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Chapter XI. ‘the circumstances of human acrts (q. 7)

THE nature of any human act is affected by its circumstances. Certain circumstances change the very species of an act: theft becomes sacrilege, when committed in a holy place. Other circumstances notably increase the gravity of the act: to steal a thousand dollars is a greater sin than to steal a few cents. Others are only lightly aggravating: to steal thirty cents rather than twenty-five,

ART. 1. WHETHER CIRCUMSTANCE CAN BE AN ACCIDENT OF HUMAN ACTS?

Response. Circumstance is an accident of the human act, affecting the morality of that act. We explain the definition. Circumstance is called an accident, because it lies outside the substance of the act, surrounds the act, as it were (ctrcumstare, the Latin verb, means to stand around). It affects the human act, but does not constitute the essence. If it were the source of essential morality, it would no longer be a circumstance, but would either specifically differentiate the act, or would be the purpose of the deed. The purpose of the agent, when it is not identical with the purpose of the work, is a circumstance. Examples: to steal in order to pay money to a prostitute, or, on the contrary, in order to give alms. A circumstance affects the act morally, that is, modifies it in relation to moral standards. A mere physical circumstance does not affect morality. Example: A man giving alms in gold or in silver, with the right hand or with the left. 167

ART. 2. THEOLOGICAL CIRCUMSTANCES

Circumstances modify acts, first, in relation to man’s last end. To illustrate: alms, not for a mere human end, but for God. Second, in relation to good and evil. By an evil circumstance an act, by its object good, can become evil. For instance, I teach the truth, but with the purpose of attaining human glory. Third, as regards merit and demerit.

ART. 3. CIRCUMSTANCES FORMULATED: WHO, WHAT, WHERE, BY WHOSE AID, WHY, HOW AND WHEN

This division is founded on the definition of circumstance. The seven circumstances are reduced by St. Thomas to three chief classes. First, circumstances that modify the act itself. Second, those that modify the causes of the act. Third, those circumstances that modify the effect of the act.

  1. Circumstances of the act itself. Such circumstances function, first, as a measure of time (when: a festival day, a prolonged period), or as measure of place (where: in public, in a sacred place). Secondly, circumstances affect the act in the manner of a quality (how: intensely, remissly, from contempt, or ignorance).

  2. Circumstances that affect causes. If the cause is final, we have the circumstance “why” (the -personal purpose of the agent). If the cause is the efficient principal cause, we have the circumstance of “who” (a priest, a married man). If the cause is the instrumental cause, we have the circumstance “by whose aid” (demon, poison, sword).

3- Circumstances that modify the effect. Here we have the circumstance “what” (a sacred thing, a profane thing). To illustrate. The circumstance called “what” does not denote that the thing stolen belongs to someone else, but that it is either sacred or profane, large or small. The circumstance “who” designates the quality of the agent (a priest or a layman). The circumstance “why” designates a purpose, not in-

CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS 169 trinsic in the deed itself, but extrinsic, namely, the purpose of the agent (stealing in order to get drunk).

ART. 4. WHAT ARE THE CHIEF CIRCUMSTANCES?

The principal circumstances are “why” and “what,” since they more nearly modify voluntariness. Hence the chief circumstance is “why” as affecting purpose. Next in importance is “what,” as modifying the effect destined for such a purpose. Other circumstances are ordered by their nearness to “why” and “what.”

Human Acts Considered Psychologically

Human acts are either elicited by the will or commanded by the will. Acts elicited deal either with the end and are therefore divided into three classes, (namely, to will, to enjoy, to intend), or with the means employed (namely, to choose, to counsel, to consent, to use).

Although intention precedes fruition, we treat of fruition first, because it deals simply with the end, whereas intention implies relation to means. Thus God enjoys His own goodness before He intends to manifest that goodness. St. Thomas treats of choice in connection with counsel, which guides choice. Consent sometimes precedes choice, when, namely, pleasing means are open, and the agent must choose between them.

Twelve Successive Acts Intellect Will

Order of Intention

  1. Judgment (this goal isde- 2. Inefficacious desire (e.g., sirable). for rain).

  2. Judgment (this goal isat- 4. Efficacious intention (I tainable), will attain this goal).

Order of Choice

  1. Counsel (many choices 6. Consent (to one of these are open). various choices). 4. Practical judgment (this 8. Choice (I select this is the best means). means).

Order of Execution

  1. Command (follow this 10. Active use (the will path). moves to take this path).

  2. Attainment of goal. 12. Fruition (enjoyment of goal attained),

This classification is of great importance in many questions. For instance, in the problem of free will, since the last practical judgment is within our power. Similarly, in dealing with indeliberate acts, with temptation, in analyzing the act of faith, in predestination, where we distinguish the order of intention and the order of execution, and even in the forms of government in civil society or in the Church. In regard to counsel, St. Thomas prefers a union of aristocracy and the popular elements (senators and representatives), But as regards command, unity is needed, lest there be discussion without end. ,

Question. Why does St. Thomas not treat these acts in their chronological and concrete order?

  1. He is here following the theoretical and abstract order, treating professedly acts that belong, not to the intellect, but to the will. Hence he treats the command and commanded acts,’ after the question of use,’ although, it is true chronologically, command enters in at the beginning of execution.

  2. Since he first speaks of acts elicited regarding the goal,

CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS 171 he speaks of fruition ê at the beginning, although this act belongs chronologically at the end.

  1. He treats of fruition before treating of intention,* because fruition is concerned with the end simply, whereas intention deals with the end in relation to ways and means.

  2. He treats counsel ë after choice,* because choice is an elicited act of the will.

  3. He treats consent’ after choice, because often there is only one suitable medium to the end. In this case the two acts are not distinguished.

  4. As consent is some times distinguished from choice, so likewise we distinguish counsel from the last practical judgment. Thus we have perfect harmony between the chronological, concrete succession generally admitted and the order of St. Thomas, who treats each act theoretically and abstractly. Finally we must notice that, in the first three * questions on the will, St. Thomas professedly treats only of simple volition. But even while he thus treats of volition, St. Thomas adds many points regarding the volitional power. Choice, for instance, is a kind of volition, although not every volition is choice. Treating of the first volition, he speaks of volition as a genus. Similarly, treating of the angels who are the first of creatures, he deals with matters that belong in common to all created things. Treating of the first sacrament, namely, of baptism, he speaks of the sacraments in general. Similarly, Aristotle, treating of the vegetative soul, deals with the soul in general.1

Footnotes

  1. Q.11. 4Q.12. 5 Q.14. 6 Q.13. 7Q.15. 8 Q.8-10. ↩

Chapter 11 of 29