Lecture 8 — Loving and Being Loved as Related to Friendship

Because of a desire for honor, most people seem to wish to be loved rather than to love. [1639]

For this reason, most men are fond of flattery. Now, the flatterer is a friend of humbler status or pretends to be of a humbler status and to love more than he is loved. [1640]

Being loved seems to be closely connected with being honored, which is something that most men desire. [1641]

And yet men do not seem to desire honor for its own sake, but only incidentally. The common run of men delight to be honored by the powerful because they hope to obtain something they need; they rejoice in the honor as an omen of good to be received. Others want to be honored by virtuous and wise men, desiring to confirm their own opinion about themselves. They delight, therefore, in a sense of their own goodness, having confidence in the judgment so expressed. [1642]

People, however, take pleasure in being loved for the sake of love. [1644]

Therefore, being loved seems to be better than being honored, and friendship is in itself worthy of choice. [1645]

Friendship, however, seems to consist in loving, rather than in being loved. An indication of this is that mothers take more pleasure in loving than in being loved by their offspring. Some mothers give to others the rearing of their children; and while knowing them to be their children, they love them, but do not seek a return of love if it is impossible both to love and be loved. They seem satisfied to know that their little ones are doing well; they love them even if the children, in their ignorance, cannot offer what is due a mother. [1646]

Since friendship consists rather in loving and friends are praised for it, the excellence of a friend seems to be found in loving. For this reason, persons who love their friends in proportion to their worth remain friends and their friendship is lasting. In this way, more than any other, those who are unequal will become friends, because they will thus be made equal. But then friendship is a kind of equality and likeness. [1648]

This likeness is found especially among virtuous men, for they remain stable both in themselves and in friendship with one another. They neither ask others to do wrong nor do wrong themselves;, and we may say that they even prevent evil. It is characteristic of virtuous men that they neither sin themselves nor suffer their friends to commit sins. [1650]

Evil men, however, have no steadfastness, for they do not long remain the same. They are friends for the short time they rejoice together in evil. [1651]

But friends for utility and pleasure remain longer in their friendships, for these last as long as pleasure and utility are provided by each party. [1652]

Between opposites, however, friendship seems to be formed most of all for utility—thus between a poor man and a rich man or between an uneducated man and a learned man—inasmuch as one friend seeks what he needs from the other, who gives something in return. [1653]

To this type of friendship may be assigned the lover and the beloved and the beautiful and the ugly. [1654]

For this reason, lovers seem ridiculous at times when they expect as much love as they give—a proper thing if the parties are equally worthy of love. But if they do not have this qualification they appear absurd. [1655]

Perhaps one opposite does not seek another in itself, but only incidentally, for what is really sought is the mean. This indeed is good for the dry, not that it become wet, but that it reach a middle state. The same is true of the hot. Because these matters are foreign to our study, we may dismiss them. [1656]

1639. Because of a desire for honor. After the Philosopher has determined that friendship between unequal persons is maintained by a proportionality of loving and being loved, he now shows how loving and being loved pertain to friendship.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he shows that loving is more characteristic of friendship than is being loved.

Second, at since friendship (1159a33; [1648]), he shows that friendship is preserved by loving according to excellence or proportionately.

He treats the first point from three aspects.

First, he shows why some people wish to be loved rather than to love.

Second, at and yet men (1159a17; [1642]), he compares being loved with being honored.

Third, at friendship, however (1159a27; [1646]), he shows that loving is more proper to friendship than is being loved.

He discusses the first point in a threefold manner.

First, he states his proposition, saying that the majority seem to wish to be loved rather than to love, and this is because they are lovers of honor. It befits the more worthy, to whom honor is due, to be loved rather than to love.

1640. Second, at for this reason (1159a14), he confirms his statement. From the fact that many people wish to be loved rather than to love, it follows that they are fond of flattery; they take pleasure in someone fawning upon them. The flatterer either really is a friend of humbler status, since it is characteristic of the lowly to indulge in flattery, or pretends by flattering to be a friend and to love more than he is loved.

1641. Third, at being loved (1159a16), he explains his statement [1639] that it is because of honor that men wish to be loved rather than to love. He states that being loved seems to be closely connected with being honored, which many desire. Honor indeed is a mark of goodness in him who is honored, and anything that is good or apparently good is loved.

1642. Then, at and yet men (1159a17), he compares being loved with being honored.

On this point, he does three things.

First, he shows why people wish to be honored, saying that men apparently desire honor not for itself, but incidentally. They seek to be honored especially by men of two classes.

1643. Many are glad to be honored by the powerful, not for the honor itself, but by reason of the hope they derive from it. They expect to obtain something they need from those who honor them. So they delight in the honor as a mark of the good disposition or kindly affection of the persons honoring them. But there are others who want to be honored by just men—that is, by the virtuous and wise—because they seek in this way to confirm a personal opinion about their own goodness. Thus, they really rejoice in the fact that they are virtuous, as it were, accepting this for the judgment of good men who, by the very act of honoring them, seem to say they are good.

1644. Second, at people, however (1159a25), he teaches that men delight in the fact itself of being loved, since the very possession of friends seems to be the principal external sign of honor.

1645. Third, at therefore, being loved (1159a25), he draws a conclusion. Since what is essential is more excellent than what is incidental, it follows from the premises [1642–44] that being loved is better than being honored, inasmuch as friendship is in itself desirable.

1646. At friendship, however (1159a27), he shows in what the excellence of friendship consists: in loving or being loved. He says it consists in loving, for friendship is predicated by way of habit, as has been explained [1596, 1602, 1627]. But a habit terminates at activity; and loving is certainly an activity, while being loved is rather passivity. Hence, loving is more proper to friendship than is being loved.

1647. He makes this clear by an example. Mothers who have a strong affection for their children take more pleasure in loving them than in being loved by them. Some mothers give their children to others to rear; knowing the children to be theirs, they love them, but nevertheless, they do not strive much for a return of love, since this is not possible. But it seems enough for the mothers to see that their children do well and are in good health. Thus, they love their little ones even though the little ones cannot make a suitable return of love because of ignorance, since the children do not know them to be their mothers.

1648. Next, at since friendship (1159a33), he shows how friendship is maintained by loving according to excellence or proportionately.

First, he shows how friendship is lasting because of the proportion that love achieves.

Second, at this likeness is found (1159b3; [1650]), he compares the different kinds of friendship relative to what has been said before.

He says first that, since friendship consists in loving rather than in being loved, friends are praised because they love and not because they are loved. In fact, this is the compliment we pay lovers.

1649. Because everyone is praised for his own virtue, the virtue of a lover should be judged according to his love. For this reason, persons who love their friends in proportion to their worth remain friends and their friendship is lasting. Thus, when people love one another according to their worth, even those who are of unequal condition can be friends, because they are made equal in this way—provided that the one who is more lacking in goodness or some other excellence loves that much more. In this way, the abundance of love makes up for the inadequacy of condition. So, by a kind of equality and likeness that properly belong to friendship, people become and remain friends.

1650. Then, at this likeness (1159b3), he compares the different kinds of friendship in reference to his previous statements.

First, he shows which friendship is most enduring. He says that the likeness that causes and preserves friendship seems to be found especially among virtuous men, for they remain like-minded both in themselves—they do not easily change from one thing to another—and in friendship with one another. This is so because the one has no need for the other to do anything evil for him, which would be contrary to the virtue of the agent. In this way, neither of them serves the other in any evil. But, if any evil may possibly occur among the virtuous, one rather prevents the other from doing wrong; for it is characteristic of virtuous men that they neither sin themselves nor allow their friends to commit sins.

1651. Second, at evil men, however (1159b7), he shows which friendship is least enduring, stating that evil men do not have any steadfastness or stability about them. The reason is that the wickedness to which they adhere is in itself hateful, and so their affection varies when they find nothing in which the will can repose; in this way, they do not long remain like-minded. But they desire things contrary to what they previously wanted. Thus, they are friends for a short time, as long as they enjoy the evil in which they agree.

1652. Third, at but friends for utility (1159b10), he shows which friendships hold a middle place in this matter. He says that friends for utility and pleasure remain longer together in friendship than do friends in evil. Utility and pleasure are such that they may be loved. Hence, friendships of this kind last as long as pleasure and utility are mutually provided. But it is otherwise with those who are friends for the sake of evil, which has no lovableness in itself.

1653. Next, at between opposites, however (1159b12), he discusses friendship between persons of disparate condition.

First, he shows under what species of friendship we may place friendship between opposites.

Second, at perhaps one opposite (1159b19; [1656]), he explains how contrary may seek contrary.

On the first point, he does three things.

First, he shows that this friendship between persons of disparate condition seems to be for the sake of utility, inasmuch as one friend seeks from the other what he himself needs and gives something in return to the other. Thus, a poor man desires to obtain money from the rich man in return for service.

1654. Second, at to this type (1159b15), he shows how this may be characteristic also of pleasurable friendship. He states that we may reduce to this type of friendship sexual love, by which the lover loves the beloved. For, sometimes there is the disparity of beauty and ugliness. On the other hand, in friendship based on virtue, there is no disparate condition, because the greatest likeness is found in it, as was noted previously [1580].

1655. Third, at for this reason (1159b16), he infers a corollary from the discussion. He says that, since a contrary condition sometimes exists in the lover and the beloved—for example, ugliness and beauty—it follows that lovers are sometimes derided who think they are worthy of being loved as much as they love. This is fitting when they are equally worthy of love. But if they have nothing of such a nature that they are worthy to be so loved, it is ridiculous for them to ask it.

1656. At perhaps one opposite (1159b19), he shows how contrary seeks its contrary. He says that this is not true from the nature of the thing but incidentally, for what is essentially sought is the mean that is the good of the subject induced to excess by one of contraries. For example, if a man’s body is very dry, perspiration is not good and desirable absolutely speaking, but as a means to a middle state attained by the moisture. The same reason holds for what is hot and contraries of this kind. Because these matters belong more to the study of physics, he says they will be passed over.