a fruit restrains this delight, and it corresponds to poverty of spirit—or even in delights of the flesh—which are held back either by abstaining from illicit delights, which chastity causes, or even from licit ones, which self-control causes, according to the Gloss. (Glossa Interlinearis.) And these two fruits correspond to the blessedness of one who mourns, and consequently these three fruits correspond to the gift of fear, as active. Or in a different way, following the Philosopher in the Ethics 7, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.9, 1151b34‒152a7.) chastity can be distinguished from self-control, such that self-control restrains the desires from dominating, whereas chastity restrains them such that they even become subordinate. In a different way spiritual delight is impeded by exterior difficulties, which consist in the labor of actions, which long-suffering overcomes; whence this fruit corresponds to the fourth beatitude and to the gift of fortitude. Or else the difficulties consist in the emotional pains, and such is overcome in two ways: in one way, such that through them one’s constancy of spirit is not broken back on itself, and this patience brings about. And this fruit corresponds to the eighth beatitude, blessed are those who are persecuted, and to the gift of fortitude. In another way, such that a man is not disturbed by someone trying to injure him, and this mildness brings about. And this fruit corresponds to meekness, which is the second beatitude, and to the gift of piety. However, the good befitting the active life that causes delight is also in one’s affection, insofar as everything good for a man pleases both himself and others, for such a man possesses a sweet spirit, and this is goodness, which the Gloss calls “sweetness of spirit.” (Glossa Interlinearis.) And the good is also in its order to its effect, insofar as a man is apt to share his things with others, and this is beneficence. And these two fruits correspond to the fifth beatitude, about mercy, and to the gift of piety. However, all the fruits mentioned correspond to the gifts of counsel and knowledge as directive of them.
However, in the contemplative life nothing can impede its delight except on the part of one’s active life. For according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Topics 1.15, 106a38.) there is no contrary to the delight found in contemplation. Whence there is no reason for delighting here except in the presence of the good in which the mind rests, and this happens in two ways. In one way, through the undoubting cognition of spiritual things; and this is faith, as a Gloss says, the certitude of invisible things, and it corresponds to the sixth beatitude, and to the gift of understanding. In another way, through an intimate union with spiritual things, from which one can make a judgment of all other things, since those who are spiritual discern all things (1 Cor 2:15); and this is charity, and it corresponds to the seventh beatitude, blessed are the peace-makers, and to the gift of wisdom.
Reply Obj. 1: The virtues are called “fruits” not by reason of the habits, but because in their works they have a delight connected to them. Whence also the virtues that are named among the fruits, such as chastity, mildness, and the like, are not placed there as virtues, but inasmuch as they have a certain notion of causing delight.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as a sin has its own punishment joined to it, since every disordered spirit is a punishment to its very self, as Augustine says in the Confessions, (Augustine, Confessions, bk. 1, ch. 12 (CCSL 27; PL 32:670).) so too does a merit have its own fruit joined to it. Yet this fruit will be completed in the future, as will be the punishment of evils. And therefore the fruits correspond to the gifts even as regards the acts that they hold on the way path of this life.
Reply Obj. 3: To enjoy something is properly the same thing as having its fruit. Now, someone holds something as fruit when he anticipates it primarily, because of his work. Whence one is not properly said to enjoy what follows from the action and is not the primary thing anticipated, but only what is anticipated primarily—which is God alone. And therefore although there is only one enjoyment, or fruition, still there are many fruits, for whatever follows, even if it is not the primary thing anticipated, can be called a “fruit.”
Reply Obj. 4: The distinction among fruits occurs in two ways. In one way, according to an intensification or diminishment—and in this way the fruits are distinguished in the Gospel, since in some deeds there will be a greater joy than in others. In another way, according to diverse reasons for rejoicing—and in this way they are divided as though essentially and through themsevles. And in this way Galatians 5 distinguishes them; and thus the fruits correspond to the gifts, as was said.
Reply Obj. 5: To the same gift there can correspond many fruits, insofar as it has many acts, as was said. And therefore it is not necessary that there be as many gifts as there are fruits.
Article 6
Whether the petitions [in the Lord’s Prayer] correspond to the gifts
To the sixth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.83.9; Compendium theol., part 2, ch. 4; In orationem dominicam; Super Matth. 6.) It appears that the petitions do not correspond to the gifts.
Obj. 1: For Augustine says in the Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity (Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 115, para. 30 (CCSL 46; PL 40:285) .) that we beg for eternal things in the first three petitions, but for temporal things in the remaining four. But each of the gifts pertains to the present life, wherein we live in time, and to the future, wherein we attain eternity, as is clear from things said. Therefore the petitions do not correspond to the gifts.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says, in the Letter to Proba, that whoever asks for whatever cannot pertain to this evangelical reward, even if he does not pray in an illicit way, he prays in a carnal way. (Augustine, Epistulae, epist. 130: Ad Probam, ch. 12, para. 22 (CCSL 31B:228; PL 33:502).) But many other things can be asked of God in a non-carnal way besides the seven gifts, such as the seven virtues, and grace, and the necessities of life. Therefore the petitions of the Lord’s Prayer do not correspond to the seven gifts.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, all the gifts are goods given by God. But the petitions of the Lord’s Prayer are directed not only to the attainment of the good, but also to the removal of evil. Therefore the gifts do not correspond to the petitions.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, among the gifts there are four that pertain to cognition, whereas among the petitions none of them appear to pertain to cognition. Therefore the petitions do not correspond to the gifts.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, petitions are ordered to obtaining something. But only one who has virtue obtains anything from God. Therefore, since the gifts are infused together with the virtues, it appears that the petitions are not ordered toward the gifts.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, Augustine, in the Enchiridion, says that this whole thing is one petition: and lead us not into temptation, but free us from evil; (Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 116, para. 30 (CCSL 46; PL 40:286).) this is clear from the fact that it does not say, and free us from evil, but rather, but. Likewise he says that the third petition—thy will be done—is contained in the first two, and thus it appears that there are only five petitions, as Luke also lays them out. But there are seven gifts. Therefore the petitions do not correspond to the gits.
Obj. 7: Furthermore, the second petition, according to Augustine in the same passage, pertains to the resurrection of the body. But no gift pertains to the resurrection. Therefore the petitions do not correspond to the gifts.
On the contrary, what is petitioned of God is received from him; whence John 16:24 says, ask and you will receive. But the gifts are what are petitioned of God, so the petitions and the gifts mutually correspond to each other.
Furthermore, in a Gloss on Matthew 6 it says, it is in one’s prayers that we might beg for the gifts, and in the gifts that we might act; the beatitudes follow from the actions. Therefore just as the beatitudes correspond to the gifts, so the gifts correspond to the petitions.
Furthermore, as the same Gloss says, (source) all the gifts of the present or future life are contained in the seven petitions. But the gifts perfect one in all these, as is clear from things said. Therefore the gifts and petitions correspond to each other.
I answer that tracing the petitions back to the gifts is not understood to mean that in the petitions only the habits of the gifts are begged for, but that in each petition one begs for something that pertains to a gift. Now, this tracing back can be considered in two ways. In one way, generally, such that whatever pertains to the gifts also pertains to the petitions, and vice versa; and in this way their tracing back to each other occurs not only through an appropriation, but even properly. For just as the gifts sufficiently perfect one in all that belong to the active or contemplative lives, whether in the present or future lives, so too do they perfect one in all things for which one implores divine help through the petitions. In another way, specifically, and in this way the tracing back of the individual gifts to the individual petitions cannot occur through something proper [to the petition]. For the things required in the diverse petitions can pertain to one gift, and vice versa, but [also] through a certain appropriation [to one gift], insofar as individual petitions have a certain likeness with individual gifts, as was also said about the beatitudes.
For there is a different reason for distinguishing the gifts and the petitions. For because the gifts are habits ordered to action, they must be distinguished according to their objects, wherein their acts are divided according to species. But one must beg for all things that we need for action, which we can have only from God. Now, a single gift needs many helps for its activity, and the same help assists the acts of many gifts. However, we need divine help both in the works of the contemplative life and in the works of the active life.
Now, in the works of the contemplative life we need two helps. The one is that the majesty and dignity of the very things that can be contemplated—that is, the divine things—become apparent; otherwise they would not be worthy of contemplation and the wonder that attracts the contemplation. And this help is begged for through the first petition, hallowed be thy name, wherein one begs that his name, which is always holy, be also held as holy among men—that is, that it not be despised, as Augustine says in his Letter to Proba. (Augustine, Epistulae, epist. 130: Ad Probam, ch. 11, para. 21 (CCSL 31B:228; PL 33:502).) Whence it is the same to beg for this as what is found in Sirach 36:4, as you have used us to show your holiness to them, so use them to show your glory to us. And from the fact that a man becomes a participant in this excellence, he orders and makes judgments, which belongs to wisdom. Therefore this petition is traced back to wisdom, and to the seventh beatitude. However, the other help is so that we might know our beatitude in the contemplation of these great things, so that thereby a man might more cling to contemplating such things. And this help is begged for through the second petition, thy kingdom come—according to the Gloss, (Glossa Ordinaria (PL 114:101).) that is, that it might be manifested to men, such that the kingdom might come to be within us, and we might merit to reign in Christ, according to Augustine in his Letter to Proba. (Augustine, Epistulae, epist. 130: Ad Probam, ch. 12, para. 22 (CCSL 31B:228; PL 33:502).) Whence this begging, as he says, is the same as saying, let your face shine, that we may be saved (Ps 80:3). And therefore this petition is traced back to the sixth beatitude and to the gift of understanding.
However, in the works of the active life we need two sorts of help. The first is that good things be conferred upon us, whereby we are aided to act rightly. The second is for the removal of evil impediments.
Now, the good necessary for the active life is of two sorts. One directly orders one to an act of virtue, as is the noble good—and this is begged for in the third petition, thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven, wherein, according to Augustine, (Augustine, Epistulae, epist. 130: Ad Probam, ch. 12, para. 22 (CCSL 31B:228; PL 33:502‒503).) we ask for obedience to God, such that his will may be accomplished by us on earth just as it is accomplished by the angels in heaven. This is why, according to him, begging for this is the same thing as saying, keep my steps steady according to your promise (Ps 119:133). And this is traced back to the fifth beatitude, which is about mercy, since God has especially commanded us to show mercy, and consequently, to the gift of counsel. The other necessary good serves virtue instrumentally, as are the temporal supports by which a man is aided in acting rightly. And this pertains to the fourth petition, wherein it is said, give us this day our daily bread. For according to Augustine in the same passage, (Augustine, Epistulae, epist. 130, para. 11 (CCSL 44).) “daily” here means “at this time,” here in the word “bread” signifying that we are begging for either that sufficiency from the Father who exceeds all things, or for the sacrament of the faithful. And this is the same as what is begged for in Proverbs 30:8: give me neither poverty nor riches; feed me with the food that I need. And this petition is traced back to the fourth beatitude, since the supports of life like this are things that sustain us in the labors of this life. And consequently this pertains to the gift of fortitude.
However, the impediment of an act belonging to the active life is of three sorts. The first is the evil of a fault, which occurred in a past action, but remains in its guilt, stain, and defilement; and against this evil, aid is begged for through the fifth petition, wherein it is said, forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us. Here, as Augustine says in the same passage, (Augustine, Epistulae, epist. 130, para. 11 (CCSL 44).) we are admonished both as regards what we beg for and what we do, so that we might receive the like. And he prayed for the same thing who said, if I have requited those attacking me with evils, let me deservedly fall empty by my enemies (Ps 7:4). (RSV reads: if I have requited my friend with evil or plundered my enemy without cause, let the enemy pursue me and overtake me.) And this is traced back to the third beatitude, which is about one who mourns, since his sins are forgiven, and consequently to the gift of knowledge.
The second is evil in the future, since we fear what inclines us to sin, and the sixth petition begs for help in this when it says, and lead us not into temptation, wherein, according to Augustine, we beg that we not be deserted by divine help in any temptation, lest we consent to be deceived or approach affliction. And this is the same as what is begged for in Sirach 23:6: let not the lusts of the flesh take hold of me, and this is traced back to the second beatitude, about mildness, since the chief temptations toward evil are the troubles brought on us by our neighbors, by which we are provoked to reciprocate; these temptations we overcome through that beatitude, and consequently it traces back to the gift of piety.
The third is the present evil, whatever it might be, and we beg for help against this in the seventh petition, which says, but deliver us from evil. Whence Augustine says that in this petition the Christian man is established as groaning under every tribulation. And this begs for the same thing as the one who said in Psalm 59:1, deliver me from my enemies, O my God, and this is traced back to the beatitude about poverty of spirit since begging for help is appropriate for one in tribulation, and consequently, this is traced to the gift of fear.
Moreover, the three last petitions can be distinguished differently, according to Augustine, such that the first of them begs for help against the evil of fault, the second against things inclining one to fault, and the third against the evil of punishment.
Reply Obj. 1: In obedience to God, which embraces every noble action, the goods of contemplation begin in this life and are consummated in the future life. And in reference to this consummation Augustine says that in the three first petitions we beg for the eternal goods, whereas in the other petitions we beg for things that are only in this life.
Reply Obj. 2: In this prayer we beg not only for the habits of the gifts—since the petitions of these habits, as regards understanding and wisdom, are included in the first two petitions—but also we beg for all the habits of the gifts or virtues that direct one in the active life in the third petition. For all the active habits are only for the sake of obeying God. But through the individual petitions we beg for the things that in some way pertain to all the gifts.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the gifts are certain goods given by God, nonetheless so that they can have their appropriate activity a man must be freed from evils.
Reply Obj. 4: Two petitions pertain to contemplative knowledge, but no petitions pertaining to practical knowledge are included for the same reason as why there are no such beatitudes either, as was said.
Reply Obj. 5: Although a man who does not possess the virtues cannot ask for the gifts by meriting them, still he can ask for them through the mode of having a disposition toward them. And again, someone who possesses the virtues and gifts can ask for perseverance in them.
Reply Obj. 6: Simply speaking, there are seven petitions, as was said. Yet it is not unfitting that one of them in a certain way be included in another, just as something exists in another in potency.
Reply Obj. 7: Because in the resurrection of the body we will be chiefly and totally participants in the divine kingdom, Augustine say that the second petition pertains to the resurrection of our bodies, not because it prays directly for the resurrection of the body.
Exposition of the text
The spirit of wisdom and understanding . . . (Sent. III, 34.2(124).1, quoting Isaiah 11:2.) The notion of the order is clear from what has been said before. However, the reason for the pairing is that two gifts are combined together when one of them directs the other, just as wisdom directs understanding, properly speaking, and counsel directs fortitude through a certain appropriation, since just as we need counsel chiefly in supererogatory activities, so too we need it in fortitude, and knowledge directs piety since both indicate what everyone is bound to do. However, fear, because it is a drawing back from evil, does not need anything of its own to direct it, as is clear from what has been said; yet, properly speaking, counsel and knowledge are directive in all three of the performative gifts.
The spirit of fear. (Sent. III, 34.2(124).1, quoting Isaiah 11:3.) This is said to have filled Christ in a special way, because, on account of its own imperfection, it seemed to be in him less. Therefore it filled him because he principally came to suffer, which was completed through his humility, which latter pertains to the gift of the fear of the Lord.
But some contend that fear is in Christ and the angels only according to effect. (Sent. III, 34.3(125).4.) This is true of fear according to act in one’s affect that is fear of separation, and not with regard to every act in one’s affect, as will be explained shortly.
Prologue to the Second Part of the Distinction
After having considered the gifts generally, here he considers the gift of fear, which holds a special difficulty, on account of its manifold senses.
Now, this part is divided into two: first, he considers fear in general; second, he considers specifically Christ’s fear, at but since there was in Christ fear of pain, it is asked whether this fear was worldly, or servile, or initial. (Sent. III, 34.9(131).1.)
The first is divided in two:
In the first he lays out the distinction of fears; in the second, he resolves a certain opposed view, at and note that here four fears are distinguished. (Sent. III, 34.4(126).2.)
Augustine . . . discusses these same fears more broadly. (Sent. III, 34.5(127).1.) Here he lays out the relation of the fears to each other, and as regards this he does two things: first, he compares the fears to each other; second, he infers a certain conclusion from the things said, at it should also be diligently noted. (Sent. III, 34.8(130).1.)
As regards the first, he does two things: first, he compares filial fear to servile fear; second, he compares initial fear to both, at and he also indicated the initial fear. (Sent. III, 34.6(128).3.)
Now, as regards the first, he does three things: first, he notes what is proper to servile fear; second, he shows how it differs from chaste or filial fear, at but there is another sentence; (Sent. III, 34.5(127).3, quoting Augustine, In Iohannis epistulam ad Parthos tractatus (CCSL 37), tract. 9 (PL 35:2406).) third, he manifests the difference through a likeness, at you cannot better explain the difference between these two fears than by positing the case of two married women. (Sent. III, 34.6(128).1, quoting Augustine, In Iohannis epistulam ad Parthos tractatus (CCSL 37), tract. 9 (PL 35:2406).)
And he also indicated the initial fear. (Sent. III, 34.6(128).3.) Here he compares initial fear with the other two, and regarding this he does two things: first, he shows its distinction from each of them; second, he notes a certain agreement between it and servile fear, at yet it ought to be known that each of these fears . . . in several places in Scripture is called 'the beginning of wisdom.' (Sent. III, 34.7(129).1.)
Here there are two questions, the first about the fear of which he is treating here, and the second, about the other performative gifts, namely, piety and fortitude.
Question 2
The gift of fear
As regards the first, three things are asked about:
first, fear in general;
second, servile fear;
third, filial fear.
Article 1
Whether Damascene’s definition of fear is sound
Quaestiuncula 1
To the first we proceed thus. It appears that Damascene unfittingly defines fear in saying, fear is a desire that moves one to draw into oneself. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 23 (PG 94:1087); parallel: ST I-II.44.1.)
Obj. 1: For desire pertains to the concupiscible part of the soul, but fear is in the irascible part. Therefore fear is not a desire.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, desire is in reference to a good. But the object of fear is an evil, which is why the Philosopher says, in the Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.6, 1115a9.) that fear is the anticipation of evil. Therefore fear is not a desire.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, desire pertains to pursuit. But fear is the flight from evil, as the Gloss on John 10 says. (Glossa Ordinaria (PL 114:387).) Therefore fear is not a desire.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, to draw into oneself is to contract. But since contraction is the heart’s bodily motion, it is not in all things that fear—like in the angels. Therefore he defines fear badly.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that the Master distinguishes the parts of fear badly here. (Parallels: ST II-II.19.2; Super Rom. 8, lect. 3.) For according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Topics 1.15, 107a34.) if one member of a pair of opposites is spoken of in many ways, so is the other. But fear and hope are opposites. Therefore, since hope is not spoken of in many ways, neither should fear be so distinguished.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, emotions and acts and habits are distinguished in reference to their objects. But the object of worldly fear, servile fear, and initial fear is the same thing: punishment. Therefore it appears that they should not be distinguished from each other.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the perfect and the imperfect in love do not divide charity. But initial fear and chaste fear differ only as the imperfect and the perfect. Therefore they should not be distinguished from each other.
On the contrary (4), it appears that one should designate more parts of fear. For fear is caused by concupiscible desires. But in 1 John 2:16, the concupiscence of the flesh is divided against the concupiscence of the eyes, which is the concupiscence of the world. Therefore worldly fear, by which we fear to lose the goods of the world, should be distinguished against fear of the flesh, by which we fear to suffer dangers to the flesh.
Furthermore (5), the Master notes near the end of the reading (Sent. III, 34.9(131).2.) that there is a certain natural fear that he says differs from all the others. Therefore it seems that he insufficiently assigned only four fears.
Furthermore (6), Damascene, in Orthodox Faith 2, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 15 (PG 94:931).) assigns more differences—namely, sluggishness, shamefulness, shyness, admiration, torpor, and agony. Therefore it appears the division listed here is insufficient.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that fear should not be counted among the gifts. (Parallels: below, 2nd exposition of the text; ST II-II.19.3, 9; Super Rom. 8, lect. 3.) For fear is one of the four principal emotions. But none of the others is asserted to be a gift; in fact, hope is asserted to be a virtue, and joy a fruit, and pain is asserted to be a part of penitence, namely, contrition. Therefore in the same way fear should not be listed as a gift.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the gifts are given to us as aids against human weakness. But fear itself indicates weakness. Therefore it should not be said to be a gift.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Augustine says that fear is the love that flees what is opposed to it. (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 14, ch. 7, n. 2 (CCSL 48; PL 41:410).) But love is not a gift, but rather a virtue. Therefore neither should fear be placed among the gifts.
On the contrary, it is said in Isaiah 11:1–3, where fear is named among the other gifts of the Holy Spirit.
Furthermore, the principle of salvation is not from us, but is a gift of God, as Augustine says. (See De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, ch. 21 (PL 42:1216), formerly thought to be by Augustine, but now attributed to Gennadius of Marseilles.) But fear is the principle of salvation: from your fear, O Lord, we have conceived the spirit of salvation (Isa 26:17). (RSV Isaiah 26:17 reads: "Like a woman with child, who writhes and cries out in her pangs, when she is near her time, so were we because of thee, O Lord." St. Thomas may have an alternative text for this verse.) Therefore fear is a gift of the Holy Spirit.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that the definition given by Damascene befits every fear. But because the names of the emotions are extended from emotions of the sensitive part [of the soul] to the activities of the superior part, as has been said above, therefore let us see first how the definition stated belongs to the fear that is an emotion of the sensitive part.
Now, every emotion pertains to the sensitive part, but among them there is a difference, according to Avicenna, (Avicenna, De naturalibus, bk. 6, ch. 7.) because the dispositions of the heart in some emotions are in a sense active, but in others they are in a sense passive. But an active disposition of the heart occurs either in virtue of a perfection of the heart in itself, such as the fullness and dilation of the heart—which occurs in joy—or also in virtue of a perfection of the heart relative to doing, suffering, or obtaining something—as is the fortitude of the heart that is required in daring and hope. However, a passive disposition of the heart is the opposite of this, either in virtue of a defect of the heart in itself, which is called its “restriction”—which is required in grief—or according to its defect in its relation toward doing something, which is called “weakness of heart”—which is required in fear and desperation. Now, “compression” signifies a thing’s motion arising from another due to which it is withdrawn into itself, where it is in a way drawn together; and therefore it indicates a disposition of the heart that is a weakness, through which it falls short of certain things due to something else, and stays within its very self.
Therefore in this way the meaning of Damascene’s definition is clear. For he called it a “desire” to signify the genus of fear, which is action or the motion of appetite. Moreover, he said, “moving one to close in on oneself” to assign its proper difference, which is taken from its material cause. And fear is spoken of even in spiritual things through a likeness to this, when the motion of the will recoils from something and stays within its very self.
Reply Obj. 1: “Desire” is placed there in a broad sense, for appetite, which is common to the irascible and the concupiscible parts.
Reply Obj. 2: And through this, the reply to the second objection is clear.
Reply Obj. 3: Even in flight there is an appetite for fleeing, which here is being called a “desire.”
Reply Obj. 4: In spiritual things there is a contraction by way of likeness, as was said in the body of the article
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that fear is here being distinguished according to the order of fear relative to God, whom one approaches or is distant through one fear more than through another. For since fear consists in a flight from evil, and evil is either a punishment or a fault, there will be a fear that consists in the flight from the evil of fault alone, through which a man is separated from God—and this is chaste, or filial fear—but another that consists in the flight from the evil of punishment.
Now, punishment is of two sorts. One punishment someone might sometimes commit a sin to avoid, such as temporal punishments; and worldly, or human fear flees this punishment. The other someone never sins in trying to avoid; rather, in it sin itself is being avoided, such as the punishment that will be after this life. And servile fear flees this.
However, another fear flees both evils, that of punishment and that of fault. This is initial fear, which has an eye on each, and therefore it is a mean between servile and chaste fears.
Reply Obj. 1: Evil happens in multifarious ways, but the good in one way, according to Dionysius and the Philosopher. (Pseudeo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 30 (PG 3:730); Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106b15‒35.) And therefore hope, which looks to the good, is not divided the way that fear, which looks to the evil, does.
Reply Obj. 2: It is not the same punishment that worldly and servile fears look to, as is clear from things said. But servile and initial fear do look to the same punishment, but the servile does so as its principal object, whereas the initial fear does not, but more as toward the evil of fault. Whence the latter belongs more with chaste fear than with servile fear.
Reply Obj. 3: Initial fear is distinguished from chaste fear not insofar as it is imperfectly related to what chaste fear is perfectly related, but rather because it also relates to a different object, although in a consequent way, as was said.
Reply Sed Contra 4: Worldly fear is distinguished from human fear according to the species of nature, but it is placed in that same grade in virtue of its nearness to merit and demerit, according to which the fears are here being distinguished.
Reply Sed Contra 5: Nature is preserved even in merit and demerit, so natural fear is not laid down as a grade of distance or proximity to merit or demerit. And on account of this, he makes no mention of it in the first division.
Reply Sed Contra 6: Those parts of fear are assigned in reference to their objects. However, he does not intend to divide fear in this way here, but as was said in the body.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that worldly and human fear, since they are disordered, cannot be gifts of the Holy Spirit. Rather, they are either emotions, or choices resembling emotions, or even habits, insofar as habits are named by the name of their activities or emotions. Likewise also servile fear does not reach the perfection of the gift, just as neither does unformed faith reach the perfect notion of the virtue. For, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.8, 1116a28; 4.9, 1128b28.) in every virtue this is common: the virtuous man acts for the sake of the good, or for the sake of avoiding the base. Now, servile fear does the good but not for the sake of fleeing the base, but for the sake of fleeing grief. Whence it falls short of the perfection of virtue, and much more from the perfection of a gift, which is more perfect than a virtue.
However, chaste fear, and initial fear insofar as it participates in chaste fear, has the notion of the gift—the notion of which is that it measures its acts by a higher measure than is human. For the measure of human deeds is the good of reason. Whence the virtuous man abstains from evils, fleeing and fearing what is unsuitable to reason, which is the base, and this fear is connected to every virtue. But the fear that is the gift makes one abstain from evils for the sake of fleeing the unsuitability of separation from God; this is why it has God as the measure of its activity. And because the mode is caused by the measure, therefore it works above the human mode, and on account of this it is a gift.
Reply Obj. 1: Fear is a gift not insofar as it is an emotion, but insofar as it is a certain habit infused by God. Similarly, neither is hope a virtue insofar as it is an emotion, but insofar as it is a certain habit perfecting one for an act like that of the emotion that is hope. Now, the pain that is an emotion of the sensitive part is not a part of penitence—although this too can be joined to penitence; rather, this is the pain that occurs in the rational part, which is more of an activity than an emotion. Also, the joy that occurs in the sensitive part of the soul is not the fruit; but the joy that occurs in reason cannot be called an emotion, properly speaking, although it has a certain likeness to the emotion.
Reply Obj. 2: Fear of things that are beneath man pertains to a man’s weakness, but fear of God, who is above man, does not belong to our weakness, but rather, to our greatest perfection in him. For in this itself, the lower that is most subject to its superior is most perfect.
Reply Obj. 3: Fear is not said to be a love essentially, but through its cause. For love is the cause of fear.
Article 2
Whether servile fear is from the Holy Spirit
Quaestiuncula 1
To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST II-II.19.4; Super Rom. 8, lect. 3.) It seems that servile fear is not from the Holy Spirit.
Obj. 1: For whatever is from the Holy Spirit can be together with him. But servile fear is not possessed together with the Holy Spirit, since he is not had without charity, with which there is no servile fear. Therefore servile fear is not from the Holy Spirit.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as God should be loved for his own sake, so should he also be feared for his own sake. But the mercenary love with which someone loves God for the sake of temporal goods is not from the Holy Spirit, as it is illicit; for those temporal goods are loved more than God. Therefore servile fear too, with which God is feared on account of punishments, is not from the Holy Spirit.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is born from the root of sin is not from the Holy Spirit. But servile fear is born from a fear that is the root of sin; this is why, on Job 3:2, why did I not die in the womb?, (The RSV reads: “let the day perish wherein I was born.”) Gregory says, since present punishment is feared due to sin, and when the face of God is abandoned he is not loved, the fear arises not because of humility but because of one is puffed up. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 4, ch. 27, para. 50 (CCSL 143; PL 75:662).) Therefore it appears that servile fear is not from the Holy Spirit.
On the contrary, on Romans 8:15, you did not receive the spirit of slavery to fall back into fear, the Gloss says, there is one spirit that causes the two fears, the servile and the chaste. (Glossa Ordinaria (PL 114:496).) But chaste fear is surely from the Holy Spirit. Therefore so is the servile.
Furthermore, it is not smaller thing to fear God than to believe him. But even unformed faith is from the Holy Spirit. Therefore even servile fear is from the Holy Spirit.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that it is not good to make use of servile fear. (Parallels: ST II-II.19.4; Super Rom. 8, lect. 3.) For a good use is that by which a good thing is done, and done well. But according to Augustine on Rom 8:15, you did not receive the spirit of slavery, (Although formerly attributed to Augustine, now attributed to Prosper of Aquitane, Liber Sententiarum, bk. 1, ch. 173 (CCSL 68A; PL 45:1873).) when one has servile fear, even if one does something good, still it is not done well. Therefore making use of it is bad.
Obj. 2: Every act of fear comes from a love. But the act of servile fear does not come from a love of charity. Therefore it comes from a licentious love, so it is bad.
Obj. 3: One inappropriate circumstance renders evil an entire act. But the act of servile fear appears to be fearing in a servile way, which is a base circumstance. Therefore making use of servile fear is bad.
On the contrary, the use of which is bad is itself also bad, since a sound tree cannot bear evil fruit (Matt 7:18). But servile fear is a good thing, since it is from God. Therefore making use of it is good.
Furthermore, using servile fear is abstaining from sin and leads one to wisdom. But this is a good thing. Therefore making use of servile fear is a good thing.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that servile fear is not taken away upon the arrival of charity. (Parallels: ST II-II.19.6; 19.8.ad 2, ad 10; De veritate, q. 14, a. 7, ad 2; q. 28, a. 4, ad 3.) For servile fear arises from an unformed faith. But unformed faith remains according to the habit’s substance, and is formed by the charity that comes to it. Therefore fear too is not expelled at the arrival of charity.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, only sin is taken away upon the arrival of charity, and what is introduced by sin. Now, servile fear is not such a thing, since it is from God. Therefore it is not expelled on the arrival of charity.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, what stands to another as an addition includes the latter; it does not take it away. But initial fear stands to servile fear as an addition, since it fears punishment as does servile fear, and beyond that, it fears separation. Therefore at the arrival of initial fear, servile fear is not expelled. Therefore neither is it so with the arrival of charity, without which there is no initial fear.
On the contrary, there is what Augustine says, quoted in the text, (Sent. III, 34.4(126).1, quoting Augustine, In Iohannis epistulam ad Parthos tractatus, tract. 4, n. 4 (PL 35:2406).) that servile fear is cast out upon the arrival of charity.
Furthermore, freedom does not coexist with servitude. But the presence of charity causes freedom, because where the Spirit of the Lord is—who is not present without charity—there is freedom (2 Cor 3:17). Therefore servile fear is expelled on the arrival of charity.
Furthermore, no one principally fearing punishment has charity. But whoever has servile fear is like this. Therefore, as before.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 1, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2, 982b26; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 1, lect. 3, n. 58.) the free man is he who is for his own sake, whereas the servant should be understood in the contrary way, as he who is for the sake of another, and not his own. Now, we are for the sake of the things that pertain to us through our will. Whence someone is said to do something freely which he does with a spontaneous will, whereas that which he lacks the will to do he does in a servile way; moreover, he does it as coerced by the violence of another or by fear, and therefore he does it with grief, since every coercion is against one’s will, and sad, as is said in the Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.5, 1015a28.)
And in virtue of this, someone is said to do something from a “free spirit” because he does it with delight, with his will being well-pleased, but he does it with a servile fear if he does it while coerced by a fear of punishment, and consequently with grief. For he would prefer not to do it, had he not been made afraid by the penalty. Therefore it is clear that servility follows on fear insofar as it inclines one toward doing something or setting it aside.
Now, this inclination does not enter into the essence of fear, but is its effect, whereas it has its essence from its relation to its proper object—which is the eternal punishment of which the faith speaks. Whence servility is an accident of fear, and it does not enter into its essence, and therefore its essence is good, since to flee eternal punishments is only good. Whence servile fear according to its own essence is from the Holy Spirit, although it is not the gift of the Holy Spirit—except commonly speaking, as we say that everything given by the Holy Spirit is his gift. However, we are not speaking of gifts this way right now. But that condition of servility that includes the lack of the will of justice is not from the Holy Spirit.
Reply Obj. 1: Certain things are from the Holy Spirit that are not present with the Holy Spirit, like unformed faith and servile fear, and this is only on account of an accompanying defect. But certain other things are from the Holy Spirit and are present with him, like charity, other things are with him but not from him, like venial sin, and others are neither from him nor with him, like mortal sin.
Reply Obj. 2: The object of love is the good, but the object of fear, as we are speaking of it now, is an evil that is fled. Now, one finds goodness in God, and therefore he is to be loved for his own sake and not for the sake of anything else. But there is no evil in him, although a certain evil is from him, the evil of punishment. And therefore fearing God on account of the evil that he inflicts is not evil in virtue of itself. However, how the excellent good might be feared with a fear of reverence will be explained below. (Below, a. 3, resp. 4.)
Reply Obj. 3: Gregory is speaking about fear by reason of its servility, that is, insofar as sin holds back the will. This is clear from his words before this, when he adds, he is haughty who does not abandon his sin if he be allowed not to be punished. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 4, ch. 27 (CCSL 143; PL 75:662).) Or it could be said that that fear from which is born a servile fear of punishment, as regards its own act, is not the disordered fear that is the root of sin; rather, it is the natural fear by which someone naturally flees all that is harmful.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that whatever belongs to the substance of a habit must shine forth in its act, insofar as the sorts of habit they are make the acts be the sort of thing they are, as is said in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.1, 1103b21.) Now, it is not necessary that everything incidental to some habit is always manifested in its act—just as having something repugnant to charity is accidental to unformed faith, yet it is not necessary that something repugnant to charity is always found in its act.
Therefore, since servility is incidental to the habit of fear, due to the subject’s imperfection, as is clear from things said, it is not necessary that its act always have in itself the conditions of servility. Rather, the act will possess goodness in proportion to the substance of its habit—that is, not a meritorious goodness, just as the habit does not possess a gratuitous goodness. And because the habit does not have the perfect notion of goodness, therefore the lack of any appropriate goodness, or any disorder, in the act is not repugnant to the substance of the habit, whereas every disordered act is repugnant to the habit of a virtue, which possesses perfect goodness. And on account of this, the use of a virtue is always good, but the use of a sin is always bad—whereas an act of servile fear can be both good and bad.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking about when something is done with servile fear by reason of its servility.
Reply Obj. 2: An act of servile fear, when it is good, does not arise from a gratuitous love nor from a licentious love, but from a natural love by which someone wants the preservation and well-being of his own subject. This is why he dreads every punishment, whether experience teaches it, as with natural fear, or the faith points to it, as with servile fear.
Reply Obj. 3: Fearing in a servile way is not always an act of servile fear, as is clear from things said.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that servile fear remains upon the arrival of charity as regards is substance, but not as regards its servility. For it is certain that a man who possesses charity fears eternal punishments, which were its proper object as regards the substance of the habit. For that he fears this more than anything else is not by reason of the habit, but by reason of its servility.
Reply Obj. 1–3, Sed Contra: And through this, the solution to each part of the arguments is clear.
Article 3
Whether chaste fear is the same in substance with servile fear
Quaestiuncula 1
To the third we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST II-II.19.5.) It appears that chaste fear is the same in substance as servile fear.
Obj. 1: For servile fear stands to unformed faith just as chaste fear stands to formed faith. Therefore, alternately, unformed faith stands to formed faith just as servile fear stands to chaste fear. But formed faith is the same in substance as unformed faith. Therefore so is chaste fear the same in substance as servile fear.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the separation from God, which is what a chaste fear fears, is included in eternal punishment, which is what a servile fear fears. But the way the objects are related is the way the habits are related. Therefore chaste fear is included in servile fear, and thus they do not differ in substance.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, those things wherein the one is the reason for the other pertain to the same habit, such as love of God and love of neighbor. But separation from God is the reason for all eternal punishment. Therefore they pertain to the same habit, and therefore chaste fear and servile fear do not differ in the substance of the habit.
On the contrary, servile fear is farther away from the perfection of the gift of fear than is virtue, which is more perfect than servile fear, as was said. But the gift of fear differs from virtue in the substance of the habit. Therefore much more so from servile fear.
Furthermore, habits are divided through their acts and objects. But the dishonorable or base, which is what chaste fear fears, and the sorrowful or punitive, which is what servile fear fears, are not called evil by one notion, nor univocally. Therefore servile fear and chaste fear are not the same habit.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that initial fear differs in substance from chaste fear. (Parallel: ST II-II.19.8.) For initial fear includes servile fear, since it fears punishment. But servile fear, according to the habit’s substance, differs from chaste fear. Therefore so too does initial fear.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the same thing is not divided against its very self. But chaste fear is divided against initial fear in the text. (Sent. III, 34.4(126).1.) Therefore they are not the same in substance.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as initial fear is more perfect than servile, so is chaste fear more perfect than initial. But initial fear is not the same as servile fear—for if they were the same, then the former would not be the same as chaste fear, which differs in substance from servile fear, as has been shown. Therefore chaste fear also is not the same as initial fear.
On the contrary, the perfect and the imperfect do not change a habit’s substance. But chaste fear and initial fear differ as the perfect differs from the imperfect. Therefore they do not differ according to the habit’s substance.
Furthermore, habits are distinguished through their acts and objects. But the object that initial fear principally looks to is the same as that which chaste fear looks to, as was shown. Therefore they are the same according to the habit’s substance.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that chaste fear diminishes as charity increases. (Parallel: ST II-II.19.10.) For initial fear and chaste fear are the same in substance, as has been shown. But initial fear diminishes as charity increases, as is said in the text. (Sent. III, 34.4(126).1.) Therefore so does chaste fear.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, every fear has a punishment, as is said in 1 John 4:18. But perfect charity has no punishment. Therefore insofar as charity grows so does every fear decrease.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, where separation is impossible, there is no fear of separation. Therefore to the degree that someone is separated from God with greater difficulty, so far is the fear of separation diminished. But to the degree that one’s charity grows, so much more difficult is it to separate one from God, since one is bound to him more tightly. Therefore to the degree that charity grows, so too does the fear of separation, called “chaste fear,” decrease.
On the contrary, chaste fear is a gift of the Holy Spirit. But all the virtues and gifts grow together, just as they are also infused together. Therefore when charity grows, chaste fear grows.
Furthermore, love is the cause of fear. But when the cause increases, the effect increases. Therefore when charity increases, fear increases.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that fear is emptied out at the coming of glory. (Parallels: ST I-II.67.4.ad 2; II-II.19.11; De spe, a. 4, ad 2.) For the reason for fearing is the possibility of an evil. But with those who are in glory, there is no possibility of evil, which is fear’s object. Therefore there will be no fear there.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, hope appears to be more perfect than fear, since hope is perfected through the fortitude of the heart, whereas fear occurs through a weakness of it, as was said. But hope does not remain in heaven. Therefore much less does fear.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, everything that belongs to perfection is present in God. But there is no fear in God. Therefore it does not belong to perfection, so it excluded when glory comes.
On the contrary, the fear of the Lord is clean, enduring for ever (Ps 19:9).
Furthermore, fear is owed to the highest majesty: if I am a master, where is my fear? says the Lord of hosts (Mal 1:6). But in the future we will be paying God everything we owe him. Therefore we will fear him.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, evil is of two sorts: one that consists in the will of the one it is in, which is called the “evil of fault,” and the other that is an evil against the will of the one it is in, which is called the “evil of punishment.”
Now, someone abhors the evil of fault either because it deviates from the rectitude of reason—and in this way this is fear of its dishonorable contrary, a fear implanted in every virtue—or because it causes one to deviate from God himself—and in this way it pertains to the gift of fear. However, an abhorrence of deviation from any rule is due to a love for that rule. Whence the fear that is the gift is caused by the love of God, and therefore it is called “friendly fear” or “filial fear,” inasmuch as God is said to be our Father, or it is even called “chaste fear” insofar as God is metaphorically said to be the Spouse of our souls.
However, a servile fear, as was said above, (Above, a. 2, resp. 1.) inclines one to do something against one’s own will. Whence that evil must have as its proper object what is opposed to the will, having from this notion of evil its being the evil of punishment. And in this way servile and chaste fear do not have the same object, but diverse objects, and on account of this they differ according to the substance of the habit.
Reply Obj. 1: The object of formed faith and that of unformed faith is the same, whereas this is not the case for servile and chaste fear. Moreover, the alternated proportion does not hold true in all things, but in numbers and magnitudes, as is said in the Posterior Analytics 1. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.5, 74a18; Aquinas, Post. Anal., bk. 1, lect. 12, n. 8.)
Reply Obj. 2: Although a friend delights in his friend’s presence, still he does not on that account seek the presence of the friend for the sake of delighting in it, but rather for the sake of the friend himself, to whom he wishes to be joined however he can be. So too chaste fear does not fear the separation insofar as it is a punishment, but insofar as it puts him at a distance from his beloved.
Reply Obj. 3: Whatever is the reason for another thing, as formally completing the object, does not pertain to a different habit or power, just as light and color are related [to vision]. And in this way God is the reason for loving one’s neighbor through charity. But that which is the reason for another thing as the latter’s cause need not pertain to the same habit, nor even to the same power, just as heat, which is the cause of an odor, is known by touch, whereas the odor is known by smell. And in a similar way the separation from God is said to be the reason for eternal punishment as its cause, so they need not pertain to the same habit.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that in all of the fears spoken about one should consider two acts, one the principal act, which a fear elicits—namely, flight from this or that evil—and the other the secondary act, which is what a fear commands—namely, to do or refrain from doing this or that for the sake of the flight from that evil that one fears.
Therefore initial fear, in reference to the first act, does not differ from chaste fear, since to fear eternal punishments is not the act of initial fear; rather, it comes with that act, as does chaste fear as well. But the act of initial fear is to fear the separation [from God], as is also that of chaste fear, although not as perfectly. But in its second act, chaste fear differs from initial fear. For initial fear commands some act or refraining from some act for the sake of [flight] not only from the separation, but also from the punishment, which does not occur in chaste fear, which has its eye only on the separation.
However, acts commanded incidentally are related to the commanding habits, and therefore initial fear and chaste fear are the same in the substance of the habit, yet they differ incidentally, as is clear from things said.
Reply Obj. 1: Initial fear does not include servile fear in virtue of its essence, but insofar as they come together for the commanding of one act.
Reply Obj. 2: They are divided as opposites by reason of that accident wherein they differ, namely, perfection and imperfection in the elicited act, and with respect to what motivates them in the commanded act, as was said.
Reply Obj. 3: Servile fear differs from initial fear in its object, and consequently in its principal act; but this is not the case with initial and chaste fear, so the account is not alike.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that in these fears there are two acts, as was said.
Therefore if we are speaking of the elicited act, then one should speak in one way of servile fear and in another of initial and chaste fear. For the act elicited by initial and chaste fears is the fearing of separation, for which two things are required: one on the part of the subject, which belongs to an imperfection—namely, the possibility of separation, since one does not fear the impossible—and the other on the part of the object, namely, the love of that from which one fears to be separated; for one does not care whether he is separated from what he does not love. And this belongs to its perfection.
Therefore the growth of charity causes the growth of the act of the fear of separation insofar as it belongs to perfection, but causes its decrease insofar as it belongs to imperfection. And because habits exist for the sake of removing imperfection from their subject, when charity grows the habit of chaste and initial fear grows. However, that act that the habit of fear elicits, which before was servile, charity causes likewise to diminish as regards the possibility of punishment. For to the degree that one’s charity is greater, so is one’s distance from punishment. But it does not make it grow in its relation to the object, since charity is not directly a love of that good contrary to that punishment. Nor in this respect does [charity] make [the act] decrease any further, except relatively, insofar as when charity grows it always extends further and further due to the act of chaste fear. However, if we are speaking of the act commanded by these two fears, then in no way does it diminish the act of chaste fear. And perfect charity casts it outside in this respect: such that one’s eye is no longer focused on punishment in doing or refraining from doing. But it diminishes the act of initial fear not insofar as it has an eye on punishment, but insofar as it has an eye on separation.
Reply Obj. 1: In the text (Sent. III, 34.5(127).1.) initial fear is not said to be diminished relative to what it has in common with chaste fear, but relative to what it has in common with servile fear.
Reply Obj. 2: Fear holds punishment only insofar as it looks to something that is contrary to the will, namely, punishment. And this is belongs to servile and initial fear.
To the third, the solution is clear from what was said in the body.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that fear, properly speaking, has evil for its object—but not every evil, but the evil that consists in being arduous; otherwise it would not be in the irascible [part of the soul]. Now, we do not fear an evil that can be easily overcome or avoided; rather, we only hate it. But the evil of separation from God consists in the most arduous thing there is; whence, when the possibility for this evil is taken away, [only] man’s relation to God as arduous will still remain. And therefore fear is taken away as regards the act that is the fearing of separation, but it will remain as regards the act that is being in awe of and revering him as arduous; and this latter occurs when a man shrinks into his own smallness from a consideration of so great a height.
Reply Obj. 1: And through this, the reply to the first objection is clear.
Reply Obj. 2: Hope indicates distance from the arduous thing, whereas fear does not. Therefore hope does not remain, whereas fear does.
Reply Obj. 3: To be subject to a superior belongs to the perfection of what is created, but not to the perfection of the Creator. For what belongs to the perfection of one thing does not belong to perfection of another, especially with God. For the perfection of a nature as created, and as glorified, and as uncreated are different, as the Master has said in Book II. (In II Sent., d. 4, a. 1.)
Question 3
The gifts of fortitude and piety
Next, one asks about the other two subsequent gifts:
first, about fortitude;
second, about piety.
Article 1
Whether the fortitude that is a gift differs from the fortitude that is a virtue
Quaestiuncula 1
To the first we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST II-II.139.1.) It appears that the fortitude that is a gift does not differ from the fortitude that is a virtue.
Obj. 1: For according to Dionysius, in the Celestial Hierarchy, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7, para. 1 (PG 3:206).) we must receive the properties of spiritual things from their names. But the habits of the virtue and the gift agree in the name “fortitude.” Therefore they share in their property, and thus they appear to be the same in reality.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Gregory says in Morals on the Book of Job 1. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 1, ch. 32, para. 44 (CCSL 143; PL 75:547).) that fortitude is what gives confidence to those who tremble, and he says this about the gift of fortitude. But the same pertains to the fortitude that is a virtue, since the man of virtuous fortitude is unperturbed about fears, as is said in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.9, 1117a29‒b19.) Therefore they are the same thing.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, as was said, a gift differs from a virtue insofar as it exceeds it. But the virtue of fortitude, since it is about the most difficult thing of all, which is death—cannot be exceeded by anything. Therefore the gift of fortitude does not differ from the virtue of fortitude.
On the contrary, diverse genera and ones that are not subordinately arranged have diverse species and differences, according to the Philosopher in the Categories. (Aristotle, Categories 3, 1b6.) But gift and virtue are such genera. Therefore the fortitude found in the genus “gift” differs from the fortitude found in the genus “virtue.”
Furthermore, in the Book on the Spirit and the Soul (Liber de spiritu et anima (Pseudo-Augustine, more likely attributed to Alcherus Claraeuallensis), ch. 20 (PG 40:794).) it is said that to fortitude belongs not only the restraint of earthly desires, but a total forgetfulness about them. But desires are not the matter of the fortitude that is a virtue. Therefore one must understand this to be about the gift of fortitude, and thus it appears that there is not just one fortitude that is the gift and is the virtue.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it is asked what is its act on the path of this life. And it appears that it does not have a unified act. For, as is commonly said, fortitude is performed in things that not all men are bound toward, and where counsel gives direction, as are the deeds of supererogation. But this cannot be traced back to one species of act, since deeds of this sort are found in nearly all the virtues. Therefore fortitude does not have an act that is one in species.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Gregory says (source) that the spirit of fortitude is to shine in miracles and teaching. But these two are diverse genera, both relative to each other, and relative to the different acts that are assigned to the gift of fortitude. Therefore the same as before.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Augustine says, in On Christian Doctrine, (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 2, ch. 7, n. 10 (CCSL 32; PL 34:39).) where he speaks about the gifts, that it belongs to fortitude to segregate oneself from the deadly pleasure of all things that are passing away. Now, Gregory says (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 1, ch. 32, para. 44 (CCSL 143; PL 75:547).) that fortitude gives confidence to one who trembles about adversities. But these two do not trace back to one genus, since the former appears to pertain to the matter of temperance and the latter to the matter of fortitude, or patience. Therefore it appears that they do not have one act.
On the contrary, habits are distinguished through their acts. But the gift of fortitude is one habit, so it has one act.
Furthermore, a gift is simpler than a virtue, since it is more sublime. But fortitude the virtue has one principal act, that is, to endure dangers for the sake of the good. Therefore much more does the gift of fortitude have one act.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, one asks about the act of fortitude in heaven. And it appears that it has no act there. For what pertains to being filled up, in reference to the state of glory, is placed in the fourth beatitude. But this does not signify any act. Therefore, since the fourth beatitude is adapted to the gift of fortitude, it appears that it does not have any act in heaven.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, to endure difficulties appears to be proper to fortitude. But in heaven every difficulty is taken away, otherwise the highest delight would not be found there. Therefore no act of fortitude will be found there.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the fortitude’s act pertains to the active life. But the active life, as the saints say, will not remain in heaven, but only the contemplative. Therefore there will be no act of fortitude there.
On the contrary, a habit appears to be nothing more than that a facility for an act; this is why the Commentator says in On the Soul 3 (Averroes, Commentary on On the Soul, bk. 3.) that a habit is that by which someone does something when he wants to. But the habit of fortitude will remain in heaven, as the Master showed through authorities earlier. (Sent. III, 33.3(122).3‒5; see above, d. 33, q. 1, a. 4.) Therefore even the act of fortitude will be there.
Furthermore, a habit without its act is like sleeping, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.8. 1099a1.) But the happy and blessed man, as he says there, is not like someone asleep, but like one who is awake, since then he is in his ultimate perfection. Therefore, since the habit of fortitude is there, so will be its act.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that the gifts differ from the virtues, as was said, insofar as the gifts operate in a higher mode. And one should take the difference between the gift of fortitude and the virtue of fortitude in reference to this. Now, the mode of each thing is established by its proper measure, as was said before.
Whence one should note that the virtue of fortitude has human strength as the measure of its acts; this is why things that go beyond a man’s strength he neither attempts nor endures. Whence the Philosopher in the Ethics 3 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.7, 1115b11.) says that man of fortitude is as dauntless as a man can be in such things, namely, things that are terrible in reference to man. But the gift of fortitude has as the measure of its own acts the divine power, in whose help it confides, as is said in Psalm 18:29, by my God I can leap over a wall, that is, all things that can be an obstacle to human weakness.
Reply Obj. 1: Fortitude the gift and the fortitude the virtue agree in a certain property, since both look to the endurance of something difficult. But it is not necessary that they be wholly the same in reality.
Reply Obj. 2: Trembling can burst forth from two sources: in one way, only from the difficulty of the adversities—and the virtue of fortitude restrains this trembling—and in another way, from the adversity’s difficulty together with the man’s weakness, or even powerlessness, to resist it. And this latter trembling the gift of fortitude restrains, from one’s trust in divine aid.
Reply Obj. 3: The virtue of fortitude is about the difficulties according to its genus, yet not according to their relation to the agent, because they do not exceed his power. But the gift of fortitude is also about things that exceed human capacity, yet not in a foolish way, for they do not exceed the capacity of the divine power, on which the gift is reposes.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that to the degree that a power is higher, it extends to more things. And because human capacity is weak relative to the divine capacity, therefore diverse human capacities are ordered to diverse difficulties, and sometimes they are separate from each other. For one man has the capacity for being able to overcome easily the difficulties found in delights, who nonetheless cannot easily overcome the difficulties found in suffering assaults, and so on for other things. But the divine capacity is one and the same with respect to all of the described difficulties.
And therefore, because the virtue of fortitude rests upon a human capacity, it is not related to all difficulties, but only to those that are the greatest in the genus of human affairs. This is why it has the name “fortitude” or “strength” in a more excellent way, whereas other virtues, which are also certain capacities, are ordered to the other difficulties. But the gift of fortitude uses the divine will as its own, as Psalm 18:1 says: I love thee, O Lord, my strength. And therefore the one gift of fortitude extends to all the difficulties that can occur in human affairs, even those above human capacity, as the Apostle said to the Philippians: I can do all things in him who strengthens me (Phil 4:13). And therefore one must take the act of fortitude as regarding all difficulties, analogous with the act of the virtue of fortitude as regarding certain difficulties.
However, since fortitude the virtue is concerned with fears and feelings of daring, it has two acts: one which is to confront, insofar as it is moderates daring feelings, the other which is to endure, insofar as it moderates the fears. But this latter act is more the principal one, insofar as it is more difficult to endure present difficulties than to pursue absent ones. And likewise, the principal act of the gift of fortitude is to endure all difficulties, whether in sufferings or in deeds. And to this is ordered the other act, which is the confrontation of difficult and arduous things in the hope of divine help.
However, these two acts do not differ in species, since the one is ordered to the other, and the notion of direction is the same in them. And therefore the gift of fortitude has an act that is one in species.
Reply Obj. 1: Because deeds of supererogation appear to carry the greatest difficulty, exceeding human strength, this is why the gift of fortitude is chiefly concerned with them. Yet it is also concerned with the other difficulties that concern virtue in common, but not in the same way, as has been said.
Reply Obj. 2: Something pertains to the virtue of fortitude in two ways. In one way, as its principal object or act, as the dangers of death that are endured for the sake of the good. In another way, as the instruments, or aids, that the man of fortitude needs for his act, such as arms and the company of soldiers. So too does the gift look to the very difficulties that are found principally in human sufferings and deeds, but to miracles and teaching as aids for its acts; this is clear with the apostles, who by miracles and teaching led the whole world into captivity under the faith, unto allegiance to Christ. And according to this Gregory says that it pertains to the gift of fortitude to shine with miracles and teaching.
Reply Obj. 3: Although they pertain to diverse virtues, they can nonetheless pertain to one gift, as was said. And in this way their objects are the same in species, insofar as they are specified in the way the gift is specified.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that whoever acts according to a measure must have some act according to which he looks to that measure, and some act according to which he looks to what is measured by it. Whence, since fortitude measures its act concerning difficulties by the divine power, it has one act in relation to the difficulties that it endures or confronts, and another act in its comparison to the divine power, on which it leans. And the first act will not exist in heaven, where there will be no difficulty, whereas the second will be there, since one will lean most perfectly on the divine power.
Reply Obj. 1: Even in bodily things “fullness” does not name any act, yet it does presuppose one, namely, the eating of food. And thus this fullness that is placed here, which is the filling up with all things, from the lack of which a difficulty was possible, presupposes a certain spiritual food. In virtue of such food, a man takes in the good described from the divine power itself, being supported by it.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the active life does not remain as regards its essence, still it remains as regards its measure toward its end. For in the things that belong to the active life we are measured by the divine truth itself.
Reply Obj. 3: This is clear from the things said.
Article 2
Whether piety is a gift
Quaestiuncula 1
To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel: ST II-II.121.1.) It seems that piety is not a gift.
Obj. 1: For a gift more immediately orders one to God than does a virtue. But the piety that is a virtue immediately orders one to God, since, according to Augustine in the City of God, (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 10, ch. 1 (CCSL 47; PL 41:279).) piety is customarily understood as properly the devotion to God, which the Greeks call “theosebia.” Therefore piety is not a gift, since it does not join one to God more immediately than does the virtue of piety.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Gregory in Morals on the Book of Job 1, (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 1, ch. 32, para. 44 (CCSL 143; PL 75:547).) piety is what teaches one to perform works of mercy, but this piety appears to be the same as mercy, which is a virtue. Therefore, since Gregory is speaking there of the piety that is said to be a gift, it appears that the piety that is said to be a gift is a virtue. But no virtue is a gift. Therefore piety can in no way be a gift.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Cicero, (Cicero, Rhetorici libri duo qui uocantur De inuentione, bk. 2, ch. 53.) piety is good will toward one’s parents, and he puts it among the parts of justice. But justice is a virtue. Therefore so is piety, so it is not a gift.
On the contrary, in Isaiah 11 it is counted among the gifts.
Furthermore, piety appears to be the most excellent thing in the entire Christian life. For it avails for all things, as is said in 1 Timothy 4:8. And Ambrose’s Gloss (Rather, Ambrosiaster, Commentarius in Pauli epistulas, on 1 Tim 4:8 (CSEL 81.3:275; PL 17:500).) on this passage says the same thing. Therefore piety most of all should be listed as a gift.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, one asks about the act that piety has in this life. And it appears that it does not have an act that is one in species. For Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 2, ch. 7 (CCSL 32; PL 34:39).) that it belongs to piety to honor the saints, [and] not to contradict the Scriptures, whether understood or not. And here he is speaking of the gift of piety; this is clear from the things he says in a sermon on the Trinity, (source) wherein he attributes this same act to the piety according to which one ascends to the second place among the gifts. However, Gregory assigns being steadfast in works of mercy as its action. Therefore, because these two actions do not trace back to the same genus, it appears that the acts of piety are not the same in species.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, as is commonly said, what knowledge directs one toward, piety performs. But knowledge directs all human acts, since it teaches one how to interact without giving offense in the midst of a depraved and perverse nation. Therefore piety too is concerned with all human acts, and thus it does not have an act that is of only one species.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the second beatitude, wherein is said, blessed are the meek, is traced back to piety. But meekness, or gentleness, concerns the emotions of anger, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.5, 1125b26‒1126b9.) Therefore piety is also concerned with the same. But it is also present in interactions relative to others, as is clear from the authority of Gregory, noted above. (In obj. 1.) Therefore, since these two are not traced back to the same genus, it appears that piety does not have an act that is one in species.
On the contrary, it is one habit, so it has one principal act.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, one asks about its act in heaven. And it appears there it has no act there. For piety consists in interactions that occur relative to others. But such interactions will not occur in heaven, since there all will receive fullness from God; for interactions among us are introduced because each of us is insufficient by himself, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.6, 1134a27.) Therefore the act of piety will not occur there.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it pertains to piety to perform works of mercy, as was said in the authority of Gregory. (See qa. 1, obj. 2.) But works of mercy will not be present where there will be no misery. Therefore no act of piety will be present in heaven.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, in the second beatitude, which pertains to piety, the possession of the earth is mentioned in reference to the state of heaven. But this does not appear to indicate any act. Therefore piety will have no act in heaven.
On the contrary, the virtue of justice appears to remain in heaven more than does fortitude as was said before. (Above,* d. 33, q. 1, a. 4.)* Therefore, since the gift of fortitude, which corresponds to the virtue of fortitude, has a certain act in heaven, much more does it seem that piety, which corresponds to justice, have one.
Furthermore, in heaven there will be nothing idle and pointless. But a habit would be pointless if it does not go into act, since activity is a habit’s end. Therefore, since the habit of piety will remain in heaven, so will its act.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that the entire matter of morality is divided into three parts: namely, things that are delightful, which one’s carnal affection seeks; things that are difficult, which it flees; and things that can be shared, which are related to others, which consist more in action than in being acted upon. Therefore both a gift and a virtue direct one in each of these things, but in different ways. For a virtue gives direction in them while receiving something human as its rule, whereas a gift does so while receiving as its rule something divine. Therefore in delights we are directed by virtue as by the dignity of our human nature, whose disturbance through temporal delights we flee; but we are directed by a gift as by its rule the divine dignity itself, the separation from which, due to the pollution of goods of this sort, we flee. This pertains to [the gift of] fear. Similarly, it is clear from the things said, (Above, d. 34, q. 3, a. 1, resp. 1.) that the gift of fortitude directs us in a different way than do the virtues, which are ordered to enduring or confronting difficulties. Something similar happens in interactions towards others, since the virtues give direction in these things, taking for their measure something human, such as the observance of what is becoming, or the obligation of one who is involved in the interactions. On the other hand, the gift in these things receives as its rule God himself, as was said, such that in fortitude a man confronts difficult matters with the aid of the divine power, through a confidence in it as though it were his own; in this way one interacts with another treating God as if he were himself—namely, such that the things that are becoming in these interactions he performs as if he were united to God. Whence in Matthew 5:45 the Lord praises the beneficence of the heavenly Father, who makes his sun rise on both the good and the evil. And because the interaction relative to divine things has the name “piety,” this is also why the gift that holds the divine measure in its interactions is named “piety.”
Reply Obj. 1: The gift orders one more immediately to God in its mode of acting, or the measure of its act, than does the virtue—but not as regards its object or end. Therefore although piety the virtue, which is called “latria,” is shown to God himself, still in this it receives something human as its measure—that is, a benefit received from God, by reason of which one is in debt to him. But the piety that is the gift receives therein something divine as its measure—that is, that he honors God not because he is in debt to him, but because God is worthy of honor, in the way that God himself is to be honored even by himself.
Reply Obj. 2: Piety the gift differs from mercy in this, because mercy is zealous about alleviating the miseries of one’s neighbors because they are joined to us either by blood, or familiarity, or at least by likeness of nature—in all things receiving something human as its measure, as do the other virtues. But piety the gift is moved to alleviate their miseries from something divine, namely, insofar as they are sons of God, or marked with the divine likeness. Whence it more properly has the name “piety,” which rings of something divine—although both it and mercy itself, according to Augustine in the City of God 10, (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 10, ch. 1 (CCSL 47; PL 41:279).) by common custom are called “piety.” And this happens because God testifies that it pleases him as though it were a sacrifice. Whence the Philosopher also says, in the Ethics 4, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.2, 1123a5.) that gifts have a a certain likeness to things sacred to God.
Reply Obj. 3: Even in parents there is something of the divine, relative to one’s children, insofar as they are themselves the cause of their children’s existence. And this is why the virtue of beneficence toward them is called “piety.” Yet it takes something human as its measure, as was said, and therein it differs from the gift.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that piety the gift in one and the same way gives direction in all interactions relative to others, yet it receives a difference measure than the virtues. Therefore by this measure, because it is one and simple, piety is one habit; and from its relation to this measure its every act is specified.
Reply Obj. 1: The gift of piety is active in both the matter of latria and the matter of mercy, although in a mode that is different from their own. And therefore it is not unfitting if those two pertain to piety, for to show reverence to Sacred Scripture and other divine things appears to pertain to latria.
Reply Obj. 2: Knowledge directs one in all human affairs wherein fear and piety and fortitude are performed. But through a certain suitability, knowledge and piety are combined, since in things related to others, a man doing something might exercise a certain judgment, but judgment and command about things to be done pertain to knowledge, as to prudence. And likewise, through a certain suitability, counsel is combined with fortitude, since in difficult matters, wherein fortitude functions, we most of all seek counsel even though counsel directs in all human affairs.
Reply Obj. 3: Anger also disturbs a man in his very self, and moves him against another, insofar as there is an appetite for revenge. And consequently, mildness perfects a man in his very self and with regard to others, and from this aspect meekness is traced back to piety.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that more of the act of piety can remain in heaven than can remain of the act of fortitude. For not only can its act in its relation to the measure that piety the gift follows remain—namely, the adhering to God himself—but so can its act in relation to those to whom one was disposed, in his affect, to offer benefits. Namely, one would remain good-willed to them, and would rejoice with them about their goods, and would even bestow them, according to the mode of this life, from what is one’s own; insofar as superiors pour something into their inferiors, according to the teaching of Dionysius. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 8, para. 1 (PG 3:238).)
Reply Obj. 1: There will be no interaction as regards supplying for someone’s needs, but there will be as regards augmenting one’s joy.
Reply Obj. 2: He is speaking of piety in reference to the act that it has on the path of this life.
Reply Obj. 3: The possession of the earth presupposes drawing one’s fullness from God, through whom they can pour it into others, either according to one’s affect or according to an effect.
Exposition of the text
This fear is an evil one. (Sent. III, 34.4(126).1.) For not just whenever danger to one’s flesh is feared is it called “human fear,” nor whenever losing a temporal good is feared is it called “worldly fear,” but only when such fear is inordinate. And therefore this always rings of something evil.
Although Bede said above that there are two. (Sent. III, 34.4(126).2.) Bede distinguished fears insofar as they draw back from the evil of fault, and he distinguished them according to things that draw one back—which are two: future punishment, and separation from God. But the Master has distinguished fears according to inclinations toward the evil and according to their drawing one back not only as regards the motives, but even as regards the states.
But because you are afraid of evil things, you correct yourself. (Sent. III, 34.5(127).3, quoting Augustine, In Iohannis epistulam ad Parthos tractatus, tract. 9 (CCSL 37; PG 35:2049).) On the contrary, Augustine says (Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos (CCSL 40), Ps 118, serm. 25, para. 6.) that in a servile fear there remains a will for sinning. Therefore one does not correct himself. And it should be said to this that an absolute will does not remain, but a conditioned one, which is called “velleity”—namely, such that one would sin if he were allowed to do so without punishment.
Yet it ought to be known that each of these fears, namely the servile or the initial, in several places in Scripture is called 'the beginning of wisdom.' (Sent. III, 34.7(129).1.) This appears to be false, since wisdom is a more perfect gift than is fear, and thus fear is not the beginning of wisdom. And it should be said in response that fear is not the beginning of wisdom as creating its essence, but as a disposition toward it, from which a motion begins that attains wisdom.
Chapter 129 of 186