Chapter I. The nature of moral theology

THE second part of the Summa begins with a prologue which outlines the purpose and scope of what is now called moral theology. Hence we dwell here, first on the nature of moral theology, and secondly on its divisions.

The word “image” (in the phrase “image of God”) signifies man as endowed with intellect, free will, and self-mastery. Hence, having treated of God, who is man’s exemplar, we now proceed to consider God’s image, man, namely, who is the source of his own deeds, since he has free will and mastery of self.:

What a sublime conception of moral theology! God’s liberty in creation is the prototype of man’s free activities.

In the first part of the Summa, the Saint, treating of God’s creatures, had shown how man is the imperfect image of God, since, like God, man can know and love himself, thus representing not only the divine nature, but also the divine Trinity. Now he proceeds to show that man is God’s image, not only by his higher faculties, but also in his free activities, whereby he knows and loves not only himself, but also God, as God knows and loves Himself. ‘This knowledge and love are indeed the final goal of all human life. But even here on earth a saint differs from his fellows by that love wherewith he loves not only himself, but God. From this sublime viewpoint moral theology is the science of imitating God. It produces a more and more perfect likeness of man to God. And this likeness would be man’s goal even if God had not become man.

But how much more perfect is this likeness when imitation of God has become imitation of Christ!

A more scholastic description of moral theology can be found in the first part: ? “Although theology is more speculative than practical, it is nevertheless practical, in its treatment of human acts, by which man is led to perfect knowledge of God wherein lies eternal blessedness.” Again, in the second question, outlining the entire Summa, he says: “We will speak first of God, secondly of man’s journey to God, thirdly of Christ who, as man, is our road to God.”

Thus moral theology may be defined as that part of theology which, guided by revelation, studies human acts as the road to man’s supernatural goal. Or, more briefly: a theological treatise which guides human acts to man’s supernatural goal.

Moral theology, then, stands on a higher level than natural ethics. Natural ethics guides man to his last natural goal, which consists, not in the beatific vision and supernatural love, but in the knowledge, perfect but abstract, of God as the author of nature, and in the consequent natural love of God above all else. Ethics, properly speaking, does not deal with man as the image of the triune God. In the definition given above, many theologians avoid the phrase “that part of theology,” substituting for it “that branch of knowledge.” Hence arises the following question: Does moral theology differ specifically from dogmatic theology?

The distinction of moral and dogma became distinct in the Summa. But some later theologians, Vasquez, for example, maintained that moral and dogma are not two parts of one science, but two distinct sciences. In line with this tendency, moral theology, ignoring dogmatic questions (e.g., grace, merit, the nature of infused virtue), often became a casuistic treatise. In our view, casuistry is but an inferior exemplification, just as asceticism and mysticism are superior exemplifications, of moral theology.

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Are dogma and moral two distinct branches of knowledge? To this question our answer must be negative: theology is one science, not many. The proof follows.

Scientific unity arises from unity in subject matter and viewpoint. Now all things discussed in theology belong to one and the same subject matter, God, and are approached from one and the same viewpoint, revelation. When theology does speak of creatures, it speaks of them only in their relation to God, and draws its conclusions from the viewpoint of revelation.

St. Thomas writes: Sacred doctrine remaining one, includes the subject matter of all philosophic sciences, because it sees them under the light of its own viewpoint. Hence, whereas one philosophic science is speculative and another practical, sacred doctrine is both speculative and practical, just as God, by one and the same act, knows both Himself and His works. But theology, since it treats principally of God and only secondarily of human acts, is more speculative than practical. It deals with human acts as leading to that perfect knowledge of God which is eternal blessedness.®

Dogma and moral, then, are but two parts, two branches, of one and the same science. In each, under one and the same light of revelation, the viewpoint is God: God either in Himself, or as efficient and exemplary source, or lastly, as the end, purpose, and goal of our life.

Now God as God, as Deity, is an object higher than that reality which is the object of metaphysics, higher than moral good which is the object of ethics. Here appears the wonderful hierarchy of knowledge: division below, unity on high. Theology, imprinted on the created mind by God, rises on high above philosophy and history, and is subordinated only to the uncreated mind of God.

It follows, then, that to consider dogma and moral as two sciences is to ignore the sublimity and simplicity of moral theology. Separated from dogma, reduced to casuistry, under

a kind of materialistic and statistic tendency, moral theology loses its native elevation and dignity.

Here follow two corollaries. First corollary. Physical science has many integral parts: mechanics, hydrostatics, hydrodynamics, acoustics, optics, thermodynamics. Theology, too, remains one science, notwithstanding the distinctions, that between positive theology and systematic theology, and that between dogmatic theology and moral theology.

Positive theology has three integral parts:

a) biblical, which assembles truths revealed in Holy Scripture;

b) patristic, which expounds the teaching of the Holy Fathers;

c) symbolic, which examines ecclesiastical creeds, definitions, and declarations.

Systematic theology has two integral parts:

a) dogmatic, which discourses on the articles of faith: God, creation, the Incarnation, the Redemption, the sacraments, the four last things;

b) moral, which deals with human acts in relation to man’s supernatural goal. Mystical theology, and ascetical, and casuistic, are subdivisions of moral theology. Here a brief word on this distinction.

Moral theology is concerned with the laws of Christian life, with the virtues, gifts, and sin. But it deals with universal principles and does not, as does prudence, descend to particular applications.

Casuistic theology solves questions of conscience, and distinguishes degrees of obligation. Its tendency is negative, the avoidance of sin, rather than positive, the cultivation of virtue. It is not really distinguished from prudence, since prudence is the source of a correct and secure conscience.

Ascetical theology teaches the road of Christian perfection in its beginning and progress, by laying down practical rules toward active purification and advance in virtue.

Mystical theology shows how the soul may reach the unitive

NATURE OF MORAL THEOLOGY 7 life, by passive purification and contemplation. Secondarily it treats also of extraordinary contemplative graces. On this mystical level, moral theology merges with dogma, with Scripture and tradition, with the Word of God, whence all theology proceeds. Beginning and end coincide. The circle is closed. Unity is preserved.

Second corollary. Deep knowledge of moral and mystical theology presupposes deep knowledge of dogmatic theology, on predestination, say, and on grace. Specialization does indeed have its place, particularly in the lower sciences, mathematics, say, in physics, and biology. But specialization can be perilous in that highest science which is one and indivisible.

A doubt may here arise. Why does St. Thomas place moral theology (his second part) between his two dogmatic parts (first and third)? Why, in particular, does he place it before the treatise on the Redemption and the Incarnation? Would it not be better to treat all dogmatic questions first? Should not theology teach imitation, not of God only, but also of Christ?

To this difficulty, two answers:

1. The Incarnation presupposes not only the creation of man, but also the relation of man to God as man’s supernatural goal. Even if God had not decreed the Incarnation, the moral law would still exist. God, without decreeing the Incarnation, could have created angels and men in the state of grace, in the supernatural order. The moral law, natural and supernatural, arises necessarily from nature elevated by grace. These indestructible moral truths, on the final goal, on human acts, on grace and infused virtue, on sin—these truths are presuppositions of Redemption from sin.

2. Further, when you speak of the virtues in Christ, you must first know the nature of virtue. Thus the Master of the Sentences, since he has no explicit moral treatise, has to deal by occasion with the virtues when writing on Christ. Hence we need not wonder that St. Thomas, proceeding specula- tively, distinguishes three parts: first, God; second, the rational creature’s movement to God; third, Christ, who, as man, is our road to God. But St. Thomas, too, in treating the sacrament of penance, deals with the virtue of penance, with grace as specifically Christian, with carrying the cross in penitential spirit. Thus he shows again that dogma and moral are not two sciences, but one. Yet in practice it is good to expound dogma entirely before beginning moral.