Chapter XIII. By what motives the will is moven (q. 9)
In THIS article, says Cajetan, St. Thomas considers, not only the objective motive of the will, but also the different causes of volition. Chief among these causes is the volitive faculty itself. This question has two parts. The first deals with intrinsic causes, namely, the intellect, the sense-appetite, the will itself. The second part deals with causes that are extrinsic, under three headings. Is the will moved by some exterior principle (object, God)? Is it moved by the heavenly bodies or atmospheric agents? Is it moved by God alone as exterior principle, or is it also moved by the angels or the demons? Throughout the present question two general theses are to be distinguished.
First. As regards the essence of its acts (the differentiating element), the will is moved directly by the intellect, indirectly by the sense-appetite and external corporeal agents.
Second. As regards the existence of its act (quoad exercititum), the will is moved only by itself and God, by no other cause. In the following question, these two general theses are particularized as follows:
The will is differentiated. This may be (a) necessarily, by three objects: by God seen clearly, by beatitude in common, by particular goods which precede deliberation (art. 1 and 2); (b) non-necessarily, by two objects: by partial good (not evidently connected with beatitude in common), by passion (art. 2).
The will is exercised. This may be (a) necessarily, by two objects: by God seen clearly, by beatitude in common (art. 4); (b) non-necessarily, by a partial good, not evidently connected with beatitude in common (art. 4).
ART. 1. IS THE WILL MOVED BY THE INTELLECT?
Preliminaries
It seems that the will cannot be moved by the intellect, because, first, we often know a good and still have no desire to attain it. Secondly, imagination often proposes an object without moving the appetite. Thirdly, we would have a vicious circle: if the will moves the intellect, then it cannot be moved by the intellect.
The response is affirmative. First, by authority.1 The object understood is an “unmoved mover” whereas the will is a “moved mover.” The will moves the other faculties to act, but itself is moved, as regards specific difference, by the good proposed by the intellect. In the body of the article we have three conclusions.
First conclusion. We must distinguish exercise of the act from specification of the act. St. Augustine, indeed, uses the term delectatio victrix, be that delight heavenly or carnal. The Saint seems to understand by this term the object which attracts rather than the efficient cause. But clearly we must make a distinction. By my color Į can objectively move the eye of another man, but I cannot move him, efficiently, to exercise his power of seeing. The teacher can move objectively the intellect of his pupil, but only God can move that intellect subjectively to exercise its act.
Proof of the conclusion. Anything that is in potentiality must be moved in order to be reduced to act. But the faculties of the soul are in a twofold potentiality: first, as regards exercise, namely, to act or not to act: secondly, as regards differentiation, namely, to do this or that. Consequently the faculties of the soul need to be moved under two aspects.1
First, subjectively toward exercise, secondly, objectively to specific differentiation.
Second conclusion. The will moves the intellect, and other powers, as regards exercise. When active powers are hierarchically ordered, that power which aims at the universal end moves to their exercise those powers which are directed to particular ends, just as the leader of an army moves soldiers subordinated to him. Now the will is directed toward good in common, whereas every other power is directed toward some special good, the eye, for instance, to perceive colors, the intellect to know the truth. Consequently the will must move to their exercise all powers of the soul, except the vegetative powers, which are not subject to our will.
This conclusion does not imply that the will is the principium quod, i.e., the acting man. But man, by his will, moves other faculties to their exercise.
Third conclusion. The intellect moves the will as regards the differentiating specification. Why? Because the intellect proposes the object to the will. Thus we have the adage, nothing willed unless pre-known. Specification in natural action, water getting hot, or cow begetting calf, comes from the specific form of the agent. But specification of an act of the will comes from the form of the object proposed to it by the intellect.
Objections Analyzed
If it be said that the intellect at times proposes a good and the will is not moved, we answer that the intellect moves, not to exercising the act, but as controlling specification, and even then not of necessity, if we are dealing with a particular good.
The intellect which moves the will is not the speculative intellect, but the practical, which proposes a certain good as here and now desirable.
3- The will moves the intellect, and is moved by the in- tellect, without any vicious circle, because the two movements are in different genera. The will moves the intellect to the existence of the act, because the truth to be known is a certain particular good. But the intellect moves the will to specification, because the good itself is a particular truth. This mutual relation of causality between will and intellect must be kept in mind when we prove free will, or show the mutual relation between choice and the last practical judgment. This mutual relationship solves also many objections of the voluntarists, who hold that intellect does not attain truth except under the influence of the will even as regards specification, What they say is true of prudential judgment, where truth means conformity with right appetite, even while speculative error remains in the intellect. It is true likewise of faith, since the object does not sufficiently move the will, and also of the quasi-experimental knowledge founded on the gift of wisdom. But it is not true of the speculative intellect, which deals with first principles, and with conclusions demonstrated from these principles.
Three Doubts
What kind of causality does the intellect exercise in moving the will as regards specification? The more probable opinion is that given by Capreolus, Ferrariensis, Bafiez, Gonet, and Billuart, namely, that the intellect exercises a causality which is final and extrinsically formal, but not efficient. The intellect, says St. Thomas,’ moves the will, not as an efficient cause, but as a final cause, by proposing to the will the object which is the goal. Cajetan indeed holds that the intellect moves the will also by a certain kind of efficient causality, since the known object concurs with the will to specify the volition, almost as the species impressa effectively concurs with the intellect to differentiate the act of the intellect. But, we must answer, this proposal of the object is2 effective only in an improper sense, since it is not an action, but only a disposition, required that this differentiated act be elicited by the will. To concur effectively in the proper sense, the object proposed by the intellect would have to be intrinsic in the intellect, just as is the species impressa.
Is the action whereby the will moves the other faculties formally transitive, or only virtually transitive? Active use is not an action formally transitive, for the act of the will does not pass out of the will. It does not pass into the senseappetite, e.g., so as to be terminated there, whereas the action of heating is terminatively in the wood that is heated. The act of the will (just as God’s creative action) is formally immanent and only virtually transitive. The effect it produces is called “passive use.”
Does the will move other faculties only by a certain sympathy, or does it imprint something real? Probably it does imprint something real,* since the inferior powers are compared to the will as instruments to a principal agent. Sympathy is not sufficient to move powers which resist, for instance, a distracted intellect or a disordered sense-appetite. Such a resistance is not overcome except by a real immutation. God moves our will by an action formally immanent but virtually transitive, but this transitive action produces something real in the creature, namely, the reduction of the power to act. The will is first an eliciting power, then by this imprint it actually elicits the operation.
ART. 2. IS THE WILL MOVED BY SENSE-APPETITE?
Preliminaries
It seems that the will cannot be moved by sense-appetite: first, because the higher cannot be moved by the lower; secondly, because a particular agent cannot move a universal agent; thirdly, we would have a vicious circle, because senseappetite is itself moved by the will.
Two Affirmative Conclusions
First conclusion. The object of the sense-appetite moves the will by the mediating judgment of the intellect. Proof. Any object understood by the intellect as good can differentiate the act of the will. Now when passion is aroused in the sense-appetite, the intellect apprehends as desirable an object which it would not so judge were passion absent. Therefore the sense-appetite moves the will by means of the intellect.
Here we may appeal to experience. In a fit of anger a man judges that revenge is a good thing, a judgment he would not pass if he were in a peaceful state. Similarly, the man who desires lust. As man is, so he chooses. Each one judges practically according to his predominant inclination. Contrast the man who has the virtue of temperance with the sinner who knows the law of temperance, but who, nevertheless, as ultimate practical judgment, says that intemperance is here and now good. Truth in the practical intellect is conformity with right appetite.* A fortiori this is true of the command that comes after the last practical judgment.
Objections Analyzed
The sense-appetite can move the will only by the mediating intellect. But it can attract the will, since the choice is concerned with a limited good.
Second conclusion. The will moves the sense-appetite by a control which is diplomatic, not despotic. St. Thomas * explains. The soul’s power over the body is despotic, because the members of the body (hand, foot) cannot resist the command of the soul. But reason’s control of the passions is diplomatic, because the sense-appetite is able to resist the command of reason, since, in man as in brute, it is moved by instinct, imagination, and sense. Thus we feel or imagine
4Ta-Ilae, q.57, a.5, ad gum. Cf. Cajetan, in Iam-—IIae, q.58, a.5. š Ia, q.81, a.3, ad gum. Cf. Ia—ITae, q.17, a.7.
something delightful which reason forbids, or something saddening which reason commands. Thus passion, not despotically, but only diplomatically, can be led to obey reason.
ART. 3. DOES THE WILL MOVE ITSELF?
Preliminaries
The response is affirmative, at least as regards some acts of the will. Two difficulties present themselves. 1. Since whatever is moved is moved by something else, we would, by allowing the will to move itself, destroy the first way for demonstrating the existence of a prime mover. 2. The will would be moved by two movers, each equal, namely, intellect and will itself.
Thesis
Particular acts. The proof is twofold. First, the will as free is the mistress of its own acts. Hence it has power either to will or not to will. Such power would be impossible if the will could not move itself. Secondly, the special nature of our will. Will, in the world of appetite, is like principle in the world of intelligence. The intellect, by knowing principle, reduces itself from potential to actual knowledge of conclusions, and thus moves itself. Hence the will, by willing the end, moves itself to will ways and means.
This self-motion toward choice, being a created act, does not, of course, exclude the causality of God, which is the first cause of all created acts, necessary or free.
Difficulties Analyzed
. Nothing moves itself. Yes, where only one act is in question. But the will, willing the end, moves itself to will the means.
- The will would thus be moved by two immediate motors. Yes, but in different orders. The will is moved by the intellect as to the kind of act it performs, but by itself to the exercise of that act.
Note that this article is of great importance in distinguishing mystical acts (where the will does not move itself, but is moved by operating grace) from ascetic acts (where the will moves itself, under cooperating grace).®
A difficulty remains regarding the first volition of the end. Does the will move itself to its first volition, when man comes to the use of reason, or again, to its first volition in any new undertaking, or to its first volition after sleep? The answer is that here the will cannot move itself, but is moved only by God, though the will elicits the act.
ART. 4. IS THE WILL MOVED BY ANY EXTERIOR PRINCIPLE?
Preliminaries
That the will is moved specifically by some exterior object is manifest. But we ask whether the will is moved by some exterior principle to exercise its act. The answer seems to be negative. First, it is the nature of the voluntary act to come from an intrinsic principle. Secondly, such an act seems to be forced, and violent volition is a contradiction. Thirdly, the will moves itself sufficiently, hence does not need to be moved by anything external to itself.
Thesis. To exercise its act, the will must be moved by an exterior mover, namely, by God. The argument runs as follows. That which is in potentiality to act needs to be premoved by something that is already in act. To choose means, the will moves itself, because it is already in act by willing the end. Now, in relation to the first volition of man’s whole life, an act which presupposes no anterior act of the will, the will is in potentiality. To this first volition, the will cannot move itself, but must be moved by the supreme motor, that is by God, the Author of nature and of will. This truth is affirmed also by Aristotle (or one of his disciples),’ and is confirmed by revelation which says: In God we live, and move, and are.’
Difficulties Analyzed
- Voluntary motion, like natural motion, must be from an intrinsic principle. From an intrinsic principle, as second cause, granted; as first cause, denied. The very first volition of our whole life comes from the will as second cause. But the will, which elicits this first volition, does not move itself to it. It moves itself when it proceeds from one act to another, when from the volition of the end it chooses the means.
The divine premotion does not reduce the will from potentiality to that act which is the operation itself. Premotion moves the will from potential eliciting to actual eliciting, just as wood becomes ignited, and then ignites other things. Three elements must be distinguished: first, the divine motion; second, the motion in the creature which is a passion; third, the operation vitally elicited.
The will, moved by some exterior principle, would be subject to violence. Yes, but only if it be against its own inclination. Under the motion of God the will itself acts.
The will is sufficiently moved by itself. To its first volition, no.
But, says the arguer, the first volition cannot be immediately from God, for this first volition presupposes intellectual cognition of the good, and this cognition presupposes the motion of the will which applies the intellect to consider and thus we have an infinite process. Answer: We need no infinite process. The intellect is simply first.? Knowledge always precedes volition, but volition does not always precede knowledge. The source of our first act of knowledge is an
intellective principle, higher than our own intellect; and this is God.
- The first volition that follows the use of reason is not only a vital act, but also an act that is free and meritorious, as is Clear in the case of Christ and the angels. Now to exercise a vital, free, and meritorious act, the will must not only elicit the act, but must also move itself to the act. Answer: This is required for a deliberate act, granted; for a free act, denied.
Explanation. This first volition, if it deals with beatitude in common, is free only as regards its exercise. If it deals with the ultimate end in the concrete, it is free also as regards specification. The act is free when the object is not proposed as absolutely good. Thus an object proposed by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost may precede the first deliberation. Then the will, already in volition to the common end, moves itself to deliberate, and this second act is not only free, but deliberate, with full dominion and full merit. Thus St. Thomas says that in their first instant of life angels could not sin, because their first act came immediately from God. Nor did that act have full dominion and full merit. But their second act was either sin, as in the demons, or fully meritorious, as in the angels. Further, acts performed under the gifts of the Holy Ghost, especially if they come after prayer disposing for them, are free and fully meritorious, although not discursively deliberate, since they come from a special inspiration. ,
The difficulty is urged. Man can sin in the first instant of the use of reason. Therefore in that instant man moves himself, otherwise sin would be traced to God as its author. The answer runs thus. Man can sin in the first physical instant of the use of reason, denied; in the first moral instant, granted. In his first use of reason man passes from a confused cognition of good in common to a distinct cognition of good-in-itself. Hence this knowledge is not acquired in one physical instant, but in one moral instant, that is, a certain length of time, shorter or longer, depending on the subject’s mental penetration. Hence that moral instant consists of many physical instants, at least two. In the first, wherein he is especially moved by God, man cannot sin. But in the following instant he can sin, because by his first act, elicited by God’s special motion, he can by his own counsel move himself as he pleases.
Two Doubts
- Does God move the will only in that first volition, or also in others? Answer: God moves to that first volition in a special manner. To all other volitions God moves at least as first and universal mover, since the will is always a second cause,
But God’s premotion is not an indifferent premotion. God moves in different fashions, according as man’s volitions are sins, or acts naturally good, or acts disposing for justification, or acts fully supernatural and meritorious. Again, in one fashion to the act of virtue, in another fashion to the act of the gifts, in still another fashion to acts which resist temptation. All these acts differ in goodness, and all good in all volitions comes from God, the supreme good.
God is not the cause of sin, but only of the physical entity underlying the sin. But God is the cause of all virtue, and of all acts which are in any way good. All that God wills He does. Nothing happens, either in heaven or on earth, unless God Himself does it in mercy (if it is good), or allows it to happen in justice (if it is a sin).
Molina * fell into error, by rejecting premotion and substituting for it a simultaneous concursus (two men drawing a ship). Those also are in error who admit only a premotion indifferent to good or to evil. From this would follow the proposition which Molina thought he had found in a genuine work of St. Justin, namely, that our deeds, good or evil,
11 The work is apocryphal, from some Pelagian author. Thus the preface in Migne.
though they presuppose the general concursus of God, still come from our free will alone as their particular cause, and are not to be attributed to God.
God is the author of all that is good, even of merely natural good, which requires a greater natural aid than does the material act of sin. How much more is God the source of supernatural good! Without Me you can do nothing. We cannot even think anything as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God.* What hast thou that thou hast not received? **
Molina’s proposition is radically opposed to the definitions of the Council of Orange against the Pelagians and Semi- Pelagians. No one has of his own anything but lies and sin.” God does many good things in man which man does not do, but man does nothing that is good unless God grants him the doing.** Surely that which is most perfect in the created order, namely, man’s good use of grace, must come from God as its source. Contrast with this truth the following propositions. “With an aid that is equal in both cases, it can happen that one man called will be converted and another not. With a minor aid of grace one can rise, whereas another with even greater grace does not rise but remains obdurate.” 11 “Of two similarly called, one may accept the grace and the other refuse. In this case the act is said to be from liberty alone, not that he who accepts receives by his liberty alone, but that only from liberty does this distinction arise, not from the diversity of the divine aid which precedes.” 38
- Does God specially move man to the first volition of each day, or each new undertaking? In a new undertaking God sometimes moves in a special manner, so suddenly that the will does not move itself.
17 Concordia, s. v. Auxilium.
a) Now this takes place in three ways: First, in supernatural motions, where no supernatural act precedes, but rather a contrary disposition. Instances: an infidel moved toward faith, a sinner toward penance. Such effects are due solely to operating grace. But when our mind is moved, and then moves, the operation is due to cooperating grace. Sometimes, at the beginning of the day, after sleep, we are granted operating grace, and then at once also cooperating grace. But it is not always thus. A sinful thought of sin at the beginning of the day, concerned indeed with beatitude in common, may immediately afterwards entertain a sinful purpose.
b) Second, in natural motions God sometimes suddenly gives men an entirely new thought. This can happen at man’s first wakeful moment.
c) In many cases the will moves itself, from a preceding virtual intention to some new undertaking, without a special motion from God. An instance is the man who suddenly consents to a new sin at the first moral instant after sleep. Since sin cannot come from God’s special movement, it must come from the sinner’s will moving itself from some inordinate preceding act, which still remains, at least virtually.
ART. 5. IS THE WILL MOVED BY -THE CORPOREAL WORLD? Preliminaries
The question of fate.** This question today would be proposed probably as follows: Is the will affected by atmospheric agents, for instance, by hot winds? It would seem so, first, because our bodies are under the influence of atmospheric variations, the source of which is the diffusion of solar heat. Secondly, voluntary bodily motions cannot be traced back to prime physical agents, unless these agents affect also the will. Thirdly, it can be foreseen that under the influence of certain winds, suicides will increase.
Further, materialists say that the existence of free will is refuted by the principle of the conservation of energy, according to which the world’s total energy, potential and actual, remains always the same. Now if human liberty exercised an influence on our body, the quantity of energy would be increased. Similarly, the existence of a First Mover would augment the quantity of energy. Against these views stands the authority of Damascene,”® who says that the corporeal universe is not the cause of our actions.
First thesis: The corporeal world, as object, moves the will. The sense-world, and our own organs, are subject to our corporeal environment, in particular, to atmospheric variations. Under these variations, the passions of the senseappetite attract the will objectively.
Second thesis: The corporeal world cannot force the will to act. No corporeal agent can force the spiritual faculty, which is independent of corporeal organs. Even objectively, the imagination cannot move the intellect except through the mediation of the intellect agent. Sense-powers, since they act by corporeal organs, can be moved by atmospheric variations, which involve variations in the organs themselves.
Corollary
Fate can be admitted, if we define it as “the mediation of second causes toward effects foreseen by divine knowledge.” Hence all events subject to second causes are subject to fate. But deeds done immediately by God are not subject to fate. The more removed a created thing is from the first mind, the more deeply is it bound in the bonds of fate, more subject to the necessity of second causes.
Divine motion, then, far from enslaving, liberates the created will from the fatality of material causes. Molina’s scientia media, on the contrary, admits a determinism by circumstances, a determinism which comes, not from God on high, but from the lowest creatures.
Difficulties Analyzed
The multiform motions of our will are reduced to one uniform cause, namely, to God, but not to the corporeal universe.
Many men follow passion, which varies with atmospheric influence. Predictions based on this fact often come true. But the wise man “rules the stars,” by resisting passion.
In modern terms, this same difficulty runs thus: The physical energy of the universe is unchangeable. Answer: Physical energy produced by physical energy, yes. But experimental science cannot prove that the invisible influence of God, the First Mover, or that of our will, does not exist. Physicists acknowledge that it has never been proved that the world is a closed system, that is, separated from all invisible influences.
ART. 6. IS GOD THE ONLY EXTERIOR PRINCIPLE THAT MOVES THE WILL?
Preliminaries
It seems that God is not the only principle which moves the will. First, the human will can be moved by the angels. Secondly, our intellect can be illuminated by the angels. Thirdly, if the will were moved by God alone, it would never be moved to evil. But the response is affirmative. In the Sed conira we hear St. Paul: “It is God who works in us both to will and to do.” * St. Paul here excludes four false understandings. Namely, first, that man, by free will, can be saved without divine aid; second, that man is necessitated by fate or providence; third, the Pelagian error, that to will comes from us, but to do comes from God; fourth, that God does no good in us except in response to our merits, whereas elsewhere St. Paul tells us that salvation belongs, not to him who wills, or to him who runs, but to God who shows 21 Phil. 2:13.
mercy.” Similarly, Isaias: “Lord, Thou hast done all our works for us.” ? And the Psalm: “Strengthen, O Lord, that which Thou hast wrought in us.” #4 And Christ Himself: “Without Me you can do nothing.” “No one can come to Me unless the Father who sent Me, draw him.” 25
Thesis
The only exterior principle that moves the will is God alone. Since the motion of the will, like every natural motion, comes from within, it cannot be produced except by the will and the Author of the will. But God alone is the Author of the will. Hence only by God can the will be moved to exercise its act.
To explain. To produce an intrinsic motion in the will, there must be an immediate power over the will itself. But the only cause that has this immediate power is God. Why? Because God alone, being the immediate and universal Creator and Preserver, can change the creature which He creates and preserves. Examples are: first, transubstantiation; secondly, multiplying the loaves; thirdly, the vital operations of plant life; fourthly, resurrection of the dead.
Objection. But man, who is not the creator of the stone, can move the stone downwards, though this motion is natural and intrinsic in the stone. Answer: Either the motion is more rapid than it would be by the natural weight of the stone, or it is not more rapid. If it is more rapid, the movement is not natural for the stone. If it is not more rapid, then he who throws it only removes an impediment. Thus the principle stands clear: motion cannot be produced except by the proximate agent from which it proceeds, and from that agent’s Creator and Preserver.
But is God the only Author of the will? Yes. First, by nature, the will is a spiritual power of the rational soul. But
God alone is the Author of the spiritual soul, and therefore of the will, which is a characteristic of that soul. Secondly, the will being a universal agent, destined for a universal good, cannot be produced except by the most universal of agents, namely, God. Hence God alone can move the created will. Demons cannot change the will of man intrinsically, but only extrinsically, by persuasion, by influencing the imagination, or by exciting the humors of the body, and thus indirectly arousing passion.
Corollary
Only God scrutinizes the heart of man. The will of the rational creature belongs to God alone, hence things which depend upon the will alone are known only to God. ‘The secrets of the heart are not necessarily connected with the external course of the world or with the essence of the soul, since they are free. Properly speaking, they are not parts of the universe, and therefore cannot be known even by the angels, though the angels know all the parts of the universe.
Difficulties Analyzed
The angel is indeed higher than man, but not high enough to be the cause of our will. Hence the angel can move our will only objectively, by persuasion, not subjectively, by causing the act itself.
Likewise the angel can illumine our intellect objectively, by proposing an object in some higher and more universal way than a human teacher could, for instance, by manifesting to a soul some beautiful metaphysical synthesis. But the angel cannot intrinsically move our intellect. This belongs to God alone. But if the angel can move our will objectively, by persuasion, like a mother, how much more is it true of God?
The Third Response
This third response is famous in the history of theology. It is cited by Molinists to prove that St. Thomas never ad- mitted physical predetermination, but only a general concursus, or an indifferent premotion. This response contains three affirmations.
“As Universal Mover, God moves man’s will to universal good. Without this universal motion man cannot will anything.”
“By his own reason man determines himself to will this or that good, a good that is either real or apparent.”
“At times, in a special manner, God moves some men to choose definitely an object which is good, as is clear in those whom He moves by grace.”
Let us consider, first, the Molinistic interpretation of this text, secondly, the Thomistic interpretation. Many Molinists conclude thus: St. Thomas admits physical premotion only for that first act whereby the will wills good in common. After this first act, premotion would be indifferent, i.e., man, of himself alone, determines himself either to good or to evil. Otherwise, they say, human freedom would be destroyed. Into man’s salutary act, God enters, first objectively, by the moral attraction of grace, secondly subjectively, by a simultaneous concursus or by an indifferent premotion. These views presuppose, as we have said above, a gratuitous definition of free will. Nor can they stand unless we admit Molina’s theory regarding scientia media.
The Thomistic interpretation rests on three propositions.
As universal Mover, God moves the will of man to universal good, and without this universal motion man cannot do anything. In this proposition there is no difficulty. This motion is required for any act, good or bad. But even under this first proposition we reject simultaneous concursus (two horses drawing a boat), and we affirm a previous concursus, at least an indifferent concursus. God moves the will, whereas one horse does not move the other.
Man by reason determines himself to this or that good, real or apparent. But man does this as proximate agent, not as sole agent. God’s premotion antecedes man’s deed, and this premotion is not indifferent, otherwise God would not be in any higher way the author of virtue than He would be the author of vice.
To understand this Thomistic interpretation we must distinguish six different ways in which the will is moved by God. Three of these ways are in the natural order, and three in the supernatural order. In the natural order we have, first, God’s motion to good in common. Here a man cannot sin, but only elicits a vital act, as a desire of beatitude. Secondly, God moves the will to determine itself, either to a true good or to an apparent good. In this case the will moves itself and is capable of sin. Thirdly, God moves by a special inspiration, in moral, or poetical, or philosophical, or military undertakings.
In the supernatural order God moves the will, first, to turn itself toward its supernatural end. In this case the will does not move itself by virtue of a previous act, but disposes itself by operating grace and free consent. Secondly, God moves the will to exercise infused virtues. Here the will moves itself. Lastly, God moves the soul to exercise the gifts of the Holy Ghost. In this case the will does not move itself, but freely consents.
Under divine efficacious premotion to good, the will never sins, but (against the Jansenists) it can sin, if it wills to resist. Nor is there any obscurity in the present response after what has been said. The will is sufficient source of its own act, in its own order, namely, as proximate agent. Hence, when the will moves itself from intention of end to choice of means, it moves itself as a second cause, under the influence of the First Cause. God alone moves the will interiorly.
The will is not moved in the same way toward sin and toward the virtuous act. God is not the cause of sin, either directly or indirectly, though He is the cause of whatever physical entity there is in the sinful act. God is not the cause of the defects in an action which comes from a deficient second cause. To illustrate. The will causes the motion of man’s members, but not his stumbling or lameness. The lameness comes from the crooked leg. But in every state, natural or supernatural, man needs the divine aid to do good. And the divine aid in the man who does good differs from the aid given to the man who, by divine permission, commits sin.
The objection to which St. Thomas is replying runs thus: If God alone moved the will, the will would never be moved toward evil. He replies: The will is moved by God alone as exterior principle, but is moved by itself as intrinsic principle, sometimes to real good, sometimes to apparent good. Here lies the possibility of sin. But there can be no sin in that first act whereby the will is moved by God and not by itself, as, for instance, in the first instant in the life of an angel, or where the will first wills good-in-common.
- God sometimes, in a special manner, moves a soul to determinately will something good, “as when He moves by grace.” Now this proposition deals precisely with the special motion which is found, either in the beginning of moral life, or at the beginning of conversion, or in the superhuman response to the gifts of the Holy Ghost, where there is no deliberation. These are the effects of operating grace. But the effects of our will, when it both moves and is moved, are the effects of cooperating grace. But operating grace naturally leads to cooperating graces.
In summary, we say that the will cannot be determined by itself alone. First, because such determination requires some mediating act whereby the will moves and determines itself. And of that mediating act we would have to inquire by what more remote principle it is determined. Secondly, because the will as a power is indifferent and indetermined, and all determination depends on the supreme determination of the first agent, who is Pure Act. But with this motion of God presupposed, the will is the proper cause of its own act as individually mine or thine. But this same act, as entity, comes from the supreme entity, and as good from the supreme good. Thus the entire act is both from God and from the will, as from two causes, one of which is totally subordinated to the other, not from coordinated causes, illustrated by the two horses drawing the wagon.
The Molinistic view is based on a false definition of created liberty, a definition opposed to the principle of efficient and universal divine causality, and opposed likewise to the principle of divine predilection, namely, no created being can be better than another unless it is more loved by God.
Footnotes
Chapter 13 of 29