Chapter XII. The wii and its osjecr (q. 8)

ART. 1. CAN THE WILL DESIRE EVIL? Preliminaries

Ir seems that the will can aim at evil, just as sight, for instance, aims not only at white but also at black, since one and the same power deals with opposites. Again, according to Aristotle, it is a characteristic of rational powers to deal with opposites, with truth and falsehood, with evil and good. Further, goodness and reality are convertible, and our will chooses negations of reality, for instance, not to walk, not to speak,

For our thesis we might quote Dionysius,? who says that evil is not aimed at by the will, that all things desire only good. But how are these assertions to be harmonized with the difficulties just now proposed? Dionysius seems at first sight to deny the existence of sin and vice. And if, as Spinoza and Hegel maintain, the object of sin is not an evil, but only a lesser good, the sinner himself would be merely a man characterized by his indistinct power of thinking. Thus we would have absolute and unlimited optimism.

Thesis. It is not necessary that the object of the will be in very truth a good, but only that it be apprehended as a good. The will cannot will evil as evil. This is the common doctrine, admitted also by St. Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, and Gabriel Biel, and rejected only by some nominalists.

A. Authority, The word of Dionysius (see above) had already been expressed by Aristotle. St. Augustine ? says: So

much do we want to be blessed, that we cannot will to be miserable. Not even the demon can will evil as evil.

B. By reason we prove, first, that the will always aims at good. Every appetite is inclined to something agreeable. The will is an appetite. Hence it aims only at what is good and agreeable. The will, however, can aim at apparent good. What is really evil, for instance, theft, is often looked upon as good. But the will is an appetite that follows, not upon a natural form (as does the natural appetite of the plant), but upon an apprehended form (as does sense-appetite), Therefore the will, like sense-appetite, can aim at something that is only apparently good.

Corollary. Natural appetite follows the natural form, which always tends to perfection and to real good. But whereas our natural appetite is always right, its object is the lowest kind of good. The will, however, is related to a higher good, which it attains freely, and can therefore turn aside from true good. But, notwithstanding the possibility of sin, the will transcends natural appetite, by reason of its universal object.

Confirmation. We must judge the adequate object of the will, just as, proportionally, we judge the adequate object of the intellect, or of the sense-appetite. The adequate object of the intellect is reality and truth, at least apparent truth. The adequate object of the sense-appetite is sense-good, suitable and agreeable, at least apparently. Hence the adequate object of the will is good, either really or at least apparently. The object is not, as maintained by some nominalists, reality as abstracting from good and evil. We cannot will evil except under the aspect of an apparent good.

Difficulties Analyzed

1. Good and evil as opposites belong to the same power. Answer: Belong to the same power, if they are related in the same way to both, yes. The will aims at both good and evil, but not in the same way. Will, volition, aims at good, Nonwill, nolition, refuses evil.

2. The will is a rational power, and therefore deals with good and with evil. Answer: The will aims at good and at evil, but at evil only under the aspect of an apparent good, I grant. Aims at evil as evil, I deny.

The following difficulties are urged.

a. He who hates his enemy wishes him evil as evil. Answer. He wishes evil as the evil of his enemy, yes; as evil to himself, no.

b. The envious man is saddened by the prosperity of another under the aspect of good. Therefore sometimes the will flees from good. Answer: The envious man is sad at the good of another as good for that neighbor, yes; as good for himself, no.

c. Sin committed by malice is distinguished from sin committed by passion or ignorance. But he who sins by passion wishes moral evil only as a sense-good, and he who sins by ignorance wishes evil because he believes it to be good. Therefore malice, differing from these two kinds of evil, chooses evil as an offense against God. Answer: That consequence does not follow. These three kinds of sin are distinguished, not by their object, but by the dispositions of the sinner. He who sins by passion is moved by that passion to sin, and he who sins by ignorance sins by responsible lack of knowledge. But he who sins from malice, not from passion and not from ignorance, while he knows that this thing is evil and forbidden, still wills it as suitable to his present evil disposition, to manifest his own liberty (e.g., his pertinacious selfishness and pride).

3. The will aims also at nonexistent things, for instance, not to walk, not to speak. But such acts cannot aim at good because good and reality are convertible. Answer. In nonexistence, in self-destruction, it is not possible to find any positive aspect of good, I grant; any negative aspect, the lack of evil, I deny. Those who will anything under a not-good aspect, do so because to lack evil is good. Demons, e.g., will nonexistence as liberation from their miseries. They desire not to be miserable. This seems to them to be good.

The objection is urged: He who hates God, wills evil as evil. Answer: He who hates God, the judge who punishes sin, wishes to escape punishment, and this would be a good.

Corollary

The good that is only apparent good is really evil, not merely a minor good. Apparent good attracts more, the more it has the appearance of good. Greatest perversity arises when the greatest evil is pursued under the appearance of good: absolute liberalism, for example, the negation of all rights of God, under the guise of charity, namely, to avoid divisions among men. Since charity is the highest of all virtues, counterfeit charity is the greatest of evils. As such, it will characterize Antichrist, under whom even the elect, were it possible, will be led into error. Beware of false prophets in the garments of sheep. By their fruits you shall know them.* Test all things, keep only that which is good.‘ Do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits to see if they be from God.’ All these evils are founded on the truth that evil is proposed under the appearance of good. Open materialism, manifestly absurd, is less dangerous than an idealism which flaunts Christian words, but denies their reality. Liberalism denies the obligation, laid on the individual and on society, to embrace revelation sufficiently proposed. Liberty of cult is an evil, to be tolerated in order to avoid a greater evil. It is not the ideal condition. On this point Lamennais was condemned. Liberalism, indifferentism, skepticism, lead many to confound true charity with false,

May certain tenets of liberalism be retained in practical life, on the plea that the rights of God and of God’s Church

are allowed in our schools? In practical life, so these men say, the hypothesis of liberty for all cults is to be admitted. Answer: If the assertion were true, then it would also be true to say that though theft is simply evil, still, in hypothesis, and in practical life, we must allow theft to be justifiable. What is needed in life is not liberalism, but prudence. Prudence never allows any deed against man’s ultimate goal, but it does tolerate one evil in order to avoid a greater evil. Our thesis is not a mere speculative ideal, to be abandoned in practice. The rights of God, the exigencies of eternal salvation, enunciate the very goal of human life. True religion is to be embraced, not only by individuals but by society. In attaining this end, prudence dictates toleration of an evil to avoid a greater evil. But to abandon the thesis as something merely ideal, something only for the schools, is in reality to turn mankind away from the end of human life. It would be opportunism, receding farther and farther from the love of God and of souls.

We must keep the efficacious intention of attaining the end. Liberty flows from the authority of God, but license leads to the servitude of corruption.

ART. 2. IS THE WILL CONCERNED WITH PURPOSE ONLY? Preliminaries

Granting that the will aims only at good, either true good or apparent good, we now ask whether the will deals only with the end or also with means, It seems that it deals only with the end, according to Aristotle, since means belong to another genus of goods, namely, not to good-in-itself, or to delightful good, but to the useful good. Thus we distinguish arts concerned with the end, navigation, for instance, from arts concerned with means, say, ship-building. We answer by a double conclusion. First: The will as a power deals with both the end and the means, since both are good. Secondly: The first act of the will, properly speaking, aims only at the end. The first simple volition is carried toward that which is willed for its own sake. But the means are not good except in relation to the end. Confirmation. In intelligence, the first act deals with principles, and the second act with conclusions. But in the order of appetibility the end has the same place as principle has in the order of intelligibility. The useful and the good-in-itself belongs to the same power, because one is subordinated to the other, just as color and light in relation to the power of vision. And one and the same operative habit (art) deals both with its own proper end and with the means to attain this end. Hence there can be no neutral act, no act which tends to an object which is neither end nor medium. Whatever we will, is in some way related to our desire for beatitude.

ART. 3. IS THE WILL MOVED BY ONE AND THE SAME ACT TOWARD PURPOSE AND MEANS?

Preliminaries

When we wish one thing for the sake of another, for instance, medicine for the sake of health, is there one act of the will directed to both objects, or are there two simultaneous volitions, one of which is the reason and motive of the other?

This article illustrates the conciliation of liberty and impeccability in Christ. Many Thomists say that Christ, wayfarer and comprehensor, necessarily loved God clearly seen in Himself, but that He freely loved God as the reason for loving creatures, and hence for loving the sacrifice of the cross. God's own love of self is necessary in relation to His own goodness, but is free in relation to creatures, This question influences spirituality also. When we will anything virtually on account of God, do we by that same act will God Himself?

Three conclusions. 1. The will is carried toward the end in a twofold manner, first, to the end absolutely, secondly, to the end as reason for willing the means. Here there is no difficulty, for our will can be carried toward God absolutely, and by reason of this to love of neighbor.

2. The act by which the will is carried toward the end absolutely is distinct from the act by which it chooses the means. The reason is that we can think of the end absolutely, before we begin to consider the ways and means. Sometimes the first act precedes the choice of means even in time. Then it is called simple volition, distinct from choice which is concerned with means. To illustrate. First, I will health; secondly, I will to call a physician. Similarly, in the intellect: first, I know principles intuitively; secondly, I know conclusions drawn from these principles.

3. The motion of the will which we call choice aims simultaneously at end and means, because in this case the medium is willed, not for its own sake, but only for the end. To illustrate. The sick man cannot will bitter medicine unless he simultaneously wills health as the reason for choosing the medicine. Again, we cannot love our neighbor for God’s sake unless we love God as the reason for loving our neighbor. Thus every act of a man who has charity, even though he is not thinking actually of God, is an act, not only of religion, but also of charity, because his will, virtually, not merely habitually, is centered on God. The will aims at medium and at end by one and the same act.

A Confirmation

By one and the same act of vision we see color and light. Light is simultaneously the what (quod) and the whereby (quo). Again, by one and the same act we know, not only the conclusion, but also the principle, not absolutely, but as our reason for knowing the conclusion. Again, by one and the same act, I believe that God is triune and I believe God when He reveals the Trinity, an act wherein God's authority is simultaneously the what and the whereby. By one and the same simple act I believe God who reveals and the God whom He reveals.

Here enters a doubt. Is the act of desiring the end in the means a simple volition or a choice? For instance, to desire health in the offered medicine. The answer runs thus: To desire medicine on account of health is an act of choice. To wish absolutely for health in an offered medicine is a simple volition. Again, when God is clearly seen in some great saint, not only is this saint loved for God’s sake, but God Himself is loved in this saint. Hence the word: Wonderful is God in His saints. And when a principle is seen clearly in a conclusion, not only is the conclusion known from the principle, but in that conclusion we see the principle absolutely.