D. 32 - God's charity for us

Division of the text

To the above we must add [something] concerning the love of God, by which he loves us. (Sent. III, 32.1(115).1.) After the Master has considered the love of charity by which we love God, here he examines the love by which God loves us.

And this consideration is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows how God loves every creature;

in the second, he raises a question about the reprobate whom God does not seem to love, at as for the reprobate, who are not prepared for life, but for death, if it is asked whether it ought to be granted that God may have loved them from all eternity, we say that this is to be granted simply only with regard to the elect. (Sent. III, 32.5(119).1.)

The former is divided into two parts.

In the first, he considers the love of God by which God is said, absolutely speaking, to love the creature;

in the second, he determines about the degrees of divine love according to which he is said to love one thing more and another less, at but since God’s love is immutable . . . one may ask what is the sense of the statement that God is said to love this thing more or less than that one. (Sent. III, 32.1(115).2.)

And this part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he determines about the order of love with respect to different objects;

in the second, with respect to the same object, at but if it is asked concerning someone whether he is loved more by God at one time than at another, we must distinguish the meaning of the statement. (Sent. III, 32.4(118).1.)

About the former, he does three things.

First, he raises the question.

Second, he determines it, at and yet it may be certainly understood. (Sent. III, 32.2(116).2.)

Third, he confirms the solution, at for God’s love is considered in two ways: according to essence and according to efficacy. (Sent. III, 32.3(117).1.)

Question 1

How God loves every creature

Here, we will inquire into five things:

first, whether God loves the creature;

second, whether he loves every creature;

third, whether he loves them from eternity;

fourth, whether he loves them all equally, (A. 4.) and what he loves more, what less or equally. (A. 5.)

Article 1

Whether it accords with God’s nature that he love a creature

To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I.20.1; 82.5.ad 1; SCG I.91; In De divinis nominibus, ch. 4, lect. 9.) It seems that loving a creature does not accord with God’s nature.

Obj. 1: For love implies a certain passion of the soul. But other passions of the soul, such as anger and things of this sort, are not in God, except according to effect and by way of likeness. Therefore neither is love in him.

Obj. 2: Further, between a great distance there cannot be love. Hence, friends do not desire the greatest of goods for their friends, lest the friendship be dissolved, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.7, 1159a6.) But there is no distance as great as that between Creator and creature. Therefore there cannot be a love of God for a creature.

Obj. 3: Further, love bears the lover into the beloved, so that he now lives the life of the beloved, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 13 (PG 3:711).) But God is not borne into anything other, since he is unmoving; rather he draws all things to himself, as is said in John 12:32. Therefore he does not love the creature.

Obj. 4: Further, the one loving is, in a way, subjected to the beloved, insofar as the lover’s affection is informed by the beloved, as was said above. But God is in no way subjected to a creature. In no way, therefore, does he love a creature.

Obj. 5: Further, all our perfection has the divine perfection for exemplar. But every virtue is a perfection of the mind. Therefore since certain other virtues are not in God, for example temperance and things of this sort, it seems that neither is charity.

On the contrary, just as God’s essence is the exemplar of every creature, so God’s goodness is the cause of all goodness in the creature. But God, in knowing his essence, knows all the things that have it for exemplar. Therefore in loving his own goodness, he loves all the things that participate goodness from him.

Furthermore, God so loved the world that he gave his only Son (John 3:16).

Furthermore, Dionysius says that divine love does not allow itself to be without seed. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 10 (PG 3:707).)

I answer that to each thing possessed of knowledge, its own proper good is lovable—not only by a natural love, but by an animal or an intellectual love. Hence, since in God there is perfect knowledge of himself, he loves his own goodness. Now the good of a thing refers not only to good present in it itself, but also to good present in another by way of that other’s likeness to it. Since therefore the goodness that is in creatures is a likeness of the divine goodness, it follows that he himself loves the creature.

Reply Obj. 1: Certain passions imply in their notion some material transmutation, and for this reason they cannot be transferred to God except by way of likeness, such as anger, and in like manner, those that imply a defect, such as sadness, and anger again, insofar as it is caused by sadness. But there are certain passions that do not imply in their notion anything material or any defect, such as pleasure or delight. Hence, as the Philosopher proves in the Ethics 7, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.14, 1154a8–15.) delight is found in intellectual activity, not just in bodily activity; and it is on account of this that delight can be posited in God—not indeed in the manner of a passion, but as, according to our mode of understanding, consequent upon his simple and motionless activity. Hence, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 7, God rejoices in a simple activity. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.14, 1154b26.) And a like response is to be given concerning love in God.

Reply Obj. 2: Between those who are at a great distance, love can certainly exist, but not friendship, since they are not sharing a life together, which is the activity proper to friendship. God, however, though he stands infinitely distant from the creature, nevertheless works actively in all things and exists in all things; and therefore even the notion of friendship can be preserved in his regard.

Reply Obj. 3: In a way, every love bears the lover into the beloved, yet in two different ways: in one way, insofar as the lover is borne into participating those things that belong to the beloved; in the other way, so that the lover communicates to the beloved those things that are his own. In the former way, therefore, God is not borne into the creature loved by him, but in the latter way [one can say that he is borne, by love, into the creature,] insofar as he communicates his goodness to it. And this is the sense in which Dionysius says that “even God himself suffers ecstasy through love.” (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 13 (PG 3:711).)

Reply Obj. 4: A passive power is informed by its object, but an active power places its own form upon the object, as is evident with the agent and potential intellect. Hence, just as the divine intellect is not informed by the things he knows through his essence, so neither is his will informed by the things he loves, since he loves them through his own goodness, and by loving, communicates his goodness to them.

Reply Obj. 5: Virtues that have determinate matter in connection with bodily acts and passions, or that imply some defect, such as faith, cannot have an exemplar in the divine nature in such a way that those virtues themselves are in God; but they do have [some] exemplar in the divine intellect, even as the rest of material things have. And therefore since charity implies neither defect nor anything material, it is found [to be predicated] of God before certain other virtues.

Article 2

Whether God loves every creature

To the second we proceed thus. (Parallels: above, d. 26, a. 1; ST I.20.2; 23.3.ad 1; I-II.110.1; SCG I.91; De caritate, a. 7, ad 2; Super Ioan. 5, lect. 3; In De divinis nominibus, ch. 4, lect. 9.) It seems that God does not love every creature.

Obj. 1: For whatever God loves, he loves from charity. But irrational creatures are not loved from charity, as was said above. (In III Sent., d. 21, q. 1, a. 2.) Therefore God does not love them.

Obj. 2: Further, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 8, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.1, 1155b3–5.) inanimate creatures are not loved except by a love of concupiscence, as is clear with love for wine. But God does not love anything by a love of concupiscence, since he does not need our goods. Therefore in no way does he love inanimate creatures.

Obj. 3: Further, intellectual love is a cause of choice. But not everything is specially chosen by God, not even all men. Therefore he does not love all creatures.

Obj. 4: Further, whoever loves something wills good for it. But God does not will for the reprobate the one good that is the perfect good, namely eternal life, since if he willed it for them, they would have it. Therefore God does not love every creature.

Obj. 5: Further, there cannot be love and hatred from the same source toward the same object. But God hates some creature: I have hated Esau (Mal 1:3). Therefore he does not love every creature.

On the contrary, you love all things that exist, and detest none of the things that you have made (Wis 11:24).

Furthermore, Dionysius says that divine love moves superior things to have providence for inferiors. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 13 (PG 3:711).) But God has providence over all things; therefore he loves all things.

Furthermore, God saw everything that he had made, and indeed, it was very good (Gen 1:31); and Augustine says (Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber, para. 5, n. 22 (CSEL 28.1:472; PL 34:228); cf. Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum,, bk. 1, ch. 6 (PL 42:608).) that by this verse it is signified that God approved of all things. But nothing is approved of unless it is loved. Therefore God loves all things.

I answer that friendship, as was said above, (Above, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1.) adds something beyond love, since for the notion of love it is enough that a man wish any good for someone, whereas for the notion of friendship it is necessary that a person wish for someone the very good he wishes for himself—namely, that he wish to converse with him and share his company in the things he loves the most.

So, then, if we speak about love in general, God loves all things insofar as he wills for them some good, namely, their natural good. But the good that he wills for himself, namely, the vision of himself and the enjoyment by which he is blessed, he wills indeed to every rational creature by his antecedent will, but only to the elect by his consequent will, which is will simply. And therefore he loves only the elect with love of friendship, while he loves all others, insofar as they are good, with love understood in the general sense of the word.

Reply Obj. 1: God loves all other things, that is, irrational creatures, from charity, not as though he has charity for them, but as ordering them to those for whom he does have charity.

Reply Obj. 2: Although we do not love inanimate creatures with a love of benevolence, since their good does not come from us, God on the other hand loves them with a love of benevolence, since by the very fact that he wills good for them, they are and are good. Nevertheless, although God does not love anything with concupiscence as desiring it for himself, he loves it with concupiscence as desiring it for another—if we do not give full force to the term “concupiscence,” which suggests not just what is proper to desire [as such], but an anxiety of desire.

Reply Obj. 3: It is love of friendship that causes choice; and this kind of love God does not have toward all things.

Reply Obj. 4: God wills for all irrational creatures the good proportionate to them and the good of which they are capable; and therefore it can be said that God loves them, simply speaking. But when it comes to the reprobate, God by consequent will, according to which he is said to will something simply, wills for them the good of nature, but he does not will the good of which they are capable, namely grace and glory, except by antecedent will. And therefore in their case it is not to be said that God loves them simply speaking, but rather he loves them in a certain respect, namely insofar as they are creatures.

Reply Obj. 5: God does not hate the reprobate insofar as they are his creatures, but insofar as they are evil; and that they are evil is not from him.

Article 3

Whether God has loved creatures from eternity

To the third we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I.20.2.ad 2; SCG IV.23; Super Rom. 9, lect. 2; Super Ephes. 1, lect. 1.) It seems that God has not loved creatures from eternity.

Obj. 1: For love is only of what is good. But creatures were not good from eternity [since they have not existed for eternity]. Therefore he has not loved them from eternity.

Obj. 2: Further, love signifies the divine essence, and connotes an effect in the creature. But names that imply an effect in the creature, like “Lord,” “Savior,” and the like, are said of God from the vantage of time. Therefore “to love creatures” is said of God temporally, since it, too, involves his causality in regard to things existing in time.

Obj. 3: Further, love unites the lover to the beloved. But things could not be conjoined or united to God before they existed. Therefore they could not be loved by him from eternity.

Obj. 4: Further, in things that have the same characteristic, there is a single notion for love. But before creatures existed, they were distinguished in nothing. Therefore in one [as yet uncreated thing] there was no reason why it should be loved more than there was in any another [as yet uncreated thing]. And so, from eternity God has not loved the elect, except perhaps just as he loved others.

Obj. 5: Further, the lover wants the beloved to exist. But God was not willing creatures to exist before they actually existed; since if he had wanted them to exist before, they would have existed before. Therefore he did not love them before they actually existed.

On the contrary, he chose us in Christ before the foundation of the world (Eph 1:4). But that choice was from love. Therefore he also loved creatures from eternity.

Furthermore, Dionysius says that divine love was the reason why God made the things he made. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 10 (PG 3:707).) Therefore the love of things was in God before the things themselves existed; and so it was in him from eternity.

Furthermore, affection for the good follows upon knowledge of the good. But God has known from eternity whatsoever good there is in creatures. Therefore from eternity he has loved creatures.

I answer that certain names may be said of God only from the vantage of time—but only those that imply in the chief thing signified something that is not really in God, such as names that imply in the chief thing signified a relation of God to the creature, such as “Lord” and the like. For indeed, while this relation is a real relation in the creature, in God it is a relation according to reason only. It is similar with names that imply in the chief thing signified a divine action having its term in something outside himself, such as “to create” and the like. Now, love, in the chief thing signified, does not indicate a relation, but rather an activity of the will—the activities of which, as with the activities of the intellect alongside it and elicited by it, remain in the one acting and do not pass over into the establishment of something in exterior matter. And therefore love [of creatures] belongs to God from eternity.

Reply Obj. 1: Although from eternity creatures were not good in their proper nature, nevertheless they were good in the foreknowledge of God.

Reply Obj. 2: Love does not connote an effect in act, but in habit. And this is because activities of the soul do not have their term in something outside the one acting; hence, they can be extended even to that which is not in act.

Reply Obj. 3: Love does not always bring about a real union, but is [essentially] a union of affection—a union that can be had even with what is absent or altogether non-existent.

Reply Obj. 4: Although [prior to being created] they did not differ according to that which in their proper natures they were not, yet they did have difference in God’s foreknowledge, according to which he foreknew their future diversities.

Reply Obj. 5: God was eternally willing that creatures exist, but he was not willing that they exist from eternity, but rather, according to the order appointed by his wisdom.

Article 4

Whether God loves all things equally

To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallels: In III Sent., d. 19. a. 5, resp. 1; In II Sent., d. 26, a. 1, ad 2; ST I.20.3; SCG I.91.) It seems that God loves all things equally.

Obj. 1: For providence, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 12 (PG 3:710).) is an effect of love. But he takes thought for all alike (Wis 6:7). Therefore he loves all things equally.

Obj. 2: Further, “God’s love for creatures” signifies his relationship to creatures. But God relates equally to all things, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.6, 400b28.) although all things are unequally related to him. Therefore he loves all things equally.

Obj. 3: Further, just as God loves all things, so he knows all things. But he knows all things equally; therefore he loves all things equally.

Obj. 4: Further, the same act cannot be more intense and more remiss, except according to different parts of it. But God loves all things by the same simple act. Therefore he does not love one thing more than another.

Obj. 5: Further, a lover loves one thing more than another for the same reason that he loves the same thing sometimes more, sometimes less: since just as one thing is better than another, so the same thing is better at some times than it is at other times. But God does not love anything sometimes more, sometimes less, since in this way his love would be changeable, which is impossible. Therefore he does not love one thing more than another.

On the contrary, the Lord has made all things for himself (Prov 16:4); (NRSVCE renders this “the Lord has made everything for its purpose.”) and in like manner, too, it is said that he made all things for the sake of man. But that for the sake of which something comes to be is loved more. Therefore God loves himself more than others, and among others, he loves one more than another.

Furthermore, God’s charity is of the good precisely as good. Therefore the more good something is, the more God loves it.

Furthermore, the order of charity pertains to its perfection. But God’s charity is most perfect. Therefore, in accordance with order, he loves one more than another.

I answer that love is measured in two ways. In one way, it is measured from its principle, so that something is said to be more loved when the will is more efficaciously inclined to loving it. And in this way, God loves all things equally, because in his love with respect to anything whatsoever he has an infinite efficacy in loving. In another way, love is measured in terms of its object; accordingly, someone is said to love more that for which he wills a greater good. And in this way, God is said to love one more than another, insofar as he wills for it a greater good. And due to this willing of a greater good he also brings about a greater effect in the more favored object, because his will is the cause of things.

Reply Obj. 1: The care of all things belongs to him equally as regards his solicitude for all, but not as regards the things provided for them.

Reply Obj. 2: Love implies not only what exists on the part of God, but also what exists on the part of the creature, whose [actual] good, insofar as it too is willed by God, is included in God’s love. And since creatures are not equally related to God, nor can they equally participate his goodness, therefore he does not love all things equally.

Reply Obj. 3: Knowledge involves a thing’s motion into the soul, love involves the soul’s motion toward things; and therefore knowledge takes its measure only from the side of the knower, whereas love takes its measure from both sides. For one is not said to know more just because he knows a greater thing to exist in anything, in the way that one is said to love more the one in whom he wishes a greater good to exist. Hence no parallel can be drawn in this regard between love and knowledge.

Reply Obj. 4: He is not said to love something more because he loves it more intensely, but because he wills a greater good for it.

Reply Obj. 5: With respect to the affection of love, he always loves the same thing equally, since when all is said and done, he always wills for it the same good, even though he does not wish that it always have an equal or the same good. Consequently, in terms of the effect, there is not an equal love.

Article 5

On the comparison of things loved by God

Quaestiuncula 1

To the fifth we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST I.20.4.) [We divide the article into four subquestions: 1. whether God loves the now-just man foreknown to be lost more than the sinner predestined to be saved; 2. whether God loves the penitent more than the innocent; 3. whether God loves man more than angel; 4. whether God loves the human race more than Christ]. It seems that God loves the now-just man more than the sinner predestined to be saved.

Obj. 1: For it is said in Proverbs 8:17, I love those who love me. But [insofar as he is presently a sinner,] that sinner predestined to be saved does not love God, whom the now-just man presently loves. Therefore he loves the now-just man more than the sinner predestined to be saved.

Obj. 2: Further, God loves more that which is better. But [compared simply, as they now are in themselves,] that just man is better than that sinner. Therefore he is more loved by God.

Obj. 3: Further, in the text of the Master (Sent. III, 32.1(115).2, quoting Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus, tract. 110, para. 6 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1923).) it says that God loves the members of his only-begotten Son more than others. But the sinner predestined to be saved is not [now actually] a member of Christ. Therefore he is loved less by God than the now-just man who is [now actually] a member of Christ.

On the contrary, intellectual love is a cause of choice. But God chooses [for salvation] the sinner predestined to be saved. Therefore he loves him more than he loves a now-just man whom he does not choose for salvation.

Furthermore, he loves more the one for whom he wills a greater good. But he wills a greater good, namely eternal life, for the sinner predestined to be saved. Therefore he loves him more.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Furthermore, it seems that he loves the penitent more than the innocent. For joy follows upon love; but God rejoices more about a penitent, as is clear from Luke 15:7. Therefore he loves him more.

Obj. 2: Further, where a person does more, he loves more—on account of which, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.7, 1168a25.) mothers love their children more than fathers do. But God does more for the salvation of a penitent than for the salvation of an innocent. Therefore he loves him more.

Obj. 3: Further, love’s affection is gauged from love’s effect. But it seems to be a greater effect of love to call an enemy back to friendship than to preserve a friend in friendship. [And since a penitent is an enemy whom God called back to friendship, while an innocent is a friend preserved in friendship,] therefore he loves more a penitent than an innocent.

On the contrary, what is more lasting is more worthy of being chosen and being loved. But the good of an innocent is more lasting. Therefore it is more loved by God.

Furthermore, it was said above (Above, d. 31, q. 1, a. 4, rep. 1, ad 2.) that the one rising up from sin never returns to as much dignity, although he can return to as much charity. Therefore God loves an innocent more than a penitent.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Furthermore, it seems that he loves man more than angel. For it is clear that he did not come to help angels, but the descendants of Abraham (Heb 2:16); and thus, he did more for men than for angels. Therefore he loves them more.

Obj. 2: Further, men are members of Christ in more ways than angels are, namely [not only with respect to grace but also] with respect to a conformity of nature. But God loves more those who are members of Christ, as is said in the text of the Master. (Sent. III, 32.1(115).2, quoting Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus, tract. 110, para. 6 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1923).) Therefore he loves men more than angels.

Obj. 3: Further, God placed certain individuals of the human race—namely, Christ and the Blessed Virgin—above all the angels. Therefore he loves men more than angels.

On the contrary, love is caused by a fittingness or agreement between lover and beloved. But angels are more like unto God, as Gregory says. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 32, para. 23 (CCSL 143B; PL 76:655).) Therefore he loves angels more than men.

Furthermore, in the beginning he bestowed glory, as it were, upon the angels, but not upon men. Therefore he loves angels more than men.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Furthermore, it seems that God loves the human race more than he loves Christ. For, as is evident from John 3:16, he gave Christ for the redemption of the human race.

Obj. 2: Further, the common good is more divine than the good of one. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.2, 1094b9–10.) But the good of the human race is a common good, whereas the good of Christ is the good of a single person. Therefore God loves the human race more than he loves Christ.

On the contrary, it is through Christ that the whole human race comes to be accepted by God. Therefore he loves Christ more.

Furthermore, he gives the Spirit [to Christ] without measure (John 3:34). Therefore God loves him more [than all others, who receive the Spirit up to a certain measure].

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that simply speaking, God wills a greater good for the sinner predestined to be saved than he wills for the now-just man; but in terms of what is the case right now, he wills a greater good for the just man foreknown to be lost. But this determination—“what is the case right now”—does not fall on love’s side but more on the object’s side, because God’s love is not changed over time, for from eternity he willed a greater good for that predestined man. Hence, it is to be conceded, simply, that he loves the one predestined more than the one foreknown to be lost.

Reply Obj. 1–5: And from this, the response to the objections is evident, since they argue in terms of what is the case right now.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that, with respect to the good of the essential reward, God loves the penitent and the innocent equally if they have equal charity, or else he loves that one more who has the greater charity. But with respect to the accidental reward, he loves the innocent more, on account of the dignity of innocence—a dignity that the penitent cannot attain.

Reply Obj. 1: Even if a penitent rises up after a fall with a charity equal to that which he had before, and thus the good willed for him by God is equal considered in itself, nevertheless this good is greater in comparison to the man to whom it is given, just as when someone is needy, a benefit given to him is reckoned more of a benefit than were he not so needy. And on account of this it is said that God and the angels rejoice more over his conversion, even as a person rejoices more over a small sign of health appearing in a sick man than that person does over the full bloom of health the sick man once had. Or it may be said that this [namely, that God and the angels rejoice more over the recovery of one than the safety of the others] is said because of the fact that a penitent frequently rises up after a fall more humble and fervent and cautious.

Reply Obj. 2: God is not more active in someone in whom he newly infuses grace than in someone in whom he continues to sustain it, even as neither is the sun more active in illuminating dark air than in continuing its light in air already illuminated. For nothing is able to subsist unless the activity of God is continued in it.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the effect of love in question may be greater with respect to the one who is freed from the guilt of sin, nevertheless it is not greater simply speaking.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that God loves angels more than human beings in terms of the good of nature, but in terms of the good of glory, angels are related to humans as both exceeding and exceeded, because God will love certain humans more than some angels, certain angels more than some people, and certain angels and people equally; for people will then be equal to the angels in enjoying God, and certain human beings will even be superior to the angels; and God has provided for each one in accordance with the needs and demands of his nature and of his state.

Reply Obj. 1–5: And through this answer the response to the objections is clear. For it does not follow that a father loves a sick son more than a healthy one just because he gives him remedies that he does not give to the healthy one.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that God loves Christ not only more than men, but also more than creation in its totality—[and he loves him more] not only with respect to his divine nature, but even with respect to his human nature, insofar as he predestined it to a greater good, namely to union with a divine person.

Reply Obj. 1: Even in the fact that Christ was given on behalf of men, the greatest good came to Christ himself, since through this giving of himself his virtue was manifested and he became the cause of human salvation, which makes him supremely honorable.

Reply Obj. 2: Although he is a single person, Christ is nevertheless the universal cause of salvation to the human race: and the cause has preeminence over the caused.

Exposition of the text

To the above we must add [something] concerning the love of God, by which he loves us. (Sent. III, 32.1(115).1.) It seems that the Master ought to have examined this matter in Book I. And it should be answered that it could have been suitably placed in the first Book, too, insofar as the divine love is the divine essence; and it can be fittingly placed here, insofar as God’s love is the exemplar of our love.

God’s love is the divine ousia. (Sent. III, 32.1(115).1.) This is said because ousia, that is, essence, and love are one and the same thing in God, differing only in notion, as was said in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, aa. 1, 2.)