Chapter XXIV. Habits in their essence (q. 49) prologue
Havinc now considered those acts that are characteristic of man, and those that are common to men and brutes, we must now deal with the sources of these acts. These sources are two: one intrinsic, the other extrinsic. The intrinsic principle is either power or habit. As powers have already been treated, we have now to deal with habits. Treatment of the extrinsic principle, namely, God who instructs by law and aids by grace, is matter for another book.
The present treatise has three divisions: habits in general (q. 49-54), virtues in general (q. 55-70), vices and sins (q. 71-89).
The treatise on habits in general has four divisions: 1. habits in their essence (q. 49); habits in their subject (q. 50); habits in their cause (q. 51-53); habits in their distinction
THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS TREATISE
Since habit is the genus both of virtue and of vice, we cannot rightly know either virtue or vice unless we first know what habit is, and how one habit is distinguished from another.
This treatise is difficult, and it is comparatively neglected. Cajetan and Koellin did indeed write on these articles, as did John of St. Thomas; but the Salmanticenses, Alvarez, Gonet, and Billuart have nothing to say on this subject.
Comparison with modern theories must be our first step, for three reasons: first, moderns generally have no explicit treatment on habits, speaking rather of custom; secondly, because moderns tend to opposite extremes, either of passivity or of activity, whereas St. Thomas harmonizes these two aspects; thirdly, because moderns, particularly the phenomenalists, deny the existence of soul-faculties, and consequently of habits, appealing instead to subconsciousness and method. . Like quacks who prescribe remedies by mere tradition, since they are not masters of medical science, many moderns seem to think that ethical science, far from being a single science, is a mere juxtaposition of unrelated conclusions. These men have lost the scientific spirit.
To illustrate. Vasquez had lost the notion of habit, when he said that, even when infused faith is lost, the habit of theology can still remain. The truth is that, when faith is lost, there remains only the corpse of theology, namely, a certain material arrangement of ideas, since theology lives only by faith itself. Modern terms, “habitude,” “usage,” “custom,” correspond rather to the Latin “consuetudo” than to the Latin “habitus.” The word “habitus” is not easy to translate. It signifies a disposition, permanent and difficult to change.
We must dwell here on two opposed theories. Some moderns, like Descartes and Comte, hold that habit is something passive, a phenomenon of inertia, meaning that a body remains where it now is, in a condition of rest or of motion, unless an extrinsic cause disturb this condition. A projectile dropped into a vacuum would have a habit of everlasting motion. Habit would thus be nothing but the passive perseverance of matter in its present state. Scientific habit would be nothing but the passive persistence of certain modifications in the nerve centers. Descartes puts method in the place of habit, as if mechanical control of method guaranteed possession of science.
An opposite extreme, borrowing from Aristotle and Leibnitz, says that habit is a law of activity, whereby living beings incline to remain in their present state or action. Habit,
ESSENCE OF HABITS 341 then, would be, not a mere passive perseverance, but a tendency to repetition of acts (“using the same path twice”). Thus habit would not be found in inanimate bodies, but only in living things, in animals, especially domestic animals, and particularly in human attitudes, intellectual or moral.
This second theory is not satisfied with Cartesian passivity, which does not explain the tendency of habit to act, to be second nature, to establish continuity in human life, to make progress and education possible. Good habits, by strengthening the will, strengthen also liberty.
This second theory harmonizes better with the view of St. Thomas,’ though he admits, not only operative habits, but also entitative habits, bodily health, say, and sanctifying grace. St. Thomas speaks thus: Habit cannot be produced in an agent (e.g., fire) whose principle is merely active. But in an agent with two principles, one active, one passive, habits can arise. Multiplied acts generate a certain quality in the passive principle, and this quality is called habit. Thus habits of virtue arise in the appetitive powers under the influence of reason, and scientific habits arise in the intellect under the repeated influence of self-evident propositions.
How profound St. Thomas here appears! Moderns, generally, do not rise above experimental psychology, whereas St. Thomas is metaphysical, and, of course, more difficult.
Other moderns, positivists and phenomenalists, deny even the existence of habits. They reduce substance, faculties, and habits to a mere succession of phenomena, and thus arrive at absolute nominalism. Many positivists recur to subconscious psychological phenomena, as the source, for instance, of mathematical virtuosity.
Against phenomenalism in general we argue thus: Whereas our sense-powers are limited to phenomena (color, sound, and so on), our intellect apprehends the reality, the substance, existing under phenomena. Now finite substance is not immediately operative, but acts by powers and faculties distinct from itself. Its existence is not identified with its
activity, since existence is one, whereas activity is manifold. But if existence and activity are really distinct, distinct must be likewise their correlative potentialities, i.e., the substance which underlies existence, and the operative faculties which underlie activity. Such faculties are intellect and will. And if we have faculties, we can also have habits in these faculties, for instance, science in the intellect, justice in the will, chastity in the sense-appetite.
HABITS IN GENERAL (Q. 49)
This question has four articles. Is habit a quality? Is it a determined species of quality? Is habit necessarily related to act? Are habits necessary?
ART. 1. IS HABIT A QUALITY?
Habit does not seem to be a quality. First, because habit, from the Latin word “habere,” indicates possession, and we possess not only qualities, but also quantity, money, and so on. Secondly, because habit is that ultimate predicament, which expresses a mode of clothing. Thirdly, habit means disposition, which seems to refer to corporeal attitude.
Authority. Habit is a quality difficult to change.?
Reason. From the nominal definition we pass on to the three meanings which the word “habit” may have: possession, a garment, a disposition either to good or evil.
“Habere” (to possess) is an element common to diverse categories, and hence is found among the post-predicaments.
“Habit” signifies garment, and thus constitutes a special category, whereby man is said to be clothed or armed. In this meaning, habit is not quality, or quantity, or action, or passion, but a mere relation.
Habit is used to express, not a possession of something external, but a mode of self-possession, and such self-possession is a kind of quality, belonging to the highest genus of quality.
ESSENCE OF HABITS 343
Aristotle’s definition runs thus: Habit is a disposition, whereby the subject is disposed, well or ill, either in itself or in relation to something else.? When we say “habit does not make the monk,” we mean external habit. But internal good habits do make the monk.
ART. 2. IS HABIT A DEFINITE SPECIES OF QUALITY?
Quality is distinct from substance, quantity, action, passion, relation, and so on. The category of quality contains four species: habit and disposition; power and impotence; sense-qualities; form and figure. Why these four? Because there are four modes whereby a substance can be disposed in itself.
To be good or evil in relation to its nature: habit and disposition.
To be disposed well or ill in its operation: power and impotence.
To be well disposed in relation to sense-alteration (color, heat, sound, odor, taste): sense-qualities.
As limiting quantity: form and figure.
Habit here comes before power, because it expresses an immediate relationship to the nature of the substance. Habit (e.g., science) can be changed only with difficulty, whereas disposition (opinion) can easily be changed, though, by reason of passion, opinion may, per accidens, be very tenacious. But habits may begin in the form of dispositions. Science, in the pupil, exists first as a disposition, and only when rooted in the subject does it become a habit. The same truth holds good in the development of moral virtues.
ART. 3. DOES HABIT INCLUDE NECESSARILY RELATIONSHIP TO ACT?
All habits, whether entitative or operative, are related to act. 1. Entitative habits, since they dispose the substance in itself, have a consequent relation to act, because activity is the purpose of nature. Thus health and sickness, beauty and12 ugliness, habitual grace and its privation, although they are entitative habits, still have consequent relationship to act. 2. Operative habits, since they dispose the operative powers, have as their chief purpose a relationship to act.
ART. 4. ARE HABITS NECESSARY?
First conclusion. Where operative power is distinct from operation and is not limited to one operation, there habits are necessary, since otherwise the power would remain undetermined and idle, whereas it should act promptly and easily, and in various directions: for instance, the intellect in physics, mathematics, and metaphysics; the will in justice, religion, and temperance.
In God, who is His own activity, as He is His own existence, habits cannot exist. Nor do natural agents, which are restricted to one effect, need a habit (e.g., external senses or the vegetative powers).
Second conclusion. Entitative habits are necessary when the subject needs them in order to be well disposed in itself, i.e., when many elements concur in forming that disposition. Thus health is an entitative habit, since it implies a definite proportion among many factors. Beauty, too, is an entitative habit. For example, loss of eyelashes or eyebrows suffices to mar the beauty of the human face.
Proceeding metaphysically, from the distinction between faculty and act, we have established these truths: Habit is a quality, a special kind of quality, either operative or entitative, each necessary in its place. Only by reduction to metaphysics does psychology qualify as a perfect science, simultaneously inductive and deductive.
Footnotes
Chapter 24 of 29