Lecture 2 — The Object of Friendship

Perhaps these questions will be clarified by some knowledge about what is lovable, for it seems that man does not love everything, but only what is lovable; and this is either a good in itself or a good that is pleasurable or useful. But the useful good seems to be a means of attaining the good in itself or the pleasurable good. Therefore, the good in itself and the pleasurable will be things lovable as ends. [1551]

Do men then love the good simply, or what is good for them? These two things sometimes differ. Likewise, the same doubt exists about the pleasurable good itself. [1553]

It seems, though, that everyone loves what is good for him; and, as the good in itself is lovable, so what is good for each man is lovable for him. [1554]

However, everyone loves not what is good for him, but what appears good. [1555]

But this makes no difference, for what is lovable will be what appears good. [1556]

While there are three motives prompting love, certainly the love of inanimate objects is not called friendship. In it there is neither a mutual return nor a will for the good of the objects. Indeed, it would be absurd to wish good to wine, although a man does want it to remain unspoiled so he can have it. On the other hand, we say that the good of a friend must be wished for his sake. [1557]

But those wishing good to someone in this way are said to have goodwill when the wish is not reciprocal, for friendship is goodwill with reciprocation. [1559]

Likewise, we must add that goodwill may not lie hidden. Many men, in fact, are of goodwill toward those they have never seen, inasmuch as they think such people virtuous or useful. It is possible too that one of these persons might feel the same way. Consequently, men of this kind seem to be benevolent toward one another, but they cannot be called friends when unaware of one another’s feelings. [1560]

Therefore, it is necessary for friendship that men wish good to one another, that this fact be recognized by each, and that it be for the sake of one of the reasons previously mentioned. [1561]

1551. Perhaps these questions will be clarified. After the Philosopher has shown in the introduction that it is necessary to clarify friendship and what things are to be determined about it, now he begins to treat friendship.

First, he explains what friendship is.

Second, at since these objects (1156a6; [1562]), he distinguishes its kinds.

Third, at in all friendships (1163b32; [1757]), he states the properties belonging to the different kinds of friendship.

He treats the first point from two aspects.

First, he investigates the four parts of the definition of friendship.

Second, at therefore, it is necessary (1156a3; [1561]), he concludes with the definition of friendship.

First, he investigates the portion dealing with the object.

In regard to this, he does three things.

First, he determines the object of friendship.

Second, at do men then love (1155b21; [1553]), he raises a doubt.

Third, at it seems, though (1155b23; [1554]), he gives the answer.

He says first that these questions will perhaps be somewhat clarified if we understand the nature of the thing that is lovable, the object of love from which friendship (or love) receives its name.

1552. Not everything is loved indiscriminately, because evil as such is not loved, but man loves what is lovable, and either this is good in itself (namely, honorable) or it is a pleasurable or useful good. The last or useful good seems to be a means of attaining the honorable and pleasurable goods, which are lovable on account of themselves as ends. On the other hand, useful good is lovable on account of another, as a means to an end. But the good and the pleasurable taken in general are not distinguished from one another in substance, but only in concept. Something is described as good precisely insofar as it is intrinsically perfect and desirable, and pleasurable inasmuch as the appetite rests in it. However, that is not the meaning here; the question here is of man’s genuine good, which belongs to reason, and the pleasurable is taken here as that which appeals to the senses.

1553. Then, at do men then love (1155b21), he raises a doubt on this point: do men love what is the absolute good, or what is good relative to themselves? These sometimes do differ from each other. For instance, to philosophize in itself is good, but not necessary in the case of the pauper. The same doubt presents itself in the case of the pleasurable good itself; for an object pleasurable in itself, such as a sweet, is not pleasant to one with a diseased taste.

1554. At it seems, though (1155b23), he answers the foregoing question.

First, he states his solution, saying everyone seems to love what is good for him, because every faculty tends to the object proportionate to itself. Thus, everyone’s vision sees what is visible to it. As the totally lovable is the totally good, so the lovable for each man is that which is good for him.

1555. Second, at however, everyone (1155b25), he argues for the contrary, saying that every man loves not what is really good for him, but what seems good for him; for, desire tends to an object only as apprehended. Consequently, it seems false that what is lovable is what is good for him.

1556. Third, at but this makes (1155b26), he gives the answer that this makes no difference to our proposition, for when some apparent good is loved, it is loved as a good for oneself. Hence, it can also be said that what is lovable is what appears good.

1557. The second portion, which he gives at while there are (1155b27), relates to the quality of love. He says that, while there are three reasons why men love—namely, the good, the pleasurable, and the useful—friendship does not consist in the love a man is said to have for inanimate things, like wine or gold.

He shows this in two ways.

First, in a love of this kind, there cannot be the mutual return that is necessary for friendship, for wine does not love man as man loves wine.

Second, we do not love inanimate things in such a way that we will their good. It would be absurd to say that we willed good to wine; but the good that is wine a man wills for himself. Therefore, in loving wine, man obviously does not have benevolence toward the wine, but toward himself.

1558. If someone says that a man wishes good to the wine because he wishes that it be preserved, we should consider that a man wants the wine to remain unspoiled so he can have it. In this way, he does not desire the preservation of the wine for the good of the wine, but for his own good. And this is contrary to the notion of friendship, for we say that the good of a friend must be willed for his sake and not for the sake of the one loving.

1559. The third portion, which he presents at but those wishing (1155b31), refers to change in the one loved. He explains that, when people wish good to someone for his sake, we call them benevolent, but we do not them friends unless the wish is reciprocated such that the loved one wishes good to, and for the sake of, the one loving. The reason is that we say friendship is benevolence with corresponding requital, inasmuch as the one loving is loved in return, for friendship has a kind of exchange of love after the manner of commutative justice.

1560. The fourth portion is taken from the condition for mutual love, and it is stated at likewise, we must (1155b34). He says that, to complete the notion of friendship, we must add that it is a mutual benevolence that is recognized. Many men are benevolent toward those they have never seen, for they judge these people to be just from reports, that is, virtuous, or useful to themselves. Likewise, it is possible that one of them should have the same feeling toward him who is benevolent in this way. Consequently, men of this kind seem to be benevolent toward one another but cannot be friends while they are unaware of one another’s feelings.

1561. Then, at therefore it is necessary (1156a3), he concludes with the definition of friendship derived from the premises. He says that it is necessary to the notion of friendship that men wish good to one another, that this fact be recognized by them, and that it be for the sake of one of the things previously mentioned, namely, the good, the pleasurable, or the useful.