Chapter VII. Wuart 1s beatitude considered formally, subjectively? (q. 3)

SEVEN notable answers have been given to the question: In what does formal beatitude essentially consist? Two answers find that essence in an uncreated Good, which is either a reception of the Divinity into the essence ? of the soul, or an un» created knowledge of God, communicated to us by our own unitive act.?

Five answers find this essence in a created good, which is, either a) a habit which deifies the essence of the soul; * or b) the beatific vision; * or c) the beatifying love of friendship with God; * or d) the enjoyment and fruition of God; or e) equally in the vision of God and the love of God.®

Let us begin with a synopsis of the doctrine of St. Thomas. Formal, subjective beatitude,

1. is the created possession of uncreated Good;

2. this possession is an activity; but

3. not a sense-activity, though it is preceded and followed by sense-activity;

4. this activity is exercised by the intellect, whereas the consequent delight is an activity of the will;

4 Thomists, Bellarmine, Becanus, Vasquez, Tostatus, and others. 5 Scotus.

6 Molina, Suarez, who thus attempt to harmonize Thomas and Scotus. 82¹

5. it is an activity of the speculative intellect rather than of the practical intellect;

6. it is not the natural metaphysical knowledge of God, though this knowledge may be called imperfect beatitude;

7. it does not consist in knowing the angels;

8. but it does consist in the immediate vision of God. These eight assertions are to be proved in the eight articles which follow.

Whereas God, the beatifying object, is indeed uncreated, unchangeable, and eternal, man’s possession of this object has a beginning, and is therefore something created. Man’s own beatitude is received from God. Hence the blessed soul loves God more than it loves itself. The soul’s ultimate end is the possession of God.

As preliminary, let us note the six initial difficulties. How can this possession of God be called an activity? Let us enumerate the difficulties.

1. The possession of God is called “eternal life;’’ and life means the nature, not the mere activity, of the living thing.

2. Boethius calls beatitude “a state;” and state (permanent condition) is surely distinct from activity.

3. Beatitude is intrinsic, whereas activity is something extrinsic, something that passes from the agent into the patient.

4. Beatitude is permanent, activity passes away.

5. Beatitude is one and indivisible, whereas activities are many (to understand, to will, to enjoy).

6. Beatitude goes on uninterrupted, whereas activities come to an end (in sleep, e.g., or in some other activity).

The Affirmative Proof

A. Our authority is Aristotle: Felicity is the activity of man’s most perfect power.’ This definition of natural felicity 7 Ethica, X, c.7.

holds good likewise of supernatural felicity. This is eternal life, that they know Thee, the one true God.’ The clean of heart will see God.® Blessed souls see the divine essence, by a vision that is intuitive.”

B. Since perfection consists in act, not potentiality, and since man’s beatitude is his ultimate perfection, beatitude must be an activity. Agere sequitur esse: activity is the purpose of existence. Possession of the beatifying object is the highest kind of activity.

Objections Analyzed

1. Life is of the very nature of a living thing; yes, when you divide substances into living and nonliving. But life means activity, when you look at the purpose for which substance exists. By its purpose, its activity, you distinguish active life from contemplative life.

2. Beatitude is a state (a permanent condition); yes, if you are giving a broad definition of the beatifying object, of all the values that are subordinated to God. But formal, subjective beatitude consists essentially, not in possessing an aggregate of goods, but in possessing the supreme good by the highest activity of our highest faculty.

3. Beatitude is an immanent activity, not a transient activity. This latter, which is truly said to be “in the agent,” is yet more truly said to come “from the agent.” Immanent action (sensation, understanding, will) is both from and in the agent, perfects the agent, and can constitute his subjective beatitude. Thus man’s immanent contemplative life stands higher than his transient active life. And the celebration of Mass stands higher than preaching.

4- Whereas beatitude is permanent, activity passes away. Yes, if you refer to this life’s activity; no, if you refer to the activity of life eternal, an activity which is measured, not by

time, but by eternity. Like God’s eternity, the beatific vision is entire and simultaneous, and the light of glory, which is its source, is not subject to variation.

5 and 6. The answer is similar. The activities of the blessed soul are indeed many, but only one of them, the vision whereby it possesses God, constitutes beatitude, and suffers no interruption. The other activities of the blessed soul (thoughts about creatures) are subject to interruption and time.

Henry of Ghent and the Magister Bonae Spei

Many mystics seem to say that the soul’s intimate union with God takes place, not in the operative faculties, but in the very essence of the soul, where sanctifying grace resides. Thus to Henry of Ghent is assigned this statement: Subjective beatitude consists in a descent of Divinity into the essence of the soul.

This view is contrary to authority, which finds beatitude, not in essence, but in operation: The blessed see God, know God, have intuitive vision of God. It is contrary likewise to reason. God is present in the essence of the soul by producing the soul’s existence, or by granting it sanctifying grace. But this descent of God, since it is found in just men here on earth and in the souls in purgatory, cannot be essential beatitude. Further, the human soul, being a created existence, can operate only by faculties distinct from itself. Action is not identified with existence, action follows existence. The view which is attributed to Henry of Ghent has no probability.

The same sentence must be passed on the Magister Bonae Spei, who finds beatitude in an uncreated understanding of God, communicated to the soul by the soul’s own act of union with God. Against this view, let us note two truths.

1. Beatitude, the vision of God, is a vital act, performed by a created soul. But an uncreated understanding, being identified with God Himself, can never be an act performed by a creature.

2. God, the Uncreated, cannot be the effect of a created intellect, or the form of a created intellect. God is the efficient and the final cause of the universe, but cannot be either the material or the formal cause. Even in the hypostatic union, the divine Word, far from being the form of Christ’s humanity, is simply the act which terminates and renders incommunicable the human nature of Christ.

These two views, then, that of Henry of Ghent and that of Magister Bonae Spei, lead to the pantheism of Spinoza,** who says: “Man’s intellectual love for God is identified with the love whereby God loves Himself.”

To conclude. Formal, subjective beatitude is an activity, an operation, immanent, not transitive, eternal, not transient, forever new and forever delightful: an everlasting midday followed by no night.

ART. 3. IS IT SENSE-ACTIVITY?

Here we note three brief conclusions:

1. Sense-operations, limited to the corporeal world, cannot be the beatifying operation.

2. But sense-operations, since they are the prerequisites of intellectual operations, belong antecedently to the beatific operation.

3. Lastly, since after the resurrection the soul’s beatitude overflows on the body, sense-operations belong to perfect beatitude as consequences.

These distinct adverbs, “essentially,” “antecedently,” and “consequently” throw light also on other questions. For example, our love of desire belongs to charity, not essentially (because charity is disinterested friendship), but antecedently (because if God were not our own supreme good we could not love Him), and also consequently (because for love of God we love our own soul, and desire eternal life for ourselves). Again, many elements which do not constitute the mystic state still belong to that state antecedently or consequently.

ART. 4. BY WHAT FACULTY IS THIS ACTIVITY EXERCISED: BY THE INTELLECT OR BY THE WILL?

Preliminaries

On this question Thomists and Scotists are at odds. St. Thomas holds that the beatifying activity is essentially an operation of the intellect, whereas Scotus says it is essentially an act of love, an act of the will. The view of St. Thomas rests on two previous positions.

1. The notion of truth is more absolute, more independent, more universal, than the notion of good. The good presupposes truth and reality. Hence the truth, as object of the mind, antecedes the good, though no concrete thing can be perfect unless it is good.

2. Hence, by reason of its object, the intellect is, speaking simply, a higher faculty than the will.

Scotus,” looking at the concrete subject rather than the differentiating object, denies these two positions of St. Thomas. The notion of truth, says Scotus, is not nobler than the notion of good. Hence the will, since it is the seat of charity, the highest of all virtues, is, speaking simply, a faculty higher than the intellect.

Initial Difficulties

1. Beatitude, since it is peace, belongs, like joy, to the will.

2. Again, since it is the highest good, it belongs to the will.

3. Again, since among the faculties the will is the prime mover, and the prime mover is also the last end, beatitude must belong to the will.

4. Again, since charity, the highest virtue, is in the will, beatitude too must belong to the will.

5. Lastly, since he is blessed who has all he wills and who wills nothing evil, the beatific operation must be an act of the will.

The Affirmative Argument

A. Scripture favors our position: To know God is life eternal. Show us the Father. The clean of heart see God. We are like God, because we see Him."* These texts, although they do not distinguish beatitude from its qualities, surely favor the intellect as the beatifying faculty.

Patristic texts likewise favor our position: Life eternal comes from seeing God.™ The highest contemplation constitutes human felicity. To live blessedly means to possess by knowledge that which is eternal.’® Mental possession means possession by knowledge.

B. In the body of the article we have, first, a distinction, then two conclusions. As we must distinguish man’s essence (i.e., rationality) from his characteristics (i.e., laughter, wonder, and speech), so must we likewise distinguish the essence of beatitude from its characteristics. The essence of beatitude is the possession of the beatifying object. From this essential possession flow many characteristics: love, joy, bodily glory.

First conclusion. The essence of beatitude cannot be found in any act of the will, but only in an act of the intellect. The proof runs thus: The attainment and possession of the beatifying object cannot be an act of the will. Why not? For two reasons, one a priori, the other a posteriori. The first reason is that the acts of the will either antecede possession (in the form of desire), or presuppose possession (in the form of joy).

Here lies the difference between intellect and will. The intellect draws its object to itself, becomes that object, intentionaliter, either by an intermediate ideal species, or without medium (in the beatific vision), But the will is drawn to the object as it is in itself. Love, says St. Augustine, is a weight, bending me to the object I love. The will, then, is either seek-

15 Cyril of Alexandria, Contr. Jul., 1. 3. 16 Aug., in his Octoginta quaestiones, q.35.

FORMAL AND SUBJECTIVE BEATITUDE 8g ing possession or enjoying possession, whereas the intellect apprehends, seizes, possesses the object.

To speak concretely. A saint (e.g., St. Teresa) who on earth enjoyed high intellectual visions, must experience the immediate vision of God as something entirely new. Her previous visions being based on faith, not sight, are like nonseeing in comparison. Even the highest faith (as in Our Lady) cannot see. Only the beatific vision can see.

Further, love effects union; yes, but an effective union, not an objective union. Objective union is effected by the vision, and this union is necessarily followed by the joy of mutual inhesion: My beloved to me, and I to him.” Even on earth (think of Mary) this mutual inhesion can be very intimate, but can never constitute perfect beatitude.

The second reason, a posteriori, rests on analogy with possession in the sense order. The child’s desire for a coin is not possession. He attains and possesses when he holds it in his hand, and possession is followed by joy. Again, the eye possesses Color, the ear possesses sound, the palate possesses flavor. Now as sense is related to sense-good, so intellect is related to intellective good. An intellective being, therefore, attains and possesses the beatifying object, not by its will, but by its intellect.

Second conclusion. But to the will belongs that joy which is a consequence and characteristic of blessedness. Joy, since it follows the possession of supreme truth, is the consummation of blessedness. “Rejoicing in the truth” is Augustine’s definition of beatitude. Joy is a characteristic, which follows beatitude but does not constitute it.

Difficulties Analyzed

These objections are: first, the initial difficulties proposed by St. Thomas; second, those proposed by Scotus; third, those proposed by Suarez.

go BEATITUDE

Initial Difficulties

1. Peace and joy, which belong to the will, are a necessary consequence of beatitude, but not the essence of beatitude.

2. God, as good, is the object of the will, yes; an object attainable without the mediation of the intellect, no.

3. Among man’s faculties, the will is the prime mover, yes, yet so that the will cannot do by itself the work which it commands the intellect to do.

4. Love for God is better than knowledge of God: here on earth, where by faith we move toward God, yes; in heaven, where we see and possess God, no.

5. Blessed is he who has all he desires: yes, but he has them, possesses them, by knowing them, not by willing them. His will is either a disposition for possession, or a consequence of possession.

Difficulties Proposed by Scotus

1. Attaining God is twofold: by knowledge, which is first in the order of time; by love, which is first in the order of perfection. Answer: Love for the beatifying object is not, speaking properly, the same thing as attaining that object. Love either precedes attaining or follows attainment.

2. Love implies rest, and resting in God is blessedness. Answer: Resting in God is the consequence, not the essence, of the beatifying operation. Love, since it abstracts from the object’s presence or absence, cannot be attainment of the object.

But, the objector insists, love, according to Augustine, Denis, and Aquinas, is “the virtue which unites lovers.” Answer: Love is union, affective union. But love causes real and objective union. Love moves the intellect to attain experimentally the object which love desires.

3. The will desires its own act more than it desires the act of the intellect. Answer: Desires its own act more, as a command to the intellect to see and possess, yes; but otherwise, no.

4. The will is more perfect than the intellect, because the will is, first, not abstractive, but concrete; secondly, it is the mover of the intellect; thirdly, it is free. Answer: The will is more perfect than the intellect: simply speaking, no; secundum quid, yes.

To explain. It is true that the good, the object of the will, does not, like the intellect, abstract from actual existence. But the object of the intellect (truth, reality) is more independent, primary, and universal, than is the good, which is the object of the will. Mere concreteness of object does not prove the superiority of the will, otherwise the sense-powers would be more perfect than the intellect, the horticulturist than the metaphysician. The will, as efficient cause, moves the intellect, but the intellect, as final cause, moves the will. The intellect plans, the will executes.

Again, freedom is indeed in the will, but the source, root, and cause of freedom are the intellect’s power of deliberation. Cause is higher than effect, root is higher than fruit. Withered root leads to dead tree.

Lastly, beatific love is not a free act, but a necessary act, which rises above freedom, just as God’s internal and necessary acts are superior to His external and free acts.

5. Charity, love of God, is more perfect than knowledge of God: on the road to heaven, yes; in heaven itself, no. St. Thomas speaks: When the thing where good resides is more noble than the soul, will is more noble than intellect. But when the good thing is less noble than the soul, intellect is higher than will. Hence, here on earth love of God is better than knowledge, whereas knowledge of the corporeal world is better than love of that world. Speaking simply, however, where objects are equal, the intellect is more noble than the will. In heaven, souls differ in degrees of grace, love, and vision; but vision, speaking simply, is more perfect than love.

6. Charity, in the will, is more perfect than faith, which is in the intellect. Answer: Faith is imperfect knowledge. As imperfect, yes, faith is lower than charity; but, as knowledge, it is higher than charity. Faculties must be weighed by their adequate objects. Thus sight, speaking simply, is higher than hearing, but listening to a symphony of Beethoven is higher than the sight of a commonplace movie.’®

7. The seraphim, named from burning love, precede the cherubim, named from perfect knowledge. Answer: Let it pass; what does it prove? If answer be called for, let us simply say that charity on earth stands higher than faith.

8. Vision is the road to love. Answer. As means to end (in final causality), no. As cause to effect (in efficient causality), or as essence to characteristic (informal causality), yes. Love, on earth, longs for the vision. Love, in heaven, follows the vision.

g. Vision reaches its perfection by love: its consequent perfection, yes; its essential perfection, no.

10. Friendship, loving God for His own sake, loves Him more than it loves its own vision. Yes, but, in so doing, friendship ascribes to God its own already established beatitude. Friendship for God, a free act here on earth, is in heaven a necessary act. The blessed soul, seeing God, must love Him above all else. Friendship for God, like impeccability, is a necessary consequence of the vision.

11. Beatific love, since it comes later than vision, is more perfect than vision. Not so, we answer, if it comes as a characteristic of the essential beatitude constituted by vision.

12. But you cannot deny that love is the ultimate act of the soul in heaven. No, I cannot deny, I affirm. But, I must add, love is the ultimate, not in the line of attaining and possessing, but in the line of resting and rejoicing.

13. If hatred of God is worse than the absence of vision, then charity is better than vision. Answer: You are confound-

18 Voluntarism leads ultimately to Protestantism, to positivism, to the denial of the natural law and of immutable morality.

ing two orders. In the moral order, hatred of God (and indeed any vice), is worse than absence of vision. But absence of vision, eternal damnation, since it deprives man of ultimate perfection, is the worst of all physical evils. Further, charity in heaven is no longer a free and moral act, but an act which transcends freedom and merit. Again, privation of vision is privation of the highest conceivable good, a good found only in heaven.

14. But, since the moral order is higher than the physical order, charity must be higher than vision. Answer: Although the moral order is higher than the physical and inanimate order, it is not higher, rather, is lower, than the intellectual order. And all acts in heaven, beatific vision and beatific love, are, properly speaking, not moral, but supramoral.

15. Fruition, peace, and impeccability flow from the act, not of the intellect, but of the will. Answer: But that act of the will, the primary characteristic of beatitude, and the source of all other characteristics, arises from the act of the intellect.

Here enters a question, suggested by the principles of St. Thomas himself. In natural beatitude would not love for God stand higher than knowledge of God? No, runs the answer, because love, by its very nature, either precedes possession or follows possession. To illustrate. The hypostatic union, though it is higher than the beatific vision, is not essential beatitude, because it does not possess God as intelligible object. Similarly, love of God as the Author of nature would be a necessary consequence of natural contemplation. St. Thomas, following Aristotle, finds natural beatitude to consist in contemplation, since contemplation is an act of man’s highest power, namely, the intellect. Hence supernatural charity is the only kind of love which stands higher than contemplation. Natural love of God is measured by natural knowledge of God.

Objections proposed by Suarez. To reconcile Scotus with Aquinas, Suarez maintains that beatitude consists equally in two acts, namely, vision of God and love for God. A general answer runs thus: The act of the will is subordinated to the act of the intellect, which it presupposes. Hence vision and love cannot equally constitute beatitude. Again, the possession of the beatifying object cannot consist in two operations equally perfect, because if the two are specifically different, then one must be more perfect, and if the two are only numerically distinct, one of the two is superfluous.

Difficulties Analyzed

1. Vision and love, as two partial causes, concur in attaining God. Answer: Since God is indivisible, He cannot be possessed by two partial causes. God entire is possessed by vision. Of this entire possession, love (the second operation) is a consequent characteristic.

2. Two operations are better than one. Answer: If you are looking at the state of blessedness, yes; if you are looking at the essence of blessedness, no. Vision, the essence, the root, precontains love and all other characteristics.

3. Vision alone does not satiate all the desires of the blessed soul. Answer: Vision, looked at as separated from its characteristics, I grant; looked at as possession, necessarily followed by love and joy, I deny.

4. But if God, absolutely speaking, would refuse concurrence with the blessed soul’s act of love, then that soul would still be essentially blessed: surely an absurd conclusion. An- _swer: Absurd, yes, if you confound essential beatitude with consummate beatitude. A baby, although it is essentially a man, is not a full-grown man.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding the difficulties raised by Scotus, by Suarez, and by others, the doctrine of St. ‘Thomas still stands. It is held by many theologians (Bellarmine, Becanus, Tostatus, Vasquez) who do not belong to the school that is strictly Thomistic.

Our defense of the intellect as the beatifying faculty has led us to anticipate the following articles, which maintain that beatitude is a contemplative activity (a. 5), is not a mere metaphysical knowledge (a. 6), consists essentially in the immediated vision of God.

ART. 5. IS BEATITUDE AN ACTIVITY OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE INTELLECT?

The practical intellect is concerned with making, the speculative intellect with knowing. God cannot be made, but He can be known. Hence contemplation is its own end, whereas actions aim at producing, not directly at knowing. Man shares contemplation with God and the angels. Action he shares with animals, who also labor for their own self-preservation.

Even the imperfect happiness of the present life lies chiefly in contemplation, and only secondarily in practical activity, whereby man rules his passions and forms his character. In heaven, then, a fortiori, contemplation transcends action. Contemplation, thus Augustine,?® is promised to us as the goal of all activity, as eternal and perfect enjoyment. Let modern pragmatism take notice.

ART. 6. CAN METAPHYSICAL KNOWLEDGE BE CALLED BEATITUDE?

Metaphysical knowledge, even in its highest reaches, rests on principles, abstract principles, derived from the senseworld. Now such principles can never raise man to perfect knowledge of God, but only to a knowledge that is negative, or relative, or at best analogical. Negatively we know God as nonfinite, nonmutable, nonvisible. Relatively we know Him as supremely good and true. Analogically we know Him as precontaining, in infinite fashion, all the perfections we find in creatures.

No wonder, then, that even perfect metaphysical knowledge is clouded with obscurities. God is unchangeable, and still

free. God has infallible knowledge of the future, yet man is free. God is omnipotently good, yet He permits evil. His mercy is boundless, yet His justice is inexorable. These obscurities, though they are antinomies, not contradictions, constitute that supreme philosophical mystery which is the source of the natural desire, conditional and inefficacious, to see the very essence of God, the Author of nature. Metaphysics alone, then, while it is the source of imperfect beatitude, can never give man perfect beatitude.

A Difficulty Analyzed

Felicity, since it is the act of our highest faculty in its highest object, must consist in the knowledge of God. Yes, but on earth this felicity remains imperfect. Even if man had been left in the merely natural state, with perfect knowledge and love of God, he would never have perfect beatitude, which arises only from intuitive vision. In point of fact, however, as revelation teaches, man is destined for supernatural felicity. Natural felicity is proportioned to human nature, but supernatural felicity, since it transcends all created natures, is attained, not by man’s natural powers, but by God’s generosity.”° Eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, heart doth not suspect, what God holds ready for those who love Him.

ART. 7. BEATITUDE DOES NOT CONSIST IN KNOWING THE ANGELS

Revelation: “Let him who glories glory in this, that he knows Me.” = “When He shall appear we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is.” ??

Reason. To contemplate limited and participated existences cannot constitute the perfection of our intellect. But the angels have participated existence and therefore participated

20 Cf. Ia, q.23, a.1; la-Ilae, q.62, a.1; De veritate, q.14, a.2. 21 Jeremias, 9:24. 22 I John, 3:2.

truth. Angels can illumine us, but only as far as they are instruments of God. Even if we knew angelic nature intuitively, as the angel sees himself, our knowledge of God would still be analogical, negative, and relative. Hence there would always remain the desire of knowing God in Himself.

ART. 8. FORMAL BEATITUDE CONSISTS IN THE VISION OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE

Difficulties. Man seems capable, not of the immediate vision of God, but only of mystic and obscure contemplation of God. To see God without medium seems to be an incommunicable perfection of God.

Revelation. “We see now as in a mirror, but then face to face.” 3 “The blessed in heaven see God clearly, one and triune, as He is.” %4 “The blessed in heaven see the divine essence, with a vision that is intuitive and face-to-face, a vision not mediated by any creature but by the divine essence showing itself without medium openly and clearly.” 7

Propositions Condemned

1. “Every intellectual nature is in itself naturally blessed, and the soul does not need the elevating light of glory in order to see and enjoy God.” *6

2. “The exaltation of human nature to share in divine nature, since it was due to the integrity of man’s primal condition, should be called natural and not supernatural.” ?7

3. “Absurd is the view of those who say that man was, from the beginning, by a supernatural and gratuitous gift, raised above the condition of his nature, in order to adore God in faith, hope, and charity.” ?8

4. “The integrity of the primal creation was not an undue exaltation of human nature, but was man’s natural condition.” 2° g. “The grace of Adam is a consequence of creation, due to Adam’s perfect nature.” °°

According to these condemned propositions man’s ultimate natural end is identified with his supernatural end, and the beatific vision is not only possible, but is due to us by justice, since it corresponds with our natural efficacious desire, and consequently is not intrinsically supernatural.

This doctrine of Baius reappears among the Modernists. “Catholic men are found who, while they reject immanence as a doctrine, nevertheless use it in apologetics, and so incautiously as to admit in human nature, not only a capacity for the supernatural order (a capacity which Catholic apologists, under proper modifications, have always maintained), but also a true and genuine exigency, and thus find in our nature itself the germ of the supernatural.” *

The beatific vision, then, the immediate vision of God, is indeed possible and welcome, is the reward promised to us, but is a gift which transcends the powers and exigencies, not only of human nature, but also of angelic nature. It is consummated grace, altogether gratuitous, because it pleased God’s infinite goodness to raise man to a supernatural end.

St. Thomas. In support of his doctrine, Baius quotes the present article. Let us look more closely at the Saint’s teaching on the existence of the beatific vision. In this article St. Thomas does not intend to prove by mere reason the existence or the possibility of the beatific vision, since mysteries, because they are intrinsically supernatural, cannot be demonstrated by the natural light of reason, not even after revelation. Thus the Vatican Council: “Divine mysteries, by their very nature, so exceed the created intellect, that even after

revelation has been given and faith has been accepted, these mysteries remain veiled by faith, wrapped in a kind of darkness as long as we are pilgrims on earth, because we walk by faith and not by sight.” ?2

Mysteries intrinsically supernatural include, not only the Blessed Trinity, but also the Incarnation, the Redemption, and the life of grace and glory. Grace and glory, since they are real and formal participations in the divine nature, in the intimate life of God, cannot be proved by reason alone even after revelation.

Why is demonstration excluded? Because what is supernatural in its substance is supernatural also in its cognoscibility. How, then, can the theologian defend these mysteries? He can do three things: first, he can show that they are contained in the deposit of revelation; secondly, he can give some understanding by analogies with nature; thirdly, in answer to those who speak against the faith, he can show that their views are either false or inconclusive.

Illustrative Texts

1. “Sacred doctrine uses human reason, not to prove the faith, but to manifest other truths contained in the faith.” $$

2. “The Trinity supposed, reason can illustrate, but not prove.” 5

The mode of arguing in this article differs slightly from the mode followed in the first part. The argument in question twelve of the first part runs thus: Natural desire cannot be in vain, cannot tend to the impossible. But man has a natural desire to know, not only that there is a first cause, but also what it is. In the Prima Secundae the argument may be expressed as follows: Man is not perfectly happy as long as something remains to be desired. But man has a natural desire to know, not only that there is a first cause, but also what it is.

22 Cf. Conc, Vat. (D. 1785 sqq) 38 Ia, q.1, a.8. 34 Ia, q.32, a.5. Cf. De veritate, q.14, a.2; Contra Gentes, 1 I, c.8; Ia-Ilae, q-114, a.2.

The principle here invoked is the principle of finality. If every agent acts for a goal, then natural desire cannot be empty or vain, otherwise it would tend to something and still tend to nothing. Natural desire is not fictitious (like, say, the desire to have wings), but is based on nature itself, which cannot be fallacious, just as the intellect is never deceived regarding the principle of contradiction. This argument has its own difficulties. It seems to prove either too much or not enough. Two difficulties arise, one minor, one major.

The minor difficulty. If we understand this natural desire to be an efficacious desire, then we prove too much. We fall back into the heresy of Baius, which claims that the beatific vision is due to human nature, just as is the immortality of the soul, or God’s concursus with created causes. On the other hand, if this natural desire is conditional and inefficacious, then it can be frustrated, and the argument does not prove enough. Nay, the question arises whether nature has even an inefficacious desire to see God. God causes natura] things, not by necessity of nature, but by intellect and will. Now this truth is known by metaphysics or natural theology, and thus we would not have even an argument of convenience in favor of the beatific vision (which is beyond the ken of philosophy).

Answer to This Difficulty

1. Even the most perfect abstractive knowledge would remain analogical, involving great obscurity regarding the intimate harmony among God’s attributes: immutability and liberty, a free act which still is not contingent, omnipotent goodness and permission of evil, infinite mercy and infinite justice. Of each divine attribute we know rather that it is than what it is. From this obscurity arises a natural desire to see the essence of God, the Author of nature. I say, the Author of nature, for God as triune, as the Author of grace, cannot be known by reason alone, and hence the vision of

God as triune cannot be naturally desired. This natural desire remains in the angels even when their natural cognition has been consummated, and their natural cognition is much more perfect than ours.

2. What kind of natural desire does St. Thomas have in mind? As background for answering this question, let us give, in synopsis, various meanings of the term “desire.” Desire may be

A. supernatural, as coming from charity or as coming from hope. It may be

B. natural

1. as innate or 2. as elicited, and a. necessary, or b. free, and if free, either efficacious or inefficacious, and implicit or explicit.

Cajetan says that, in our present article, the term “desire” means “supernatural desire,” connatural to us under grace. Scotus says that it means an “innate natural desire of the beatific vision.” Baius says that it means a “natural and efficacious desire.” ‘Thomists say that it means a “desire, natural but inefficacious.”

We follow this last view. St. Thomas is speaking, not of an efficacious natural desire, but of a natural desire which is conditional and inefficacious, of velleity, which, absolutely speaking, might be frustrated, and would in fact have been left unfulfilled had not God pleased to raise man to a supernatural end. Thus understood, the argument proves ncither too much nor too little, since it is not apodictic, but is persuasive. There cannot be a natural efficacious desire except in relation to a good that is proportioned to nature and due to it.

Illustrative Texts. 1. Thomas. “Eternal life is a good exceeding the proportions of created nature, because it exceeds even the cognition and desire of nature.” Again

2. “Man cannot merit eternal life without grace, nor prepare himself without the aid of grace for grace.” *

3. “No rational creature can have a motion of the will directly ordained to that beatitude unless this creature is moved by a supernatural agent, namely, the aid of grace.” °

4. “There is another good which exceeds the proportions of human nature, which natural powers do not suffice either to think of or to desire.” 3

5. “Nothing can be ordained to a certain end unless there pre-exist in it a proportion to that end, which may create desire of the goal. Hence man’s initial step toward eternal life is infused faith.” **

These texts show clearly that Baius was wrong in citing St. Thomas for his view. The term “natural desire,” as used by St. Thomas, although it does not mean “efficacious desire,” does not, on the other hand, mean the “innate desire” admitted by Scotus, namely, an inclination of the will anteceding all cognition and all elicited desire, since it is clear from the text of St. Thomas that the desire of which he is speaking follows cognition of the effects of God and of the existence of God, whereas appetite is directed only to beatitude in common.

Hence, as Thomists commonly say since the time of Baius, we are dealing here with a natural desire, not innate, but elicited, not efficacious, but conditional and inefficacious. Now this conditional and inefficacious desire supposes a judgment both on the goodness and on the natural unattainability of the desired object. Man might say: “Oh, this wondrous vision of God: if only I could attain it.” Finally, this velleity would be either explicit or implicit: implicit, when it is known confusedly; explicit, when the object is known.

This velleity seems to be expressed in this passage of Plato:

“How blessed would that vision be, could a man be granted to see beauty itself, beauty unalloyed, and divine! Would not this man be the friend of God? Would he not deserve to be called immortal?” *

Conclusion. Hence, as Thomists commonly teach, man naturally desires to see the essence of God, the Author of nature, yet this desire is not innate, but elicited, conditional, and inefficacious. But even this desire, although conditional and inefficacious, cannot, it seems, be vain, cannot tend to something impossible. Thus the argument is persuasive of the possibility of the beatific vision, of the existence of a potentiality which can be elevated to the supernatural vision.

A doubt. Why is this argument not apodictic but only persuasive? All Thomists agree that this article does not prove apodictically the fact of our elevation to the beatific vision. Some few, however, hold that it does prove apodictically the possibility of this elevation, since it would be absurd to admit such a natural desire if the vision were impossible. Answer. The general answer runs thus: The existence and the intrinsic possibility of mysteries which are essentiaily supernatural cannot be demonstrated by reason even after revelation has been given. But life eternal, the beatific vision, participation in the divine nature, is a mystery intrinsically supernatural. Hence this vision is impossible without the light of glory, and by reason alone we cannot prove the possibility of the light of glory, though we can defend that possibility.

A special reason runs thus: The aforesaid desire, since it is conditional, does not prove apodictically the possibility of this vision, but presupposes the hypothesis of this possibility. Yet this desire, since it is natural, since it does not proceed from mere phantasy, or from one individual’s philosophical knowledge, but is found in all wise men, it becomes a very probable and persuasive proof that the vision of God, the Author of nature, is a possibility. We cannot, from reason

alone, prove that the adequate object of intellect is not onty reality as reality, the object of metaphysics, but also reality in its whole latitude, containing the Trinity clearly seen.*°

Synopsis of Opinions Natural desire is either: A. innate 1. and in some way efficacious, because intuitive vision, while it is a natural goal of man’s desire, is supernatural in mode of attainment (thus the Augustinians, Noris and Berti); 2. and inefficacious, because intuitive vision, while it is the universal human goal, is not universally known, hence not efficaciously desired (thus Scotus); or B. elicited and 1. natural secundum quid, because, while it does not reach out beyond our natural powers, it still arises connaturally when the effects of grace have been revealed (thus Cajetan against Scotus); 2. simply natural, because it follows knowledge of natural effects (Thomists in general).

Opinions Examined

1. The Augustinian opinion, closely related to Baianism, does not preserve the absolute distinction of the natural order from the supernatural order, and denies the principle of finality, that every agent acts for a proportionate end. God as Author of nature, would have given us an innate desire for an end to which, as Author of nature, He could not lead us.

2. Nor does the opinion of Scotus sufficiently preserve the distinction between the two orders, because this distinction, according to him, is not necessary but free, depending on God's free will, since God could have given us the light of glory as a human characteristic. But then, our intellect would

naturally have the same formal and proper object as has the divine intellect, and would thus be a created God: a view which leads to pantheism.

Further Reflections

1. This desire, being inborn, should be efficacious, since a desire is inefficacious only by proceeding from a conditional judgment. Innate desire, since it does not proceed from cognition, cannot be conditional and inefficacious.

2. This innate desire involves contradiction. It would be essentially supernatural, differentiated by a supernatural object. The very nature of the human will would be ordained, not only to good in general, but positively and naturally to the vision of God. Similarly, the active obediential potency held by Suarez would be something positive and essentially natural, and at the same time essentially supernatural.

3- Cajetan’s opinion seems to be an excessive reaction against Scotus. St. Thomas, expounding the mode in which this desire arises, speaks of the supposed knowledge of effects, not supernatural, but natural: a desire which is simply natural, but inefficacious. Cajetan himself seems to grant this when he says: “The human intellect, knowing that God exists, and desiring naturally to know what God is, obeys a natural desire which leads us, when we see an effect, to know the cause of that effect.” #

4. Following Ferrariensis and Bafiez, and the Thomists who wrote at the time of Baius, we hold that man could have been created in a purely natural state, and that therefore grace, as its name implies, is a gift simply gratuitous, not due to us or to the angels, but supremely harmonious with created nature.

Two Corollaries

First. The obediential potency, the elevability of our nature to the order of grace, is not active, but passive, an 41In lam-Ilae, q.3, a.8.

aptitude, that is, to receive from God whatever God wills to give. Thus our nature has obediential potency for the hypostatic union. Second. Obediential potency is immediately directed, not to any supernatural object or act, but to the supreme Agent whom it obeys. Hence the human soul is positively and immediately ordained to a supernatural act only after its elevation to faith and grace.

The foregoing opinions may be thus summarized.

St. Thomas: Grace is gratuitous and harmonious. Seminaturalism: At least the possibility of revelation can be demonstrated. Scotism: The distinction between the two orders is contingent. The Augustinians: Latent confusion of the two orders. Pelagianism: Denial of all supernaturalness of Christian life. Pseudo-supernaturalism (Protestants, Baius, the Jansenists): Supernaturalness does not transcend the exigencies of our nature.

The principal objection against our doctrine runs thus: The beatific vision, since it is in supremest harmony with our nature, must be proportioned to that nature, and not gratuitous. Were it not so proportioned, it would not be harmonious, but inharmonious, violent, or indifferent, neither good nor evil. Answer. Supernatural harmony, by reason of its very gratuity transcends natural harmony, and is the most profound of all harmonies. Only God can unite two things that are apparently opposite, the highest kind of harmony and the highest reach of gratuitousness. Supernatural gifts perfect us more than do natural gifts. They perfect our soul at its deepest and highest, namely at the point where supernatural life is inserted. The elevation of the obediential capacity to the supernatural level, in the hypostatic union, say, or in the infusion of grace, presupposes an active power that is infinite, just as does creation from nothing. Obediential potency, then, is nothing else than the essence of the soul, capable of receiving whatever God wills.

Here lies the ultimate root of our solution. We are dealing with a mystery which lies on the confines of two orders, infinitely distant one from the other. But this much we must say: Supernatural is what exceeds the proportions of finite nature, by gratuitously perfecting the obediential capacity of that nature. Grace perfects our nature, does not destroy it.

Corollaries

1. Had man been created in a merely natural state, his lack of the supernatural would not have been painful: first, because only velleity would be frustrated; secondly, the velleity itself would not be entirely in vain, because it would lead men to adore the hidden mysteries of God’s hidden life. If, on the contrary, that desire were innate and efficacious, then a merely natural state would be impossible, since God would owe it to Himself to elevate us to the life of grace.

2. After elevation to the supernatural order, privation of the beatific vision is not painful in the present life, because the radical order of our life does not yet demand that we enjoy this vision; but, even on the earth, the saints, from the efficacious ardor of their charity, desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.

g. This privation is very painful in purgatory because the radical order of the supernatural life demands that the soul enjoy this vision immediately after death. This purgatorial pain of loss is like that of extreme hunger or thirst.

4. A fortiori, perpetual privation in hell is supreme misery, simultaneously against nature and against grace. The supernatural and the contranatural are radically opposed. Even the natural law says that we are to obey all God’s commands, hence to lose our supernatural end is simultaneously to lose our natural end. To confuse the supernatural gifts of God with things that are contrary to nature is to confuse true religion with stupid superstition, to confuse the beatific vision with supreme misery.

Footnotes

1. Henry of Ghent. Peter Lombard’s view of charity as something uncreated. 2 Master Bonae Spei and some Belgian Carmelites. 3 St. Bonaventure (IV Sent., dist. 49, a.1, q-1, 1.5.) ↩