Chapter III. Ethical systems

BEFORE we study the articles of St. Thomas on the final goal, we think it well to classify the various systems of natural ethics. Such classification will serve to emphasize the importance and the timeliness of the saint’s teaching. A. Ethics without sanction, without obligation. 1. Hedonism, founded on pleasurable good (Aristippus, Fourier). 2. Utilitarianism. a) Individual utilitarianism (Epicurus, Hobbes, Bentham). b) Social utilitarianism (Comte, Durkheim, Levy- Bruhl). 3- Good-for-its-own-sake (Stoics, Spinoza). B. Ethics, with sanction and obligation. 1. Obligation arising: a) from the human will, autonomous, by categorical imperative (Kant). ` b) from the divine will, which freely decrees the precepts of the Decalogue (Scotus), and all precepts (Occam, fideists, theological positivists), C. From good-in-itself, according to right reason, human and divine.

REFLECTIONS ON THESE SYSTEMS

These systems, one excepted, are false: false, rather in what they deny than in what they affirm, since they single out some elements of moral reality, and neglect others. Aristotle, on the contrary, and St. Thomas much more perfectly, embrace and 16

ETHICAL SYSTEMS 17 harmonize all aspects of morality. Hence the Thomistic ethical system is universal,* opposed to partial systems, as Catholic doctrine is opposed to heretical doctrine. Heresy, as its name implies, chooses one element of truth and rejects others.

Hedonism considers only the pleasurableness of good; utilitarianism, only its usefulness, unconcerned with what is by nature good (e.g., to tell the truth in the face of death). Kant does indeed admit obligation, but finds for the obligation no objective foundation, which can be found only in objective good, and ultimately only in the supreme good. Others (e.g., Spinoza), while they admit the dependence of our will on rational good, do so in a pantheistic fashion, with consequent denial of obligation and free will. The fideists (e.g., Occam) do admit moral obligation, but base this obligation, not on the immutability of nature, divine and human, but on contingent positive law, and thus reach theological positivism, which denies the immutability of natural law.

St. Thomas, on the contrary, admits all these aspects of moral reality, and harmonizes them. The good is delightful and useful, but is first of all good in itself. And thus, as good in itself, it is the object of our will, the will being a rational appetite implanted in man by the author of nature. And this good-in-itself, discovered by reason, is the proximate foundation of moral obligation. Further, since reason is right only by its conformity with divine reason, i.e., with the eternal law, the ultimate foundation of morality is God, who created and ordained men to know and love the supreme good.

Further, the Saint admits contingent positive law, even in the supernatural order. But he does not deny, rather he upholds, the necessity of natural law, whereby we are bound, not merely by necessity of precept, but also by necessity of means, to know and love God above all else, if we would attain eternal life.

1Some authors fear that the Church is becoming Thomistic! No, runs the answer, Catholicism is not Thomism, but Thomism is Catholic, because it is universal, not particularist. See P. H. Woroniechi, “La catholicité du Thomisme,” Revue Thomiste, October, 1921, pp. 323-29.

Elevated and universal, St. Thomas is also scientific. He proceeds from the four causes:

a) Material cause, the subject matter, is human activity.

b) Formal cause, the viewpoint is the morality of human acts, i.e., conformity to the supreme standard.

c) Efficient cause is twofold, directive and productive. The directive cause is itself twofold, one ultimate, i.e., the eternal law, one proximate, i.e., reason enlightened by faith. The productive cause also is twofold, one radical, i.e., nature elevated by grace, one proximate, i.e., virtue, infused and acquired.

d) Final cause, the ultimate goal, i.e., the supreme good, to be loved for its own sake, not merely for the delight or utility which follows the possession of that good. This supreme good is God, both in the order of nature and in the order of grace.

Let us now enumerate, in descending order, the sources of morality.

1. The eternal law, i.e., God . The natural law Revelation: divine positive law Human laws and customs Church law and doctrine Synderesis (conscience) Prudence (the golden middle way) . Choice (ruled by justice) . Regulated passions (fortitude and temperance) . Performance of moral act.

Of these ten sources of morality, naturalism denies the third and the fifth (revelation and Church doctrine). Positivism denies the second (natural law). Kant denies the ontological validity of the sixth (conscience, human reason).

Some intellectualists minimize the role of right will in forming a good conscience. This view shows the inadequacy of probability. St. Thomas shows clearly that moral and practical truth arises, not directly from conformity with reality, but

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ETHICAL SYSTEMS 19 from conformity with right appetite and will (in determining the golden mean, in regard to temperance, say, or bravery, or humility, or meekness). This view, which at first glance seems to be a concession to subjectivism or pragmatism, rests in fact on profound understanding of moral activity.

The ethical synthesis of St. Thomas, then, is not, like other systems, particularistic. It is universal, it is scientific. It is but the unfolding, the development, of common sense, of natural reason, which contains all elements of morality, but does not know how to systematize them. That is why the Church, ever more insistently, prefers the teaching of St. Thomas.

Let us now proceed to a brief delineation of the aforesaid systems, as contrasted with their refutation by him whom the Church calls the Common Doctor.