Chapter VI. Man’s objective beatitude prologue
THE first five questions in this part of the Summa are concerned with the following:
primarily, with man’s formal, subjective well-being;
with the object wherein this well-being can be found;
with the activity, the beatific vision, whereby God is possessed;
with the characteristics of the act whereby we possess God; 5. with the attainment of this possession, its possibility, and its degrees.
THE PRESENT QUESTION
These eight articles are condemned with four possibly beatifying objects:
a) with external goods, the goods of fortune, namely, riches (art. 1); honors (art. 3); fame and glory (art. 3); power over men (art. 4);
b) with bodily goods (art. 5) and sense-delights (art. 6);
c) with soul-goods, virtue, and knowledge (art. 7);
d) with any created good whatsoever (art. 8).
DIVISION OF GOODNESS
- The good, as identified with reality, is divided into the ten categories of reality (substance, quality, etc.). 2. The good, as good, has three divisions, based on: 64 a) its perfection, by reason of which good is either fully good, or only in a certain sense (wine, deficient, but still wine);
b) its desirability, by reason of which good is good in itself, or good as giving mere pleasure, or, finally, good as the road to higher good;
c) its standard (right reason), by reason of which good is either moral or immoral or indifferent. Moral good, identified with good in itself, is found in man on three levels: in man as substance (the good of self-preservation); in man as animal (the good of begetting and educating children); in man as endowed with reason (the good of justice toward God and men).
The good-in-itself, even though it were not delightful or useful, is man’s proximate standard and first duty, simply because man is endowed with reason.
ART. 1, 2, 3, 4. CAN EXTERNAL GOODS BE MAN'S BEATIFYING OBJECT?
A. The reply of revelation is clear: “Blessed are the poor in spirit, those who mourn, . . . those who suffer persecution.” “What doth it profit a fool to have riches, since he cannot buy wisdom?” ?
B. Reason itself sees this truth. If ““blessedness means that perfect good which totally satiates man’s longings,” then, for three reasons, external goods are not the beatifying object.
Goods found in bad men cannot be the beatifying object. But external goods are possessed, not only by good men, but also by bad men.
Goods that are incomplete are not the beatifying object. But external goods are incomplete (they do not, e.g., include health and wisdom).
Goods that, while useful, are insecure and transitory cannot be the beatifying object. But external goods, while useful, are insecure and transitory.
This last argument condemns utilitarianism, which sets up usefulness as the supreme standard of morality and happiness.
Looking at particular external goods, we argue thus:
The external goods of fortune are more gloriously lost than retained. The Apostle looks on temporal goods as manure, which, heaped up, stinks, but when scattered on the field, is transformed into bountiful harvests. This holds good, not only of riches, but also of honors, dignities, and power over men. How many popes, writes Gonet, died soon after their supreme elevation. Thus pass all the glories of the world. We add a particularized proof for the first four articles.
- Wealth cannot be the beatifying object. Wealth, money, the reward of human art and industry, is intended to serve natural wealth: food, drink, clothing, shelter. These in turn, as means of self-preservation, are subordinated to man, inferior to man. Gold, in contrast to wisdom, is but a small heap of sand. Fools think otherwise. But human standards should not be set up by fools.
Further, wealth, however great, longs for ever greater wealth. Its insufficiency is best known by its owner. But the beatifying object, the more it is possessed, the more it is loved and appreciated.
- Honors cannot be the beatifying object. Honor, to be genuine, presupposes virtue. In contrast to the ambitious man, the magnanimous man aims, not at honor, but at honorable deeds, which he esteems much more than the honor which may or may not follow. “If you would be first, become a servant.” Humble yourself, if you would be exalted.
3- Human glory is not the beatifying object. Glory rests on human knowledge, often defective. Again, true glory does not cause, rather it presupposes, that excellence which is the source of blessedness. The canonized glory of the saint presupposes the saint’s beatitude.
Divine glory, by contrast, God’s approving knowledge, is the cause of the saint’s beatitude. “I will deliver him, glorify him, show him that I am his savior.”1 To St. Thomas, still on
° earth, Christ spoke the glorifying words: “Thou hast written well of Me.” Genuinely glorious is he whom God commends.
- Power over others is not the beatifying object. Rulers often misuse their power. Power is attended by cares and fears. Power is exercised over others, and is therefore a transitive thing, which presupposes an excellence immanent in the ruler who is to lead others to beatitude. The genuine “superman” is the supernatural man, who rules in superhuman fashion, as instrument of the Holy Spirit. Only he who serves God can rule men. Blessed are the meek, the humble, the obedient. “Blessed those who rule others:” Christ never said that.
Summary: External goods, the goods of fortune, may serve as instruments in attaining beatitude, but can never be the beatifying object.
ART. 5. BODILY EXCELLENCE IS NOT THE BEATIFYING OBJECT
Materialists, who hold that man’s death is the end of his existence, must find the beatifying object in man’s bodily excellence. Against them we argue as follows:
A. Common sense sees that man, in some real way, surpasses the animal world. But in bodily excellences man often yields to beasts: to the elephant, in duration; to the lion, in strength.
Our opponents insist that in brain power, the chief bodily excellence, man transcends all beasts. Here enters the twofold argument of the present corpus.
B. 1. The primary purpose of the ship is the ship’s destination, not the ship’s preservation. The example illustrates a principle: Destination is more important than self-preservation. Nothing less than the supreme good, which man does not have but only desires, can be the beatifying object. Man, who is limited in so many ways, cannot be the supreme good. Hence his bodily excellences (health, strength, speed, skill) cannot be the beatifying object.
- Man’s soul is more important than his body, since on his immortal and subsistent soul depends the existence of his body. Even if, therefore, self-preservation were the beatifying object, bodily excellence could not be that object.
Difficulties Analyzed
As external goods are subordinated to the body, so is the body subordinated to the soul.
Existence is higher than life, yes, if you are talking of God’s unreceived existence. But no, if you are talking of that received existence, shared in even by the stone,
Not self-preservation, but assimilation to the Creator, is the creature’s ultimate purpose.
ART. 6, PLEASURE IS NOT THE BEATIFYING OBJECT
The word “pleasure,” which means primarily sense-pleasure, includes in its wider meaning also intellectual pleasure, poetic and philosophical pleasure. Pleasure, says Aristotle, is the natural consequence of any operation perfect in its kind.
Initial Difficulties
Pleasure, since it is sought for its own sake, must be the beatifying object.
Pleasure, since it makes man scorn all other goods, must be the beatifying object.
Pleasure, since it is the goal of all men, whether wise or foolish, must be the beatifying object.
These objections stem from the hedonists, especially Epicurus.
The Response
A. Boethius * and Plato * are our authorities. The supreme good, says Plato, cannot be found in pleasure, because pleasure can be evil.
B. We have two proofs.2
Pleasure, since it presupposes the possession of good, is indeed a characteristic of beatitude, but cannot be the essence of beatitude. Pleasure arises from some possession, present (in re) or future (in spe) or past (in memoria). Just as, to quote Aristotle, beauty does not constitute youthful vitality, but is a consequence which manifests that vitality, so likewise is pleasure the consequence and expression of successful activity.
Much less can corporeal pleasure be the beatifying object. Man’s soul, transcending matter, rises above all sensetransmitted pleasure, to the pleasures attained by man’s intellect in the possession of universal truth, and by man’s will in the possession of the universal good. “All irrational beings taken together, the firmament, the stars, the earth and all its kingdoms, are of less value than the lowest of spirits, since the spirit knows that entire irrational world, and also knows itself, whereas the corporeal world knows nothing at all.” §
Difficulties Analyzed
Is pleasure aimed at for its own sake? As an inseparable consequence of the good possessed, yes. As direct and formal motive of activity, no. Eating, to illustrate, by aiming at corporeal preservation, results in the pleasure which manifests the good act performed. Thus, if we distinguish the joys of heaven from the possession of God, of which those joys are the inseparable consequences, we see how the saints love themselves as a consequence of the love they have for God.
Is corporeal pleasure the chief motive of human appetite? If chief motive means, “motive the most easily perceived,” yes. If it means, “motive in itself most noble and effective,” no.
Is pleasure the most universal motive? As an inseparable consequence of aiming at the good, yes. As something to which good itself is subordinated, no.
The greatest pleasure, then, the highest joy, results from the possession of the supreme good. But this highest joy must be
5 Pascal, Pensées.
distinguished, both from the supreme good (the beatifying object), and from the possession of that object (by the beatific vision).
ART. 7. IS VIRTUE THE BEATIFYING OBJECT?
Preliminaries
The controversy here is with the Stoics, ancient and modern. Rational activity, life according to man’s nature, was the watchword of the ancient Stoics. Permanent fortitude of will results in harmony with all men. “Man sacred to man” condemns slavery. Harmony with all men leads to harmony with the whole universe, since divine reason (here pantheism enters) is the soul of the universe.
The wise man, then, the Stoic philosopher, transcends the limits of family, city, and country, and becomes a cosmopolitan, a citizen of the universe, subject only to fate, which leads him who is willing, and drags him who is unwilling. Passion, the Stoic says, since it is the enemy of virtue, must be destroyed, by patience and abstinence. Says Epictetus: Sustain and abstain. Be a man, strong against passion and pleasure, tranquil in fortune and misfortune. Pleasure and pain are meaningless. Virtue is its own reward.
This ancient Stoic school was indeed a school of courage and constancy, but it was likewise a school of pride. Further, it denied free will by its pantheism, its universal determinism, which ended in fatalism. As an ethical system, although it seemed to be superhuman, it was in truth inhuman, indifferent when faced with human joy and pain.
Echoes of this ancient Stoicism are still heard in later times. Spinoza’s system, though he ascends to contemplation of divine good, is still pantheistic, since he looks on man’s intelligence as a mode of divine thought; Spinoza’s system, like ancient Stoicism, denies free will and merit.
Stoic elements remain also in Kant’s ethical system, wherein man’s rational dignity is the supreme motive of man’s activity. Thus this system leads to “anthropolatry,’”’ to the worship of man, just as the altruism of Comte leads to “sociolatry,” to the worship of society.
What are the arguments which seem to show that virtue is the beatifying object? Three such arguments are noted by St. Thomas:
The beatifying object, since it can be neither external good nor bodily excellence, must be an intrinsic good in man’s soul.
Since we love a person more than the gift we give him, and therefore love our own person more than we love all other goods, the beatifying object must be our own personal virtue and value.
Since beatitude means perfection, and perfection is something intrinsic in man’s soul, beatitude must consist in virtue.
Virtue, Soul-good, Cannot Be the Beatifying Object
A. Our authority is St. Augustine: Man, and all that is in man, must be loved for the sake of God, who is infinitely better than man, and from whom comes all good that man has.®
We have two conclusions, one concerned with the beatifying object, the other with subjective beatitude.
A. The soul itself, being a potentiality capable of receiving knowledge and virtue, cannot be its own actual and beatifying object.
Further, all soul-goods (knowledge, virtue), taken singly or collectively, are not a perfect and universal good, and cannot, therefore, be the beatifying object. In God alone, says Cajetan, is found unlimited and absolute good, whereas created goods are necessarily limited. Man’s nature, says St. Thomas, desires complete goodness, but the object which gives that complete goodness is not determined by nature. All soul-goods, says Koellin, are limited, and hence cannot satiate man’s desire. Just as the adequate object of the intellect, as Billuart says, is simply all truth, so the adequate object of the will is simply
all good, and God alone, since He precontains all created good, is simply and absolutely all good.
Inductively, too, we reach the same conclusion. Look at the values inherent in the soul (powers, habits, acts, all knowledge, scientific or artistic, all virtues, even the most heroic): each of these, being an accident, not only is a limited good, but has an ulterior purpose: powers and habits end in acts; intellectual acts end in truth, and ultimately in the supreme truth; voluntary acts end in goodness, and ultimately in the supreme and unlimited good, to which are subordinated all good in all souls, and all single virtues, all prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.
Against the ancient Stoics, then, and against our modern subjectivists, we must maintain that the virtues, all and singly, are subordinated to the supreme Good which is their ultimate goal. Virtue is the road to happiness, but the road is not the goal. Virtue aims at regulating, not at satiating, man’s appetites and desires. Beatitude is the reward of virtue, but virtue is not itself beatitude.
B. Beatitude, considered formally and subjectively, inheres in the soul. Since formal beatitude means to possess and enjoy supreme Good, and since man possesses this Good by his intellect and will, we must conclude that formal beatitude resides and inheres in man’s soul.
Here we must note, with Koellin: “Not human act as such, but act as possessing infinite Good, can satisfy man’s desires. Possession (the fints quo), and the object possessed or desired (finis qut) are not two separate goals, but rather two related aspects of one and the same goal.”
A Corollary
The Stoics, ancient and modern, put too much value on themselves, do not look high enough to see God, the supreme Good. Even in Nietzsche’s “superman” nothing is found to transcend man. The only genuine “superman” is the supernatural man, the saint, who lives, not for himself, but for God, who lives and acts for God, his friend supreme.
Difficulties Analyzed
Goods are external, bodily, and spiritual. This enumeration is incomplete unless it includes God, the supreme good.
When we give a gift to a friend, we love the friend as him to whom (finis cui), but we love the gift as what we give (finis qui). Thus, in friendship with God, by the virtue of charity, we wish to give God His own infinite goodness, and, secondarily, to give that same infinite goodness both to ourselves and to our neighbor.
Man’s perfection is something intrinsic in man. Yes, if you are talking about formal, subjective beatitude; no, if you are talking about the beatifying object.
ART. 8. NOTHING CREATED CAN BE THE BEATIFYING OBJECT
Initial Difficulties
Each lower level of creation finds its goal in the next higher level: vegetation in sense-activity, sense-activity (artistic imagination, say) in rational] activity. Hence man ought to find his goal in the next higher level of creation, i.e., in the angels.
Man, being but a part of the universe, should find his goal in that universe, since parts exist for the sake of the whole.
g. Man’s natural desire, since it is created and limited, cannot receive a good which is uncreated and unlimited.
Proof of the Thesis
A. The Lord is my portion forever.’ Patristic texts are numerous. Two sentences of St. Augustine are often quoted: “As the soul is the life of the body, so God is the life of man.” “Thou hast made us, O Lord, for Thyself, and restless is our heart till it rests in Thee.” § To the question of Christ addressed to St. Thomas: “What shall be thy reward,” the Saint replied: “Nothing but Thyself, O Lord.”
B. Nothing created can be the beatifying object, because nothing created can satiate man’s natural desire.
This argument rests on the principle that natural desires are never in vain. Man’s will aims at the universal good, just as man’s mind aims at universal truth. And universal good, good that totally satiates desire, cannot be found in any or all created and limited goods.
Here we must again note that the word “good” is not used as an abstract predicate, because the will aims at the good actually existing in the concrete object. Nor does the word “good” refer directly to God, who is the total plenitude of goodness. What the word does directly refer to is good as such, good unlimited, uncontracted. And the conclusion is that such unlimited good, existing as an actual and concrete object, is to be found in God and God alone.
We may add this reflection. Let us suppose all the limited goods of the universe to be multiplied to infinity. Such an infinity of finite goods, were it even an actual infinity, would never be an infinite good, just as an actually infinite number of irrational animals would never make one man, or as an infinite number of fools would never make one sage.
Here lies the source of that deep dissatisfaction and boredom which are the intolerable burden of worldly men. Only in God can the human heart find rest.
Difficulties Analyzed
The human will, like the angelic will, aims at that universal and unlimited good which is found in God alone. The intuitive vision of even the highest angel could never satiate man’s desire, because the angel is and remains a creature.
The universe in relation to its parts may be an intermediate goal, but never an ultimate goal. Thus, whereas the active life serves society, the contemplative life aims directly at glorifying God, the supreme good. Again, schism, a sin against ecclesiastical society, is not as great a sin as is infidelity, which is a sin against God.
Here enters a question: Does the human individual exist to serve society (communism), or does society exist to serve the individual (liberalism)?
Communism and liberalism are two extremes. Between and above these extremes runs the golden middle way. The individual, in temporal matters, serves society; but in eternal things he rises above civil society, since he is a fellow citizen of the saints, a member of the household of God. In defense of his country the citizen must be willing even to shed his blood. But civil authority, on the otherhand, while its proximate goal is the well-being of society, has as its ultimate goal that eternal life which is the end of all human activity. Man’s active life, then, his lower and external life, is subordinated to society. But man’s contemplative life, his higher and internal life, transcends civil life.
Here we note the distinction between “individual” and “person.” The animal is an individual, but not a person. Man is both an individual and a person. Man, as an individual, is subordinated to society, whereas society is subordinated to man asa person. Thus in the spiritual order (as person) man is bound to provide first for himself, whereas in the temporal order (as individual) man is praiseworthy when he is generous in providing for his neighbor. Again, virginity excels matrimony, because divine values surpass human values. And private spiritual good stands higher than common civil good.
Here too lies the reason why the secrets of man’s heart are not really parts of the universe, and hence cannot naturally be known.
- Man is incapable of receiving an uncreated and infinite good. Yes, we answer, if he is to receive it intrinsically, as an attribute of his inner self. But no, if he is to receive it as object, eternally distinct from himself. Thus, even in the natural order, we would know and love God as our beatifying object.
But is not man’s desire a limited and finite thing? Limited, yes, as a being, but still so insatiable that it cannot be satiated even with an actually infinite number of finite and limited values.
But, you may insist, subjective beatitude, being finite, should be satisfied with a beatifying object which is finite. Answer: Subjective beatitude, as an elicited act, is finite, yes, yet so that its object is not finite.
But then, you insist, man would have to possess infinite knowledge of God. This does not follow. Only God’s knowledge of Himself is infinite.
But then a lower saint would desire a higher knowledge of God. No. The lowest saint is fully satiated, just as the man with the least hunger is satiated, though he eats less than others.
But, lastly, the saint who possesses God still has other desires: glorification of his body, e.g., and the salvation of his relatives. Answer: He desires these things as consequence and extension of his possession of God, yes. In any other sense, no. All goods that man can desire pre-exist in God, in higher fashion than they exist in themselves.
Corollaries
Temporal goods are to be sought only as ways and means to spiritual values.
External goods, while looked upon by the Stoics as in no sense good, are good as instruments of higher goods.
Temporal goods are not the reward of virtue, and their loss is not primarily the punishment of sin.
God distributes temporal good and evil in such fashion as to promote virtue.
Temporal goods given to a sinner, though often in fact tending to evil, are intended to lead him back to God.
Spiritual goods are permanently satiative, but temporal goods are not.
Temporal goods attract in anticipation, but disgust when actually attained. Spiritual goods act inversely.
Spiritual goods do not taste well to those whose appetite is spoiled by sense-indulgence.
g. Spiritual goods, but not corporeal goods, remain full and entire when shared with others. Two men cannot simultaneously own one and the same house, or eat one and the same article of food. But two men can simultaneously possess wisdom, virtue, and God. Matter divides, spirit unites.®
APPENDIX
Plato and Aristotle on the Supreme Good
Plato. Plato sets up a stairway of beauty: from love of bodily beauty (sounds and colors) man rises to beauty of soul, because bodily beauty comes from the soul, which gives the body motion and life. Further, soul-beauty comes from noble deeds, noble deeds from elevated doctrines and precepts, and elevated doctrines depend on the highest branch of knowledge, which has as object self-subsistent beauty and good. What felicity it would be, he cries out, what a blessed vision would be his, who beholds beauty itself, beauty pure, perfect, and simple, uncontaminated by human flesh, by colors, by all mortal trifles, a beauty uniformly permanent and divine! Would not sucha man be truly virtuous, truly a friend of God, truly an immortal among mortal men?
Thus Plato, following Socrates in condemning sophistic utilitarianism, holds that beatitude does not consist chiefly in sense-pleasure, though it includes higher pleasures. Further, he holds that God, the supreme good, is man’s beatifying object, to be attained by him who by virtuous life imitates God. And the supreme virtue, higher than temperance, fortitude, justice, prudence, is that wisdom which is chiefly occupied with the contemplation of the supreme good.
Further, Plato affirms the immortality of the soul, since even here on earth man’s mind knows unchangeable and universal truth. Good souls, after death, are rewarded by association with the gods, but wicked souls will be tortured. But will punish-
®On these corollaries, cf. Ia-Ilae, q.87, a.7, and Ila-Ilae, q.20, a.4, and Ia, q. 28, 2.4. 10 Convivium, chap. 29.
ment be eternal? Here Plato speaks uncertainly, basing his view on traditional myths. Thus he speaks of souls which, though evil, can still be cured, and hence return to a new body for a new trial (metempsychosis, transmigration of souls). But, although at times he speaks plainly both of eternal punishment and eternal reward, he elsewhere seems to say that all souls will ultimately attain beatitude.
To understand Plato, while we acknowledge his genius, we must recall two errors: first, his absolute and exaggerated realism which leads to pantheism: secondly, his exaggerated dualism, which, while favoring the immortality of the soul, still looks on the body, not as the soul's substantial instrument, but rather as a burden and hindrance. Yet, notwithstanding these aberrations, Plato definitely finds man’s beatifying object in God, the Author of nature, known, not abstractly, but concretely and intuitively. Further, although he does not speak of the eternal law as the supreme law of morality, his philosophy does lead naturally to God as the supreme moral norm, since God formed the universe and all its laws.
Aristotle. How does man reach that beatitude which his nature desires? Not by pleasure or by riches or by power or even by virtue, but, as Plato said, by contemplating God. Dispositions for this contemplation are the moral virtues, and secondarily, bodily health and sufficiency of external goods. Contemplation is beatitude, because it is the highest act of man’s highest faculty, exercised on the highest of objects, namely, the supreme good. Contemplation is characterized by its permanency, its delightfulness, its self-sufficiency, its supremacy. The contemplative life is full human life, almost a superhuman and divine life, because man’s mind is something divine, even while man is mortal. Let man live by what is best in his soul, his intellect, by which he is man. Soul-life, mindlife, is of all lives the best and most delightful. Little at best is man’s knowledge of higher beings, but that little is more lovely and desirable than all man can know of lower beings.
These affirmations, as being in harmony with truth, become, in St. Thomas, the natural foundation of supernatural morality.
But Aristotle speaks only of beatitude in the present life. On the future life he is silent. Since the soul is the form of the body, how can the separated soul think, since it cannot employ as instruments the sense-powers which reside in the body? Nor does he speak explicitly of the supreme standard of morality, though he maintains that justice is something objective, based on nature. Nor did he reach an explicit knowledge of creation.
DESIRE FOR HAPPINESS AS PROOF OF GOD’S EXISTENCE
Preliminaries
This proof is virtually identified with St. Thomas’ fourth way, which shows the necessary dependence of imperfect goods on an actual infinite Good, which makes them one in goodness. St. Thomas, like Plato, rises from multitude to unity, from composition to simplicity, from received good to the Good unreceived,
From the viewpoint of morality, we present this argument as follows: Since natural desire can never be in vain, and since all men naturally desire beatitude, there must exist an objective being that is infinitely perfect, a being that man can possess, love, and enjoy.
This argument * rests first, on inductive evidence, secondly, on metaphysical evidence. Inductively, we take examples: the natural desire of life for air, of self-preservation for food, of the ox for grass, of the lion for meat. We quote illustrations from the words of Christ: the birds of heaven, fed by the heavenly Father, the foxes who have their burrows. We quote the Psalms and Job: The swallow finds a house, the dove a nest, the young crows find food. To all these illustrations, the cynic, pointing to individual cases of starvation, fails to see
12 Father Gredt’s formulations of this argument (Elementa, Vol. II) are not quite correct and precise.
that exceptions prove the law, that the natural desire of living things for life is not a desire that is idle and in vain, but a desire that is fulfilled in the endless propagation of the race.
But do all men naturally desire beatitude? Again, induction says yes. Neither sensual pleasure nor riches, nor honor nor power nor science nor even friendship can satisfy man’s natural desire, which remains unsatiated until its rests in the supreme good. All else is “vanity of vanities” and affliction of spirit.
Metaphysically considered, our two propositions are likewise evident. A natural desire cannot be in vain, because nature tends to an object that is real, not merely imaginary. If any action could be without some natural purpose, it could not exist at all, since everything that exists has a sufficient reason for its existence. This truth is particularly true in relative beings, like desire or sight or hearing, since their whole nature is a tendency to something else which is their object. ‘Thus the human will’s natural tendency cannot be idle and in vain.
Again. Good exists in actually existing objects. Hence, since man’s desire tends to good as such, to a boundless and unlimited good, this infinite good really exists.
Clarifications
This argument rests, not on man’s natural desire to see God face to face, but on man’s desire for natural happiness, a desire which is innate, identified with the will itself, a desire which is quasi-infinite, insatiable by any finite good. Seen thus, this argument is an apodictic proof of God’s existence. “One sigh of man’s soul for perfect happiness is a supergeometric demonstration of the existence of God.” Supergeometric, we say, because it is metaphysical, based on principles on which depend mathematical principles. Metaphysical, yet simple, since Christ’s word, that “the clean of heart will see God,” holds good proportionally also in the natural order.
Is our argument identical with that of Blondel and others, who try to prove God’s existence from man’s immanent desire for God? Superficially, yes, in reality, no. These philosophers, since in various degrees they follow Kant in doubting the validity of speculative reason, affirm in its stead the primacy of practical reason, which, objectively insufficient, is nevertheless a subjectively sufficient basis for moral life. This conclusion, they add, is then confirmed by moral life itself, which finds experimentally that God satiates man’s aspirations.
But, we must ask, if in the order of thought you mistrust even the principle of contradiction, what assurance can you have in the order of action? If your speculative mind is fallible, how can your will, which follows your mind, be sure and infallible?
To summarize. The existence of God is proved by man’s natural desire for an actually existing supreme good. God, known as the Author of nature, is the presupposition of man’s knowledge of God as the Author of grace.*
18 God as being, as reality, is infinitely simple. But God as intelligible ob- ject is seen in one way by reason, in another way by faith, and in a third way by the beatific vision.
Footnotes
Chapter 6 of 29