Lecture 5 — The Act and Habit of Friendship

Just as it is in the case of the virtues, that some men are called good by reason of habit and others by reason of performance, so in friendship, some actually live together pleasantly and do good for one another, while others who are asleep or separated by place do not actually perform the works of friendship although they have its habit. Distance, indeed, does not sever friendship itself, but only prevents the acts of friendship. [1596]

However, if the absence is prolonged, it apparently makes people forget friendship. So goes the proverb: “out of sight, out of mind.” [1597]

Neither old men nor morose men seem inclined to friendship, because there is very little that is pleasant in them. No one can continually live with a gloomy person or with one who is unpleasant, for nature avoids the painful and seeks the pleasant. [1598]

But those who get along with one another and yet do not live together are more like well-wishers than friends. [1599]

Nothing is so characteristic of friends as living together; the needy desire assistance, but even the happy (who especially do not like to be alone) wish to spend their time with their friends. Men, however, cannot associate with one another unless they are pleasant and rejoice in the same things; this is found in the friendship of those who are comrades. [1600]

Friendship between the virtuous, then, is friendship in the best sense, as we have noted many times. The reason is that what is wholly good and pleasurable seems to be lovable and worthy of choice; and a thing of this nature is lovable and worthy of choice by everyone. But it is for these two reasons that one virtuous man is good in the eyes of another virtuous man. [1601]

Affection resembles an emotion, but friendship itself is similar to a habit. [1602]

Affection, however, may be bestowed even on lifeless objects. But a return of love for love is accompanied by deliberate choice, and what is done by choice is from habit. [1603]

Men wish good to friends for their sake, not from passion, but from habit. [1604]

Likewise, those who love a friend love their own good. For, when a good man becomes a friend, he also becomes a good to his friend. So each loves what is good for himself and repays equally both in goodwill and in pleasantness. The reason is that friendship is a kind of equality. What has been said applies especially to the friendship that exists between virtuous men. [1605]

1596. Just as in the case of the virtues. After the Philosopher has distinguished the kinds of friendship, he now treats them in relation to the proper act of friendship.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he distinguishes friendship by reason of habit and act.

Second, at affection resembles (1157b28; [1602]), he proves what he had assumed.

He discusses the first point from three aspects.

First, he distinguishes the kinds of friendship by way of habit and act.

Second, at however, if (1157b11; [1597]), he shows that some lose friendship by lack of friendly acts.

Third, at friendship between the virtuous (1157b25; [1601]), he shows that friendship especially between virtuous men arises from the nature of the very act of friendship.

He says first that, as in other virtues, in which some men are called good or virtuous by reason of habit (for example, the brave or the generous) even when they are not performing the act of virtue while others are called virtuous for actually performing a virtuous action, so too in friendship, some are friends actually inasmuch as they live together pleasantly and do good for one another—two things that seem to belong to the act of friendship. But others are not actually performing the works of friendship, although they are so disposed by habit that they are inclined to perform such works—this is obvious of friends who are asleep or locally separated from one another. Indeed, separation does not sever friendship itself, but only friendship’s activity. Thus, it is evident that the habit of friendship remains even when its expression ceases.

1597. Then, at however, if the absence (1157b11), he shows how, in some cases, friendship ceases from a lack of friendly acts.

First, he explains his proposition.

Second, at nothing is so (1157b19; [1600]), he proves what he had assumed.

He explains his proposition in regard to three classes of men.

The first are those who are separated from one another for a long time.

He says that, if the absence of friends from one another is prolonged, it seems to cause forgetfulness of a previous friendship. In this way, other habits are also weakened and finally disappear from lack of use. As habits are acquired by practice, they must be preserved by practice, for everything is preserved by its cause. For that reason, it has become proverbial that many friendships are destroyed through a man’s neglect to call upon his friend, to converse and associate with him.

1598. Second, at neither old men (1157b13), he shows the same thing about the old and the morose. He says that neither the old nor the morose—that is, people severe in word and social intercourse—seem to be friendly or disposed for friendship, since they are not inclined to the activity of friendship, which is association. Very little that is pleasant is found in them. For this reason, they are not easy to live with, for no one can spend his days (that is, a long time) with a man who is gloomy or with one who is unpleasant. Men and other animals find it natural to avoid pain and seek pleasure, which appears to be simply repose of the appetite in a desired good.

1599. Third, at but those who (1157b17), he shows the same thing about a third class of men, those who are acceptable to one another in that one approves the ways and conduct of the other, although for some reason the two never live together. Such persons, he says, are more like well-wishers than friends, because friendship requires living together for some time.

1600. Next, at nothing is so (1157b19), he proves what he had assumed, that living together is required for friendship as its proper act. He says nothing is so characteristic of friends as living together. Previously [1595] he stated that two works belong to the act of friendship: living together and bestowing favors on one another—this is to bring a friend some benefit, a thing that not all seek from friends, but only the needy. Even happy people—namely, those with abundance (who do not like to be alone)—desire to spend their days (that is, a long time) with friends. Nor can men associate with one another if they are not mutually pleasant and do not rejoice in the same things—two qualities found in the friendship of those who are brought up together. So, then, it is evident that the principal act of friendship is to live with one’s friends.

1601. At friendship between the virtuous (1157b25), he concludes from the premises that friendship between virtuous men is friendship in the best sense, as we have frequently noted [1574–79, 1592]. That seems to be lovable and absolutely worthy of choice in itself that is wholly good and pleasurable. But something of this nature—that is, good or pleasurable in itself—is lovable and worthy of choice for everyone. But one virtuous man is lovable to another and worthy of choice for these two reasons: each is good and pleasant without qualification, and each is good and pleasant to the other. Consequently, virtuous men especially can live pleasantly with one another.

1602. Then, at affection resembles (1157b28), he proves what he had previously assumed: that friendship may be predicated not only according to act but also according to habit.

On this point, he does three things.

First, he states his proposal, saying that affection seems to indicate passion. But friendship seems to indicate habit and to be like other habits.

1603. Second, at affection, however (1157b29), he proves his proposition by two reasons.

The first is that one-sided love can be bestowed even on lifeless objects, as we are said to love wine or gold. But mutual love—which belongs to the notion of friendship, as we have indicated [1557]—is accompanied by deliberate choice, for this is found only among rational beings. But what is done by choice is not done from passion, but rather from habit. Therefore, friendship is a habit.

1604. He gives the second reason at men wish (1157b31), saying that, by friendship, men wish good to friends for their friends’ sake. If men wished good for their own sake, they would love themselves rather than others. But to love others for their sake is not from passion, because passion, since it belongs to the sensitive appetite, does not go beyond the particular good of the one loving. Consequently, it remains that this is from habit, and so friendship is a habit.

1605. Third, at likewise, those who love (1157b33), he answers an implied objection. It has just been said (n. 1601) that what is good to anyone is lovable to him. It seems contrary to this that a man loves his friend for the friend’s sake. But he answers that those who love a friend love what is good to themselves. When a person who is a good in himself becomes a friend to someone, he also becomes a good to his friend. So each, in loving his friend, loves what is good for himself, and each makes an equal return to his friend both in the fact of willing—as he wishes good to his friend—and in the kind of willing. He wishes good to his friend not for his own sake, but for the friend’s. The reason is that friendship is a kind of equality precisely as it requires mutual love. This seems to be an addition above the mode of virtue. For, in any virtue, the act of the virtuous man is enough, but in friendship, the act of one is not sufficient, but rather the acts of two mutually loving one another must concur. For that reason, the Philosopher did not state absolutely that it is a virtue, but added or at least accompanies virtue, because it seems to add something above the notion of virtue.

1606. The observations that have been made about friendship seem to be especially applicable to friendship between virtuous men.