D. 29 - Order of charity

Division of the text

After the above matters, we must discuss the order of charity. (Sent. III, 29.1(108).1.) After the Master has determined what is to be loved from charity, here he determines about the order of charity.

This consideration is divided into two parts.

In the first, he determines the order of charity with respect to its objects, so far as the amount of love is concerned; (Sent. III. d. 29.)

in the second, he determines the same, so far as the amount of merit is concerned, at here it is usual to ask what is better and of greater merit, to love friends or to love enemies. (Sent. III, 30.1(111).1.)

The former is divided into two parts.

In the first, he determines about the order of charity with respect to the different levels among the objects of love;

in the second, he determines the same order, but in terms of the state of the lover, at the place at it is to be noted that there are different degrees of charity. (Sent. III. 29. 3 (110). 1.)

The former is divided into two parts.

In the first, he considers the order of charity with respect to the objects of love;

in the second, he raises certain questions about the matters determined, at it is also usual to ask: if our parents are evil, or our children, or our siblings, whether they are to be loved more or less than other people who are good, but not joined to us by such a bond. (Sent. III, 29.2(109).10.)

Concerning the former, he does two things.

First, he shows that charity does have an order;

second, he shows in terms of what realities that order is to be looked to, at and so, as to this, too, a question is frequently raised, which the various views expressed by the saints make perplexing. (Sent. III, 29.2(109).1.)

And concerning this, he does two things.

First, he sets down diverse points about these opinions;

second, he determines what seems true to him, at but because the above words of Ambrose, to those who examine them with diligence, seem to set out the order of loving according to feeling. . . (Sent. III, 29.2(109).8.)

Concerning the former, he does two things.

First, he sets down diverse opinions and the arguments in support of them;

second, he shows how the first opinion responds to the arguments given in favor of the other position, at but they say that the things said above about the order of love are to be referred to the performance of works, which are to be extended differently to our neighbors. (Sent. III, 29.2(109).6.)

Concerning the former, he does two things.

First, he sets down the opinion of certain people who say that an order of charity is to be looked to only as far as charity’s effect is concerned;

second, he sets down the opinion of other people who say that this order is to be looked to not just in terms of charity’s effect, but also in terms of one’s affection for the object of love, at but in opposition to these stands the commandment of the law concerning the love of parents. (Sent. III, 29.2(109).3.)

But they say that the things said above about the order of love are to be referred to the performance of works, which are to be extended differently to our neighbors. (Sent. III, 29.2(109).6.) Here he shows how the first opinion answers the arguments given in favor of the other position. And concerning this, he does two things.

First, he shows how the first opinion answers the arguments in favor of the second.

Second, he shows how the first opinion says, in addition, that the love given to the neighbor should be equal in affection to the love one has for oneself, at a few of them also teach that, by the feeling of charity, we are to love our neighbors as much as we love ourselves. (Sent. III, 29.2(109).7.)

It is also usual to ask: if our parents are evil, or our children, or our siblings, whether they are to be loved more or less than other people who are good, but not joined to us by such a bond. (Sent. III, 29.2(109).10.) Here he raises certain questions about the truth he has determined. And this is divided into two parts, according to the two questions he raises.

The second begins at it is also usual to ask 'why the Lord would command that we love our enemies . . .' (Sent. III, 29.2(109).12, quoting Augustine, Retractationes, bk. 1, ch. 19, n. 5 (CCSL 57; PL 32:615).)

Question 1

The order of charity with respect to its objects

Here we will inquire into eight things:

first, whether it belongs to charity to have an order;

second, whether that order is to be looked to regarding both affection and effect, or merely regarding affection;

third, whether God is to be loved above all things;

fourth, whether loving him permits looking to a reward;

fifth, whether we ought to love our neighbor as much as we love ourselves;

sixth, whether among neighbors, those who are close to us are to be preferred to those who are strangers;

seventh, the order of love in regard to those who are close to us;

eighth, the perfection of charity and the degrees enumerated in the text.

Article 1

Whether charity has an order

To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-26.1; De caritate, a. 9.) It seems that charity does not have an order.

Obj. 1: For Bernard says that love knows no grade, it considers no dignity. (Bernard, Sermones super Cantica Canticorum, serm. 64, n. 10 (PL 183:1088); serm. 79, n. 1 (PL 182:1163); serm. 83, n. 3 (PL 182:1182).) But every order involves some grade. There is not, therefore, any order in charity.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says that friendship is a certain equality. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.5, 1157b36.) But equality belongs to what is uniform, allowing no diversity, even as unity does not allow division. Therefore charity does not have an order.

Obj. 3: Further, to put things in order belongs to reason, whose function it is to gather things together. But charity is not in the reason but in the will, which is not a collecting force. Therefore in charity there is no order.

Obj. 4: Further, order requires distinction. But charity is the most unitive of the virtues. Since therefore in the other virtues an order is not assigned, neither should an order be assigned in charity.

Obj. 5: Further, everything that pertains to the act of a virtue, for example, certain necessary circumstances, falls under a commandment. But the order of love does not fall under a commandment, since, if I give someone what I owe him, the law does not forbid me to give more to someone else to whom I have no such obligation. Therefore, the order of love is not a due circumstance in charity.

On the contrary, as Dionysius says, what is evil for man is to be against the good of reason. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 32 (PG 3:734).) But to be against virtue is [likewise] evil for man. Consequently, the good of reason must be present in any virtue. But it belongs to the good of reason that man should do whatever he does in an orderly way. Since, therefore, charity is a virtue, it must have an order.

Furthermore, the acts of the virtues are diversified according to the requirements of the objects. But the good, which is the object of charity, has an order, since some goods are better than others. Therefore charity too ought to have an order.

Furthermore, wherever one thing is on account of another, some order is to be found. But charity loves something on account of another, for it loves all things on account of God. Therefore charity has an order.

I answer that there must be a mode in any act of virtue whatsoever, for a man is truly just not when he merely does just things, but when he does just things justly. But the mode belonging to an act of virtue comes from its commensuration to its object, in such a way that the act receives its measure from the same thing from which it derives its species. But the good is charity’s object in such a way that the good as such is lovable as such, whereas to each man his own proper good is lovable, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 8. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.5, 1157b26.) Hence, since there happens to be a great diversity and many different grades as regards this [object], insofar as one object of love is better or closer than another, the act of love must also have an order, if it is to be virtuous.

Reply Obj. 1: In love a twofold grade can be discerned: one is of an object of love vis-à-vis another object of love, and it is of this grade we are speaking; the other is of the lover to the object of love, and it is of this grade Bernard is speaking. Nevertheless, there is a way in which love knows this grade, and a way in which it does not. For it knows it with respect to the exterior effect, since it does not give the same thing to superiors and to equals; but it does not know it with respect to affection, insofar as it unites the lover to the beloved. And meanwhile, something of the affection does shine out in the effect—namely, that we bear ourselves more trustingly to superiors and more sociably to inferiors.

Reply Obj. 2: Friendship does not consist in a strict equality alone, since it can be had with superiors, inferiors, and equals alike; rather it consists in a proportionate equality—an equality that does not exclude a diversity of quantity, since 3:2 and 6:4 are the same proportion, viz., half-again, even though the excess quantity is unequal in the two cases.

Reply Obj. 3: The act of reason precedes love. Prior things, however, leave behind something of themselves in things that come after. Thus, the order that reason brings about is found in love, so that love itself is ordered—not that love is responsible for bringing about that order, but because love tends in an orderly way toward goods that have been placed in order by reason.

Reply Obj. 4: Some virtues, such as faith, temperance, and others of this sort, order a person within himself. Justice, on the other hand, orders a person to someone else, insofar as the person is made equal to that other in regard to the matters with which justice is concerned. But charity orders a person to someone else by uniting him to the other in affection. Thus charity’s proper object is [not some thing that needs to be equalized between two persons, but] the very rational nature toward which charity is to be had; and there are many diverse grades of rational nature found in reality. And for this reason, one may attribute an order to charity more than to any other virtue.

Reply Obj. 5: In one genus there can only be one highest. So, if I love something other than God as ultimate end, I cannot love God as ultimate end. Thus, by the very fact that I place what is to be loved less on equal terms of love with what is to be loved more, I do not give the whole of the love that I ought to give to the one who is to be loved more; and something similar is true in other cases. Hence the order of charity is present in the commandment of love, and whoever acts in disregard of proper order commits a sin, as is said in the text. (Sent. III, 29.1(108).1.)

Article 2

Whether the order of charity is to be looked to regarding affection or regarding its effect

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that the order of charity is not to be looked to according to affection, but only according to effect.

Obj. 1: For just as the first truth on which faith depends is one in all, so the highest goodness on which charity depends is one. But faith is equally certain about all the things which are believed on faith. Therefore charity, too, has equal affection for everything loved from charity. And so there is no order of affection in charity, but only an order of effects.

Obj. 2: Further, an act takes its measure from the notion of the object. But although many things are loved from charity, in all there is a single notion for loving, namely the divine goodness, which is charity’s object. Therefore there is an equal affection toward everything loved from charity. And so there is no order of affection in charity, but only an order of effects.

Obj. 3: Further, when a person has greater affection for someone, he desires a greater good for him. But for all whom we love from charity, either we desire the same good if it is not yet fully possessed, or we are pleased with the same good when it is possessed—namely, eternal life. Therefore all are loved with equal affection. And so there is no order of affection in charity, but only an order of effects.

Obj. 4: Further, the order of charity is present in the commandment of love. In the commandment, however, there is nothing to do with affection, since as long as I actually do for anyone what I am supposed to do for him, even if I do it without affection, I am not guilty of breaking the commandment. Therefore the order of charity is not looked to according to affection, but only according to effect.

Obj. 5: Further, where there is greater affection there is also greater merit, since merit is measured in reference to the root of charity [that is, the will]. But a man does not merit more in loving those who are close to us than in loving other people, or even in loving himself than in loving others. Therefore the order of love is not to be gauged according to affection.

On the contrary, love is proved by outward deeds, Gregory says. (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in evangelia, bk, 2, hom. 30, para. 1 (CCSL 141:256; PL 76:1220).) If, therefore, there is an order of love according to effect, there must also be an order according to affection.

Furthermore, the good is the object of charity, as far as affection is concerned. But the order of charity, as was said, is looked to according to a diversity of goods. Therefore charity has an order not only according to effect, but also according to affection.

Furthermore, just as charity chiefly concerns affection, so beneficence chiefly concerns the effect. If, therefore, an order were to exist only regarding effects, this would not be an ordering of charity, but rather of beneficence—which is against the authority of the Song of Songs invoked in the text. (Sent. III, 29.2(109).4, referring to Song of Songs 2:4.)

I answer that an exterior effect only pertains to charity in as much as it proceeds from affection, in which the act of charity first has its being. Hence, if order were to be looked to only regarding the effect, that order would in no way pertain to charity, but rather to other virtues, for instance liberality or mercy. Accordingly, since charity is held to be ordered, an order must be observed in one’s affections, and one must proceed from affection to effect—not in the sense that more effects are bestowed upon the one who is loved with more affection, but in the sense that a man should be prepared to bestow more upon him if it becomes necessary, since sometimes the one who is more loved does not need our aid at a given time.

And this is clear, too, through something similar found in nature, since the Creator endows each natural thing with as much natural love for something as the creature needs in order to carry out appropriate actions in regard to it. And in like manner, divine law commands an order of affections that corresponds to the gradation [of lovable things]—a gradation we must respect and abide by in our actions.

Reply Obj. 1: The object of faith is the first truth, not insofar as it simply exists in reality, but insofar as it is divinely announced to us, since faith comes from what is heard (Rom 10:17). Since therefore all the things which are of faith are announced to us in the same way, an equal certitude is had about all of them. But the object of charity is the good insofar as it really exists in things. Consequently, since the divine goodness is found in different things differently, our affection must be extended to those things in different ways.

Reply Obj. 2: Although in everything may be found the same common aspect according to which they are loved, nevertheless individual things do not participate equally in that aspect, and therefore neither is an equal affection owed to them.

Reply Obj. 3: The intensity of an act, especially in acts of the soul, which does not necessarily act according to its whole capability, as natural things do, takes its measure not merely from an object’s quantity but also from an agent’s efficacy and effort in acting. Hence he who sees better is not the one who sees a bigger thing, but the one who sees a thing more clearly. And therefore, too, I need not have equal affection for those for whom I desire an equal good.

Reply Obj. 4: Even though someone who gives to another what he owes him yet has no affection in doing so is not guilty of breaking the commandment that concerns the act of justice, he is guilty of breaking the commandment that concerns the act of charity. Hence in Romans 1:31, to be without affection is deemed a vice.

Reply Obj. 5: The treatment of the amount of merit corresponding to various objects of love will come in the following Distinction, and is therefore reserved until then.

Article 3

Whether God is to be loved above all things from charity

To the third we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.26.2; De caritate, a. 4, ad 2; a. 9.) It seems that God is not to be loved above all things from charity.

Obj. 1: For as Dionysius says, love is a unitive power. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 15 (PG 3:714).) But anyone is more united to himself than he is to God. Therefore he ought from charity to love himself more than he loves God.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 8 that anyone finds lovable that which is good for him. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.5, 1157b27.) But whatever a man loves owing to the fact that it is good for him, he loves on account of himself. Therefore whatsoever he loves, he loves on account of himself. Therefore he loves himself more than everything he loves; and so, he does not love God above all things.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9 that friendly feelings for another come from friendly feelings toward oneself. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.4, 1166a1–3.) But the first in any genus is the most powerful. Accordingly, the love someone has for himself is more powerful than the love he has for another, and so, by nature, a man loves himself more than he loves God—and the same is true even by charity, since grace does not destroy nature.

Obj. 4: Further, as Gregory says, love’s proof is a deed done. (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in evangelia, bk, 2, hom. 30, para. 1 (CCSL 141:256; PL 76:1220).) But a person does as much to preserve grace or possess created beatitude as he does for the sake of God. Therefore a person loves grace or created beatitude as much as he loves God. But the love by which we are said to love virtue or some accident is referred to the subject of the accident, the one for whom that accident is desired. Therefore someone having charity loves himself as much as he loves God.

Obj. 5: Further, a person loves her neighbor only to the extent that she loves God in the neighbor. But a person loves God in himself as much as she loves God in a neighbor or in herself, because God is no better in himself than he is wherever he is. Therefore a person loves herself or her neighbor as much as she loves God; and thus God is not loved above all things from charity.

On the contrary, the end is more to be loved than things ordered to the end. But God is the end of everything that is loved from charity. Therefore he is to be loved most of all.

Furthermore, each and every man finds his proper good lovable, according to the Philosopher. But God is a greater good than any other, and is more proper to someone than any other, since he is more intimately present to the soul than even the soul is to itself, as is said in On the Spirit and the Soul. (De spiritu et anima, ch. 14 (PL 40:789); attributed without certainty to Alcherus Claraeuallensi.) Therefore God is to be loved above all things.

Furthermore, that which is a cause of others in any genus is supreme in that genus, as is said in the Metaphysics 2. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1.993b24.) But God is the cause and the reason why all things are loved from charity, since the divine goodness is charity’s per se object. Therefore God is more to be loved from charity than anything else.

I answer that, since the good is the object of love, there are two ways in which someone can tend to something’s good.

In one way, he can tend to it such that he refers that thing’s good to another, as when I desire one thing’s good for the sake of another, should that other lack it, or when it pleases me that the other has that good, just as someone loves wine insofar as he greatly desires the wine’s pleasant taste, and rejoices not because the wine possesses that pleasant taste, but because he is enjoying it. And this love is called by some the “love of concupiscence.” That love, however, does not have its ultimate term in the thing that is said to be loved, but is bent toward that person for whom that thing’s good is desired.

In another way, love is borne to the good of something such that it has its term in that very one, inasmuch as the lover is pleased that the object of his love has whatever good he has, and desires for him the good he as yet lacks. And this is “love of benevolence,” which is the beginning of friendship, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.5, 1167a3.) Hence, the degrees of charity are to be gauged in accordance with this kind of love, since charity includes friendship, as was said above. (Above, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1.)

Now, the good that each person most of all wishes to see preserved is that good that is more pleasing to him, because this good is more in conformity with the appetite informed through love. This good, however, is his own good. Hence, it is to the extent that something’s good is, or is reckoned to be, more the lover’s own good that he wishes that good to be preserved in the one loved. The lover’s own good, however, is found more where it is more perfect. And thus, since any part whatever is imperfect in itself but has perfection in its whole, it follows that even by natural love the part tends more to the preservation of the whole than to its own conservation. Accordingly, an animal naturally interposes its arm in defense of the head on which the health of the whole animal depends, and particular men, too, expose themselves to death for the preservation of the community of which they are a part.

Since therefore our good is perfect in God, as in the first and perfect universal cause of good things, it follows that the good’s being in him naturally pleases us more than the good’s being in us. And thus, too, with love of friendship, God is naturally loved by a man more than a man loves himself. And since charity perfects nature, it follows according to charity as well that man loves God above himself and above all other particular goods. However, charity adds to the natural love of God a certain fellowship in the life of grace, as was said earlier. (Above, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1.)

Certain ones, on the other hand, say that a man naturally loves God more than himself with a love of concupiscence, insofar as the divine good is more delightful to him [than his own good is], whereas he naturally loves himself more than God with a love of friendship, because he wishes himself to exist and to live and to have some goods more than he wishes the same for God; but [they go on to say] that charity then has the function of so elevating nature that a man loves God more than himself even with love of friendship. But the first opinion is more defensible, since the inclination of human nature, as such, never contradicts the inclination of virtue, but is in conformity with it.

Reply Obj. 1: Love is not essentially a union of things themselves, but a union of affection. However, it is not unfitting that what is less conjoined in reality should be more conjoined in regard to affection, since it often happens that things really conjoined to us are displeasing to us and most of all conflict with our affection. But love does bring about a real union with things, so far as this is possible. And therefore divine love makes a man, so far as this is possible, live not his own life but the life of God, as the Apostle says: it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me (Gal 2:20).

Reply Obj. 2: Although each person finds lovable that which is good for him, it is nevertheless not necessary that the object of love be loved on account of that, that is, that it is good for him, as though this were the lover’s goal, since friendship does not turn back to oneself the good desired for another. For we love our friends, even if nothing might come of it to us.

Reply Obj. 3: Friendly feelings toward another come from friendly feelings toward oneself, not as if the latter were the final cause of the former, but in the manner of what is prior in the process of generation, because, just as each person is first known to himself before another person, even God, is known to him, so too, in the process of generation, the love anyone has for himself is prior to the love he has for another.

Reply Obj. 4: Properly speaking, our works are not proportioned to the affection by which we love God in himself, since nothing accrues or is able to accrue to him from our works. But if it were possible that something could accrue to him from our works, the person who has charity would do much more for the sake of preserving his beatitude than for the sake of securing it for herself.

Reply Obj. 5: While God is everywhere equally loved, nevertheless the divine good existing in some particular being is not as lovable as that very being is in God, since the divine good does not exist equally perfectly in everything.

Article 4

Whether the love of God permits consideration of a wage

To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST II-II.27.3.) It seems that love of God forbids looking to some wage.

Obj. 1: For in John 10, the wage-seeker is reproved, but “wage-seeker” signifies one who seeks a wage. Therefore the love of God from charity cannot admit consideration of a wage.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says: although it is impossible to serve God and gain no reward, nevertheless he is to be served without looking to a reward. (Augustine, Sermones ad populum, serm. 385, ch. 4 (PL 39:1692); also Bernard, Liber de diligendo Deo, ch. 7, n. 17 (PL 182:894).) But a reward is nothing other than a wage for labor done. Therefore God is to be served without consideration of a wage.

Obj. 3: Further, although civic friendship brings with it many delights and benefits, still for all that it does not look to them, but has the noble good as its foundation. But the friendship of charity is more noble than civic friendship; therefore neither does it look to any benefits.

Obj. 4: Further, a wage is the end of things done for the sake of a wage. But an end is more loved than things that stand relative to the end. If, therefore, God were loved for the sake of a wage to be gained, something else would be loved more than God—which is contrary to the nature of charity.

Obj. 5: Further, just as a person secures a reward through charity, so too does he escape punishment through charity. But charity, most of all when it is perfect, banishes the fear of punishment. Hence it also seems to exclude looking to a wage.

On the contrary, as is said in a gloss on Matthew 1, hope generates charity. But hope is the expectation of a wage. Therefore charity can co-exist with looking to a wage.

Furthermore, in Hebrews 11:26 it is said of the holy patriarchs that they were looking ahead to the reward. But there is no question that they loved God from charity. Therefore the love of God from charity is compatible with looking to a wage.

Furthermore, friends seek to enjoy one another. But our wage is nothing other than to enjoy God by seeing him. Therefore not only does charity not exclude having an eye to a wage, but it even makes one do so.

I answer that a wage properly signifies the reward that someone earns from labor or from some work. Now, a reward is what is rendered to someone for his benefit. Hence a wage, insofar as it fits this description, implies something referable, through love, to that one whose wage is rendered, for a person loves a wage on account of himself. Nonetheless, it does not belong to the notion of a wage that it be the end of a person’s intention, since it often happens that someone to whom a wage is given does not, in fact, seek a wage from his work. Now, those things that someone loves on account of himself are either formal perfections in him, such as health, virtue, activity, love, and the like, or they bring into being or preserve these things or impede their contraries. Hence, if someone loves something outside of himself on account of himself, that thing can be called a wage insofar as from it something else is obtained by him or is preserved in him. But, as was said above, it belongs to the notion of friendship that a friend be loved for his own sake. Hence within friendship a friend does not have the notion of a wage, properly speaking, even though the many good things that are brought about for us by a friend—for example, the delights and benefits that we, the lover, obtain from him—can have the notion of a wage, by reason of which the friend himself is called a “wage” in the manner of a cause, just as God is called our “wage” by reason of those things that exist in us from him.

It is clear, therefore, that setting up some wage as the end of love, on the part of love’s object, contradicts the definition of friendship. Hence in this way charity cannot have an eye to a wage, for this would be to set up as the ultimate end not God, but the goods that derive from him.

On the other hand, to set up a wage as the end of love on the part of the lover, but still not as his ultimate end, taking into consideration that love itself is a certain activity of the lover, does not contradict the definition of friendship, because this very activity, since it is an accident, is not said to be loved except on account of its subject, as is clear from what was said before. And, without prejudice to friendship, there can be an order among things that a man loves on account of himself. Hence, friendship notwithstanding, I can love the very activity of love, on account of something else. Nevertheless it will contradict the notion of virtue if the activity of a virtue is loved on account of some other inferior power, of which sort are temporal goods.

It is therefore clear that the person who has charity cannot have an eye toward a wage in such a way that he would be setting up anything else as the end in comparison with the one loved, viz., God, for this would contradict the definition of charity as friendship; nor in such a way that he would be setting up some temporal good as the end of his love, because this contradicts the definition of charity as virtue. But, since beatitude is the end of the virtues, the person who has charity can have an eye toward a wage in such a way that he sets up created beatitude as the end of his [exercise of the virtue of] love—not, however, as the end in comparison with the one loved—for this contradicts neither the definition of friendship nor the definition of virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: The wage-seeker we read about in that passage signifies one who undertakes a spiritual work for the sake of a temporal wage.

Reply Obj. 2: God is to be served without looking to a reward in such a way that a reward is not set up as the end of the one loved and served [as if there were some end beyond God], but is set up as the end of that very service or love [insofar as they are the lover’s activities].

Reply Obj. 3: Friendship does not look to the delights and benefits supplied by friends as if these were the end on account of which a friend loves.

Reply Obj. 4: The solution is clear from what was said in the response.

Reply Obj. 5: The good with which hope is concerned has more consonance with love than the evil with which fear is concerned. As a result, although perfect charity banishes altogether the fear of punishment, it is not necessary that it banish looking to a wage.

Article 5

Whether from charity a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor

To the fifth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.26.4; 44.8, ad 2; De caritate, a. 9; Super 2 Tim. 3, lect. 1.) It seems that a man ought not to love himself more than he loves his neighbor from charity.

Obj. 1: For that on account of which something else is given up is more loved. But charity makes a man in a way give up his very self and cleave to the beloved, since, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 13 (PG 3:711).) love places a man outside himself and places him in the beloved. Therefore he loves his friend more than himself.

Obj. 2: Further, we love God more than ourselves inasmuch as our good is found more perfectly in him than in us. But in like manner, it is found more perfectly in some of our neighbors than in us, since they have the goods that we have, yet more perfectly. Therefore we should love our neighbor more than ourselves.

Obj. 3: Further, what someone most of all loves in himself is to live and to exist. But charity makes one lay down one’s bodily life on behalf of one’s brethren; for even certain pagans, owing to love of friends, exposed themselves to death, without any hope of eternal life. Therefore friendship, and charity too, makes one love one’s neighbor more than oneself.

Obj. 4: Further, we love people the more in proportion to how much we desire goods for them and prevent evils befalling them. But, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9, when we are sorrowing we should be slow to call upon friends, yet go promptly to share in their sorrows, whereas in regard to joys the converse holds, since one should promptly call upon friends to share in one’s joys, but thrust oneself cautiously into their joys. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.11, 1171b15–19.) Therefore charity makes one love one’s neighbor more than oneself.

Obj. 5: Further, beneficence is an effect of charity. But those who are benefactors to their friends receive greater praise than those who are benefactors to themselves. Therefore charity makes one love one’s neighbor more than oneself.

Obj. 6: Further, friendship makes a man rejoice in the company and conversation of his friends. But a man is more delighted by the company and conversation of his friends than by his own in regard to himself. Therefore he loves friends and neighbors more than himself.

On the contrary, to the extent that someone loves anyone’s salvation, to that extent he shuns his sin. But a man ought more to shun his own sin than another’s. Therefore he ought to love his own salvation more than the salvation of another.

Furthermore, mercy arises out of love. But according to what Augustine says, (Augustine, Sermones ad populum, serm. 106, ch. 4 (PL 38:626): quid est, facite misericordiam? Si intelligis, a te incipe.) a person ought to begin by having mercy on himself [before he extends mercy to others]. Therefore love, too, ought to begin from himself [and then spread out to others].

Furthermore, what is natural is more vehement than what is only voluntary. But love of self comes from an inclination of nature, whereas love of others comes only from rational will. Therefore a man loves himself from charity more than he loves others.

I answer that, just as something is found more perfectly in a perfect and universal cause than in a particular effect, so too something is found more perfectly in a thing itself than in its likeness. Hence, since the proper good of a man is found (1) in God as in a universal cause, (2) in himself as in a particular effect, and (3) in the neighbor as in a likeness, it follows that just as he ought to love God more than himself by the love of benevolence, so he ought also to love himself more than his neighbor.

But it should be known that since in a human being there is a twofold nature—the interior, that is, the rational nature, which is called the “inner man,” and the exterior, that is, sensual nature, which is called the “outer man”—a man ought to love himself more in regard to the interior nature than in regard to the exterior nature. And therefore he ought to desire more those things that are goods of the interior nature than those things that are goods for him according to the exterior nature.

Now, all the works of virtue—among which are included those works by which someone behaves appropriately toward a friend—are goods for a man according to his interior nature. And therefore more exterior goods are to be bestowed upon friends than upon ourselves, insofar as the good of virtue, which is our greatest good, consists in this [kind of activity]; but in regard to spiritual goods, we ought always to bestow them more upon ourselves and will them more for ourselves than for our friends; and the same holds about avoiding evils.

Reply Obj. 1: In love the one loved as the beloved is more powerful than the one loving as the lover. But since the one loving is [not only lover of another but] also an object of love to himself, it follows that he can be more powerful in regard to love than an extrinsic object of love, insofar as he is an object of love to himself and his affection is concentrated more upon himself than upon the extrinsic object of love.

Reply Obj. 2: Although it is possible that the good I have is found more perfectly in a neighbor than in myself, nevertheless it is always found more perfectly in me as something proper, since the good that is in him is not mine except by way of likeness. The good that is in God, however, is mine too, by virtue of God’s causing of my good.

Reply Obj. 3: To hand oneself over to death for the sake of a friend is the most perfect act of virtue; accordingly, a virtuous man desires this act more than he desires his own bodily life. Hence the fact that a man lays down his own bodily life for the sake of a friend does not happen because he loves the friend more than himself, but because he loves the good of virtue in himself more than he loves his bodily good.

Reply Obj. 4: The very fact that a man wishes not to be burdensome to his friend by sharing his sorrows with him, but instead wishes to be generous and delightful, shows that he is acting according to virtue; and so he renders more spiritual good to himself than to his friend.

Reply Obj. 5: As far as spiritual goods are concerned, we bestow more upon ourselves than upon our friends, but as far as bodily goods are concerned, we bestow more upon friends than upon ourselves, for the reason that was given in the response.

Reply Obj. 6: The company and conversation of friends is delightful to us insofar as we are acquainted with their good, which pleases us as if it were our own. And since we are better acquainted with things through sight than through any other sense, friends most of all desire to see each other. And since a man can get to know things that belong to another better than he can get to know those that belong to himself, he takes more delight in sharing conversation with a friend than in conversing with himself, although the virtuous man pleasantly converses with himself, insofar as within himself he turns over memories and plans and the hope of good things, all of which bring delight to him, as is said in the Ethics 9. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.4, 1166a3–5.)

Article 6

Whether from charity a man ought to love strangers more than those who are close to him

To the sixth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.26.7; De caritate, a. 9, ad 12, 14.) It seems that from charity a man ought to love strangers more than those who are close to him.

Obj. 1: For charity, like friendship, has the noble good as its foundation. But a greater nobility or virtue is sometimes found in strangers more than in those who are close to us. Therefore strangers are sometimes more to be loved from charity than those who are close to us.

Obj. 2: Further, charity brings about a conformity of man to God. But God loves those who are strangers to us, if they are better, more than he loves those who are close to us. Therefore we, too, ought to love them more.

Obj. 3: Further, effect corresponds to affection. But in some affairs, as in the distribution of ecclesiastical benefices, we ought to show a greater effect of love to strangers than to those who are close to us, if the strangers are better. Therefore strangers are sometimes to be loved with greater affection, too, than those who are close to us.

Obj. 4: Further, concord is both implied in and effected by charity. But concord sometimes exists more with strangers than with those who are close to us, as occurs in a time of war, when the commander of the army is to be obeyed more than one’s own father. Therefore [in such circumstances] strangers are more to be loved than those who are close to us.

Obj. 5: Further, what is owed should take precedence over what is not owed. But the returning of benefits is something owed to benefactors. Now, sometimes benefitting those who are close to us is not something owed. Therefore benefits are to be given more to strangers than to those who are close to us; and so, at least with respect to the effect of friendship, strangers should take precedence over those who are close to us.

On the contrary, let us work for the good of all, and especially for those of the family of faith (Gal 6:10). Therefore those who are close to us are to take precedence over strangers.

Furthermore, whoever does not provide for relatives, and especially for family members, has denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever (1 Tim 5:8). Therefore care is more to be taken of those who are close to us than of others.

Furthermore, man ought to love himself more than others. Therefore when some are closer to him, he ought to love them more.

I answer that, as was said above, (Above, a. 5, ad 6.) that we love neighbors inasmuch as our good is found in them by way of likeness, speaking here of the love of benevolence. Now, this likeness is attended to in terms of the manner in which we share things in common with them, for which reason the Philosopher distinguishes different friendships according to different manners of sharing things in common. For there is a natural sharing in common, according to which some people share a natural origin; and upon that sharing is based the friendship of father and son and of other blood relatives. Another sharing in common is economic, according to which men share domestic duties with each other. Still another sharing in common is political, according to which men share things in common with their fellow citizens. A fourth sharing in common is divine, according to which all men share in the one body of the Church, either actually or potentially; and this is the friendship of charity, which is extended to all, even to enemies.

Therefore, since charity implies benevolence, which desires good things for friends and does good things to them, it follows that, in any of the aforesaid friendships, friends are to be loved at the level of the goods pertaining to that sharing in common upon which the friendship is based. Hence, to our fathers and blood relatives we ought to bear ourselves more amicably in that which pertains to the preservation of nature; to members of the household in that which pertains to household government; to fellow citizens in that which regards civil life, such as conversing together and assisting in civic works; and to all men in that which regards God, so that we desire eternal life for all and work for their salvation according to our station and means.

Nevertheless, simply speaking, there ought to be a greater love by that friendship which more closely approaches what deserves to be more loved. Now, God is to be loved most of all, and after this, a man ought to love himself most of all, as was said above. And since the last of the aforesaid friendships, namely that of charity, approaches more nearly to the love of God, if it were separated from those prior friendships and taken by itself, it would be more powerful without the others, simply speaking, than the others would be without it. These different friendships are not, however, really separate with respect to anyone who is still living this mortal life; but after death, the damned are separated from the friendship of charity. Hence I ought to love a Christian man more than my dead infidel father, simply speaking, although when it comes to natural affection it is permitted that we be drawn more toward that which is more conjoined to us by nature. The first friendship [the natural] is closer to that [love] by which someone loves himself than the second [the domestic], and the second than the third [the political], and the third together with the fourth [that of charity] than the fourth by itself.

Consequently, Ambrose (Attributed to Ambrose, but in fact from Origen, Glossa Ordinaria (on Song of Songs 2:4) (PL 113:1137).) sets down this order of love: first, that blood relatives are loved, with whom the first friendship exists; second, that “domestics” are loved—with whom the second friendship [the domestic, narrowly speaking] exists in regard to those who live together with us in the same household, and with whom the third friendship [the political] exists in regard to those familiar acquaintances who undertake with us civic and noble deeds ; third, that enemies are loved, toward whom we have only the fourth friendship. And this ordering is to be understood under the proviso: “simply speaking.”

Yet in a certain respect that order can be changed, so that, for instance, to a familiar acquaintance who undertakes noble works in common with me, I should bear myself more amicably in regard to our association in such things than I do to my father, if he does not share them in common with me. And the same qualification should be understood in the other cases as well.

Reply Obj. 1: Political friendship has for its basis a sharing in noble works, which some men pursue in common, whereas natural friendship has for its basis a natural sharing, and this sharing is closer to that whereby a man has something in common with himself. Hence, just as a man, simply speaking, ought to love himself more as far as nature is concerned, even if he is evil, than he ought to love another man who is good, so too he ought to love more the nature of his [evil] father, simply speaking, than he ought to love another man who is good—not, of course, insofar as the father is evil, but to the end that he might become good.

Reply Obj. 2: We are conformed to God in this: that we love those more who have more in common with us, even as he loves more those who have more in common with him—although they who have more in common with us and they who have more in common with him are not necessarily the same ones.

Reply Obj. 3: In regard to things that do not pertain to what we naturally share in common with our father or other blood relatives, we need not confer benefits upon our blood relatives more than upon others, but should rather benefit those who are more conjoined with us in regard to the precise sharing in common to which the goods in question pertain. Ecclesiastical benefices, accordingly, are not to be granted more to blood relatives, but to those who are more suitable for ruling the Church, since they share more in common with us insofar as we are dispensers of divine things. Whereas when it comes to the disposing of one’s own patrimony and of those things that a man privately and lawfully acquires, one can and should benefit blood relatives in preference to others, unless from another point of view there is something that weighs more heavily, such as poverty to be met or advantage to be gained.

Reply Obj. 4: The solution is clear in what has been said, since we ought to bear ourselves more amicably to anyone in precisely those things that pertain to the sharing in common proper to that friendship by which they are joined to us.

Reply Obj. 5: In things pertaining to the preservation of [human] nature we are debtors more to our parents, from whom we have received that nature, than to any others; and consequently, we are debtors also to blood relatives because of their connection to our parents. We are therefore more obliged to deliver our father from death than to deliver a stranger from death, even if the same stranger in a similar case would have delivered us. But in regard to other benefits, there are times when we may bear ourselves more amicably to strangers than to those who are close to us.

Article 7

Concerning the order of charity to be observed among those who are close to us

To the seventh we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.26.8–12; De caritate, a. 9; Super Eph. 5, lect. 10; Sent. Ethic. VIII, lect. 12; IX, lect. 7.) It seems that one’s father is not to be loved most of all [among those who are close to us].

Obj. 1: For effect corresponds to affection, and makes the latter manifest. But we ought to show love’s effect more to children than to fathers, for, according to 2 Corinthians 12:14, children ought not to lay up wealth for their parents, but conversely. Therefore children are more to be loved than parents.

Obj. 2: Further, the order of charity is not repugnant to the order of nature, since charity does not destroy nature but perfects it. But a man naturally loves his child more than his father, just as a benefactor naturally loves the one benefitted more than the other way around, insofar as the former’s own good shines out more in the latter, as is said in the Ethics 9. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.7, 1167b17–19.) Therefore according to charity, too, children are to be loved more than parents.

Obj. 3: Further, after God, each one ought to love himself more than any other. But a man ought to love his wife as himself, since he is one body with her. Therefore he ought to love his wife more than any other.

Obj. 4: Further, we ought to love more those who love us more. But mothers love their children more than fathers do. Therefore children ought to love their mothers more than their fathers.

Obj. 5: Further, likeness is the cause of friendship. But daughters are more likened to their mothers than to their fathers. Therefore daughters, at least, ought to love their mothers more than their fathers, and [for the same reason] their sisters more than their brothers. And so the order set down in the text (Sent. III, 29.2(109).5.) is not universal.

Obj. 6: Further, Peter’s siblings are closer to his father than Peter’s children are. If, therefore, the father were to be loved above all others, it would follow that one’s siblings should be loved more than one’s children, of which the contrary is said in the text.

On the contrary, we ought to love God above all. But the love we bear toward a father has a greater likeness to the love we bear toward God, who is our Father, than has any other love. Therefore we ought to love a father above all others.

Furthermore, the one to whom a sufficient return can never be made is to be loved most of all. But as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 8, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.12, 1162a2–5.) we can never make a sufficient return to our fathers, from whom we have received being, nourishment, and education. Therefore among neighbors we ought to love fathers most of all.

Furthermore, as a friendship is greater, so is it firmer. But the friendship a child has for a father is more firm than the converse, since sons cannot repudiate their parents, as fathers can repudiate their sons and, on account of some crime, accuse them and throw them out, as is said in the Ethics 8. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.14, 1163b18–20.) Therefore fathers are to be loved more than children.

I answer that the friendship of those who are close to us, as was said above, is founded upon a natural sharing of something in common. Now every natural sharing is based upon the origin in terms of which father and child are constituted as such ; for siblings are called siblings because they are born of the same father, and so on in succession. Hence the entire friendship of those who are close to us is based upon the friendship of father and child; and therefore this friendship is greater than any other friendship with those who are close to us. Yet in this sphere of friendship, children in a certain way take precedence over parents, and parents in a certain way take precedence over children, in accordance with the two modes of love. For something is loved as a distinct thing, for example, as I love a human being, and something is loved as existing in or for another, for example, as I love my hand or another bodily member by the one love by which I love myself.

Speaking, therefore, of the love of something in itself, in this way parents are more loved than children. But speaking of the love by which something is loved as existing in another, in this way children are more loved than parents. The reason for this is that each thing is more loved the closer it is to us. But something that has an essential order to someone is closer to him than something that is ordered to him accidentally. Now, a cause is essential to an effect as a genus is essential to its species, whereas an effect is related incidentally to a cause. This is because the effect follows upon the being of the cause as species follows upon genus—unless the effect is something of the cause, since in that case the effect will be compared to the cause in the manner of an integral part, which is actually and essentially in the whole, while insofar as the effect is something of the cause, it is not distinct from it but is one with it.

Accordingly, if we consider father and child as certain persons distinct in themselves, the father is more loved than the child, because the father is a cause, whereas the child is an effect. But since the child is a certain “thing of the father,” which does not hold conversely [the father is not a “thing of the child”], the child is therefore loved by another love, insofar as the child is a “thing of the loving father” as though one of his own members. Hence the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.12, 1161b19–24.) that what is generated from someone is closer to him, as though it were a bodily member, say a foot or a tooth. And since in this way it is loved by a love that is as one with that love by which someone loves himself, it follows, from this vantage, that the child is more loved than the father.

And according to this way of viewing the matter, the Philosopher assigns three reasons why children are loved more than parents. The first is that children are like members of their father; hence someone loves his child even as he loves himself. The second is that a father knows better who are his children than his children know who is their father. The third is that the good of the father shines forth in the child as the good of the cause shines forth in the effect—for which reason any artisan naturally loves his works as though they were his children. But since the love by which something is loved in itself [rather than in another] has more the character of benevolence, which is the source and root of friendship, therefore one has friendship, and likewise charity, more for one’s father than for one’s child, although in a way one’s love is more for one’s child.

Certain ones, however, say that children are more loved by natural affection, but fathers are more loved by the affection of charity. But this opinion displeases me, since in natural things nothing is inordinate, yet an inclination of nature that inclined someone to love more what in reality is to be loved less would be inordinate. Hence charity does not change the order of nature, but perfects it. Further, in certain respects a man is naturally more inclined to the love of his father than to the love of his child, even as a man more easily drives away a child from himself than a father, whom he does not drive away except on account of superabundant malice, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 8. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.14, 1163b25.) In like manner, too, certain animals have a greater natural inclination toward their parents in certain matters than toward their offspring, as Basil in Homilies on the Six Days 8, (Basil, Homiliae in Hexameron, hom. 8, n. 6 (PG 29:175).) relates about storks, which, when their parents are worn out by old age, cover them with their feathers, feed them, and support them in flight.

Hence it is clear that, according to both natural inclination and charity, there is need of a distinction [between the love of something in itself, and the love of something as in or for another].

Reply Obj. 1: The father is a cause of the child. Now, it belongs to a cause to flow into the caused, and not conversely. Hence, natural love for a child is gauged according to the father’s natural inclination of affection to benefit his child, whereas the love of a child for his father is gauged according to the child’s natural inclination to subject himself to its father; and this latter inclination is not less than the former, but greater. Hence, it requires greater malice in a man to arrive at the point of turning away from the latter inclination than to arrive at the point of turning away from the former. Now, although in some cases a father is inferior to his child insofar as he needs the child’s help, nevertheless this inferiority does not attach to the father qua father, since qua father he is always superior and [has the dignity of] a cause. And therefore, since nature always inclines to what is always and per se the case, not to what may chance to occur in particular cases, there is not so great a natural inclination on the part of the child to benefit its father as there is on the part of a father to benefit his child.

Yet this inclination [of offspring to parent] is brought about by reason, which in men supplies that for which nature by itself does not suffice. In other animals, however, in which it frequently happens that sires owing to old age need the help of their offspring, nature endows the offspring, since they lack reason, with the inclination to provide for their sires, even as conversely [the sires are endowed with a natural inclination to provide for offspring], as was said about storks.

Reply Obj. 2: That reasoning applies to love for a child in the sense in which he is loved as a good of the father; for in this way, the one benefitted is naturally more loved than the benefactor, insofar as he is the benefactor’s accomplishment.

Reply Obj. 3: A wife is a woman who is taken to oneself for the act of generation. Hence it seems that, in terms of the love of benevolence, she is to be placed in the same category as children who are generated in this union.

Reply Obj. 4: Mothers naturally love their children more than fathers do, for three reasons. The first is that they labored more in their generation; they thus put more of themselves into them. The second is that mothers know better than fathers which children are their own. The third is that right after birth, they take their infants to themselves and nurture them, which fathers do not do; and this makes a difference, even as we love among our relatives those with whom we have regular interaction more than we love the more distant ones, since by such interaction social friendship is joined to natural friendship. And all these reasons amount to this—that the mother puts more of herself into a child than the father does. But more of that which is of the son is contributed by the father than by the mother, since the father gives the form while the mother gives the matter. Consequently, a man by nature loves his father and relatives on his father’s side more than he loves relatives on his mother’s side.

Reply Obj. 5: In regard to things that pertain to perfection, which she loves more in themselves, a daughter is more likened to her father than to her mother; but in regard to things that pertain to defect, she is more likened to her mother than to her father, and a likeness of this sort is not a rationale for loving. And consequently, too, a person by nature loves brothers more than sisters, insofar as brothers more perfectly imitate their father than sisters do.

Reply Obj. 6: Although brothers are closer to the father, nevertheless children are closer to us [than brothers are]. Now, we ought to love ourselves more than our fathers; therefore, we ought to love our children more than our brothers.

Article 8

Concerning charity’s perfection and degrees

Quaestiuncula 1

To the eighth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II.24.9; Super Isaiam 44.) It seems that those degrees of charity [given in the text] are unfittingly distinguished.

Obj. 1: For the perfection of charity consists in this: that God is loved with one’s whole heart. But this is not possible in the wayfaring state, as was said above. (Above, d. 27. q. 3, a. 2.) Therefore charity in the wayfaring state cannot be perfect.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is always on the increase can never be perfect. But as long as we are in this life, charity can always be increased, as was said in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1.) Therefore it cannot be perfect.

Obj. 3: Further, in any motion whatsoever, an infinity of intermediate points can be taken between the first and the last points. But beginning charity is like the starting-point of a motion, and the perfection of charity is like the term. Therefore infinite degrees can be assigned between these.

Obj. 4: Further, as soon as someone begins, he is already advancing forward. Therefore “advancing charity” ought not to be distinguished from “beginning charity.”

On the contrary, the spiritual life bears a likeness to natural life. But determinate degrees of age are assigned in the advance of natural life. Therefore determinate degrees ought to be assigned in charity, too, since the spiritual life of the soul is according to it.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Furthermore, it seems that all are bound to aim for the practice of perfect charity. (Parallel: De caritate, a. 11, ad 1.) For, as Bernard says, “to stand still in the way of God is to fall backwards.” (Bernard, Epistulae, epist. 254 (ad abbatem Garinum), nn. 4, 5 (PL 182:460–61).) But everyone who advances forward in the way of God is tending to the goal of perfection. Therefore all are bound to tend to the perfection of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, each man is bound to love his neighbor more than his own body. But to lay down one’s bodily life for one’s brethren is something that belongs to perfect charity. Therefore each man is bound to perfect charity.

Obj. 3: Further, those who denied God owing to fear of death are not excused from sin. Yet they would not have sinned unless they were bound to do the opposite. Therefore each one is bound to dying for Christ, which belongs to perfect charity.

Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 8 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.14, 1163b16.) that in the honors we give to parents and to God, we cannot make a return of something equivalent to what has been given to us, so that justice in this instance is to make whatever return to them we can. Now, all are bound to the work of justice. Therefore each man ought to do for God the whole of what he can. But a man can extend himself to works of perfection. Therefore he is bound to those works.

On the contrary, anyone sins by omitting that to which he is bound. If, therefore, all were bound to perfect charity, all the imperfect would be damned, which is false.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Furthermore, it seems that one who has attained perfect charity is bound to everything that belongs to perfection. (Parallels: ST II-II.186.2; De caritate, a. 11, ad 12; Quodl. I, q. 7, a. 2; Contra impugnantes, ch. 2.) For, as Gregory says, when gifts increase, the reckonings of the gifts also increase; (Gregory the Great, Homilia in evangelia, bk. 1, hom. 9, para. 1 (CCSL 141:58; PL 76:1106).) and in Luke 12:48 it is said, everyone to whom much has been given, much will be required. But more is committed to him who has perfect charity. Therefore he is bound to more, in keeping with the demands arising from the gifts he has received. And so it seems that he is bound to [all] those things that belong to perfection.

Obj. 2: Further, as an imperfect man stands to what is commonly required of Christians, so a perfect man stands to those things that belong to perfection. But the imperfect one is bound to what is commonly required; therefore the perfect one is bound to those things that belong to perfection.

Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle was bound to evangelizing, which is a work of perfection; for he says: An obligation is laid on me, and woe to me if I do not proclaim the Gospel! (1 Cor 9:16). This “necessity” pressed upon him for no other reason than that he had perfect charity. Therefore those who have perfect charity are bound to those things that belong to perfection.

On the contrary, when someone has more charity, he has more freedom, since where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom (2 Cor 3:17). But the one who has perfect charity has charity most of all. Therefore he is under less of an obligation, and consequently is not obliged to do as great things as others are.

Furthermore, it belongs to perfection not to give offense by one’s speech and to avoid venial sins. But no one succeeds in doing this [perfectly], not even the apostles. Therefore those who are perfect are not obliged to those things that belong to perfection.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, just as diverse ages are distinguished in bodily growth according to some notable effects to which nature advances when before, in an earlier stage, it was unable to exercise these effects, so, too, in spiritual growth diverse degrees of charity are assigned according to some notable effects that charity produces in the one who has charity.

The first effect of charity is that a man draws back from sin; and therefore the mind of the one who has charity is at first occupied most of all with this—that he should be cleansed from past sins and avoid future ones. And with respect to this effect, charity is called “beginning.” The second effect is that the one who is now confident of having liberation from sins should extend himself to gaining good things. And with respect to this effect, charity is called “advancing”—not because it does not advance in other states as well, but because in this state its special care is to gain good things; during it, a man is always panting for progress. The third effect is that a man, now thoroughly nourished with those good things, possesses them as, in a certain way, natural to him, and rests in them and is delighted by them. And this pertains to “perfect” charity.

The intermediate state, however, can be viewed under two aspects: one, according to which it is compared to the first state, since it is strengthened against the evils that beginning charity is careful to avoid; the other, that it is nourished, according to which it tends toward the third state, as always incorporating good things more and more into itself.

In like manner, perfect charity has two degrees: one, according to which it rests securely in the good things that are commonly required of all, and in terms of this it is called “perfect”; the other, according to which it sets its hand to any difficult task whatsoever, and in terms of this it is called “most perfect”—or [according to another explanation] “perfect” as regards the wayfaring state, “most perfect” as regards the state of heaven.

Reply Obj. 1: That commandment is fulfilled, in a certain way, in both the wayfaring state and in the heavenly homeland, but not in the same way. In the wayfaring state the commandment is fulfilled as regards the perfection here attainable; in heaven it is fulfilled as regards the perfection there attained.

Reply Obj. 2: Although charity may always be increased as regards the intensity with which the same effects are willed, nevertheless it is not increased in such a way that there would be added to it some notable effects which were absent before.

Reply Obj. 3: Although infinite intermediate points can be taken in any motion, nonetheless they do not all have a notable diversity.

Reply Obj. 4: Although a beginner does advance, still his mind is more occupied with removing evils than with advancing in the good. Consequently, he is not called “advancing” with respect to his state, since moral things receive their names from the end aimed at.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that the quantity of charity can be viewed in two ways, and this distinction applies to the quantity of any virtue, whether moral or natural: in one way, according to the intensity of charity; in another way, according to its object. And in keeping with this distinction, a twofold perfection of charity can be considered: one according to intensity, viz., that it should love perfectly; the other according to its object or effect, that it should do perfect things. Now, in regard to charity, each of these perfections can be viewed in two ways. For (1) it has perfection with respect to its being, insofar as it is perfect in its species; and this is the perfection of sufficiency, to which all of us are bound even as we are bound to [have the virtue of] charity itself, since in both ways charity has a determinate quantity beneath which it does not extend. And in this [having of sufficient quantity] stands its essential perfection. (2) It has a further perfection with respect to well-being, and in regard to this perfection, too, a distinction is to be made, since one is bound to tend to, though one is not bound to have, the perfection that has to do with intensity, whereas someone is not bound, simply speaking, either to tend to or to have the perfection that has to do with charity’s objects, but he is bound not to despise it or harden himself against it. And the reason is that the essential reward to which we are bound to tend is measured not by the greatness of one’s deeds but by the intensity of one’s charity, since God thinks more of how much charity a deed was done from, than how much was done. Nevertheless, one is bound in particular cases to do some works similar to works of perfection, as will be said.

Reply Obj. 1: Bernard’s statement is rightly understood of advancement in regard to intensity, for which a man always ought to strive.

Reply Obj. 2: When we know that a brother can be freed from the death of his soul through the death of our body without danger to our own soul, then handing over our life for the brethren does not belong to perfection but is a matter of necessity; in other circumstances, however, such an act belongs to perfection.

Reply Obj. 3: Similarly, for a man to hand himself over freely to persecutors when danger to the faith presses, is a matter of perfection; but for him not to deny the faith if he is caught is a matter of necessity.

Reply Obj. 4: In things not determined to one, a power in its totality cannot be bound to something one, since were this the case, its character of contingency, according to which something can fail in the lesser part, would perish. Since, therefore, men in this wayfaring state do not have their free will determined to one thing, it is not required of them that the totality of free will be expended in the service of God—for this will be the case only in heaven, when it will be impossible for anything less than perfect to occur—but it suffices that we expend nothing of our power against God, and that we do those things that are determined for us [for example, obey the commandments]; for if it were the other way [that is, if we were bound to do all we could], the essence of our state [as wayfarers] would perish. Hence, just as God does not demand from us as much as he gave to us, since it is impossible for us to make an equal return to him, so he does not demand from us as much as we are able to do, since this, too, would run contrary to the essence of our state as wayfarers.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that “one who has perfect charity” can be understood in two ways. (1) In one way, according to the perfection of charity considered with respect to its objects, as those people are called “perfect” to whom it pertains to do works of perfection either from vow, such as religious, or from office, such as prelates. And so, in terms of what is owed, such “perfect” people are not bound to anything to which others are not bound except for those specific things they vowed to do or things connected with their office. Hence neither prelates nor religious are bound to all of the counsels. (2) In another way, according to the perfection of charity considered with respect to its intensity, as might be found in a layman in the world who is fervent in charity. And such a man is not obliged to undertake works of perfection except in the way that others are, but he is obliged to love God more intensely for the goods he has received; he is also inclined to do this from his habit of perfect charity.

Reply Obj. 1: The one who has perfect charity is bound to love God more, that is, to act more intensely and more perfectly [in regard to what is required of all], but is not bound to perform other, additional works on the basis of what God has given him, although perhaps another man is more bound to perform such works on the basis of what God has forgiven him. Now, although what is given is much more [valuable] than what is forgiven, since good is more good than evil is evil, nevertheless, the one who is a debtor from being forgiven is bound to some things, such as making satisfaction for sins, to which the other one is not bound.

Reply Obj. 2: This reasoning supposes something false, unless it be understood about perfect ones who vowed some works of perfection, to which works they are bound above other men.

Reply Obj. 3: This work of evangelizing pertained to Paul on account of the office of prelate [in which he was installed].

Reply Sed Contra: Nevertheless it should be known that the argument made in support of the opposite position goes too far, since the perfect are not less bound, but are merely less moved from debt, since love moves them more than debt, even in those things in which they are debtors; and it is in this respect that greater liberty is said to be in them.

Exposition of the text

The charity of many is disordered. (Sent. III, 29.2(109).5, attributed to Ambrose but actually from Origen, Glossa Ordinaria (on Song of Songs 2:4) (PL 113:1137).) In this passage the term “charity” is being used broadly for love or friendship.

If these last are good, they are to be placed ahead of wicked children. (Sent. III, 29.2(109).5, attributed to Ambrose but actually from Origen, Glossa Ordinaria,* at Song of Songs 2:4, (PL 113:1137*).) But not in those affairs that have reference to what parent and child naturally share in common, like the distribution of an inheritance, education, and things of this sort; unless perhaps the superabundant malice of those children makes them unworthy of fatherly favor.

This is perfect charity, that one is prepared to die for his brothers. (Sent. III, 29.3(110).1, quoting Augustine, In Iohannis epistulam ad Parthos tractatus, ch. 3, n. 4 (CCSL 37; PL 35:2014).) On the contrary: someone who is imperfect is not ready to die even for God; therefore, someone who is perfect loves his neighbor more than someone imperfect loves God. In response, it should be said that this difference between them arises from the fact that the one who is perfect loves his bodily life less than does the one who is imperfect. Moreover, the one who is perfect lays down his life for the brethren from a superabundance of divine charity, for it is impossible that any charity should cause a love of neighbor as great as another charity causes a love of God. But these two loves are not of the same kind; one kind of love—the love of God—is love of the end and cause of all loving, while the other kind of love—the love of neighbor—is love of what is for the end and receives the nature of being lovable from another, which is God. Thus the two are not comparable in the way that the objection compares them.

When [this charity] has come to perfection, it says: 'I desire to be dissolved.' (Sent. III. 29. 3 (110). 1, quoting Augustine, In Iohannis epistulam ad Parthos tractatus, ch. 3, n. 4 (CCSL 37; PL 35:2014), referring to Phil 1:23.) We seem to have a contrary example in the case of blessed Peter, to whom the Lord said: you will stretch out your hands, and someone else will fasten a belt around you and take you where you do not wish to go (John 21:18); and in blessed Martin, too, who did not refuse to keep on living. In regard to Peter’s case, it should be said that the Lord’s words are understood as referring to natural will, whereas the words of the Apostle are understood as referring to rational will. In regard to Martin’s case, it should be said that perfect charity, insofar as it has something of the love of concupiscence, wishes above all else to enjoy God in the way Paul describes; but inasmuch as it consists more chiefly in benevolence, it makes one desire above all what is pleasing to God. And it was according to this aspect of charity that blessed Martin spoke his words. (With death imminent, he said: Domine, si adhuc populous tuo sum necessarius, non recuso laborem.)

The increase of charity, however, was discussed in Book I, Distinction 17. (In I Sent., d. 27, q. 2, aa. 1–4.)