Lecture 1 — Friendship, a Subject of Moral Philosophy

After the previous discussions we must pass on to a consideration of friendship, for it is a kind of virtue or at least accompanies virtue. [1538]

Besides, friendship is especially necessary for living, to the extent that no one, even if he had all other goods, would choose to live without friends. Indeed, the rich, the rulers, and the powerful seem to need friends most of all. What purpose do goods of fortune serve if not for the beneficence that is especially and most laudably exercised toward friends? Or how will goods of fortune be preserved and retained without friends? For the greater they are, the less secure they become. In poverty and other misfortunes, people consider friends their only refuge. Likewise, friendship helps young men to guard against wrongdoing; it helps old men to support their deficiencies and faltering movements arising from weakness. Friendship is even useful to people in their prime for the performance of good actions, since two persons working together either in intellectual endeavor or external activity are more effective. [1539]

By nature, the parent feels friendship for its offspring, not only among men but also among birds and many other animals. There is also friendship among people who are of the same nation with one another, and notably among men in general. Hence, we have praise for lovers of their fellow men. Even when traveling abroad, we see that every man is a familiar and a friend of every other man. [1541]

States, it seems, are maintained by friendship; and legislators are more zealous about it than about justice. This is evident from the similarity between friendship and concord; and legislators most of all wish to encourage concord and to expel discord as an enemy of the state. [1542]

If people are friends, there is no need of justice, but just men do need friendship. Likewise, what is just seems to be especially favorable to friendship. [1543]

Friendship is not only necessary but also noble. We praise those who love their friends; and a multiplicity of friendships seem to be a good thing. People even identify good men and friends. [1544]

On this subject, not a few things are uncertain. Some philosophers contend that friendship is a kind of likeness, and that friends are like one another. Hence, we have the sayings “like seeks like,” “birds of a feather flock together,” and other proverbs of this sort. Others, on the contrary, hold that all similar individuals are mutually opposed. [1545]

Likewise, some seek less superficial reasons, those more rooted in nature. Euripides, for instance, maintained that the parched earth longs for rain and that. when majestic heaven is filled with rain, it longs to fall on the earth. Heraclitus held that contrary contributes to contrary, that the most excellent harmony results from opposites, and that all things have their origin from strife. But others were of a contrary opinion, especially Empedocles, who contended that like desires like. [1546]

Certainly, questions belonging to cosmology should be passed over as not pertinent to our present purpose. But we must give our attention to whatever subjects are human and refer to man’s morals and passions: whether all men are capable of friendship or whether evil men can be friends, and whether friendship is of one kind or many kinds. [1548]

In fact, some philosophers thought that there was only one kind of friendship because it is susceptible of more and less; they did not accept the sufficient indication that things that differ in species admit of more and less. But we have treated these matters before. [1549]

1538. After the previous discussions. After the Philosopher has determined the moral and intellectual virtues and continence, which is something imperfect in the genus of virtue, he now turns his attention to friendship, which is founded upon virtue as an effect of it.

First, he explains by way of introduction what he intends to do.

Second, at perhaps these questions (1155b17; [1551]), he begins to treat friendship.

He develops the first point in two ways.

First, he shows that it pertains to ethics to treat friendship.

Second, at on this subject (1155a32; [1545]), he shows what matters are to be treated in the question of friendship.

In regard to the first item, he offers six reasons to explain what we must consider about friendship.

He states first what has to be treated in examining the subject of friendship after the previous discussions: things pertaining to the study of moral philosophy but not what belongs to the field of the cosmologist.

The first reason why we must investigate friendship is that the consideration of virtue is the concern of moral philosophy. Friendship is a kind of virtue, inasmuch as it is a habit of free choice—this will be explained later [1559, 1602–1604, 1645, 1831]. Also, it is reduced to the genus of justice, as offering something proportional (a point that will also be discussed later), or at least it accompanies virtue insofar as virtue is the cause of true friendship.

1539. He gives the second reason at besides, friendship (1155a4). Moral philosophy considers all things that are required for human living; among these, friendship is especially necessary, to such an extent that no one in his right mind would choose to live in the possession of great external goods without friends. Indeed, friends seem most necessary for the wealthy, the rulers, and the powerful, who have abundant external goods:

first, for the enjoyment of these goods, since there is no advantage to be derived from goods of fortune if no one can be benefited by them, but a benefit is especially and most laudably done for friends;

second, for the preservation of such goods that cannot be retained without friends. The greater the goods of fortune, the less secure they are, because many people secretly covet them. Nor are friends useful only in good fortune, but also in adversity.

1540. Therefore, in poverty, people look upon friends as the one refuge. So, then, in any situation, friends are needed. Likewise, friendship is necessary for young men that the help of friends may restrain them from sin, for they themselves are inclined to desires for pleasures, as has been already remarked in book 7 [1531]. On the other hand, friends are useful to the old for assistance in their bodily infirmities: because they are faltering in their movements from weakness, friends are needed to assist them. But even to those who are at their peak, in the very prime of life, friends are useful for the performance of good actions. When two work together, they are more effective. This is true in both rational investigation where one sees what the other cannot see and external activity in which one is especially a help to the other. Thus, it is evident that we must investigate friendship as a state necessary for all.

1541. He presents his third reason at by nature, the parent (1155a17). By nature, a parent feels friendship for its child. This is true not only of mankind but even of birds, who obviously spend a long time training their young. And the same goes for other animals. There is also a natural friendship between people of the same nation, who have common customs and social life. There is above all that natural friendship of all men for one another by reason of their likeness in specific nature. For this reason, we praise philanthropists or friends of mankind as fulfilling what is natural to man. This is evident when a man loses his way; for, everyone stops even an unknown stranger from taking the wrong road, as if every man is naturally a familiar and a friend of every other man. But those things that are naturally good must be treated by the moralist. Therefore, he ought to treat friendship.

1542. At states, it seems (1155a22), he offers the fourth reason, pointing out that states seem to be preserved by friendship. Hence, legislators have greater zeal for maintaining friendship among citizens than even justice itself, which is sometimes omitted, such as in the infliction of punishment, lest dissension be stirred up. This is clear from the fact that concord and friendship are similar. Certainly lawmakers especially want this harmony and eliminate from the citizenry contention inimical to the security of the state as much as possible. Because the whole of ethics seems to be ordered to the good of the state, as was said at the beginning [25], it pertains to ethics to treat friendship.

1543. He states the fifth reason at if people (1155a26), saying that, if men are friends, there should be no need of justice in the strict sense, because they should have all things in common; a friend is another self and there is no justice to oneself. But if men are just, they nevertheless need friendship for one another. Likewise, perfect justice seems to preserve and restore friendship. Therefore, it pertains to ethics to treat friendship much more than justice.

1544. He gives the sixth reason at friendship is not only (1155a28), explaining that we must treat friendship not only because it is something necessary for human living, but also because it is something good, that is, laudable and honorable. We praise philophiloi, that is, those who love their friends; and philophilia, which is a multiplicity of friendships, seems to be so good that people identify good men and friends.

1545. Then, at on this subject (1155a32), he shows what should be considered on friendship.

First, he presents an obvious doubt about friendship.

Second, at certainly, questions (1155b8; [1548]), he shows the kind of doubts to be resolved about friendship.

Third, at in fact, some (1155b13; [1549]), he rejects an error of certain philosophers.

He considers the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he states the conflicting opinions of some thinkers on friendship in human affairs;

second, at likewise, some (1155b1; [1546]), on friendship in things of nature.

He says first that not a few things regarding friendship are uncertain. This is obvious primarily from the diversity of opinions. Some contend that friendship is a kind of likeness and that like people are friends of one another. In favor of this, they quote proverbs “like seeks like” and “birds of a feather flock together.” Certain birds, like starlings, do flock together. There are other proverbs of this type. But others, on the contrary, hold that all potters are enemies of each other, since one hinders another’s gain. But the truth of the matter is that, essentially speaking, like is lovable; but it is hateful incidentally, precisely as an impediment to one’s own good.

1546. At likewise, some (1155b1), he states conflicting opinions about the same subject in things of nature. He says that, on this very question, some seek loftier (that is, deeper) reasons, more in the manner of cosmologists. Thus, Euripides maintained that the parched earth desires rain as if loving its contrary and that, when heaven, worthy of honor on account of its excellence, is filled with rain, it longs to fall on the earth, that is, to send down rain to earth, which is the contrary of its loftiness and fullness. Likewise, Heraclitus held that contrary contributes to contrary, as cold things to a man suffering from excessive heat, insofar as the most excellent harmony or equilibrium is produced from different and contrary things. But he said that the contrary does this inasmuch as all things had their origin from strife, by means of which the elements that were mingled in the beginning become separated. But others like Empedocles were of an opposite opinion: that like desires like.

1547. Now our difficulty is answered. Essentially speaking, like is desirable naturally, but incidentally like desires the contrary, inasmuch as it is helpful and medicinal, as was said above about bodily pleasures [1525–27].

1548. Next, at certainly, questions (1155b8), he shows the kinds of doubts to be resolved about friendship, saying that cosmological questions must be omitted as irrelevant to our present purpose. Attention should be directed to human affairs as connected with morals and man’s passions, such as whether all men are capable of friendship, or whether evil men are incapable of it, and whether there is one kind or many kinds of friendship.

1549. Then, at in fact, some (1155b13), he rejects an error of some philosophers who thought there was only one kind of friendship because all species of friendship are to be compared according to more and less. Thus, we say that honorable friendship is greater than useful friendship. But Aristotle says that they have not accepted the adequate explanation that even those things that differ specifically receive more and less, inasmuch as they agree generically. For example, we may say that white has more color than black, or by analogy, that act is more excellent than potency, and substance more excellent than accident.

1550. In conclusion, he says that the things just treated pertaining to human activities in regard to friendship were discussed above in a general way.