Chapter XIX. Definition and division
DEFINITION. Conscience is a practical judgment, which proceeds from common moral principles, and which, here and now, commands good and forbids evil.
Explanation. First. Conscience dictates and regulates both choice and execution: of the three acts of prudence, namely, counsel, judgment, command,’ the second, that is, judgment, coincides with conscience that is right and certain, though conscience exists imperfectly also in those who do not yet have prudence acquired or infused. The phrase, “man must form his conscience before he acts,” means that he must form a right judgment.
Second. The subject of conscience is practical reason, not the will nor the speculative intellect.
Third. It proceeds from common principles, furnished by faith, or by natural reason, or by a moral conclusion. Conscience is not identified with the habit (synderesis) of prime moral principles. Conscience can err, synderesis cannot err. Synderesis is a spark enkindled by the Creator in the minds of all men, a spark which cannot be extinguished as long as man retains his reason, and which remains in the condemned as a worm that cannot die.
Further, speaking properly, neither moral science nor the virtue of prudence is subject to error. Error arises, not from these habits, but from some other source, such as precipitation, which does not use moral science or prudence as it should. Imprudent judgment comes, not from prudence, but from imprudence. Conscience, on the contrary, can be erro-1 neous, an erroneous application of true principles to a particular case.
Fourth. Conscience judges goodness or evil, either of the act already done, or of the act to be done. Whatever conscience, after due diligence, judges to be in harmony with law, is subjectively good, even though it be objectively evil. Thus conscience, even when it is invincibly erroneous, is the subjective standard implanted by God. It is, as it were, the voice of God, intimating to us how His law is to be applied in this particular case.
DIVISIONS OF CONSCIENCE OBJECTIVE DIVISION
A. True and right conscience.
- In relation to obligation.
a. When binding, it is called commanding conscience or forbidding conscience;
b. when not binding, it is called permitting conscience or advising conscience.
- In relation to act, it is called (a) antecedent conscience (when it deals with an act not yet done), (b) consequent conscience (when it deals with a deed already done or omitted).
B. Erroneous conscience.
When it is excessive, it is called (a) scrupulous conscience (futile fear of evil), (b) perplexed conscience (seeing sin on both sides).
When it is defective, it is called (a) lax conscience (judging too easily that there is no sin), (b) hardened conscience (by sinful habit), (c) pharisaical conscience (making great sins small, and small sins great).
SUBJECTIVE DIVISIONS
A. Certain conscience (acting prudently, without fear) B. Uncertain conscience, which is called 1. probable con- science (judges, with fear, an act as licit or illicit), 2. dubious conscience (not assenting to either side); it is either speculatively dubious or practically dubious.
Let us note that a conscience speculatively probable can become practically certain, here and now, by a reflex principle. To illustrate. I can judge speculatively that it is illicit to confer baptism with rose-water. This is an abstract judgment, speculativo-practical. But if I am dealing with an infant about to die, and all other material be absent, I judge practically that, here and now, under these circumstances, it is right to confer baptism with this dubious material. In this decision I am guided by the reflex principle: “Sacraments are for the sake of men.” Hence in the case of necessity, I can give baptism even with dubious matter.
TRUE AND RIGHT CONSCIENCE
Here we must solve some doubts. Is a conscience which is practically true necessarily also right? The answer is affirmative. Practical truth, rectitude, arises from conformity with right intention according to law. But note that a judgment can be speculatively true, and still be rash. Example. A judge condemns to death a man whom he believes, but on slight grounds, to be a murderer, or a traitor. The judge’s conscience is speculatively true, but not morally correct.
Can a conscience that is practically true and right still be speculatively false? The answer is affirmative. Speculative truth means harmony with objective reality. But practical truth, prudential truth, means conformity with a right intention, made with due diligence and attention. Now only this practical truth is the object of conscience. But such a conscience can be speculatively false. To illustrate. A judge, under invincible ignorance, decides that this man is a murderer. When Jacob took Lia for his wife, his error was speculative, not practical.
But are we not arguing in a circle? Will and intention are right only by conformity with right reason. The answer is, no. Practical judgment, the prudential judgment, dealing only with ways and means, is true by its subjective conformity with right will, with right intention. But this right will itself, this right intention, means objective conformity with moral science, and this means conformity with reality, with human nature, with natural law. Let us note the three levels of truth.
Speculative truth, objective conformity to reality, in synderesis and moral knowledge. Example: Temperance is man’s duty.
Truth in the will, regulated by the moral science, say, of temperance.
Practical truth, conformity with the right intention. Here and now, I must observe the just medium between excess and defect.
Question. In the development of moral virtue, temperance, for example, is the virtue regulated immediately by moral science, or by initial prudence? Answer. In relation to the goal, initial temperance is regulated by synderesis and moral knowledge.*? But in relation to ways and means, initial temperance is regulated by prudence. Causes are mutually causes. Further, the four cardinal virtues grow together, since, whether initial or perfect, they are inseparable, and grow simultaneously, like the four fingers on one hand.°
PRINCIPLES OF CONSCIENCE
Man is bound to have a right conscience, a conscience in harmony with the law of God, the voice of God. Hence conscience must be formed by serious study of the laws which govern life. But ordinary diligence suffices.
Supposing conscience to be right, man is bound to follow that conscience, whether it commands or forbids. Conscience, being the application of the law, here and now, is as binding as is the law itself.2
Modern manuals give little space to the virtues, in particular to the virtue of prudence. Thus, in favor of practicality, they neglect the deeper reasons for the truth which they defend. Much of the doctrine of St. Thomas on conscience is found in his treatise on the virtue of prudence.
IS MAN BOUND TO OBEY AN ERRONEOUS CONSCIENCE?
Preliminaries. Synderesis, the knowledge of first principles, cannot err, but conscience, the application of those principles, can err. Examples. A man who concludes from Christ’s words on swearing that he cannot, here and now, take an oath before a tribunal, even if legitimate authority commands the oath. Again. A man who concludes from the law of charity that he is bound, here and now, to tell a lie in order to save his neighbor’s life. In such and similar cases conscience, though erroneous, is still binding. If the error is vincible, the man is bound to renounce the error before acting. But he is not allowed to act against his erroneous conscience, even if the error is vincible.
Authority. That which does not come from faith (i.e., from conscience) is sin.*
Reason. The will is evil when it aims at an object proposed by reason as evil. An object proposed by conscience, even by erroneous conscience, is an object proposed by reason. Hence the will, if not in harmony with conscience, true or erroneous, is always evil.
Goodness or evil in the will comes from the object as proposed by reason, because nothing can be willed by the will unless it is foreknown by reason. Further, by definition, conscience is the proximate and immediate standard of human acts, because it applies the law here and now, dictating that the act is either an evil to be avoided, or a good to be done. Hence we are never allowed to act against conscience, even though conscience be erroneous. Examples. If erroneous reason proposes abstinence from fornication as evil, the will dis- cordant with this dictate is evil. Again. When belief in Christ is proposed as evil by erroneous reason, the will is related to this belief as evil, not because the belief is evil in itself, but because it is evil as apprehended here and now by reason. Briefly, the argument runs thus: That man sins who wills sin and is attached to it. But he who acts against his conscience, even if it be erroneous, wills sin, because he wills a thing which he judges to be a sin.
Objections Analyzed
Reason that errs does not come from the eternal law, and therefore is not binding. Answer: Reason that errs comes from the eternal law, not by objective truth, but by subjective judgment, and is, even though erroneous, still binding.
The precept of reason in error is against a higher law. Answer: Is against a higher law, and this opposition is known, I deny; this opposition is not known, I grant.
A man can believe invincibly that to love God above all things is a sin. Answer: This statement we simply deny. A man who knows that love for God means inclination toward God cannot simultaneously think that such love is against God.
Corollary. One who thinks, erroneously, that the day is a day of fast, and still acts against his conscience, sins formally, because he scorns a precept which he thinks to exist. One who thinks that Christianity is not revealed by God cannot legitimately believe, because he has no sufficient credibility and his act would be against prudence. But if he thinks that the divine origin of Christianity is seriously probable, he is bound to inquire and to pray.
THE WILL IN HARMONY WITH ERRONEOUS REASON IS GOOD
First conclusion. The will, if it agrees with invincibly erroneous reason is good. Proof. Good and evil are in an act as they are willed. But under invincible error, evil is not willed as evil, but is willed as good. Conscience, invincibly in error, while it is speculatively false, is practically true. The sin in this case is not formal, but only material.
Corollary. A man who, under invincible error, thinks it his duty to tell a lie (e.g., to save his friend), would commit sin by refusing to lie.
Second conclusion. We are not allowed to follow a conscience that is vincibly erroneous. Proof. Good and evil depend on voluntariness, But vincible error does not make the evil involuntary, because the man exposes himself to the peril of sin. He must put away his erroneous conscience, by prayer, deliberation, and counsel. If he must act, let him choose the less probably evil.
Doubt. In what sense is it true to say that we must revere every man’s conscience? Answer: From the truth that conscience is always binding it does not follow that we can follow conscience if its error can be cured. Rather, we must reform and correct that conscience. Otherwise we fall into liberalism, that is, into denial of divine law. This denial, at least implicitly, speaks thus: “Whether God speaks in the Gospel, whether Catholic doctrine is revealed or not, is of little importance; I intend to enjoy my liberty.” Such a position gives to error the rights that belong to truth alone, to erroneous sects the rights that belong to revelation alone. The pretext of intellectual liberty minimizes, even destroys, the supremacy of truth. Under the pretext of charity we leave the field to unbelievers who themselves fight against the faith. People begin to say that no religion can sufficiently manifest its own divine origin. Man feels that he is excused from sin when he says: “I do not believe” or “I cannot believe,” * Liberty or error has become liberty of perdition.
CONSCIENCE ON THE PART OF THE SUBJECT
On Certain Conscience
First conclusion. We are never allowed to act with a conscience that is practically doubtful, or probable, or even prac-
tically more probable. This is the common conclusion, even among probabilists.
Authority. Again St. Paul’s text: “What is not from faith (that is, from good conscience), is sin.” St. Augustine: ““To do a deed, uncertain whether it is a sin, is certainly a sin.” ® St. Alphonse: * “He who acts with a dubious conscience, commits a sin of the same species and gravity as the matter on which he doubts, because he who exposes himself to the danger of sin has already sinned: He who loves danger will perish therein.” $ We add that the sin is less grave than if he were certain.
Reason. 1. An act against prudence is sinful. But he who acts with a conscience practically dubious, or practically probable, or more probable, does not act prudently, for the act of prudence is always practically true and certain.
- He who acts thus exposes himself to the proximate danger of sinning formally. By doing what he reasonably suspects to be a sin, he virtually wills sin, just as a man who would take a drink, though very probably not poisoned, would imprudently expose himself to the danger of death.
Second conclusion. Indirect moral certitude suffices, if direct certitude is unattainable. Moral certitude differs from metaphysical and physical certitude. Metaphysical certitude excludes all possibility of error, Examples: Good is to be done, God is to be worshiped. Physical certitude excludes error in the physical order. Examples: I shall die, the sun will rise tomorrow. Moral certitude is based on human habits and dispositions. Example: I am certain that my friend, whom I know perfectly well, is not, here and now, telling me a lie.
But this moral certitude is twofold: speculative or practical. Speculative certitude means harmony with objective reality, as known by reliable testimony. Example: This man is a murderer, hence it is right and just that the judge inflict on this man the punishment of death.
ê De bapt. contra Donatistas, c.6, n.6. 7 Theol. mor., Bk. I, n.22. 8 Eccli. 3:27.
Practical certitude means harmony with right intention and due diligence. Example: Obedience to a man whom, mistakenly, we hold to be legitimately elected. This practical certitude can exist, with or without speculative certitude. If speculative certitude is absent, practical certitude, based on reflex principles, is always attainable. Example: In doubt whether a superior’s command is licit, the presumption stands for the superior.
This wider certitude may be called “probable certitude” if, following Aristotle and St. Thomas, we make “probable” the equivalent of “commonly admitted.”
Why does our thesis say that practical certitude, even if imperfect, is ordinarily sufficient? St. Thomas answers: “We must not seek for the same kind of certitude in all matters. The field of prudence is that of particular and contingent things.” ° Now in this field no certitude can silence all questioning. We add the restriction “ordinarily speaking,” because in certain cases the use of probability is not licit.
Footnotes
Chapter 19 of 29