Chapter XV. Other acts elicited by the will (q. 11-17) fruition (q. 11)

FRUITION is concerned with the end simply, whereas intention is concerned with ways and means. God enjoys Himself, but He does not intend Himself. Fruition, derived from “fruit,” from the tree’s perfection, is essentially delight in the end attained, a delight which presupposes the possession of the end by the apprehensive faculty. It is the act of the lover resting in possession of his desire. The animal’s enjoyment of its food is fruition, but an imperfect fruition. Complete fruition is concerned only with the last end; incomplete fruition is from an intermediate end, for instance, from a medicine which is tasty. In relation to the last end, we distinguish imperfect fruition, based on hope, from perfect fruition, arising from possession in reality.

Intention is the efficacious desire to employ the proper means for attaining the goal. Thus it is distinguished from simple volition, which is a mere complacency in the good without relation to ways and means. Inefficaciously, I can wish rain, but I cannot intend it. The natural desire for the beatific vision is an act of the will, but not an efficacious intention.

Intention can be concerned either with the last end or with an intermediate end. The right intention is called the eye of the soul: “If thine eye be simple, thy whole body will be lightsome.”? It is called the eye of the soul because it presupposes right knowledge of the last end. By right intention our works are lucid before God, by evil intention they become dark.

A doubt. St. Thomas says: “If we take two unrelated things, man can intend many ends.” Answer: At first view these words seem to say that man can intend two ultimate ends. But if so, then the will would have simultaneously two unrelated acts: an impossibility. Alvarez, with others, answers thus: “The will can simultaneously intend many things, provided they agree in some element which is willed primarily and per se.” Thus the will can desire two ends for the tongue, namely, speech and taste, because this organ serves both purposes. A medium may be intended because it is suitable for many ends,

ART. 4, 5. IS THE INTENTION OF THE END IDENTICAL WITH THE ACT OF THE WILL TOWARD THAT END?

Answer: If we will the medium solely on account of the end, then there is one act, namely, choice. But if we will separately, first the end and then the means, then there are two acts: intention of the end and choice of means. In article five we read that brutes intend materially the end, but tend executively to the thing which is the end, but not as end. Intention, therefore, belongs to animals, not formally, but executively.

Corollary. In order that choice be right and efficacious, and a fortiori that command shall be right and efficacious in dealing with means, there is prerequired a right and efficacious intention of the end. Hence prudence, which is obligated to reach a right and efficacious command, presupposes right appetite, that is, an intention which is right and efficacious.

THE ACT OF CHOICE (Q. 13)

Presupposed efficacious intention of the end, four acts are concerned with means: first, counsel, that is, consultation by the intellect on the means suitable for reaching the end; second, consent, which follows counsel, whereby these means are accepted as a unit; third, a discerning judgment in the intellect, which discovers the medium that is most apt; fourth, choice in the will, which accepts this medium. The act of choice, presupposing the judgment by which it is directed, is substantially an act of the will, because it deals with a good, and only the will aims at the good. But choice, properly speaking, deals only with means subject to deliberation. The physician does not deliberate on restoring health, but on the means suited to attain this end. Now man can deliberate on the ordination of his whole life toward his last end. “When man begins to have the use of reason, the first thing that occurs to him is to think of himself, to ordain himself to the right end.” ? In this case the object of deliberation and choice is not, properly speaking, the last end, but the ordination of our life to this end. Similarly, a man may choose virtue instead of vice, in relation to beatitude in common. Choice is concerned only with those things which are subject to us, or at least are subject to our appointment, as when we elect the superior of a community.

THE ACT OF COUNSEL (Q. 14)

1. Counsel is an inquisition of reason to prepare choice. Reason does not proffer its judgment without preceding investigation.

Doubt. Does counsel include intrinsically the act of judgment? There is a difficulty here in solving the doubt. St. Thomas,’ following Aristotle, says that ewbulia is a power that¹ counsels, but is distinguished from synesis which judges well in practical matters. Cajetan solves the difficulty thus: Human counsel includes inquisition and judgment, whereas divine counsel is a judgment without inquisition. According to the common way of speaking, the act of counsel remains incomplete unless followed by an act of judgment on the medium to be chosen. Counsel is a practical syllogism, and the practical judgment is the conclusion of this syllogism. When many suitable media appear, counsel may approve them in globo, before the ultimate, practical judgment determines which of the proposed media is the better: in this case there are two acts, and the qualities of counsel are distinct from the qualities of the ultimate judgment. Counsel, examining many different means, all of them apt, may consult many men: a king, for example, profits by a great diversity of competent ministers, in order to see all aspects of the affair, and all the motives pro and con. But out of this multitude of counsels the king himself pronounces the ultimate practical judgment. Counsel comes from many sources, whereas the ultimate judgment comes from one, the monarch.

A second doubt. Does every deliberate choice involve a practical judgment? The answer is affirmative.* Simple apprehension of good does not suffice. Without an affirmative judgment “this is to be done,” “this is to be refused,” choice would lack direction. Alvarez says that also the act of command belongs to all deliberate acts.

Even for the act of faith four judgments are prerequired: first, this statement is credible; second, men are bound to believe this statement; third, I am bound, here and now, to believe this statement; fourth, if I believe this statement, then I say “I believe.” “No one believes the mysteries of faith unless he sees that they are to be believed, either by the evidence of miracles or by some similar evidence.” 5

But do we not thus start an infinite process? No. “We regress to the first act of the will, which does not depend upon the command of reason, but comes from instinct of nature, or from something higher than nature, namely, God who inspires the act.” ¢

Art. 2. Counsel, like choice, deals, not with the end, but only with means. The end in practical matters is like principle in speculative matters. Counsel is a practical syllogism, which presupposes the intention of the end.

Art. 3. Counsel deals only with things subject to our control. It does not deal at all with things that are necessary and universal.

Art. 4. Counsel does not deal with everything we do, but only with matters of some importance. As regards matters of minor importance, the adage holds good: “Little is reputed as nothing.” Lack of order in little things is not always a venial sin; it can be a mere imperfection.

Art. 5. Counsel proceeds analytically. Analytical order begins with something that is prior in cognition but posterior in existence. Now the principle in counsel is the end, which, in intention, is prior to counsel, but posterior in existence.

The order of deliberation, then, descends from the end intended to the first medium, whereas the order of execution is just the inverse, It ascends from the lowest medium to ultimate attainment. In the order of execution, life is first, study and knowledge second. But, in the order of intention, philosophical contemplation, and, a fortiori, Christian contemplation, stand higher than material or economic life. For the sake of this higher life, public executive power preserves peace in the state.

Art. 6. Counsel cannot proceed to infinity. It begins with principles of practical reason, and terminates in practical conclusions. Neglect of this conclusion constitutes scrupulosity. Is this good deed done out of pride? Ah, but even asking myself this question may be owing to false humility!

A doubt. May we counsel a lesser evil in order to avoid a greater? On this matter we find two extreme opinions. Some say that the lesser evil in relation to the greater is really good. Others deny, for various reasons. The lesser evil, even if compared with the greater evil, is still an evil, hence cannot be chosen, but at best be tolerated. This reason seems to be apodictic, if we are dealing with acts that are intrinsically evil. St. Thomas, proving that a lie is always a sin, that we cannot licitly lie even to avoid a homicide, continues thus: “We are not allowed to do anything illicit to avoid danger or harm. We are not allowed to tell a lie in order to deliver another from peril. But we are allowed to hide the truth prudently.” 7 A minor physical evil may be counseled to avoid a greater evil. But he who counsels a lesser moral evil is the cause of that evil, and therefore sins.

Third opinion. This opinion is affirmative, but with many limitations. For this view, which Alvarez says is the more common Thomistic view, we note three considerations. First, Aristotle says that the lesser evil in comparison with a greater is really a good, supposing that we cannot avoid both evils and as long as we cannot avoid them. Secondly, the lesser evil shall not be intrinsically evil. In elections, for example, we cannot approve a program that is intrinsically evil in order to prevent one that is worse. Thirdly, the two evils must threaten one and the same“person. Thus, in Jeremias,’ ten men gave Ismael their treasures that he might not kill them. But Lot sinned, so St. Augustine says, when he counseled the men of Sodom to abuse his daughters in order to avoid the sin of sodomy. Still, when only a slight danger threatens a third person, we can counsel a lesser evil, at least a physical evil, in order to avoid a greater evil.

In summary, prudence must decide. In elections, for example, a person may commend a good candidate, so that men may not be tempted to choose between two evil candidates.

THE ACT OF CONSENT (Q. 15)

Here, briefly, are the four conclusions of St. Thomas. 1. Consent is an act of the appetitive power. 2. Consent, properly speaking, is not found in brute animals. 3. Consent, properly speaking, deals, not with the end, but with the means to the end, thus differing from intention. 4. Consent to the act belongs to the higher reason, because consent is the final sentence on what is to be done. As long as the proposal is still subject to judgment, we do not have the final sentence. Consent to the act belongs to the higher reason, which includes also the will. Thus consent to mortal sin always belongs to higher reason, at least indirectly or negatively or imputatively. The higher judge revokes the unjust sentence of the lower judge, otherwise the higher judge himself becomes guilty. Thus mortal sin is always aversion from the last end, which higher reason is bound to consider.’

We distinguish active use, which belongs to the will, from passive use, which belongs to the executive faculties. And we deal here directly with active use. Here, briefly, are the four articles of St. Thomas. 1. Active use properly belongs to the will, because the will moves other powers to their operations. Active use is an act, formally immanent and virtually transitive. g. This act, properly speaking, is not found in brutes, because brutes do not know purpose or utility as such. 3. Use is concerned with media, with the means useful to an end. We do not use the end, we enjoy it. The last end, indeed, is useless, properly speaking, because it is above utility, not below. Thus Aristotle says that metaphysics is useless, that is, it is above utility and is sought for its own sake, thus differing from the arts, especially the mechanical arts, But metaphysics uses logic, as theology uses sciences lower than itself.

The superior uses the inferior, but the inferior, properly speaking, does not use the superior. 4. Use differs from choice, and follows it. Choice belongs to the order of second intention, namely, deliberation, whereas active use belongs to the order of execution. In choice the will possesses the end affectively, but in active use it tends to the end effectively. Choice is concerned with the medium as future, whereas use deals with the same medium as present. Use, here and now, overcomes the difficulties bound in execution itself. Many men choose easily, but fail in carrying out their choice.

Further, we choose first those media that are nearer to the end, and then descend to the lower media. To attain health, I first choose a physician, and then tell a servant to call him, and so on. In the order of execution, on the contrary, I first call the servant. God predestines first to glory, but in the order of execution, glory comes last. Again, since the acts of the will are self-reflective, in each act we can distinguish consent, choice, and use: the will consents to choose, and consents to consent, and uses itself to consent and to choose, and these acts are all destined to that which is first. Again, the will uses reason to deliberate, and this use precedes choice. Then, deliberation ended, the will freely uses reason to direct choice, and thus the ultimate judgment is free.

Cajetan, commenting on this article, gives a division of the twelve acts which nearly coincides with what is commonly admitted. But he does not sufficiently notice that every act of the will is preceded by a correlative act of the intellect.

ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL (Q. 17)

The command here in question is not a political command, whereby a king or a superior commands his subjects, but that personal command whereby man governs himself and his powers, which we call self-government, self-control. The present question is perfectly ordered.

Art. 1. Some theologians, Suarez and Vasquez, for ex- ample, say that command is not a special act, since the preceding judgment directs choice. Thomists, and many others, say that command is a special act, belonging to the intellect, but presupposing an act of the will.

Three conclusions.

First. Acts of the will and acts of the reason interact on one another, in virtue of the axiom: Causes are mutual causes, though in diverse genera.

Second. Command is an act of reason, because order, arrangement, intimation belong to reason, and command is a kind of intimation. Command differs from the practical judgment, as the two following propositions differ: One says, “this is to be done,” for example, tomorrow; the other says, “do this, here and now.”

Third. Command presupposes an act of the will, because the first mover among the powers of the soul is the will itself. Now the command moves to execution, at least secondarily and participatively.

Suarez objects: No other act of the intellect is required but that of the practical judgment. Answer: Since nothing can be willed unless it is foreknown, a special act of the will presuppose a special act of the intellect. Hence active use, being a special act of the will, distinct from choice, presupposes a special act of the intellect, distinct from practical judgment.

Cajetan notes that the act of command includes three elements: to ordain, to intimate, to move. It ordains execution of media, here and now, not like choice, but in the inverse order, beginning with the lowest and ascending to the highest. Secondly, command intimates execution by saying, not indicatively “This must be done,” but imperatively, “Do this.” To intimate is to announce, to manifest, and this is an act belonging to the intellect. Thirdly, command moves toward execution. This act belongs, secondarily and participatively, to the intellect by reason of the preceding act of choice, the power of which remains in the subsequent act. Therefore command is a special act, an act of reason, which presupposes an act of the will. Thus St. Thomas says that prayer is, properly speaking, an act of the intellect, being a quasi-command of an inferior to a superior."

Corollary. The order of execution is clearly distinguished from the order of choice, because active use is distinguished from choice. Thus a new order begins. Suarez did not sufficiently notice this truth. The reason is that in the order of execution new difficulties arise, which demand not only a new effort of the will, but also a new ordination and intimation of the intellect. Many men judge well and choose well, but fail in execution, by reason of these new difficulties, many of which could not be foreseen, or, if foreseen, did not then move as they do now when they are present. Thus execution demands a new direction of reason, a direction distinct from the practical judgment, almost as existence is distinct from essence. The command “Do this,” here and now, deals with media as present, whereas the judgment, “This should be done,” deals with these same media as future.

Confirmation. Just as a prince or a superior must not only judge that something is to be done, but must also command it, so in our personal life, since nothing is willed unless foreknown, command is the ultimate intimating judgment.

Six Objections

1. Since we should not multiply realities without necessity, the practical judgment, if continued, suffices to direct the execution. Answer: The practical judgment would suffice if you disregard all ensuing difficulties.

2. But the preceding practical judgment, as distinct from speculative judgment, had already considered the media in their here and now. Answer: The practical judgment had already considered the media, as here and now desirable, I grant: as here and now to be carried out, I deny.

3. But even for execution thus understood, an act of the will suffices, that act, namely, which we call active use. An-

swer: To move toward execution belongs, properly and primarily, to the will, I grant: belongs to the will, secondarily and participatively, I deny.

4. Decree is the same as command, and decree belongs to the will. Thus even Thomists speak of the decrees of the divine will. We distinguish. Decree, in the wider sense, belongs to the will, yes; decree, in the proper sense, belongs to the will, no. Decree in the wider sense is identical with the choice of the will, and thus precedes execution.

5. St. Thomas himself writes as follows: “Let us consider the acts commanded by the will.” Answer: The will commands, in a wider sense, by moving, yes. A command, even taken strictly, does belong to the will, not substantially, but causatively and originally, because from the will it gets its power of moving. Thus law is an act of reason, but also an expression of the lawgiver’s will. Command, dominion, as intimating and directing, belongs to the intellect, but, as moving, it belongs to the will.

6. Charity commands all other virtues, and charity is in the will, Answer: Charity commands in the wider sense of the word, that is, it moves just as the will does. But when it commands in the proper sense, it does so by a mediating act of the intellect, i.e., of faith or of infused prudence. The intellect differentiates the act of the will, but exercises its act under the influence of the will.

Art. 2. Command does not belong to the brute order, because only reason can ordain and arrange.

Art. 3. Command precedes use, which it directs. But the acts, both of reason and of will, are self-reflective.

Art. 4. The command and the act commanded constitute one human moral act, just as two physical acts make one moral act, by being mutually related, as are matter and form, or body and soul. Thus we explain the unity of the mystical body, expressed by St. Paul when he says; “I live, yet not I, but Christ lives in me.” This unity is more than a unity secundum quid. Christ and His living members constitute one reality, not in the physical order, but in the moral order.

Art. 5-9. What acts are subject to command? These acts are divided into four classes: acts of the will, of reason, of sense-appetite, of the body.

1. Acts of the will: in a wide sense, consent and choice are commanded; in the proper sense, active use is commanded.

2. Acts of the reason: first, as regards exercise: sudden thoughts, continued or not; and deliberate study. Then, as regards specification, we have opinion, the act of faith, the last practical judgment.

3. Acts of the sense-appetite: acts which depend on reason’s power over the imagination, but not acts arising from indisposed organs, or from unforeseen acts of the imagination.

4. External acts, depending, not on the vegetative powers, but on the sense-powers, e.g., acts of our hands and feet. Acts of the vegetative soul are not subject to the command of reason, because they are not mediated by knowledge, and depend on dispositions of the body which are not in our power. This synopsis is explained in the following articles.

Art. 5. Acts of the will can be commanded, with the exception of the first volition wherein man does not move himself but is moved by God. But this act is not deliberate, though surely it can be free. Intention and choice are commanded in a wider sense, because they are preceded by a command in the strict sense. Active use follows this command. Per accidens, however, choice itself can be commanded, when a man who is slow in choosing finally says to himself: “You must choose, now choose.”

Art. 6. Acts of reason can be commanded in three different ways.

1. Thoughts that arise unforeseen come under the command of reason, to be admitted or refused or continued or interrupted. Thus it is with the first thought of all moral life, to which God moves us immediately. Thus also with many divine inspirations; thus also with evil thoughts, arising from temptation, by means of the imagination.

2. Certain acts of reason can be commanded only as regards exercise. But evident truths necessitate assent. Thus it is with principles and demonstrated conclusions. But adherence is free when we are dealing with opinions or with inevident postulates.

3. Certain acts of reason are commanded even as regards objective specification. Thus it is with opinion, and the act of faith, and the ultimate practical judgment.

Art. 7. Some acts of the sense-appetite can be commanded, but not those acts which necessarily arise from dispositions of the body, from too great heat, or from illness, or from unforeseen motions of concupiscence. On the contrary, those acts are subject to our command which arise from the imagination, for the imagination can be ruled by reason.

Here we pause to notice more clearly the doctrine of St. Thomas concerning the first motions of sensuality. He speaks as follows: “It happens at times that the motions of the senseappetite are suddenly aroused by imagination or sense. Such motions are not under the command of reason, but could have been impeded if reason had foreseen them.” Now since human reason, even when diligent, cannot foresee everything, the first motions of sensuality are not always sinful. “Reason’s control of the passions is not despotic but diplomatic.” “Imagination, the stronger it is, the more it is subject to reason. But when the imagination is weak, by reason of indisposition of its organ, it may fail in forming appropriate images.”

Art. 8. The acts of the vegetative soul and of the correlative organs are not subject to the command of reason. We cannot command nutrition, or growth, or the movement of the heart, or the natural alterations of the organs of generation. In the state of innocence, by a supernatural privilege, concupiscence was perfectly subject to reason, but original sin left nature to itself.

Art. 9. The acts of the external members (hands, feet, head), since they are controlled by the sense-powers, just as in brutes, are subject to command, by reason of their dependence on the imagination, which can be controlled by reason.

Corollary. Man’s dominion over himself and over his acts justifies the statement quoted by St. Thomas from Boethius. “Those levels of creation which are nearest to the First Mind transcend the order of fate. The farther away creation is from the First Mind, the more is it bound by the ropes of fate, by the necessity arising from second causes.” **

The wise man rules the stars.** Contemplation, elevating the mind to God, frees the soul from the fatality of the laws of nature. Here lies the progressive perfectibility of the human personality.

THIRD PART

MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTS

Footnotes

1. Ia-IIae, q.89, a.6. 3 Ia-Ilae, q.56, a.6; Ia-IIae, q.51, a.1 and 2. ↩