Lecture 10 — Distinction of the Kinds of States

There are three kinds of polity and just as many perversions or corruptions of it. These forms are kingdom, aristocracy, and a third aptly named timocracy from timos, meaning rewards. This last is usually called by most people simply polity. [1672]

Of these, however, the best is kingdom and the worst timocracy. [1674]

The perversion of kingdom is called tyranny. Both are forms of monarchy, but they differ very much, for a tyrant aims at his own selfish interest while a king strives for the good of his subjects. No man is truly a king who is not adequate of himself to rule and does not abound in all good things. Such a one is in need of nothing, and therefore will not work for himself, but for his subjects. Then, too, a king not independent of his subjects will resemble a ruler chosen by lot. But the very opposite of a king is a tyrant, because he seeks his own profit. Obviously, this corruption is the worst, for the worst is contrary to the best. But a ruler deviates from a monarchy into tyranny, for the perversion of a monarchy is tyranny, and a wicked king becomes a tyrant. [1675]

But aristocracy degenerates into an oligarchy through the wickedness of rulers who do not distribute the goods of the state according to merit, but usurp all or most of them for themselves, and who always keep the same people in office, aiming at riches for the most part. As a result, a few men, and those evil, gain control in place of the very virtuous. [1678]

And timocracy deteriorates into democracy, with which it is coterminous, for timocracy is also the rule of the masses, and all who own property are equal. Nevertheless, democracy has a minimum of perversion, as it departs very little from the character of the polity. Consequently, these are the ways in which polities are most easily transferred, being the least in degree and easiest to make. [1679]

Likenesses of these very forms of government can be exemplified in domestic affairs. [1681]

Certainly the association of a father with his sons has the form of a monarchy, for he takes care of their interests. Hence, Homer calls Jove “father” because paternal rule is the ideal of a monarchy. [1682]

With the Persians, the authority of a father is tyrannical; they use their sons as slaves. But the authority of a master over slaves is tyrannical, for he uses them to his own advantage. This procedure appears to be right while that of the Persians is wrong, because different kinds of authority are suitable for different kinds of persons. [1683]

But the authority of husband and wife seems to be aristocratic, because the husband has dominion over the affairs pertaining to him according to his dignity and he hands over to the wife whatever pertains to her. [1684]

On the other hand, when the husband is in charge of everything, the rule is changed into an oligarchy, for then he acts unfairly and not according to his greater dignity. And when wives have dominion by reason of being heiresses, authority is not in virtue of excellence, but according to riches and power, as is the case in oligarchy. [1685]

Among brothers, authority seems to be timocratic, for they are equal aside from the difference in age; therefore, if their ages differ much, the friendship will not then be called fraternal. [1686]

Democracy, however, exists in those groups living together without a master (all being on an equal footing); in them, the director has weak authority and everyone follows his fancy. [1687]

1672. There are three kinds of polity. After the Philosopher has explained that the species of friendship are reducible to civic or political association, he now distinguishes them according to the divisions of political association.

On this point he does two things.

First, he distinguishes the species of friendship according to the divisions of political association or states.

Second, at all friendship, then (1161b11; [1702]), he subdivides these kinds of friendship.

He treats the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he distinguishes the kinds of states, one from another;

second, at each form of government (1161a10; [1688]), he distinguishes the kinds of friendship according to these [kinds of states].

He discusses the first point under two aspects.

First, he distinguishes the kinds of states;

second, at likenesses of these (1160b22; 1681]), he points out the kinds of domestic associations that resembles them.

He handles the first point in a threefold manner.

First, he indicates the forms of government;

second, at of these, however (1160a35; [1674]), he compares them;

third, at the perversion of kingdom (1160a36; [1675]), he shows how they are corrupted.

1673. He says first that there are three forms of polity and just as many corruptions or violations. The three good forms are these. Monarchy is rule by one, and aristocracy is government by the best, virtuous men. And then it seems fitting that there be another kind of governance too, although some authors do not recognize it, as is evident in Politics 4, (Politics 4.8.1293b22–1294a29; see Aquinas In IV pol., lec. 7, nn. 604–13.) and this last is aptly called “timocracy,” from timos, which means “reward,” for under this form of government, rewards are bestowed on the poor when they serve in a judicial capacity and penalties are imposed on the rich when they do not, as is clear from Politics 4. (Politics 4.9.1294a30–1294b41; see Aquinas, In IV pol., lec. 8, nn. 614–20.) Some are accustomed to call it by the common name “polity” from the fact that it is common to rich and poor, as appears in Politics 4. (Politics 4.3.1289b27–1290b20; see Aquinas, In IV pol., lec. 2, nn. 544–56.)

1674. Then, at of these, however (1160a35), he compares these forms of government. He says that the best among these is monarchy, in which the best qualified man rules. The worst, or the least good, is timocracy, in which many mediocre men govern. In the middle is aristocracy, in which a few very good men rule; however, their power of doing good is not so great as in the best form, where one ruler has the fullness of power.

1675. At the perversion of kingdom (1160a36), he treats of the corruptions or perversions of these political systems:

first, about the corruptions of monarchy;

second, at but aristocracy degenerates (1160b12; [1678]), about the corruption of aristocracy;

third, at and timocracy deteriorates (1160b16; [1679]), about the corruption of timocracy.

He explains the first point under two headings.

First, he states his intent, saying that perversion or corruption of monarchy is called “tyranny.” He makes this clear first by the fact that they agree in kind, for both are forms of monarchy, that is, rule by one. Just as one man governs in a monarchy, so also in a tyranny.

1676. Then he indicates the difference between them, saying that they are vastly different. It seems that they are contraries, since contraries are things that differ greatly and are in the same genus. He manifests this difference by saying that a tyrant, in his government, aims at what is useful to himself, but a king strives for what is beneficial to his subjects.

1677. He proves this by the fact that a ruler cannot truly be called a king who is not of himself adequate to rule, that is, excelling in all goods of soul and body and external things such that he is worthy and able to govern. But when he is so endowed, he needs nothing, and so will not work for his own interest, which the poor characteristically do, but rather for the benefit of his subjects—as the affluent do. For a man who is not such—namely, excelling in all goods—can better be called clerotos, as if chosen by lot to rule, than king. But a tyrant is the very contrary of a king, for he seeks his own profit. So, this corruption is obviously the worst, for the worst is contrary to the best. But a ruler deviates from a kingship that is best, as we have noted [1676], into a tyranny that is nothing else than a perversion of monarchy or one-man rule; and when a king becomes wicked, he is called a tyrant. Hence, it is evident that tyranny is the worst perversion.

1678. Next, at but aristocracy (1160b12), he treats of the perversion of aristocracy, saying that an aristocracy degenerates into an oligarchy, which is the government of a few. This happens by the wickedness of the rulers not distributing the goods of the state according to merit, but rather usurping all or the greater part of them for themselves and always keeping the same people in office, aiming especially at enriching themselves and their friends. By reason of this, a few evil men come into power in place of very good men who rule in an aristocracy.

1679. At and timocracy deteriorates (1160b16), he treats of the perversion of timocracy, saying it deteriorates into democracy, which is rule by the populace. In fact, these two are coterminous, or bordering upon one another, for they are alike in two ways.

The first is that timocracy or government of rewards is likewise the rule of the masses, just as democracy is.

Second, in both forms of government, all who occupy places of honor are equal.

On the other hand, they differ because, in a timocracy, the common good of the rich and the poor is intended, but in a democracy, the good of the poor alone is aimed at. Hence, the perversion inherent in democracy is the least, for it departs very little from timocracy, which is a kind of good government.

1680. He concludes, then, that these forms of government change very much from one to another, and so are easily perverted, as has been pointed out [1675–79].

1681. Then, at likenesses of these very forms (1160b22), he distinguishes between states and households according to resemblances to these forms.

First, he shows what among them corresponds to a kingdom and a tyranny;

second, at but the authority (1160b32; [1684]), what corresponds to aristocracy and oligarchy;

third, at among brothers (1161a3; [1686]), what corresponds to timocracy and democracy.

He discusses the first point under three aspects.

First, he states his intent, saying that a model and example of these forms of government can be found in domestic affairs.

1682. Second, at certainly the association (1160b24), he shows which domestic relation corresponds to a kingdom. He states that association between a father and his sons resembles a kingship, because a father has care of his sons, as a king of his subjects. Hence, Homer calls Jove “father” because of his royal power. Indeed, the rule of a father in his home is a kind of kingship.

1683. Third, at with the Persians (1160b27), he shows what corresponds to household tyranny.

He distinguishes two kinds.

The first is the way Persian fathers look upon sons, for they treat their sons as slaves.

The second is the way masters manage slaves: masters intend their own profit in the use of slaves.

However, these two procedures differ, for the one in which masters employ slaves for their usefulness seems to be right. But the other, in which fathers use their sons as slaves, seems to be wrong. The reason is that completely different persons should be governed in different ways. Consequently, it is wrong for a man to govern children and slaves in the same manner.

1684. At but the authority (1160b32), he shows what in households corresponds to aristocracy and its opposite.

He treats his point in a twofold manner.

First, he shows what corresponds to aristocracy. He says that the authority by which a husband and a wife govern a household is aristocratic, because the husband has dominion and charge over the affairs that pertain to him according to his dignity and he hands over to the wife those matters that pertain to her.

1685. Second, at on the other hand (1160b35), he states two procedures corresponding to oligarchy.

One occurs when the husband wants to arrange everything and leaves the wife in charge of nothing. This accords neither with his dignity nor with what is best.

The other is when wives have complete authority because they are heiresses, and then their authority does not arise from their excellence, but from their riches and power, as in an oligarchy.

1686. Third, at among brothers (1161a3), he shows what corresponds to timocracy and its opposite.

First, as to what corresponds to timocracy, he says that the authority wielded by brothers in a household seems to be timocratic, because brothers are equal except for difference in their ages; if their ages are far apart, their friendship seems to be in a way paternal and not fraternal.

1687. Then, at democracy, however (1161a6), he shows what corresponds to democracy. He states that a resemblance to democracy exists in groups living together who have no director—companions staying at an inn, for instance. There, all are on the same footing; if anyone has authority, it is weak (for example, the one in charge of paying expenses). Each member has power in the dwelling, as in a democracy each individual has quasi-equal power and the directors can do little.