D. 37 - Precepts of the law

Division of the text

Having considered the virtues and gifts, which incline us to acting well, in this part the Master considers the precepts of the law, whereby we are directed to the acts of the virtues and gifts. Now, this is divided into two parts:

in the first, he considers the eight first commandments, which in a certain way look to actions;

in the second, he considers the two last commandments, which look only to the desire of the heart, in Distinction 40, at the sixth commandment is: 'You shall not desire your neighbor’s wife.' (Sent. III, 40.1(162).1.)

The first part is divided into two:

in the first, he considers the first eight commandments;

in the second, he considers certain things that are understood to be forbidden in one of those commandments, which have their own special difficulty, in Distinction 38, at it is to be known that there are three kinds of lies. (Sent. III, 38.1(144).1.)

The first is divided into two:

in the first, he considers the precepts of the first tablet;

in the second, he considers the precepts of the second tablet, at on the second tablet were the seven commandments pertaining to the love of neighbor. (Sent. III, 37.4(141).1.)

The first is divided into three according to the three commandments under consideration;

the second begins at the second precept is: 'You shall not take the name of your God in vain'; (Sent. III, 37.2(139).3.)

the third at 'remember to make holy the Sabbath day.' (Sent. III, 37.2(139).4.)

As regards the first he does three things:

first, he distinguishes the precepts;

second, he explains the first of them, at the first on the first tablet is: 'you shall not have strange gods'; (Sent. III, 37.1(138).2.)

third, he resolves a question that had arisen from things said, at but it is asked how it can be said here that the form of the idol is not made through the Word. (Sent. III, 37.2(139).2.)

On the second tablet were the seven commandments. Here he considers the precepts of the second tablet, and it is divided into five parts, following the five commandments, which is sufficiently clear in the text.

The fourth part of this is divided into two:

in the first, he explains the fourth commandment;

in the second, he proposes a question, at if it is asked whether they committed theft, we say that they who did this . . . did not commit theft; (Sent. III, 37.5(142).4.) the second begins at here the objection is made that even the good sinned in that deed. (Sent. III, 37.5(142).5.)

And likewise, the fifth part is divided into the explanation of the precept and a question, which begins at it is usual to ask whether all lying is forbidden. (Sent. III, 37.6(143).2, quoting Augustine, Quaestionum in heptateuchum libri septem (CCSL 33), bk. 2, q. 71.)

Question 1

The acts of the virtues and the gifts

Here six things are asked:

first, about the need for a written law;

second, about the distinction, order, and assignment of the commandments;

third, whether all the commandments of the law are brought back to these ten;

fourth, whether they admit of dispensation in some cases;

fifth, about the observance of the Sabbath;

sixth, about usury.

Article 1

Whether it was necessary that a written law be given

To the first we proceed thus. It appears that it was not necessary that a written law be given, especially one concerning these ten precepts.

Obj. 1: For no science collects in writing those things that are naturally written in the speculative intellect; rather, each man makes use of them as much as he needs to. But these ten precepts are naturally written in the practical intellect of each man. Therefore it was not necessary that they be put in writing.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, writing appears to have been discovered to compensate for memory’s slipperiness. But the other precepts of the law that are not written in man’s heart, such as the judicial and ceremonial laws, could more easily be lost to forgetfulness. Therefore they should be written down on stone tablets more than these.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, things that are handed down in writing reach the people through the wise. But these ten commandments the people themselves heard immediately from God, as is clear in Exodus 20. Therefore they ought not be put in writing.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the lawgiver who intends to make those subject to him good should not make anything as a law that he foresees might increase vices. But because these commandments were handed on to the people as binding, transgression grew: the power of sin is the law (1 Cor 15:56), and a Gloss says, by forbidding it, the law increases the desire for sin. (Augustine, De perfectione iustitiae hominis, ch. 6, para. 14 (CSEL 42:12; PL 44:298).) Therefore God, who foresees all things, should not give the precepts of the law.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, coerced service is less acceptable to God. But a certain coercion arises through law, insofar as it obligates. Therefore it appears that he should not have published an obligatory law of this sort.

On the contrary, God does not care less about human things than about natural things, which he made for the sake of man. But he gave definite laws to natural things. Therefore he should also have given laws to human things.

Furthermore, in every governance the will of the ruler must be made known. But God’s will is made known to us through the precepts of the law, insofar as they are signs of the divine will. Therefore it was necessary that precepts be announced to the world by the one who rules the world.

Furthermore, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.10, 1161a11‒15.) that a king by his command moves those who are in his kingdom. But God moves all things. Therefore it was necessary that he reveal his command to men, by which they would be moved to God.

I answer that it was necessary that the things that natural reason dictates, which are said to pertain to the law of nature, be given to the people as precepts, and be rendered in writing—and this was for four reasons. First, because, through contrary customs by which many were falling into sin, natural reason, wherein it was written, among the many had already become darkened. Second, because although in some reason was still vigorous, nevertheless the love of the good in them was failing, so through a certain coercion of obligatory law they needed to be led to the good. Third, so that not only nature but even the reverence of divine command would incline us to works of virtue. And fourth, so that [the precepts] would be better held on to by memory, and one would more frequently turn to them in thought.

Reply Obj. 1: The soul’s emotions do not corrupt our speculative judgment as much as they corrupt our practical judgment, and therefore it was more needed that the precepts of the law of nature be put in writing than that the speculative principles be.

Reply Obj. 2: The judicial and ceremonial precepts were changeable, according to the diverse states and conditions of men, whereas these precepts of the law of nature were to endure immovably. As a sign of this, God wished to write them in stone tablets.

Reply Obj. 3: These precepts were implanted in all within their natural cognition, and therefore as a sign of this God announced them to the whole people himself. But on account of the many who live according to their emotions, wherein the judgment of reason is darkened, he wanted the cognition of these precepts to be preserved in them through wiser men, wherein the judgment of reason was still vigorous. And this is why he wanted them to be written.

Reply Obj. 4: The law, as it as was in itself, was in no way either an occasion for or a cause of the growth of desire. Rather, this happened on account of the corruption of the fomes, (Or the "kindling for sin.") sinners themselves taking an occasion from the law, without the law having given them one.

Reply Obj. 5: Good men who have the will of doing right do not act as though coerced by the law; rather, they are a law for themselves. Whence the law was not given for their sake, but for the sake of its transgressors, as is said in Galatians 3:19—in whom it is better that they be coerced, so they would desist from evil, than that they do evil freely.

Article 2

Whether the precepts of the Decalogue are fittingly assigned

Quaestiuncula 1

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST I-II.100.7; II-II.122.) It seems that the precepts of the Decalogue are not fittingly assigned.

Obj. 1: For the precepts of the law are ordered toward merit. But merit consists in a certain action. Therefore, since no action is asserted in negative precepts—action is only denied—it appears that the precepts of the Decalogue should not be assigned by negation.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, that thing due to the giving of which something else is also to be understood as given should in some way contain the latter. But the prohibition of a greater evil does not contain the prohibition of a lesser evil, nor does a more obligatory precept contain a less obligatory precept. Therefore, since due to the prohibition of adultery is given to be understood the prohibition of every illicit use of one’s members, as is said in the text (Sent. III, 37.4(141).5, quoting Augustine, Quaestionum in heptateuchum libri septem, bk. 2, q. 71, n. 4 (CCSL 33; PL 34:622).)—because adultery is more grave than simple fornication—it appears that prohibiting other lesser things through the prohibition of adultery was not the right mode of assigning the precept. And similarly one can object about the honoring of parents, which is more obligatory than the benefits that should be shown to other men, which are traced back to this precept.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, all the precepts of the law ought to be equally held in one’s memory. Therefore, since in the third precept memory is mentioned, it appears that for the same reason it should be noted in the other precepts.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the precepts of the Decalogue pertain to the natural law. But a dictate of the natural law is through natural reason. Therefore it was not necessary that in any precept of the law any other reason for it be assigned than what natural reason dictates.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, a reward is owed for the observance of all the precepts. But a reward is given in the fourth precept: namely, that one might live long on the land. Therefore for the same reason one should be given in the other precepts.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that there should not be ten precepts of the law. (Parallels: ST I-II.100.5; SCG III.120 and 128; De caritate, a. 7, ad 10; Super Rom. 13, lect. 2.) For, as it is said in a Gloss on Matthew 6, it is in the prayers so that the gifts might be obtained, in the gifts so that the commandments might be fulfilled, and in the commandments that we might attain the beatitudes. (source) But prayers, and even the gifts, and likewise even the beatitudes are in a certain way seven. Therefore the commandments of the law should also be only seven.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law (Rom 13:8). But the intention of the lawgiver in all his precepts is that the law be fulfilled. Therefore it was sufficient that only one precept be given, namely, the love of neighbor.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Gloss on Romans 7:7 says, a law is good that, when it forbids concupiscence, forbids an evil. (Glossa Ordinaria (PL 114:491).) But the precepts are ordered against sin, as is clear from Augustine in On the Ten Strings. (Augustine, Sermones ad populum, serm. 9 (de decem Chordis), ch. 3 (CCSL 42:109; PL 38:76).) Therefore it would be sufficient to give one precept, wherein concupiscence is forbidden.

On the contrary (4), it appear as that there should be more than the ten. For wherever a sin can occur in an action it can also occur in the interior desire, since the consent to the sin is itself a sin. But theft and adultery are forbidden in diverse precepts as regards their act and as regards the desire for them. Therefore for the same reason also the other sins should be forbidden in paired precepts.

Furthermore (5), as the Master says in Book II, Distinction 42, (Sent. II, 42.4(262).1) someone sins in three ways: namely, against God, against one’s neighbor, and against one’s very self. Therefore, since some precepts are ordered against a sin against God, and some against a sin against one’s neighbor, it appears that some should also be ordered against a sin against one’s very self.

Furthermore (6), according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.1, 1103b3.) the intention of the lawgiver is to lead the citizens to virtue. Whence also a law commands something concerning the individual virtues, as is clear in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1129b13‒24; 5.2, 1130b10‒12.) But there are many more virtues than just ten. Therefore there should be more precepts.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that the precepts are badly ordered. (Parallels: ST I-II.100.6; II-II.122.) For as Gregory says, (Gregory the Great, Corpus praefationum latinarum ab aetate patrum usque ad saeculum XX-um compositarum), pref. 1322 (CCSL 161C:404; PL 78:31).) from visible things we are carried to the love of invisible things. But the precepts of the second tablet order one to the love of neighbor, whom we see, while the precepts of the first tablet order one to the love of God, who is invisible. Therefore the precepts of the second tablet should have been put first.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, something is in one’s heart before it is in one’s doing of the deed. But the third precept of the first tablet appears to pertain to the heart, and the second precept to speech, and the first to an exterior deed, because it pertains to the act of latria. Therefore they are unfittingly ordered.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Boethius, (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 3, poem 1 (PL 63:722).) vices should be uprooted before virtues are planted. But negative precepts are ordered to the uprooting of vices, and affirmative ones to the possession of virtues. Therefore in the second tablet an affirmative precept should not be the first, but the last.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, because the intention of a lawgiver is to lead to the virtues the men to whom he gives a law, in the assigning of the precepts of a law he must use that mode that fits the path to virtue. And this, of course, is that, from the things that they are more ready to do, he draw them into the more difficult things, just as also in learning one advances from things more known to things less known.

And therefore in these ten precepts, which are, as it were, the first beginnings of the law, the lawgiver forbade or commanded those things that first occur to one heading toward virtue as things to be done or things to be set aside; and from these things he wanted other things to be understood that are included in them as in their principles. And on account of this he placed in it more negatives than affirmatives, since one is more ready, and it is easier, to set aside evils than it is to bring to perfection things that are good. Also, among the evils, it forbade those that are right away on their face seen to be detestable, and likewise among the goods, it commanded those goods that everyone manifestly ought to do.

Reply Obj. 1: Although in negative precepts an exterior act is more taken away than put forth, nonetheless in such is included reason’s act of choosing to repress the desire or concupiscence that inclined one to the forbidden acts; and in this merit consists.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the prohibition of a lesser evil is not included in the greater evil by way of syllogism—such that it could be argued that if the greater evil is to be shunned, so should the lesser evil—nevertheless it is included in the way in which things that come forth from nature’s seeds are contained in their seminal causes. For just as nature progresses from small seeds into the greatest trees, so too the law also proceeds from the things that are present in the principle and easy, to other things that are sometimes more difficult and also more perfect. And this is why the lawgiver forbade simple fornication through the forbidding of adultery, and every lie through the forbidding of false witness, and every dishonorable acquisition through the forbidding of theft, and so on for the others.

Reply Obj. 3: The third precept of the first tablet was not implanted in reason, simply speaking, since the determination of the day that should be left vacant for divine service is a ceremonial, and not a moral determination; however, the substance of the precept is moral. Whence it was more naturally apt to fall out of the mind than were the things that a totally natural reason would dictate. And this is why it was more important that this precept bring in memory, and assign a reason for the precept, than that the other precepts do so.

Reply Obj. 4: This is clear from the above.

Reply Obj. 5: The fourth precept appears to partake most of obligation, natural inclination, and private love, and therefore it appeared to be less meritorious than the others. And therefore on account of this a reward needed to be added to it. Or it could be said that the fourth precept is the first of the second tablet, and this is why a reward is added to it—just as even in the first precept of the first tablet a reward is hinted at by the fact that the mercy of God is commemorated, so that from these two commandments all the ones that follow them are shown to be worthy of reward.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that the civil law directs a man by its precepts in his interactions relative to others according to political life; and this can only be of man in relation to man. For those extending the praise of the political life to the gods appear laughable, as is said in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.8, 1178b10‒13.) But the divine law directs us by its precepts in the spiritual life, in virtue of which we have society not only with man but even with God (1 John 1:3). And this is why it was necessary that the precepts of the divine law be distinguished in this way, such that some might direct man in things that look to God, which are called the precepts of the first tablet, and some might direct man in things that look to his neighbor, which are called the precepts of the second tablet.

Now, man is ordered to God in three ways. In one way, by the meditation of the heart, as is said in Psalm 46:10: be still, and know that I am God. And the third precept—that is, keeping holy the Sabbath—directs one toward this, in that a certain time is picked to be vacated for divine things, by one ceasing from all things that might disturb this leisure. In another way, through the reverence of the mouth that occurs when he is praised and his name is spoken with reverence. And because it happens that one takes an oath in reverence of the divine name before he renders the praise owed to God, thus in the second precept is placed, you shall not take the name of your God in vane. Third, so that one might show the appropriate service in one’s actions, which is called “latria,” the first precept is ordered toward this act in a similar way, by the forbidding of its contrary: you shall not have alien gods.

However, a man is ordered to his neighbor in two ways. In one way, so that he might be of benefit to him, which one should most of all be for one’s parents. Whence, in the first precept of the second tablet, the honoring of parents is commanded, wherein being of benefit to one’s neighbor is understood. In another way, such that one might not be of harm to one’s neighbor, and this happens in three ways. First, as regards the heart: and thus there are two last precepts: you shall not desire your neighbor’s wife, and you shall not desire your neighbor’s house. Second, one can be of harm to his neighbor in speech; and this is forbidden by the fifth precept: you shall not speak false witness against your neighbor; wherein, according to the rule given before, detraction and mocking and all such things are forbidden. Third, one can be of harm to his neighbor in his actions, which can again happen in two ways: in one way, insofar as one takes away things that are necessary for life—and thus there is the fourth precept: you shall not steal; and in another way, insofar as one presents an impediment to life itself. And this happens in two ways: in one way, as regards the life by which he lives in numerically one life—and the second precept is against this: you shall not kill, wherein any harm against a person is also forbidden. In the other way, as regards the life that one lives in his offspring, a life that is the same in species—and the third precept is against this harm: you shall not commit adultery, since adultery is opposed to one’s certainty about one’s offspring.

Reply Obj. 1: The virtues, gifts, beatitudes, petitions, and precepts of the law, as was said above, correspond to each other in general, because each of them extends to the whole of human life. Yet it is not necessary that the individual ones correspond particularly to individual ones, except through a certain adaptation, insofar as there is not the same notion of distinction in all of them.

Reply Obj. 2: The love of one’s neighbor is as the first root of the observance of the precepts insofar as the love of God is included in the love of neighbor. For it is the end of the precept, as is said in 1 Timothy 1:5; whence it holds the place of a first principle among things to be learned. Now, other principles that are closer to particular conclusions are placed after the first principle—to which all of them should be traced, as is said in the Metaphysics 4, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.3, 1005b19–20.) that is, that an affirmation and denial cannot be true of the same thing; whence in the same way even in the law, besides the love of one’s neighbor, there must be placed other specific precepts that direct one in particular acts.

Reply Obj. 3: This reply about concupiscence, which is as the root of all evils, is given in a similar way.

Reply Sed Contra 4: The harm that can be brought upon another person holds a natural abhorrence, nor does it accomplish any real good for the one who does it, but only a good in one’s judgment, which is vengeance. But the harm that can be brought about in taking things away, or in the abuse of a wife, is naturally apt to hold a certain delight insofar as it accomplishes a real good, at least a sensory good, for the one doing it. And this is why these two harms are distinguished by precepts pertaining to the heart and to action. But the precept about harm to one’s neighbor’s person does not look to such a distinction.

Reply Sed Contra 5: According to the Philosopher in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.2, 1130b25.) the lawgiver intends the common good through bringing forth a law, and therefore he commands the particular acts of one man only insofar as he is ordered to others. And on account of this also, as far as the manner of handing on these precepts, so far they have been assigned in this way—such that through them a man might be ordered to others—although in that ordination to others is also included an ordination to his very self, just as in one’s love of neighbor is included a love of oneself.

Reply Sed Contra 6: It was not necessary that the acts of all the virtues be commanded in the precepts of the Decalogue, since this pertains to the perfection of the virtuous life. But it was necessary that man be directed through the precepts of the Decalogue only in those things that first arise as needing to be done by those striving toward virtue, as was said.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that the precepts of the Decalogue are ordered according to the things that first and principally arise as needing to be done or avoided. And because in the spiritual life—for the direction of which the Decalogue is given—the notion of action is God as its end, therefore the precepts ordered to God are placed first. Among these, an order is considered such that that precept is placed prior whose contrary is more distant from God, since we approach God gradually, by departing from things more removed from him. And this is why the precept that forbids a contrary worship, whereby a man as it were totally moves away from God, is placed before the precept that forbids irreverence in taking the divine name in vane. And last is placed the precept about the heart’s rest in God, wherein a man comes closest to God.

Moreover, in the precepts of the second tablet a similar order is observed—namely, such that first is placed that precept that arises first in good interactions. And because a man’s ordination to those in his own house is prior to that to those outside it, so the precept about honoring one’s parents is placed before the others that pertain to all men in common, in which latter are also placed first the prohibitions of things that arise principally in need of avoidance. Now, for those striving toward virtue, harm in one’s action needs to be avoided prior to harm in one’s speech, and that in one’s speech prior to that in one’s heart. And therefore the forbidding of murder comes before the forbidding of adultery, which comes before the forbidding of theft—and these three prohibitions come before the forbidding of false witness; and last is placed the forbidding of desire, wherein right away consists the perfection of virtue.

Reply Obj. 1–3: And through this, the solution to the objections is clear.

Article 3

Whether all the precepts of the law are ordered to these ten

To the third we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II.100.3; II-II.122.6.ad 2; De malo, q. 14, a. 2, ad 14; Quodl. VII, q. 7, a. 1, ad 8.) It appears that not all the precepts of the law trace back to these ten.

Obj. 1: For because these precepts contain the natural law, they could only be traced back to them if they come from the natural law. But some things are forbidden in the law that appear in no way to come from the natural law, things for which it makes no difference whether it be this way or that way, before they have been settled by law, such as that a goat or a bull is sacrificed; and the Philosopher also says this in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.7, 1134b22.) Therefore not all precepts of the law are traced back to these ten.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, things that belong to diverse genera are not traced back to each other, just as artificial things do not trace back to natural principles, but to a principle that is a will, as is said in the Metaphysics 7. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.7, 1032a32‒b29; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 7, lect. 6, nn. 1044‒45.) But these precepts are natural, since they are of the natural law, so the ceremonial precepts, which belong to a different genus, do not trace back to them.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as long as the cause remains, its effect remains. But certain precepts of the law have changed while other precepts remain. Therefore they are not traced back to them as to their cause.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, natural reason dictates all these precepts. But one should not look for a reason for all the things asserted in the law, such as in digests of the law and senate proceedings. (See Pandectarum (Digests of the Code of Civil Law), bk. 1, tit. 3, leg. 2021.) Therefore not all the precepts of the law are traced back to these.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, where the cause is the same, the effect is the same. Now, these precepts are the same among all people. Therefore, since many precepts of the divine law and of the civil law are diverse among diverse people, it appears that not all the precepts of the law are traced back to these ones.

On the contrary, all the precepts of the law are in some way traced back to the love of God and neighbor, as the Master said in Distinction 36. (Sent. III, 36.3(137).1; see above, d. 36, a. 6.) But the love of God and neighbor is sufficiently contained in these precepts. Therefore all the other precepts of the law are traced back to these [ten].

Furthermore, as Celsus said, (Juventius Celsus, in Digestis, bk. 1, tit. 1, (de iustitia et iure), leg. 1.) the just is the art of the equal and good. But whatever is contained in any art traces back to the first principles of that art, just as in the demonstrative sciences such things trace back to axioms. Therefore, since the precepts of the natural law relate to things that can be done just as naturally known principles relate to things that can be demonstrated, it appears that all the legal precepts are naturally traced back to these precepts of the law.

Furthermore, no precept of law is just unless it is laid down in a reasonable way. But every right reasoning must be drawn from a natural cognition, since the principle of reasoning is the understanding of principles. Therefore all the precepts of the law, if they are just, must be drawn from the precepts of the law of nature. And thus, all the others are traced back to these precepts.

I answer that among natural things one finds three courses of things. For some things are always the case, things that never fail, having it from their nature that they be so and cannot be impeded; but some things are the case for the most part, things that are impeded for the lesser part; and some things are so only rarely, or happen for the less part.

Now, the things that are always so are the cause and origin of the things that are so frequently and rarely. This is also why the latter are traced back to the things that always so, as is shown in the Metaphysics 6 (Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.2, 1026b27‒1027a6; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 6, lect. 2, n. 1182.)—for example, the celestial motions, which always exist, are the cause and rule of the motions of the rains and storms, which occur frequently in the same way. And both of these are the rule and cause of fortuitous motions, such as the discovery of a treasure or the like, insofar as a man, either due to the rain or the like, which traces back to the motion of the heavens, has an occasion for digging in the field, where he finds the treature.

So it is as well with laws, which direct human motions.

For there are certain laws implanted in reason itself, the ones that are the first measure and rule of all human acts. And these in no way fail, just as neither can the governance of reason cannot fail, such that at some time it should not exist. And these laws are called “natural right.”

But there are certain laws that, in virtue of what they are, have a reason that they should be observed, although in certain situations their observance might be impeded. For example, returning what was loaned to its owner is impeded when one would have to return a sword to its owner who is in a rage. And these laws are like the ones that are the case for the most part in nature. And therefore they are traced back directly and immediately to natural right. This is why Cicero, in Rhetoric 1, (Cicero, Rhetorici libri duo qui uocantur De inuentione, bk. 2, ch. 36.) names laws of this sort the right effected by natural right.

And there are certain laws that, considered in themselves, appear to have no reason for their observance, but they acquire a sort of reason from certain situations that make it fitting that they be observed. And these laws are like things that happen in nature on rare occasions. Whence, just as the latter are traced back to natural causes only by the concourse observed by all things, by means of which some rare outcome happened, so even legal matters of this sort, which are called “positive rights,” are traced back to the law of nature, not absolutely in virtue of themselves, but with the consideration of all particular circumstances that together made their observance fitting.

Whence it is clear that all the precepts of the divine law or the civil law are traced back to these principles in some way.

Reply Obj. 1: Such things laid down by law, concerning which the Philosopher is speaking, considered in themselves hold no difference such that they should be this way or that; rather, the difference of this sort arises from diverse circumstances, as was said.

Reply Obj. 2: Artificial things are not traced back to natural things such that the latters’ nature is their first and chief principle, but inasmuch as art uses natural tools to being the artifact to completion. Likewise, the ceremonial precepts, or the precepts of positive right, are not traced back to natural ones as though from their very nature they have the force of obligation; rather, they have this from the will of the one who establishes them, who uses natural reason in that act of establishment, if he establishes it rightly.

Reply Obj. 3: Those precepts of the law that have changed had the reason for their observation not from the very substance of the deed, but from certain causal circumstances—such as their being necessary to prefigure the mystery of our redemption by means of certain signs, or the like. Whence, upon the cessation of these causes, they can no longer be so traced back to the natural precepts.

Reply Obj. 4: This should be understood in reference to the substance of the deed that the law commands; that is, sometimes it does not have a reason why it should be this way rather than that way, as was said.

Reply Obj. 5: The precepts of law that are diverse among diverse peoples depend on the natural precepts, which are the same among all. Yet they depend so by the mediation of certain circumstances, as was said, and the variety of the latter causes the variety in the positive right.

Article 4

Whether the precepts of the Decalogue admit of dispensation

To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallels: In I Sent., d. 47, a. 4; ST I-II.94.5.ad 2; 100.8; II-II.104.5.ad 2; De malo, q. 3, a. 1, ad 17; q. 15, a. 1, ad 8.) It appears that the precepts of the Decalogue admit of dispensation.

Obj. 1: For according to the Philosopher, in human actions, on account of their variety, one cannot find a single common rule that would not necessarily fail in certain cases, according to a likeness with building on Lesbos. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.10. 1137b30. It is thought that in Lesbos the builders would use a flexible leaden ruler instead of a rigid one, to accommodate it to each thing in need of measurement.) But the precepts of the law are the measure of human actions. Therefore, since every precept that in certain cases must be suspended admits of dispensation, it appears that all the precepts of the law admit of dispensation.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.7, 1134b34‒1135a4.) what is naturally just is not the same for all, just as neither are other things that follow on man’s nature found to be the same in all; for example, that the right hand is stronger than the left, for some are ambidextrous. But all the precepts that need not be observed by all admit of dispensation. Therefore the precepts of the Decalogue, which are belong to natural right, admit of dispensation.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a divine precept cannot be unjust. But God sometimes commanded that something be done that is contrary to the precepts of the Decalogue; this is clear in Exodus 12 in despoiling of the Egyptians, and in Hosea 1, on fornication. Therefore sometimes it is just to do what is opposed to the precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore the precepts of the Decalogue admit of dispensation.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the precepts of the Decalogue contain a prohibition against homicide. But in certain contingent cases a judge commands that a man be killed, and justly. Therefore in the same way other precepts in certain cases that emerge can also need not to be observed.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, as was said before in the preceding article, all the precepts of the law are in some way traced back to the precepts of the Decalogue. But it is licit for prelates of the Church to dispense with certain precepts of the law. Therefore they can do the same with the precepts of the Decalogue.

On the contrary, according to Bernard in On Dispensation and Precept, (Bernard, Liber de praecepto et dispensatione, vol. 3, para. 3, p. 256 (PL 182:862).) it is not licit for anyone to make a dispensation in a precept that had been imposed by his superior. But the precepts of the Decalogue have been imposed by God, who is superior to all things. Therefore it is not licit for anyone to make a dispensation in such precepts.

Furthermore, in every genus there is one first measure that must be the most certain and infallible, as is clear in the Metaphysics 10 and 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1052b18‒25; 5.6, 1016b18‒20; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 10, lect. 2, n. 1938; bk. 5, lect. 8, nn. 872‒76.) But the first measure of all human acts is the law of the Decalogue. Therefore in no case is it licit to depart from it, and so it cannot admit of dispensation.

Furthermore, what is true through itself is always and everywhere true. Therefore what is just through itself should always and everywhere be observed. But the precepts of the Decalogue are of this sort. Therefore and so on.

I answer that in every giving of law one must consider two things: namely, the substance of the law being laid down, and that to which the lawgiver is looking. And just as a law that has been given is the measure of those subject to it in their actions, so too that to which the lawgiver is looking—the intention and end of the law—is the measure of the law being laid down. Therefore, just as the acts of the subjects are distorted if they are discordant with the law laid down, so too the law has no rectitude if it deviates from the intention of the lawgiver, which is to establish and preserve rectitude.

Therefore, if there are some precepts that contain the lawgiver’s intention itself, it is impossible for there to be a case wherein someone can bend away from the precepts while also preserving justice. For example, if there were a precept that no injury should be done to anyone, therefore, since all the precepts of the Decalogue are of this sort, it is impossible that they could admit of dispensation. However, precepts that the lawgiver has established should be measured against the measure of what was said. Whence, as long as those precepts laid down cannot be set aside without violating the first measure according to which they were instituted, it is illicit for anyone to dispense with them. But if when they can be set aside while preserving the law’s intention, then it is licit, for someone who has the authority, to dispense with those precepts. But if in some cases the law laid down deviates from the lawgiver’s intention—because the lawgiver, in establishing that law, was not able to have an intention while looking to all cases, but [only] to ones that happen most often—then too it is licit to set aside the established law and to follow the lawgiver’s intention. This is clear in the one who does not return a loaned [sword] to one who is at war with the faith or the fatherland. And a certain virtue, which the Philosopher calls epikeia in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.10, 1137a31‒1138a3.) perfects one in this; through it a man, setting aside the law, follows the lawgiver’s intention.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of the precepts of positive law, and not of those that include the intention of the lawgiver.

Reply Obj. 2: What is naturally just is of two sorts, as was said above in the previous article. For some things are always and everywhere just, such as things wherein consists the form of justice, and of virtue in general, such as to hold fast to the mean, to serve rectitude, and the like. But some things are an outgrowth from this, according to Cicero, and this happens this way for the most part, even though it can fail in a few cases, as was said; this happens because what is just in this way is a certain application of the universal and first measure to manifold and changeable matter. And the Philosopher is speaking of this latter sort of justice.

Reply Obj. 3: God never commands something contrary to the precepts of the Decalogue, insofar as they pertain to the Decalogue. For the prohibition of theft pertains to the Decalogue insofar as the item stolen does not belong to the one taking it. Therefore, holding onto this condition, if that item comes to belong to the one taking it, this will no longer be against the Decalogue. However, not only God, who is the Lord of all things, can do this, but sometimes even men in possession of authority can confer on someone an item that belongs someone else, from a certain cause. Yet God in some deeds can remove certain conditions contrary to the Decalogue—he can even change a thing’s nature, which no man can do. For example, God can remove from a woman not bound by marriage this condition of not being one’s own, without her thereby becoming fully one’s wife, so that he might approach her without thereby violating the Decalogue.

Reply Obj. 4: Killing simply speaking is not forbidden in the Decalogue, but the killing of one who ought not be put to death.

Reply Obj. 5: There is not the same account for the precepts of the Decalogue and for the other precepts of the law, as is clear from things said.

Article 5

Whether it was fitting to command the observance of the Sabbath

Quaestiuncula 1

To the fifth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II.100.5.ad 2; II-II.122.4; De decem praeceptis, a. 3; Super Isaiam 56; Super Col. 2, lect. 4.) It appears that it was unfitting to command the observance of the Sabbath.

Obj. 1: For the Sabbath is a seventh part of a man’s entire life. But it appears to be rather unreasonable for a man set aside the seventh part of his life for leisure, as Seneca says when deriding the ceremonies of the Jews, as Augustine recounts in the City of God. (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 6, ch. 11 (CCSL 47; PL 41:192).) Therefore it was unreasonable to command the observance of the Sabbath.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, to the degree that the exercise of something is more discontinuous, so much less progress a man makes in it. But the observance of the Sabbath was instituted to make space for divine things. However, the exercise of divine things would be much more continuous if we assigned it at least an hour of every day. Therefore it appears that this would have been better for making progress than the observance of the seventh day.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no time should be made empty of the works of virtue. But servile works are the matter of virtue. Therefore there should be no command to abstain from servile works on the day of the Sabbath.

On the contrary, it pertains to a lawgiver to moderate all human acts. But, since it is impossible to be active at all times, as the Philosopher says in On Sleep and Sleeplessness, (Aristotle, On Sleep and Sleeplessness 1, 454b8.) it pertains to the moderation of human acts that some time be set aside for rest. Therefore it was fitting that the lawgiver institute this.

Furthermore, for men living by the spiritual life the greatest care should be shown to knowing God’s omnipotence and providence. But the law of Moses was given for instructing the spiritual life. Therefore that should be commanded in this law which would accustom men to the belief in God’s omnipotence and providence. Now, such is the observance of the Sabbath, which holds in one’s memory the beginning of the world, as Rabbi Moses says, (Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, bk. 3, ch. 53.) whose making was completed on the seventh day. Supposing this, it is evident even to the simple that God is omnipotent, and acts not from necessity but from providence. Therefore it was fitting that the observance of the Sabbath be established by the law.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that the precept about observing the Sabbath was simply speaking a moral precept. For things that fit in one division appear to have one notion. But the precept about observing the Sabbath is in the same division as the Decalogue’s other precepts, which are moral precepts of the law of nature. Therefore the Sabbath precept is moral.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, on Luke 13:14, there are six days on which work ought to be done, the Gloss says, the law forbids on the Sabbath not that a man cure, but that he do servile works—that is, be weighed down by sins. (Glossa Ordinaria (PL 114:303).) But becoming empty of sin is a moral precept. Therefore so too is the precept about observance of the Sabbath.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what has a moral reason appears to be a moral precept. But the observance of the Sabbath is such, as is clear from the cause that Damascene assigns: the observance of the Sabbath was devised to 'make a space' that is for God, and so that they might offer a small part of their life to God, and they might be at rest as servant and subject. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 4, ch. 23 (PG 94:1203).) Therefore the precept about the Sabbath observance is moral.

On the contrary, the precepts that were given as signs are not moral, but ceremonial. But the precept about the Sabbath is one of the latter, as is clear in Exodus 31:13: you shall keep my Sabbaths, for this is a sign between me and you. Therefore the Sabbath precept is ceremonial.

Furthermore, a Gloss on Leviticus 26 says, the Sabbath commandment, even though it is counted among the ten commandments, is nonetheless not of them. Therefore it appears that it is ceremonial, not moral.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that it should not cease in the time of grace. For as the saints and masters say, using incense did not cease, because it signifies something that one should always do, namely, be devoted in prayer. But the observance of the Sabbath signifies rest in God, as Augustine says, commenting on Exodus 31 (Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Ps 32, enar. 2, serm. 1, para. 6 (CCSL 38; PL 36:281); Quaestionum in heptateuchum libri septem, bk. 2, q. 139 (CCSL 33; PL 34:643).)—and this too one should always do. Therefore it should not cease in the time of grace.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the observance of the Sabbath was ordered to the greatest perfection—namely, making space for divine contemplation. But the state of grace is more perfect than the state of the law. Therefore much more so should this be observed in this state than in that.

Obj. 3: You might say that it is observed, but the day has been changed, that is, to the Lord’s day.

On the contrary, what pertains to his divinity should be held in greater reverence than what pertains to his humanity. But the reason for observing the Sabbath was the mystery of the divine rest. Therefore the observance of the Sabbath should not have been changed to the observance on the Lord’s day on account of the mystery of the Resurrection, which befits Christ in virtue of his human nature.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in the time of grace we are bound to make space for God more perfectly than they were in the time of the law. But in the time of the law one abstained from many things that now can be licitly done on the Lord’s day; for it was not licit to cook food or to walk. Therefore the observance of the Sabbath was not changed to the Lord’s day. Therefore the observance of the Sabbath should still remain.

On the contrary, when Exodus 31:15 says, the seventh day is a Sabbath of solemn rest, a Gloss says, we do not doubt that the other precepts should be observed literally in the New Covenant, but the precept about the Sabbath was veiled and commanded in a mystery, so that it would not be kept by us today, but so that we might look upon it as only a sign. (source)

Furthermore, Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 4, ch. 23 (PG 94:1203).) that the observance of the Sabbath was devised for the little ones, and those serving under the elements of the world. But we have been freed from such service by the coming of the Christ, so the observance of the Sabbath has ended.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that the precept about the sacrifices had a certain moral cause, not simply speaking, but according to a congruence with those to whom the law was given, who were prone to idolatry, so that they might offer to God what they would otherwise have offered to idols. And it also had another, mystical cause: namely, to signify the sacrifice of the Passion of the Christ. In the same way, so too the precept about the observance of the Sabbath had a certain moral cause, due to a condition of those to whom the law was given, who, on account of the avarice so deeply established in them, occupied both themselves and those subject to them with servile works, which thoroughly drew their minds away from divine things; Damascene is touching on this cause. And likewise, because they too were prone to the errors of the nations, the observance of the Sabbath was appointed for them, so that they would always hold before their eyes the creation of the world, and thus would recall God and fear him; Rabbi Moses is touching on this cause.

Not withstanding, it also had a mystical cause in three ways. One was allegorical—for signifying Christ’s rest in the tomb. The second was moral—for signifying the rest of the human mind from sins and from all other things in which it does not find rest, other than in God, in whom alone there is rest. The third was anagogical—for signifying the eternal rest whereby the saints rest in glory. And therefore the institution of the Sabbath was fitting for that time.

Reply Obj. 1: The time of the Sabbath is not given up if what it was set aside for still occurs on that day—namely, the contemplation of divine things. But because the Jews omitted divine things on their Sabbaths and made space for rather useless things, this is why Seneca derided them, as is said in Lamentations 1:7, her enemies saw her and laughed at her Sabbaths. (The RSV reads the foe gloated over her, mocking at her downfall.)

Reply Obj. 2: Labor impedes the act of contemplation not only while it is being done, but even after, when one’s members are weary from that labor and the mind is distracted. Whence more fittingly was one entire day set aside for divine things rather than certain hours on each day.

Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes the act of one virtue must be interrupted for the act of a more excellent virtue; for example, the works of the other virtues are interrupted at a certain time for a work of justice, as Cicero says in On Duties 1. (Cicero, De Officiis, bk. 1, ch. 43, n. 154.) Now, all the contemplative virtues are of greater dignity than the active virtues, the matter of which can be servile works. Whence it is not a problem that a servile work be interrupted for a time so that one can make space for contemplation.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that the precept about observing the Sabbath is in a certain respect moral, in a certain respect ceremonial, and in a certain respect can even be called judicial. For in reference to that [part] of it that natural reason dictates, it is a moral precept—namely, such that man vacates a certain time for contemplation. But the assignment of the time to be so vacated does not come from a dictate of natural law, so it is not a moral precept. But insofar as it has a signification as a [final] cause, in this way it is ceremonial. But insofar as the precept has as its cause the condition of the people who were to be subject to it, in this way it is judicial.

Reply Obj. 1: It is numbered with the other precepts of the Decalogue insofar as it has something of the notion of a moral precept.

Reply Obj. 2: Sins are understood mystically by “servile works,” but literally “servile works” signifies the matters we have designated servants to do, wherein mechanical arts, which are divided against he liberal arts, ought to be directive.

Reply Obj. 3: Those causes are only moral when one considers the condition of that people to whom the law was given. Whence from this argument one concludes that it is a judicial precept more than a moral one.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that the observance of the Sabbath, with respect to what it has of the natural law, insofar as it is a moral precept, has not ceased in the time of grace—indeed, it has been fulfilled more perfectly, as is the case with the other moral precepts. This is why the Apostle, in 1 Corinthians 7, gives the counsel about virgins so that, being without concerns, they might always think about the things of God. But the assignment of the day or time, which did not pertain to the moral law, has ceased with the advent of the state of grace, as do other things pertaining to the law too.

Reply Obj. 1: The observance of the Sabbath, insofar as it is ceremonial, signifies principally Christ’s rest in the tomb, and consequently the rest that we have through him, having been buried with him through baptism into death (Rom 6:4). Whence, upon the coming of the truth, the figure ceased. And this is not like using incense, which is not principally a sign of something to come, but of what ought always to be so.

Reply Obj. 2: Because we ought to make space for God more perfectly in the New Covenant, a time should not be assigned for those to whom it is enjoined, so that they might pray without ceasing.

Reply Obj. 3: The observance of the Lord’s day does not bind one as a precept of the Decalogue except insofar as the latter is from the dictate of the law of nature. For the assignment of that day comes from an institution of the Church intending that Christ’s Resurrection—to which we ought to conform our lives—be held constantly in our memory. Now, although Christ’s Resurrection belongs to him in virtue of his humanity, still it is the work of his divinity that he rose from the dead. Whence it should not be held in less reverence than the rest of the artisan and the consummation of the works of creation accomplished on the seventh day—indeed it should be held in even greater reverence, insofar as the work of creation is perfected by the work of reparation.

Reply Obj. 4: On the Lord’s day we are bound, by of an establishment of the Church, to be unoccupied by works that can impede us from divine worship, which we should do on that the day—unless a dispensation is given in something for some reason by one who has the authority. Nor is it necessary that we on the Lord’s day cease doing all the things that they ceased doing on the Sabbath day, since the ancients’ cessation from all servile works was to signify something, but our cessation is not.

Article 6

Whether usury is a sin

To the sixth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II.105.3.ad 3; II-II.78.1; De malo, q. 13, a. 4; Quodl. III, q. 7, a. 2; De decem praeceptis, a. 7; Sent. Politic. I, lect. 8.) It appears that usury is not a sin.

Obj. 1: For nothing is a sin unless it is against some moral precept, whereas the ceremonial and judicial precepts of the Mosaic law do not obligate us. But the precept about not committing usury is not a moral precept. For the moral precepts obligate as regards all things and to all men, but in Deuteronomy 23:19–20, it is granted to the Jews that they may lend at interest to foreigners, but not to their neighbors. Therefore usury is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is certain that he who loans money to someone does him a favor. But according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 5, in repayment the city endures, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.5, 1132b33‒1133a4.) namely, such that as much as someone has done, so much is done for him in return. Therefore it is not a sin, but something licit and just, that for a favor that someone has done in lending, some profit would come back to him.

Obj. 3: You might say that one is bound to lend to someone gratuitously, and this is why one sins who sells to someone what he owed him.

On the contrary, according to this, he who seeks profit from loaning will sin only when he is bound to lend. But one is not always bound to lend. Therefore sometimes it is licit to take usury.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, I am just as able to receive from one to whom I have been liberal, as I am from one to whom I have shown no liberality. But if someone to whom I made no loan were to give me something of his, even if I had hoped to receive it, I can licitly hold onto it. Therefore also from him to whom I have been liberal in giving a loan, it is licit for me to hope for, to receive, and to hold onto something.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, one to whom I have transferred ownership of something of mine becomes my debtor more than does one to whom I have granted only the use of something of mine. But in things wherein ownership is not transferred, if their use is granted, it is licit thereby to receive something in return—as is clear in the locations of homes, horses, and the like. Therefore much more is it licit for me to receive something from someone wherein, through a loan of my money, I have transferred ownership.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, whoever is a partner with someone in a mortal sin, sins mortally. But he who pays the interest when taking a loan is a partner with him who receives the interest when making the loan. Therefore, if one who receives interest always sins, it appears that so is the one who pays it—which is false.

On the contrary, Luke 6:35 says: lend, expecting nothing in return. But the moneylenders came against this. Therefore they sin.

Furthermore, things that belong to the same division are of one notion. But to give money in usury is counted with other things that are mortal sins, as is clear in Psalm 15:1, O Lord, who shall sojourn in thy tent? (The reference is to v. 5: who does not put out his money at interest.) Therefore it is a mortal sin.

Furthermore, wherever there is base profit there is sin. But the Philosopher asserts, in the Ethics 4, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.1, 1121b31‒1122a10.) that moneylenders are base profit-makers. Therefore etc.

I answer that it is commonly said by all that usury is a mortal sin, but they assign diverse reasons. For some say that it is not licit to loan someone money for a determinate profit—for example, a gift or a horse or the like—because money does not deteriorate from the use of it, whereas other things are worn out by their use. But this argument is not universal, since in some things for which it is licit to receive something when loaning them are not worn out by their use; for example, in loaning one’s house for a day’s use. And further, the payment that is received is not commensurate with the loss that its use incurs, for it does not lose as much as is given in the loan.

And therefore others assign a different reason: namely, because when money is loaned, its ownership is transferred, whereas when a house or other things are loaned this does not occur. Now, it appears just that I would receive something for the use of a thing that remains mine, like a house, but to receive something for the use of my money, which occurs differently because of the fact that it is loaned, is nothing other than to receive something from someone for the use of the latter’s own property. Therefore this appears to be a tax, and a sin. And this reason appears sufficiently probable; and it is why something similar happens in things wherein ownership is transferred through a loan, like grain, wine, and the like, for whose use it is illicit to receive anything beyond the value of what was loaned.

Nonetheless, another reason can also be assigned: because all other things have a certain utility from themselves, whereas money does not, but is only a measure of the utility of other things, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.5, 1133b21‒28.) And therefore the use of money does not have a measure of its utility from the money itself, but only from the things that are measured by money, according to the industry of the one who exchanges money for things. Whence to take more money for something less appears to be nothing more than to change the measure in receiving and giving, which manifestly contains a lack of equity.

Reply Obj. 1: The law of Deuteronomy is speaking of the Jews in their relation with the other nations that occupied the land of the promise divinely bestowed upon the Jews. And therefore usury was permitted to them, as was exacting any taxes from those unjustly in possession of what was justly owed to the Jews; this is also like the despoiling of the Egyptians, to whom the Jews had been slaves and from whom the Jews were taking the wages of their labor. Or it could be said that, just as a bill of divorce was permitted for them because of the hardness of their hearts, lest they kill their wives, which they were prone to do, so too it was permitted that they lend money to foreigners, lest they lend money to their brothers, toward which an inborn avarice incited them.

Reply Obj. 2: The benefit of the loan is not greater than the money loaned, so if one exacts more, he exacts more than he is owed. And this is why it is an unjust exaction.

Reply Obj. 3: Although a man is not always bound to grant a loan, still he is bound to this: that whenever he does make a loan, he may not require more than he gave.

Reply Obj. 4: From him to whom I have offered the benefit, it is licit for me to hope for, and to receive, as much as I have given and no more. However, whatever arises from the money loaned beyond the measure of the loan, due to the use of what I have loaned to him, this is due to the industry of him who sagaciously made use of the money. However, I ought not try to sell him his own industry, just as neither ought I to have less because of his own foolishness.

Reply Obj. 5: The very fact that the ownership of the money is transferred is the reason why I should receive or hope for nothing for its use, as though it were owed to me.

Reply Obj. 6: One who pays the interest and receives the loan out of necessity does not sin, nor does he participate in usury as such. For he pays the interest involuntarily, but as though coerced by necessity.

Exposition of the text

Origen says these are two commandments. (Sent. III, 37.1(138).2.) Just as Origen divides the first commandment into two, so too the last two commandments, about the forbidding of desire, he joins into one. And thus precepts do not exceed ten.

An idol is nothing in the world. (Sent. III, 37.2(139).1, quoting 1 Cor 8:4.) This can be understood in many ways. In one way, insofar as an idol is a likeness, and thus Origen explains that an idol is called “nothing” because it is not a likeness of anything in the world. In other way, it can be understood of the idol insofar as it is itself a definite thing, and this is in two ways: in one way, with respect to the form that is thought to be in the idol but is not in fact in it, namely the form of Godhead. In another way, with respect to its effect, namely, because it leads to sin, which is a nothing.

You shall not take the name of your God in vain. (Sent. III, 37.2(139).3, citing Exod 20:7 and Deut 5:11.) “To take” here means taking it for the sake of something. Now, the name of God is taken for the sake of confirming some truth by way of an oath. Therefore, if it is taken to confirm something false, which in itself cannot in any way be confirmed, then it is taken in vain, and one makes an oath for nothing. For what is done for the sake of an end that it cannot accomplish is something vain, as is said in the Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics 2.6, 197b22‒25; Aquinas, In Physic., bk. 2, lect. 10, n. 9.)

And so by the term adultery is to be understood every illicit union and every illegitimate and forbidden use of those members. (Sent. III, 37.4(141).5, quoting Augustine, Quaestionum in heptateuchum libri septem, bk. 2, q. 71, n. 4 (CCSL 33; PL 34:622).) Since a sin against nature is more grave than adultery, it appears that it should be more emphatically forbidden, as something to be avoided in the first footpath. And to this it should be said that, because the lawgiver gave the law to men, he should forbid in the first mandates of the law only human sins, whereas a sin against nature is not human, but bestial, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 7. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.5, 1148b19‒30.)

As if we give ten measures in winter, and take fifteen measures at harvest-time. (Sent. III, 37.5(142).3, quoting Jerome, Commentarii in Ezechielem, bk. 6, ch. 18 (CCSL 75; PL 25:171).) This should be understood such that if it is valued at harvest-time, according to the common marketplace, at fifteen measures more than ten in the winter; otherwise, if what is given and what is received were commensurate with the value of the money, it would not be usury, but an equal exchange.