Lecture 22 — Intemperance Compared with Cowardice and the Sins of Children

Intemperance is more like the voluntary than fear is, because the former is motivated by pleasure and the latter by pain. One of these (pleasure) is to be chosen, while the other (pain) is to be avoided. [635]

Pain stupefies and corrupts the nature of its possessor, but pleasure does no such thing, and so is more voluntary. [637]

For this reason, intemperance is also more despicable; it is easy to become accustomed to the objects of temperance, for many occasions occur in a man’s life and the habits can be practiced without danger. With terrifying objects, however, the reverse is the case. [638]

There does not appear to be a likeness in voluntariety between fear itself and individual cases of it. Fear itself seems to be painless, but particular cases stupefy men by reason of pain, so that they throw away their arms and do other disgraceful actions. On this account, these things seem to be done under compulsion. [640]

In regard to intemperance, the order is reversed. Particulars are voluntary because they are in accord with what a man strives for and desires, but the condition (intemperance) as a whole is less voluntary, for no one wants to be intemperate. [641]

We transfer the name intemperance to the sins of children, for they do have a certain resemblance. But which one is named from the other does not concern us now. It is clear, however, that the later is derived from the earlier. [643]

This transference does not seem to be unsuitable. He who strives after what is base and increases greatly in evil must be punished. In this, sensual desire and the child are alike. Children live in accord with sensual desire and they strive most of all after pleasure. Therefore, if it will not be properly obedient, sensual desire will come to rule and increase considerably. To a stupid person, the desire for pleasure is insatiable and omnipresent; and the exercise of desire increases its natural power. For the appetites are strong and violent, going even to the extent of interrupting the act of reasoning. [644]

For this reason, sensual desire and pleasure must be moderated; that is, sense pleasures must be few in number and in no way contrary to reason. Such a state is what we call obedient and disciplined. As a child must live according to the instructions of his tutor, so the concupiscent part must conform to reason; each, the tutor and reason, aspires to the good. And the temperate man desires the right things at the right time as reason disposes. These then are the things we have to say about temperance. [647]

635. Intemperance is more like the voluntary. After the Philosopher has treated the act of temperance and the opposite vices, he now compares the sin of intemperance with other sins.

He makes two points here.

First, he compares intemperance with the vice of cowardice;

second, with the sins of children, at we transfer the name (1119a33; [643]).

He clarifies the first point by a twofold distinction.

First, he shows that intemperance has more of the voluntary than cowardice has.

Second, at there does not appear (1119a27; [640]), he shows that the voluntary in each vice is found in a different order.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he explains that intemperance has more of the voluntary than cowardice has.

Second, at for this reason intemperance (1119a25; [638]), he infers a corollary from his discussion.

He says first that intemperance is more like the voluntary than fear is, because intemperance has more of the voluntary.

He proves this by two reasons.

636. The first of these is taken from what follows the voluntary and the involuntary as a property. Everyone delights in what he does voluntarily but is sad over what is contrary to his will. It is obvious that the intemperate man acts for the pleasure he desires. The coward, on the other hand, acts because of the pain that he flees. Of course, the operation of both is pleasing because not only is actual pleasure a matter for joy, but even the hope of future pleasure. But pain is a thing to be avoided, and consequently is contrary to the will. So it is evident that intemperance is caused by what is of itself voluntary. Cowardice, however, is caused by something involuntary and repugnant. Therefore, intemperance comes closer to the voluntary than cowardice.

637. He gives the second reason at pain stupefies (1119a23). This is taken from the fact that ignorance causes an involuntary action. Because pain follows from the presence of some contrary and harmful principle, it stupefies and corrupts the nature of its possessor. So it is that the mind of man is impeded by pain from proper knowledge. But pleasure is caused by the presence of an agreeable object that does not corrupt the nature. Hence, pleasure does not stupefy or corrupt the mind of the one who takes pleasure. From this, it follows that intemperance, which operates on account of pleasure, has more of the voluntary than fear does—which is caused by pain.

638. Then, at for this reason, intemperance (1119a25), he concludes that, since praise is due to the good and blame to the evil for voluntary acts, the vice of intemperance is more disgraceful than the vice of cowardice, which has less of the voluntary. To this he adds also another reason taken from the fact that a vice is more worthy of reproach insofar as it is more easily avoidable.

639. Each vice can be avoided by the contrary habit. For two reasons, it is easy to become accustomed to good actions in matters of temperance.

First, pleasures in food, drink, and so forth take place very often in man’s life. Hence, there is no lack of opportunity to get used to virtuous actions in such matters.

Second, becoming accustomed to good deeds of temperance does not constitute a danger. A person does not run any great risk in abstaining at times from some pleasure of touch. But quite the reverse is true in the vice of cowardice, because the dangers from war happen rarely. Besides, it is dangerous to get mixed up in wars. It follows, then, that the vice of intemperance is more worthy of reproach than the vice of cowardice.

640. Next, at there does not appear (1119a27), he shows that the voluntary in each vice is not found in the same order.

First, he shows in what order the voluntary is found in cowardice;

second, in intemperance, at in regard to intemperance (1119a31; [641]).

He says first that fear does not seem to be voluntary in the same way for the universal as for particular cases. Universals seem to be without pain: for example, anyone may go into battle and attack the enemy. But particular happenings—for instance, that a man is wounded or routed or suffers other misfortune—bring such great pain that men are stupefied on account of these things, so much so that they throw away their arms and do other disgraceful actions. Hence, since these acts are voluntary in reference to the universal but involuntary in reference to the particular, they seem to be done under compulsion (inasmuch as a man is induced by an external principle to give up what he had previously wished).

641. At in regard to intemperance (1119a31), he shows what the order is in regard to intemperance. He says that, in this case, the order is reversed, for singular things are voluntary in the highest degree, since they occur in accordance with what a man strives for and desires. But the whole, considered in the abstract, is less voluntary—for instance, that anyone should commit adultery. No one desires to be intemperate in general. However, particular things by which a man becomes intemperate are delightful.

642. The reason for this difference is taken from this: pain that causes fear pertains to the involuntary, as pleasure that causes intemperance pertains to the voluntary. Every inclination of the soul toward particular things is rather vehement. For this reason, cowardice regarding particular things has more of the involuntary but intemperance more of the voluntary. Therefore, in sins of intemperance, it is exceedingly harmful to dwell upon the thought by which a man comes down to the particular that entices the will.

643. Then, at we transfer the name (1119a33), he compares the vice of intemperance with the sins of children.

First, he states the agreement as to the name.

Second, at this transference (1119a33; [644]), he assigns the reason for the agreement.

He says first that the name intemperance is transferred to the sins of children. This is more apparent in our language on the part of the virtue than in that on the part of the vice. We call chastity a species of temperance, as we say that disciplined children are chastened. And those who are not disciplined can be called “unchastened.” So, too, one who is not chaste is said to be incestuosus (in-castus). The reason for this transference is that sins of this kind have a certain likeness, as will be shown later [647]. But which of these is named from the other does not concern us now. It is clear, however, that the thing given the name later was called after that which had the name earlier.

644. Next, at this transference (1119b3), he assigns the reason for the previous transference in accordance with the likeness of the sin of intemperance to the sins of children:

first, in respect to the necessity of chastising or restraining;

second, in respect to the manner of chastising and restraining, at for this reason sensual desire (1119b11; [647]).

He says first that the transference of this name from one sin to another does not seem to be unsuitable because of the likeness according to which the transferences are made. It is necessary to punish—that is, chastise and discipline—one who strives after improper things and whose evil inclination is greatly increased, points on which sensual desire and the child are in agreement.

645. This agreement seems to be reasonable, for children live especially in accord with sensual desire, since they strive most of all after pleasure, which belongs to the nature of sensual desire. The reason why they strive after pleasure will be given in book 7 [1531]. Therefore, if the child and sensual desire are not rightly restrained by reason, they come to rule and increase such that the appetite for pleasure (that is, sensual desire) will be lord and master.

646. The reason for this is that the desire for pleasure is insatiable; indeed, the more pleasure is enjoyed, the more it is desired, in that pleasure itself is desirable. Hence, just as it is with a child or a simpleton, so too it is with sensual desire: the proper operation increases what is innate, namely, what is like them. If a child or a simpleton should be allowed to work according to their folly, the folly increases more in them. When a man satisfies sensual desire, it increases more in him and becomes master. This is especially true if sensual desire or pleasure is great by reason of the object, that is, things very delightful and also vehement for the man who desires and takes pleasure. This man is so influenced by pleasures that they may impede his knowledge or reasoning. The less sensual desire can dominate, the more power of thought remains efficient, .

647. Then, at for this reason, sensual desire (1119b11), he shows the likeness between the two sins in respect to the manner of chastising or restraining. He says that, since sensual desire and pleasure are vehement, they grow by themselves. For this reason, they must be moderated, that is, not excessive in extent or in vehemence of inclination or in number. They must not be contrary to reason in any way, especially in regard to the species of sensual desire or pleasure taken on the part of the object. That which is so disposed in the matter of sensual desires and pleasures is said to be readily obedient and chastised, corrected by reason. As a child must live according to the instructions of his tutor, so the faculty of sensual desire must be in conformity with reason. Both reason and the tutor aspire to the good. The concupiscent part in the temperate man is so disposed that he desires the right things, in the right way, and at the right time—as reason directs.

648. He says in conclusion that these are the things we have discussed about temperance. With this, book 3 ends.