Chapter X. Voluntary and involuntary (q. 6)

THis question is divided into two parts. First part, where is voluntariness to be found? This question is treated in the first three articles: first, is voluntariness to be found in human acts; second, is it also to be found in brute animals; third, can there be voluntariness without any act? Second part: Things which can cause involuntariness or reduce voluntariness: Can the will suffer violence (art. 4)? Can violence cause involuntariness (art. 5)? Can fear cause involuntariness (art. 6)? Can concupiscence cause involuntariness (art. 7)?

ART. 1. ARE HUMAN ACTS VOLUNTARY?

Preliminaries

Here we have the definition of the voluntary act. After the first three articles on the nature of voluntariness, we discuss the divisions of voluntariness, divisions which are commonly proposed today, and which are founded in the doctrine of St. Thomas. This process is the normal one. Step by step St. Thomas proceeds to a methodical definition of voluntariness, whereas modern theologians often presuppose the definition already found and received. The difficulty of the question appears in the objections. Voluntary is that which proceeds from our will, that is, from a principle intrinsic in us. But man is moved to act from without, that is, either by the proposed object, or by a precedent motion, either corporeal (e.g., to avoid cold or heat), or spiritual, since man needs to be moved by God in order to act at all.

The Affirmative Argument

A. Authority. St. Damascene says that “voluntary is an act proceeding from the will under the direction of reason.”

B. Voluntariness is found in the highest degree in human acts. When we say “in the highest degree,” we are speaking of man’s relation, not to God, but to brutes. The conclusion is proved as follows. Man has within himself the principle, not only of acting, but of acting for a purpose, since he knows the end and purpose of his work. Hence, since voluntary means something that proceeds from an intrinsic principle accompanied by knowledge of the end, voluntariness is found in the highest degree in human acts.

To explain the principle here invoked we must notice the divisions of motion. Intrinsic motion is either vital or nonvital. Vital movements are of two kinds, one cognitive, when the agent knows, either purpose as purpose (man), or knows only the thing which is purpose (animal). Second, vital motion, which is noncognitive (the plant which preserves itself by assimilating food). Next the nonvital movements which are still intrinsic (the stone which falls by gravity). Finally, we have extrinsic motion (the stone moving upward).

The minor is a nominal definition of voluntariness, namely, motion which comes from the agent’s own inclination. But this one element is not sufficient. The vital action of the plant, for example, nutrition, is not voluntary. Hence voluntariness requires also knowledge of the end. Thus we say, in some real sense, that animals perform voluntary acts (this dog wills to eat).

In response to the third difficulty, we say that man moves himself to his end, even though, first, the object must be proposed to him, and, second, he must be premoved by God. Man has in himself, not the first cause of his act, but a created intrinsic principle of acting under knowledge of purpose. And thus man knows, not merely the thing which is his purpose, but knows it as purpose, as precontaining the relation of means to the purpose he intends.

ART. 2. ARE THE ACTS OF ANIMALS VOLUNTARY?

Conclusion: the imperfect voluntary is found in brutes but the perfect voluntary only in men.

A. Authority. Aristotle says that boys and brutes share in the voluntary.? Boys, it is understood, before the use of reason. The same view is expressed by St. Damascene and Nemesius.

B. The argument. In order to have a voluntary act, the principle of the act must be within, with knowledge of the end. Now in brute animals there is at least an imperfect knowledge of the end, since by their sense-powers, especially by their instincts, they know the thing which is the end, though they do not know the end as end, i.e., they do not know the proportion between the act and its purpose. Hence in brute animals we find an imperfect voluntary. Only in man who deliberates can we find the perfect voluntary. Only man knows purpose as purpose, not only in the abstract, but also in the concrete (for example, the cook preparing a meal).

Objection: The brutes have no will and therefore they have no voluntariness. The answer runs thus: Brutes have no will, because will signifies rational appetite; while ‘voluntary’ gets its name from the will, it has a wider signification, namely, that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end, and in this sense it is found, analogically and imperfectly, also in brute animals.

Certain authors say that voluntariness is found univocally in brutes and men. This statement does not seem to be true, because “voluntary” follows knowledge and appetite. Now cognition and appetite are analogical terms when applied to the two orders, sensitive and intellective: analogical, because based on a similitude of proportion. Cognition is not one

univocal notion, it is not a genus, diversified by differences which lie outside the genus. In this analogous sense, cognition can be claimed even for God. Thus John of St. Thomas speaks as follows: “Some hold that the voluntary is spoken analogically of man and brute, or metaphorically, as the meadow is said to laugh.” To us it seems that “voluntary” is an analogical term. It is used, not metaphorically, but properly, as is the term “cognition.” Sense-cognition is cognition, properly so called, not a mere metaphor. Yet this cognition agrees only analogically with intellective cognition. Thus compare also the word “life,” which is predicated, analogically but properly, of God, of the angels, of our mind, of animals, of plants. It can, of course, become a mere metaphor when we speak, say, of living water.

St. Thomas says: ‘““Voluntariness is found by the philosopher in brutes, not as coming from the will, but as opposed to violence, so that we can speak of the acts of brutes and children as voluntary, because they act spontaneously, though without an act of choice.” ? Voluntary is here identified with the spontaneous. This seems to be the meaning of Cajetan where he says: “Simply speaking, we can deny that brutes move themselves to their end. The statement is true only secundum quid.” * And St. Thomas says; “In things which do not have the use of reason there is neither voluntariness nor involuntariness.” * From all these considerations it seems to follow that voluntariness is found in brutes only analogically.

Definition of Voluntariness

Voluntary is that which comes from an intrinsic principle under knowledge of purpose. The voluntary is perfect when an end is known, not only materially, but formally as an end. The intrinsic principle is, in the case of perfect voluntariness, man’s spiritual will, which is guided by reason. In the case of¹ the imperfect voluntary of brutes, it is their sense-appetite, guided by instinct (thus the sheep flees from the wolf).

This definition of the voluntary is legitimate, it follows the laws of logic. For, by nominal definition, popular definition, voluntary is that which proceeds from the will, or from the inclination of the agent.

A real definition is reached by the division of natural motion proceeding from a natural internal inclination of the agent which moves and acts. Now the principle of motion is twofold: efficient or final. Hence those things are perfectly moved by an intrinsic principle in which we find these twofold principles, efficient (in the inclination or appetite), and final (rational knowledge of the end).

The correctness of this definition is confirmed when we compare the voluntary with other similar or dissimilar motions. Here we institute a comparison that is inductive and ascending. Voluntary is contrasted

A. as an intrinsic principle (a) with the violent (where the principle is external, counter to inclination); (b) with the object willed, but not produced by the agent (rainfall).

B. As proceeding from knowledge (a) against vegetative life (sleep, digestion, respiration); (b) against the mere spontaneous (first motions of passion, preceding all advertence).

ART. 3. CAN THERE BE VOLUNTARINESS WHERE THERE IS NO ACT?

Conclusion. A thing can be voluntary without any act, even without any internal act, if we speak simply and objectively. We have two arguments. First, from common principles. This proof runs as follows: Anything which is under our control is said to be voluntary. But man is master of his action and his nonaction, of his willing and nonwilling. Therefore, as willing is voluntary, so also is nonwilling, so far as it is under man’s dominion. Therefore a man is culpable, not only when he does evil, but also when he does not do the good which he should do,

An argument more direct and proper, runs as follows: Voluntary is that which comes from the will with knowledge of purpose. But a thing can be indirectly from the will, when man does not place an act which he can and should place. To illustrate: The sinking of a ship comes indirectly from the will of the pilot, if he does not will to guide it as he should and can. Thus a thing can be voluntary without any act, internal or external. A sin of omission does not require an act of nolition, because then the omission would be directly willed. That the omission may be indirectly willed, it suffices that the agent, who can and should (e.g., go to Mass) does not do so.

In answer to the second difficulty we note the difference between ‘‘willing-not-to” and “not-willing-to.” Willing-not-to is an act, not-willing-to is the absence of act. Here an objection enters. It seems that to ‘‘will-not-to” constitutes rather an involuntary act. The answer is that sometimes it does. A man who wills not to write can be forced to write, and thus does something involuntary. But sometimes willing-not-to constitutes a voluntary: I will-not-to go to Mass. Again, in the third difficulty, not to consider is voluntary, when man can and should consider.

Corollary. That omission be voluntary, it is required and suffices that a man knowingly omits a work which he could do, for instance, going to Mass on a feria] day. That the omission be not only voluntary, but also culpable, three things are required: first, that the agent could act; second, that he had a duty to act; third, that he did not act. Thus Sylvius. Similar are the words of Cajetan: “To constitute an act, indirectly culpable, three elements concur: first, ability; second, duty; third, not willing. Hence we must diligently consider whether the agent should, and when he should, hinder an omission. Thus divine permission of sin is without fault. God certainly can hinder all sin. He does not hinder, but He is not bound to hinder. Rather, as St. Augustine says, God, being infinitely good, would in no wise allow anything evil in

His works, were He not so omnipotent and good as to draw good even from evil.

A Doubt

Can omission be indirectly voluntary without some act which is its cause or occasion? Many disciples of St. Thomas answer negatively. These Thomists say that, whereas St. Thomas had answered affirmatively in his earlier writings, he later changed his view. Now, in point of fact, St. Thomas in the Summa says this: “For the essence of a sin of omission there is not required per se any act, as when, to illustrate, a man at the hour when he is bound to go to church, does not in any way think of going or of not going to church.” $

“But if,” St. Thomas adds, “in the sin of omission we understand also the occasions or causes of omitting, then in a sin of omission there must be some act. To illustrate. A man does not will to go to church, because he wills to play at the moment, or because he stayed up late last night, and in consequence does not go in the morning to church. And then this act, interior or exterior, is per accidens the cause of the omission. But judgment on things is to be given by what they are per se and not by that which they are per accidens. Hence we can say truly that there can be sin without any act at all.”

Objections

1. But certainly at times it seems that there is no act which is cause or occasion of the culpable omission. To be guilty, it suffices that a man can and should consider and will, whereas in fact he does not consider and does not will. Answer: For the sin of omission some act is required, at least per accidens. When an object is proposed by the intellect, for instance, the obligation of going to Mass on Sunday, the will can have three relations to that act. First, to will; second, to will not; third, not to will. Now to will and to will not are acts, and in this latter case the omission is directly willed. Not to will is the suspension of act, whether of volition or nolition. But, so Thomists argue, this determination to suspension cannot exist without some act. If the will would in no way determine itself to suspend the act, there would be no exercise of liberty and we would be dealing with a voluntariness that is merely potential. But, possibly, it seldom happens that we deal with this act to suspend an act, because generally the omission of the precept takes place because he who omits wishes to do something else, say, to sleep.

2. That the omission be voluntary it suffices that a man can act and does not act. But here there is no act. The answer is: If the omission is to be voluntary, the man must be able to do the objective deed and does not do it, this I grant; but the man remains without any subjective determination, this I deny. The agent certainly determines himself at least not to place the act. The exercise of liberty cannot be without all act, otherwise the will would remain as it were dead, free only as a power. Thus God omits voluntarily to hinder the sins of men, and permits them for higher motives of His wisdom, namely, to manifest His mercy or His justice.

First corollary: That an effect be voluntary, it must proceed either physically or morally from the will.

Second corollary: The effect which follows or accompanies the omission is not voluntary, unless there is an obligation to impede that effect, or unless the omission is chosen purposely as a means to this effect.

Here, then, we have the proof that this effect does not proceed either physically or morally from the will: not physically, because the agent exercises no influence; not morally, unless there is an obligation for the agent to hinder this effect. To illustrate: God omits voluntarily to hinder the sins of men, yet these sins are not voluntary on the part of God, because God is not bound to hinder these sins, but can permit them in view of a greater good.

Further, from positive and fully voluntary acts there may follow several effects which are not voluntary, since there is no obligation to hinder them. To illustrate: The sacrilege of a bad priest is not voluntary to the penitent who asks for the sacrament. Motions of concupiscence which follow the confessor’s hearing of confessions, or the physician’s care of the sick, are not voluntary in the confessor or in the physician, because they are not bound to hinder these effects, since their duties are causes per accidens of the unintended effects.

But when an omission which is voluntary and not culpable is chosen as means to a certain effect, then such effect is voluntary, because it is directly willed. To illustrate: A man who Stays away from the fire in order to suffer cold for the sake of mortification. The cold is willed per se, and the mortification is voluntary.

Divisions of Voluntariness

The voluntary is either perfect or imperfect. The perfect voluntary is either necessary (beatific love, love of beatitude in general) or free. The free voluntary is either direct or indirect. The direct voluntary is either voluntary in its cause or voluntary in itself, and this in two fashions: positive (volo), or negative (nolo). The positive includes the voluntary simpliciter (consequent will), and the voluntary secundum quid (antecedent will). The indirect voluntary is negative (sinking of a ship by reason of lack of vigilance). The imperfect voluntary is twofold: first, in human emotions, which are either semideliberate, or entirely indeliberate; second, the imperfect voluntary (the spontaneous as found in brutes). The six most important of these divisions are to be explained.

Divisions arising from: 1. degrees of cognition; 2. degrees of advertence; 3. degrees of freedom; 4. modes of influence; 5. Modes of termination; 6. modes of willing.

1. Degrees of Cognition

By reason of cognition the voluntary is divided into the perfect and the imperfect voluntary, according as cognition is either perfect, knowing the purpose and the proportion of means to that purpose, or is imperfect, when it apprehends, as animals do, the thing which is the purpose but not as purpose.

Thus the imperfect voluntary belongs to brutes, but it is found also in men, motions which are either indeliberate, i.e., such motions as antecede advertence, or in motions that are semi-deliberate of which we are only imperfectly conscious, because, for example, we have not waked up entirely. This imperfect voluntary appears in infants, in lunatics, in drunkards, in those suffering from hallucination or obsession. But deliberate motions elicited with full advertence are fully voluntary. Some authors note that half-insane people may still be responsible, in matters where judgment and deliberation are still free. This holds good, particularly at the beginning of the disease, as regards moral and religious standards.

2. Degrees of Advertence

Even full advertence may be either distinct or confused, according as the morality of the object is perceived distinctly or confusedly. To illustrate. He who throws a stone from a window, foreseeing that he will thus wound his passing enemy, adverts distinctly to the malice of the act. But if he does the act surmising that possibly some passer-by may be wounded, he does not advert except confusedly to the likelihood of wounding his enemy.

3. Degrees of Freedom

By reason of the object proposed, the voluntary is divided into the necessary voluntary, (for example, the desire of beatitude here on earth and beatific love in heaven), and the free voluntary, an act, namely, that is immune, not only from coercion, but from the natural necessity of instinct, or of any power determined to one line.

Here enters a doubt considered by Billuart: Is the perfect voluntary identical with the free? An affirmative answer is given by a few, who deny that the necessary voluntary is perfect. Thomists reply by distinguishing two classes of the necessary voluntary: first, what arises from imperfect cognition as in brutes and children); second, that which originates from perfect cognition. This voluntary, they hold, is not imperfect, but in the highest degree perfect. Examples are the love by which God loves Himself, and breathes the Holy Spirit, also the love whereby the blessed love God clearly seen in paradise.

4. Modes of Influence

By reason of influence, the free voluntary is either direct or indirect, according as the will has, or has not, a direct influence on the thing willed. What is only indirectly willed is willed for something else. Example: the omission of Mass when I will to do something else, as, for instance, to read a profane book. I do not will to go to Mass, but I do not say directly: “I will not go to Mass.”

Further, the direct voluntary is twofold, either immediate or mediate. It is immediate when I will the object in itself, either positively (I will go to Mass), or negatively (I will not go to Mass). But this direct voluntary is mediate when I will something, not in itself, but in its cause. Example: I will to drink immoderately, though I foresee that drunkenness will be the cause of a quarrel. In this case the quarrel is willed in its cause.

Here we must note that many authors confound the indirect voluntary and the voluntary in cause, because each resembles the other, and because the omission indirectly willed, as we said above, presupposes some act of the will as cause, or at least as occasion. But according to St. Thomas there is a difference. The voluntary in cause is not indirect but direct, though not immediate. To illustrate. The demonstration from motion to God’s existence is not indirect but direct, though medi- ated. Voluntary in cause is the foreseen effect of a positive action willed in itself. Indirect voluntary is the foreseen effect of an omission. We must here pause to discuss the following relevant principles.

1. The voluntary, either indirect or in cause, can be good. And the effect foreseen as good increases the goodness of the whole act. But theologians generally deal rather with these two voluntaries under the aspect of evil, in order to tell us when the evil effect is to be avoided.

2. An evil effect, willed only in its cause, is imputable as guilt, under three conditions; first, the agent was bound to foresee this effect at least confusedly; second, the agent was able not to place the cause; third, he was bound to hinder the effect.

First condition. Nothing is willed unless foreknown. A physician or confessor, conscious that he lacks the necessary knowledge, foresees, indistinctly, the evil effects that may follow. The surgeon, conscious that he has not studied sufficiently the conditions required by the operation, is responsible for the evil effect that may come from his negligence. Thus foresight and circumspection are parts of prudence.

But when the agent cannot foresee the evil effect, then this effect is not imputed to him as guilt. Drunkenness is not indirectly voluntary in him who is ignorant of the special power of a certain wine and thus beconies inebriated (as happened to Noe).

Second condition. The agent who is morally bound to place the cause is not responsible for the effect. A priest is not guilty of sacrilege when he gives Communion to a sinner whose unworthiness he knows only from confession, because he is bound to preserve the sacramental secret.

Third condition. The agent must be bound to hinder the effect. If he is not thus bound, the effect is not imputable. Inordinate motions of sensuality, in a physician, say, or confessor, are not imputable when they arise from the exercise of duty.

Third Principle

It is allowed to place an act, in itself good or indifferent, from which follow two effects, one good, the other evil, provided the good effect is immediate, i.e., is not mediated by the evil effect; provided further that there be present a grave reason for acting, and that the agent’s purpose be good. Four conditions are here laid down.

First condition. The act in itself must be good or indifferent. For if it be in itself evil, it can never become licit. We are never allowed to lie, to blaspheme, to commit fornication, even though a good effect may follow. The reason is clear. Evil is not allowed as road to good.

How do we judge whether the act in itself is evil or not? By its moral object. To illustrate. Hypnotic sleep, voluntarily produced in another, is it something morally indifferent or is it evil? The more probable opinion, based on various responses of the Holy Office, is that hypnotism is sometimes natural, not diabolical, not absolutely to be condemned. Thus we can use this medium if the reason be proportionately grave (not mere curiosity), and if there is no intention of evil, and if there is no diabolical intervention.

Second condition, The good effect must be immediate, i.e., not follow from the evil effect. Though at times good may follow from an evil effect, we are still not allowed to place the cause, since the evil effect would be directly intended as medium, and evil may not be done that good may result. Illustrations: to slay an infant in the womb, in order to save the life of the mother; to cause an abortion, in order to save honor: these acts are illicit. But a man need not abstain from riding, even though sensual disturbance may follow, an evil which he permits and to which he does not consent.

If the effect is only physically evil, not morally, it is licit as medium. Thus, if there is no other way to save your life, you may kill an unjust aggressor.

Third condition. The purpose of the agent must be a good one. The confessor, intending the salvation of souls, can be permissive in relation to temptations which may follow. He does not desire these temptations, but detests them.

Fourth condition. There must be a cause proportionately grave for acting and permitting the evil effect. The reason is that the evil effect, though not intended, is a material sin, and not rarely brings on the danger of formal sin. To illustrate. A very urgent cause is required for a maidservant to go on exercising her service in a home where she is often solicited by a son of the family, since she is in proximate peril of sinning mortally. But for an action which only remotely and lightly tends toward an evil effect, less urgent reason is required. This question on voluntary in cause is not negligible.

5. Modes of Production

Under this heading we distinguish the positive voluntary from the negative voluntary. To illustrate. A positive voluntary act is that of theft. A negative voluntary act is that of an administrator, who knows that goods in his charge are being stolen and neglects to hinder such thievery.

This negative voluntary can be either direct (when I say “I will not go to Mass’’) or indirect (when I do not go to Mass, because I will something else). This negative voluntary appears in two kinds of negligence: first, in regard to what we can and should do, second in regard to what we can and should consider. Here lies a probable explanation of a difficult doctrine of St. Thomas on the first motions of sensuality. If, he says, consideration was possible and binding, then these sensual motions are minor venial sins.® “It is manifest,” he continues, “that the act of sensuality can be voluntary, since sensuality by its nature can be controlled by the will.” 7 Now reason, in the waking state, is bound to advert to the motions of the soul. If, therefore, due advertence is not present, we have a sin against prudence, an omission in some way voluntary. Again,

St. Thomas says, that, if reason resists sensual motions there is no sin.® But, he adds, reason, if watchful, can be aware of and avoid each individual inordinate motion, but not the whole series as a unit.®

Many Thomists require at least an interpretative influence of the will if a motion of sensuality is to be a sin. Others say that it is a venial sin even when there is no sin in the will. To us it seems that there is no sin unless there is at least a negative voluntary, by neglecting resistance or consideration. We can avoid this negligence in each and every particular case, but not in the whole series as a unit.

6. Modes of Willing

Here we have two divisions: the simple voluntary and the voluntary secundum quid.

The simple voluntary arises when the object, considered in all its circumstances, is simply willed, although it may be associated with some difficulty or discomfort. For example, I wish to study theology, not withstanding the difficulties I must conquer. The voluntary secundum quid is a conditional volition, a mere velleity.

Certain authors *° depart here from the terminology of St. ‘Thomas. Voluntary secundum quid, they say, is an object at which the will aims with reluctance. They illustrate with these examples: I will to take medicine, even though it is bitter. I throw my wares into the sea in order to save my life. St. ‘Thomas, on the contrary, says that to throw away goods when in danger of shipwreck is a simple voluntary act, and only secundum quid involuntary. Why? Because the sailor truly wills, though reluctantly, to act as he does act. St. Thomas would invert the example. The preservation of goods at the time of danger is voluntary secundum quid.

Thus the voluntary secundum quid is reduced to the con-

8 De malo, q.7, a.6, ad 6um. ® See note 6. 10 Priimmer, Manuale theologiae moralis (first edition), I, 38.

ditional or antecedent voluntary. St. Thomas writes: “Antecedently God wills all men to be saved, whereas cousequently He wishes some to be condemned, according to the exigence of His justice. Thus the just judge wills, antecedently, all men to live, but, consequently, he wills the murderer to be put to death.” # St. Thomas adds: What we will antecedently, we do not will simply, but only secundum quid, because will is related to objects as they are in themselves. Now objects in themselves are individual and particular. Hence when we will an object simply, we choose it with all its particular circumstances. The just judge simply wills the murderer to be put to death, but, in a certain sense, secundum quid, wills him to live, namely, in as far as he is a man. To will secundum quid is a velleity rather than an absolute act of the will. And thus it is clear that, whatever God wills simply, comes to pass, whereas what He wills antecedently does not always come to pass.*?

The simple voluntary, we conclude, is identified with the consequent or efficacious voluntary, whereas the voluntary secundum quid is identified with the antecedent, conditional, and inefficacious voluntary. The merchant who throws his wares into the sea to save his life, says conditionally: “I wish I could save these wares, but, in point of fact, I choose definitely to throw them into the sea.”

The Involuntary and Its Causes

The involuntary must be distinguished from the nonvoluntary. St. Thomas says that nonvoluntary means simply the absence of the act of the will. But the involuntary means that the will is contrary to the object proposed. Hence upon the involuntary there follows sadness, which does not always follow the nonvoluntary.

The involuntary is divided into the simply involuntary and the involuntary secundum quid. The simple involuntary is a

proposal which the will resists with all its might. To illustrate. He who is forced by external violence to immolate to an idol exercises an action that is simply involuntary. Involuntary secundum quid is x proposal which the will resists under one aspect, but which it still goes on to will simply, in order to avoid a greater evil. Example is again the merchant throwing his wares into the sea in order to save his life. This act is involuntary secundum quid, but is simply voluntary, here and now, in order to preserve his life.

We distinguish four causes of the involuntary: force, fear, concupiscence, ignorance.

ART. 4. CAN THE WILL SUFFER VIOLENCE?

Whereas external members can be overcome by force, the question here is: Can the will itself suffer coercion? And by coercion we mean that species of violence to which cognitive beings may be subjected. A plant may indeed suffer violence, but not coercion.

Violence, generically, is defined by Aristotle as follows: an act whose principle is outside, against the inclination of the patient, who contributes nothing to the result, Hence violence adds something to necessity. Necessity means determination to one act, without power toward the opposite act. Thus the necessary can be spontaneous. To illustrate. The brute animal necessarily, but spontaneously, desires food. But under violence, the act comes from an extrinsic principle, against the inclination of the patient. ‘Thus the necessary is twofold, namely, either violent or spontaneous.

When we have thus defined violence, it might seem (so the first objection) that the will can be forced at least by God. Further, the Molinists say that it would be thus forced if there were such a thing as a predetermining physical premotion. Further, (thus the third objection) the motion of the will to sin is against nature and therefore violent.

Our Thesis

Violence can be inflicted upon the will’s commanded acts, but not on the will’s own elicited acts.

Proof of the first part. By exterior violence the members can be impeded from following the command of the will. To illustrate. Someone may close my eyes, so that I cannot see, or he may open my eyes, compelling me to look upon something obscene against my will. Then this sight, though it proceeds from my visual power, is called violent, since it is against the inclination of my will.

Objection, But then this sight is not an act commanded by the will. Therefore violence cannot be effectual against the will, even in commanded acts. Answer: We distinguish the antecedent. It is not an act commanded by the will actually, we grant. Not commanded even potentially, we deny. But the conclusion deals with acts either actually or potentially commanded. Acts actually commanded by the will can be prevented by violence. Since the will resists, they come to pass only by the force of an external agent. In possession or obsession, for example, demonic violence exercised on the organism or imagination, can compel speech or prevent motion. But, says St. Thomas, although the devil can compel a man to do an act which is sinful, he cannot compel man to sin. When reason is bound, nothing that man does can be imputed to him as sinful."

Proof of the second part. The will can suffer no violence in its own elicited acts (to will, to intend, to choose). No power, created or uncreated, can force the will to elicit an act. The act elicited by the will is nothing else than the will’s own inclination, actually proceeding from the will under knowledge of the end, whereas an act that is forced must come from an exterior principle, against the inclination of the patient. An act elicited by the will, and at the same time forced, implies a contradiction. This conclusion is confirmed by analogy with the natural inclination of noncognitive things. By force the

stone goes up, but it goes down by its natural inclination, natural gravity.

This doctrine is found in Augustine (the text cited in sed conira est). Also in St. Anselm, who says: “An unwilling man can not-will anything, because he cannot will, willing not-towill.” #4

But can God, who moves from within, force the will? All theologians agree that God, using an instrument of justice (e.g., fire) can inflict punishment against the will of the patient. Thus the sufferings of hell are contrary to the will of its victims. These punishmentsare violent at least secundum quid as being against a particular inclination of the condemned soul, but nevertheless they are according to the order of justice.

Certain theologians hold that God, as universal mover, can force the will. The acts thus forced, they say, though they are in harmony with potency and with the fundamental inclination of the will to universal good, may still be against the will’s inclination to a particular good. Further, Suarez and Molina say that, if God premoves and predetermines the will, the acts thus caused would not be free, and God would be the author of violence.

St. Thomas replies: God, who is more powerful than the human will, can move the human will. Again, he says: “As long as judgment remains indifferent, it is impossible that God can so premove as to force the will. Such an act would no longer be free. As long as judgment remains indifferent, the will is not limited to this object. God clearly seen by vision is the only object which removes this indifference of judgment.” 38

Further, as it is a contradiction for the will to desire an object not proposed by the intellect, so it is also a contradiction that the will desire an object under some aspect not proposed to it by the intellect. Otherwise the will would cease to be a rational appetite, and would act without cognition.

Objections

1. God can deny cooperation, say, with the act whereby the blessed love God in heaven. This cessation would be forced. Answer: First, the force here in question would not be positive compulsion to an elicited act, but a negative impeding of the act to be elicited. Second, such cessation would not be, properly speaking, violence. As it is natural for a second cause to act under the influence of the first cause, so it is natural (or supernatural or preternatural) not to act when the influence of the first cause is removed. Thus it is when fire does not burn, or when hungry lions do not devour.

2. God can produce in the will of Judas, who at the time hates John, a love for John. This act would be forced, that is, against the inclination of Judas. Answer: God can do this by changing the evil inclination of Judas into a good inclination. But He cannot do this, and at the same time preserve the contrary volition. When God changes the will, He brings it about that in place of the preceding inclination, there follows another inclination. Thus “the heart of the king is in God’s hand, and whithersoever God wills He can turn it.” 18

3. Sin is against man’s natural inclination, but is nevertheless an act elicited by man’s will. Answer: Sin is against man’s partial inclination to good-in-itself, yes; it is against man’s adequate inclination to good in common, no. Man wills sin as an apparent good.

ART. 5. CAN VIOLENCE CAUSE INVOLUNTARINESS?

Preliminaries

From this fifth article to the end of the question we deal with the four causes of the involuntary, namely, violence, fear, concupiscence, and ignorance.

When we say that violence or fear or concupiscence or ignorance causes the involuntary (at least as regards com- manded acts), we do not mean to say that these causes physically influence the act of the will. But they do move, either physically or morally, to an act in some way contrary to the inclination of the will. Thus when fear moves man to throw goods into the sea, his act is involuntary secundum quid, because of his inclination to preserve his goods.

Thesis. Absolute violence causes the simply involuntary in commanded acts, Example: the man who, against his own persevering inclination, is forced to sacrifice to an idol. This conclusion is to be understood of absolute violence, such, namely, that the victim, with all his efforts, cannot overcome it. We are not treating of violence secundum quid, which a man is able to overcome if he resists as far as he can. Absolute violence causes the simple involuntary, violence secundum quid causes the involuntary secundum quid. Martyrdom is involuntary secundum quid, but simply voluntary, just as is loss of goods from fear of shipwreck. The arguments follow.

A. Our authorities are Aristotle and St. Damascene.

B. From reason. A voluntary act comes from an intrinsic principle, in agreement with the will’s inclination. But that which is absolutely violent comes from an extrinsic principle, and against the will’s inclination. Therefore that which is absolutely violent is not voluntary in an agent capable of cognition, just as it is not natural in things which lack cognition.

1. Objections. Our conclusion holds good only for acts commanded by the will, not for elicited acts.

2. Note that a thing can be natural, or voluntary, in two ways, one active, the other passive.

3. An act can be violent secundum quid, and still voluntary simply. A man, climbing a hill, is performing an act violent secundum quid, since the body naturally tends downward, but the act is simply voluntary, by reason of the man’s intention and inclination.

Question. Does violence make the sufferings of the martyrs involuntary? Answer: The martyrs did not suffer absolute violence, but only relative violence, violence secundum quid.

The martyrs, had they so willed, could have escaped violence, namely, by denying their faith. But they voluntarily endured death for God’s sake. Hence they did not suffer absolute violence, but they did overcome the greatest violence secundum quid. Everything that is born of God conquers the world, and this is the victory which conquers the world, our faith.”

On the contrary, when the martyr’s hand is forced open to sacrifice to an idol, this sacrifice is simply involuntary, if the man resists as far as he can.

The same truth holds good of a woman in relation to the man who violates her. If she resists as far as she can, the violation is involuntary. If she does not so resist, she consents to sin. If you command me to be violated against my will, said St. Lucy, my chastity will have a double crown. The body cannot be soiled except with the permission of the mind.

A man who is forced to receive baptism receives it validly, and therefore voluntarily. Answer: To receive baptism validly, he must first put away his contrary disinclination.

A clarification: When is a woman culpable in relation to an aggressor? She is not allowed to kill her oppressor, because the integrity of the flesh is a lower good than life itself. But she can resist by cries, blows, and wounds, and she is bound to this resistance. But if there is peril to her own life or fame, and if there is no danger of interior consent, the woman is not bound to extreme exterior resistance, because exterior resistance is an affirmative precept, which does not oblige to loss of life or fame. But if the danger of interior consent is present, the woman is bound to resist even at the expense of life and fame. It is better to lose corporeal life than the life of grace.

Corollaries

1. Ifall resistance, interior and exterior, is unavailing, then violence is absolute, and causes the simply involuntary, because the act is not free and therefore not imputable.

2. If the person resists exteriorly, but not interiorly, the

voluntary is indeed diminished but not taken away. If under violence the person is altogether passive, not cooperating, and not resisting except interiorly, then the act can still be imputable when there is an obligation to resist exteriorly, in order to prevent scandal (for example, in matters of faith), or of consent (in matters of chastity).

ART. 6. DOES FEAR CAUSE THE INVOLUNTARY?

Preliminaries

An act done from fear differs from an act done with fear. The merchant begins his voyage with fear, but not from fear. But when, in a storm, he throws his goods overboard, he acts from fear.

Difficulties

Three difficulties present themselves: 1. Fear seems to be related to the future as force is to the present. 2. A deed done from fear seems to be in itself involuntary. 3. Such a deed is voluntary only under condition, and hence is voluntary only secundum quid, not simply.

Our Thesis

Deeds done from fear are simply voluntary, but secundum quid involuntary.

A. Authorities. Nemesius and Aristotle speak thus: “Deeds done from fear are voluntary rather than involuntary.”

B. Reason. That deed is simply voluntary which, here and now, is chosen by the will. Now the deed done from fear is, here and now, chosen by the will, though that deed, seen in itself abstractly, is against the will’s inclination. Therefore the deed done from fear is simply voluntary and yet involuntary secundum quid,

To explain. The simple voluntary act deals with objective good, clothed, here and now, with all its circumstances. The voluntary secundum quid deals with the object, not as it is here and now, but as it is in the intellect abstractly, denuded of its actual and objective circumstances.

Note that we are not speaking here of fear so extreme as to make deliberation impossible. Acts done from such fear are not in any sense voluntary.

A confirmation. Acts done from fear are willed absolutely and efficaciously. The will is against them only inefficaciously and conditionally. The merchant wills efficaciously to lose his goods, though he would will to retain them were there no danger of shipwreck. A deed willed efficaciously is simply voluntary, and only secundum quid involuntary.

Difficulties Analyzed

1. In acts done from fear, the will consents. In acts done under violence, the will does not consent.

2. An object in itself involuntary may become simply voluntary.

3. An act done here and now from fear is absolutely willed, conditionally non-willed.

Special Difficulties

1. Fear of hell leads many men to sorrow for sin and observance of the law. Now this sorrow and observance are in no way involuntary. Hence acts done from fear need not be involuntary secundum quid. Answer: Even in this case the will remains conditioned: Were there no hell, I would sin. While the man in this condition is not good, his sorrow and observance are good, just as faith in a sinner is good, even while the man remains bad.

2. Buta deed which is simply voluntary cannot in any real sense be involuntary. Answer: The adverb “simply” does not mean “‘totally.” It means “principally and efficaciously.”’

3. Contracts entered into under grave fear are invalid, and therefore simply involuntary. Answer: Such contracts, even when they are not invalid by natural law, are made invalid by positive law. Natural law itself cancels gratuitous contracts, if such contracts result from fear unjustly threatened, because gratuitousness presupposes full freedom.

Grave fear unjustly inflicted invalidates matrimony, some say by natural law, others, by ecclesiastical law.

1. Corollaries. Grave fear, in matters prohibited by the natural law, does not entirely excuse from sin, because the act remains simply voluntary. Example: one who from fear of death denies the faith or commits perjury or fornication. But fear does diminish the voluntary, in the degree in which the fear is grave. It even destroys the voluntary if it takes away the faculty of deliberation.

2. Grave fear, in matters which are evil only because prohibited, generally excuses from all sin, because positive laws do not oblige under grave loss. Under fear of death or of infamy, a man is not bound by the law of fasting, say, or of Sunday Mass.

3- But at times even positive laws oblige a man to risk or lose his life. But such cases contain an element of the natural law. For example, a soldier must face his country’s enemy. Again, a Christian, ordered to eat meat on Friday, if the command comes from scorn of religion.

ART. 7. DOES CONCUPISCENCE MAKE THE ACT INVOLUNTARY?

Preliminaries

By concupiscence we here understand those passions which incline us to follow a certain line of activity. Concupiscence is thus opposed to fear, the latter being motion away from evil.

Concupiscence is either antecedent (which precedes the motion of the will) or consequent (which follows the act of the will). Consequent concupiscence is the sign and effect of an intense voluntary act, which excites a corresponding passion (e.g., anger) in the inferior appetite. Here we deal only with antecedent concupiscence.

A Twofold Conclusion

First. Antecedent concupiscence of itself inclines rather to the voluntary than to the involuntary, because it attracts the will to that which concupiscence desires. Thus it increases the imperfect voluntary, whether in brutes or in man.

Second. Antecedent concupiscence diminishes the perfect voluntary, because it weakens judgment. It may even coerce judgment completely (e.g., in hysteria or extreme anger). In any case, it distracts the intellect from attention to the reasons for good.

AN APPENDIX

Question: Do habits, good or bad, increase voluntariness? Habit is an acquired operation quality, a quality hard to change, which man uses when he wills, and by which he is inclined to perform similar acts, good or bad, virtuous or vicious.

Habits are found, not only in the sense appetite, but also in the intellect and the will. As regards the influence of habits upon liberty, under the moral aspect of imputability, we must make a number of distinctions. Habit either remains voluntary, or, if it has been efficaciously retracted, still influences materially.

Conclusions

1. Habit, good or bad, unless retracted, increases the voluntary, because it gives to the will facility and propensity to act, and takes away all repugnance. Nor does it diminish liberty, because it has been acquired freely and is freely preserved.

2. A good habit perfects liberty, since it inclines the agent to act according to right reason, and diminishes the power of sinning, which is a defect of liberty.

g. An evil habit increases sin, because he who sins from a habit not retracted sins with greater inclination and delight, but not with less liberty. The man who sins by habit, and not merely from a momentary impulse, sins by malice.

4. An evil habit, efficaciously retracted but still exerting material influence, remains as a temperamental! disposition, which diminishes the voluntary because it partially impedes deliberation. Acts which flow from it indeliberately (for instance, blasphemy or excess in drinking) are no longer imputed as guilt, because they are not free in their principle. But the man is bound to do his utmost toward eradicating his bad habits.

Heredity and Temperament

Heredity transmits certain inclinations which, while directly physical, are indirectly moral (e.g., the inclination to anger or to lust). Many determinists maintain that children simply cannot resist their hereditary passions.

To this we must reply: As long as the use of reason remains, there remains likewise the power of deliberating and choosing, even against hereditary inclinations. This truth is clear by the testimony of conscience and many historical facts. Christian discipline has often overcome and transformed the hereditary inclinations of barbarians. That which is born of flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit.

Still we must grant that hereditary inclinations do lessen liberty by disturbing judgment. Men under this handicap are to be treated kindly. Their temptations need the aid of special grace. Heredity

By heredity we here understand psychopathic tendencies, transmitted by parents to children. From parents insane or alcoholic or neuropathic, or drunk at the moment of conception, children may have an organic predisposition to any of these evils, a certain psychopathic tendency, especially in the form of disordered imagination and sensibility, of obsession, tendencies, for instance, to suicide.

Immediate heredity, i.e., from parents alone, may be simple (from one parent) or double (from each parent). Maternal heredity is probably more frequent and more grave. Mediate heredity, if it has grown through several generations, is called accumulated heredity.

Heredity is progressive, when the aforesaid disposition continually grows, and tends to the annihilation of the family. Or it is regressive, when corrected by a happy marriage, as it were by the infusion of new blood. In a family where insanity is hereditary, children are sometimes immune, and even distinguished by great genius. The sickness transmitted can be a disposition to insanity or to general paralysis or to neurosis or to syphilis or to alcoholism. General paralysis often arises from hereditary syphilis.

Modern theories tend to consider pathological heredity as the effect of disturbed nutrition, or of intoxication in the embryo. Intoxication in the blood may result in delirium, or give rise to forms of nerve-tension.

Temperament

Temperament is the complex of all inclinations directly physical, which arise, either from -heredity or from the individual organism. These inclinations are based in matter signed with quantity which, according to Thomists, is the principle of individuation. This individuation, since it lies below direct intelligibility, cannot be defined, just as God cannot be defined, since He stands higher than the created intellect. Temperaments differ by predominance of nervepower or of blood or of bile or of lymph. Some men are thus prompt to begin, but without perseverance, Others are energetic and persevering, and others sluggish.

These native dispositions can be modified by education, by external circumstances, by individual effort. Thus arises character, which is a stable complex of these native propensities, as fixed by education and the individual’s own will. Virtuous character is related to temperament, as in Latin the word vir is related to the word homo. Vir, like virtus (virtue), originally signified man as distinguished from woman. Cicero uses the word “virility” to express character and vigor of soul. Homo, on the contrary, means any member of the human race, man or woman. The word seems related to humus (the soil). Character, then, is the seal which man (vir) imposes upon his humus, his temperament. Christian character is constituted by the virtues, moral and theological.

Temperament, like antecedent passion, lessens free will. Character, on the contrary, like a voluntary habit not retracted, increases the voluntary and does not diminish freedom. Good character perfects liberty, evil character not retracted increases sin.

Character Education

Hereditary inclinations are modified by parents, teachers and society, under three forms.

1. The inculcation of principles, good and bad. This is a truth of the greatest importance, if, as Aristotle says, the boy’s mind is a blackboard where nothing has been written. The enemies of the Church recognize this importance by claiming a legal monopoly in education.

2. The second influence of education is that of giving example which allures imitation.

3. Third, the education of passions, either by moderation or by perversion, not only by example or by inculcation of principles, but by commands, properly so called, given by parents and teachers.

Finally, the individual Christian educates his own character, by acquiring virtue, by prayer and the sacraments, which increase infused virtues. For example:

1. The spirit of faith, hope, and charity grows by meditation, by acting from good motives, natural and supernatural.

2. The continual practice of prudence, natural and Chris- tian, which directs the moral virtues to a supernatural end. Negative prudence is not sufficient, operative prudence is required. The phrase “he is prudent,” is often misused to express a negative prudence, employed in avoiding the discomforts of life, as, for example, by Epicureans.

3. Moderation of the passions, that the man may have true temperance and fortitude. Passions are not to be extinguished, because man is to be moved toward good, not only by his will, but also by his sense-appetites, regulated and commanded by virtue. God gave us sensibility to attain our purpose in life.

4. Frequent consideration of the rights of others, in a spirit of justice, and love of our neighbor's sanctification, in the spirit of charity.

Pathological Conditions

Modern authors tend to consider pathological conditions as directly affecting the will. Indecision, or any particular propensity, is looked on as sickness of the will. Such a view denies or ignores the spirituality of the soul. We must clearly distinguish physical sickness from vice, which is an evil habit of the will itself. Vice has in it more than mere sickness. Speaking properly, sickness is in the body, but only analogically in the soul, as far as the will is evilly disposed.’®

Certain pathological states impede more directly the exercise of judgment and will. Thus indecision (aboulia) affects the will, as insanity does the intellect. Others less directly impede the exercise of liberty, for instance, neurasthenia, hysteria, epilepsy. But even here a crisis may make the use of reason impossible. ‘Those who undergo hypnosis, and afterward carry out the suggestions of the hypnotist, probably suffer only a diminution of liberty, But even when liberty is entirely taken away, we must still consider whether the deeds done are voluntary in cause (by the patient’s imprudent consent to be hypnotized). Each case is to be examined by the experience of

those suffering from the sickness, by the testimony of experts and physicians.

ART. 8. DOES IGNORANCE MAKE THE ACT INVOLUNTARY?

Preliminaries

Ignorance is the lack of knowledge that is due; for instance, absence of theological knowledge in a priest or of medical knowledge in a physician. Thus ignorance is distinguished from nescience, which is a mere absence of knowledge, for instance, in the insane. It is likewise distinguished from error, which is not only negation or privation of knowledge, but is a contrary disposition.

Divisions of Ignorance

St. Thomas speaks of three kinds of ignorance: antecedent, concomitant, and consequent. Modern theologians prefer to speak of ignorance, vincible or invincible. But these two modes of division can be harmonized.

1. By relation to its object, ignorance is ignorantia juris (when the law is unknown, when, e.g., I do not know that excommunicated persons are to be avoided).

2. Second, ignorance of fact. To illustrate. I know the law, but do not know that Peter, for example, is excommunicated.

3. Two other kinds of ignorance are distinguished by their relation to the will. Here we have, first, consequent ignorance, that is, ignorance willed and vincible. And this itself has two classes: ignorance, directly willed, i.e., pretended ignorance, or, then, indirectly willed, arising from negligence, which can be either grave or light.

4. Distinct from consequent ignorance is ignorance that is nonconsequent, i.e., not willed, and invincible. Also this ignorance is of two kinds. First, antecedent ignorance, when the deed is indeed done but would not be done if there were knowledge. For example, I kill a friend while invincibly I think that I am killing a deer. Second, concomitant ignorance, when, e.g., I kill my enemy, thinking invincibly that I am killing a deer, but so minded that I would have done the deed even if I had known that it was my enemy.

Principles Regarding Ignorance

First Principle

Consequent ignorance, directly willed and vincible, causes the simply voluntary and the involuntary secundum quid. Such ignorance does not take away freedom and imputability. But ignorance indirectly willed lessens freedom and voluntariness.

Ignorance directly willed is itself voluntary. Willing the cause, I will the effect. For example; a physician, negligent in removing his ignorance, wishes in cause the death which follows from this ignorance.

Nevertheless this consequent ignorance, when indirectly willed, is in some way against the inclination of the agent. If he had known, the deed would not have been done. Hence ignorance indirectly willed lessens freedom and voluntariness. Thus ignorance arising from light negligence may reduce a sin objectively to a venial sin. But crass ignorance cannot be so excused. If, however, ignorance is so affected that even in its absence the work would still be done, then it does not lessen the voluntary. Example: a man wills not to know the law in order to sin without remorse. Here we have full imputability.

This first principle is thus divided by some modern theologians. Ignorance actually vincible does not remove freedom but lessens it. Ignorance here and now invincible, whereas formerly it was vincible, results in an act voluntary in cause. To illustrate. The physician, who during his medical education neglected study, does not incur the sin of homicide in that instant when he gives a medicine which produces death: but he willed the effects of his ignorance when he neglected study. The same hold good of the confessor who has gravely neglected the study of theology.

Second Principle

Ignorance nonconsequent, not willed, invincible, causes the involuntary simply or at least the nonvoluntary. This principle has two subdivisions. First: Ignorance invincible and antecedent, since it is itself involuntary, causes the involuntary simply. For nothing is willed unless it is foreknown at least in its cause. Further, the deed proceeding from this ignorance is against the agent’s inclination, actual or habitual or interpretative. This is evident in the example already adduced: I kill a friend, because invincibly I think I am killing a deer, but would not have killed him had I known him to be my friend. Second: Invincible ignorance concomitant makes the act, not simply voluntary nor simply involuntary, but nonvoluntary. This is clear from the example of the man who, invincibly thinking that he is killing a deer, kills instead an enemy whom he would have killed anyhow had he known it. Such ignorance does not take away all will of sin. Therefore the act is not simply involuntary. But neither is the act simply voluntary, because the ignorance itself is not voluntary.

Corollary. In this last case, the man who kills his enemy, invincibly thinking that he is killing a wild beast, while he is guilty of intended homicide is excused from actual homicide, and hence from punishment and censures, which are not inflicted except on account of the external act.

A Final Conclusion

In every sin there is voluntary ignorance of choice, not as regards the law, but as regards the law’s application to the here and now. Here and now we choose something that is simply evil, and only good secundum quid. Thus, misled by passion, a man judges that it is good to steal or to lie.

Thus we harmonize the word of Plato and Aristotle that “every evil man is ignorant,” with the saying of Augustine that “all sin is voluntary.”

A brief synopsis. 1. Consequent ignorance causes the simply voluntary. 2. Antecedent ignorance causes the simply involuntary. 3. Concomitant ignorance causes the nonvoluntary.

Footnotes

1. De veritate, q.24, a.2, ad 1um. 3 Art. 1, no. 6, 4 la-Ilae, q.6, a.7, ad gum. ↩