Lecture 7 — Friendship Between Unequals

There is another kind of friendship that consists in an inequality, as the friendship of a father with a son, or—in general—of an older with a younger person, of a husband with a wife, and of a ruler with his subject. [1625]

These friendships, though, differ from one another. because the friendship of parents for children is not the same as the friendship of ruler for subjects; nor is the friendship of a father for a son the same as that of a son for a father; nor that of a husband for a wife the same as that of a wife for a husband. [1626]

Indeed, the virtue and function of these persons is different. [1627]

Different, too, are their motives for loving. Therefore, their affections and friendships differ. [1628]

Certainly the same benefits are not received by each from the other, nor should they be sought. When children give to their parents what is due the authors of their being and when parents give to children what is due their offspring, there will exist between them a lasting and virtuous friendship. [1629]

In all friendships according to inequality, love must be given proportionately. Thus, the superior party is loved more than he loves; the same is true of the person who is more useful or more excellent in any way at all. When love is bestowed according to excellence, a kind of equality will arise that seems to belong to friendship. [1630]

Equality, however, does not seem to be applicable to justice and friendship in the same way. Equality in justice is accounted first according to excellence and then according to quantity. But in friendship, quantitative equality must be considered first and then what is in conformity with excellence. [1631]

This is clearly the case if there is a great difference in virtue or vice or anything else, for men do not then remain friends; nor do they even expect to be friends. [1633]

This is evident in the case of the gods, because they greatly exceed men in good things; it is clear too of kings, for people in humbler walks of life are not likely to have royal friends; it is true also of the best and wisest men with whom individuals of no distinction do not become friends. [1634]

In such matters, then, it is not possible to determine exactly at what point men can be friends, for when many qualities are absent, friendship still remains. But if the persons are far removed from one another, like men from God, the friendship ceases. [1635]

From this a doubt arises: perhaps men do not wish their friends the greatest goods, such that they become gods; for, then the friends will not benefit them. [1636]

If it was correctly stated that a man wishes good things to a friend for his sake, we must suppose that the friend remains much the same person as he is. One wishes the most excellent goods to his friend as he is a man, but perhaps not all goods, for everyone wishes good to himself most of all. [1637–38]

1624. There is another kind of friendship. After the Philosopher has distinguished the kinds of friendship that consist in equality, he now distinguishes the kinds of friendship that exist between unequal persons.

He treats two aspects of this subject.

First, he determines the things pertaining in general to the distinction of such friendships.

Second, at as we noted at the outset (1159b25; [1657]), he treats the distinction of these friendships according to their particular natures.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he discusses the friendships of a superior to a subordinate, as father to a son, and a husband to a wife.

Second, at between opposites, however (1159b12; [1653]), he discusses friendships existing between opposites, like a poor man and a rich man, and so on.

He treats the first point in a threefold manner.

First, he distinguishes the classification of this friendship from the previous kinds of friendships.

Second, at these friendships, though (1158b14; [1626]), he distinguishes friendships of this type from one another.

Third, at certainly the same benefits (1158b20; [1629]), he shows how these friendships are preserved.

1625. He says first that, besides the foregoing friendships, which we said [1562–95] consist in equality, from the fact that they belong to persons having likeness in virtue or utility or pleasure, there is another kind of friendship that consists in inequality (inasmuch as one person excels another), as the friendship of a father with a son, or more generally, of an older with a younger person, or of a husband with a wife, or for the most part of a superior with a subordinate.

1626. Then, at these friendships, though (1158b14), he differentiates these friendships from one another.

First, he states his proposal, saying that friendships of this type differ in kind.

He assigns two differences, one according to various relations of inequality: the friendship of a father for a son is one kind, and of a ruler for his subject is another.

Another difference is according to the contrasting relation of the superior and subordinate, for the friendship of a father toward a son is not the same as the friendship of a son toward a father, nor is the friendship of a husband toward a wife the same as the friendship of a wife toward a husband.

1627. Second, at indeed, the virtue (1158b17), he explains his proposal by two reasons.

The first is that, since friendship may be predicated according to habit and act, every friend necessarily should have a habitual disposition to do the things pertaining to friendship as well as the function itself of friendship. But it is clear in the case of the persons just mentioned that the function is not the same, for example, of a father toward a son and of a husband toward a wife, or even of a son toward a father. Consequently, there is not the same virtue. Therefore, they are also different kinds of friendship.

1628. He gives the second reason at different, too, are (1158b18). It is this. In these friendships, there are different motives for which people love. A father loves a son for a reason different from that for which a son loves a father or a husband loves a wife. But, according to the different reasons for loving, there are different kinds of love and so different kinds of friendship.

1629. Next, at certainly the same benefits (1158b20), he shows how these friendships are preserved.

First, he explains that they are preserved by the parties mutually offering what they should in regard to loving and being loved.

Second, at because of a desire for honor (1159a12; [1639]), he explains how loving and being loved are related to friendship.

He discusses the first point in a threefold manner.

First, he shows how these friendships are preserved because the parties mutually offer what is proper.

Second, at in all friendships (1158b23; [1630]), he shows that these reciprocations are considered according to proportionality.

Third, at equality, however (1158b29; [1631]), he explains how this applies to justice and friendship in different ways.

He says first that, in these friendships, the same benefits are not bestowed by each friend, and it is unnecessary to expect in return the same benefits that one bestows. For example, a son ought not to ask of his father the reverence of that which the son shows the father, as in the previous friendships, pleasure was offered for pleasure and utility for utility. But, when children show their parents what is due those who have generated them, and when parents show their children what is due their offspring, there will exist between them a lasting and just or virtuous friendship.

1630. Next, at in all friendships (1158b23), he shows how what is proper is offered in these friendships. He says that, in all friendships involving inequality of one person to the other, love is given proportionately, such that the superior party is loved more than he loves; the same is true concerning the person who is more useful, more pleasant, or more excellent in any way whatsoever. For, when each person is loved by reason of the worth he manifests, an equality of proportion that apparently pertains to friendship will ensue.

1631. Then, at equality, however (1158b29), he shows how this is applicable to justice and friendship in a different manner.

First, he gives the difference.

Second, at this is clearly (1158b33; [1633]), he makes it clear by an indication.

Third, at from this a doubt (1159a5; [1636]), he solves a doubt.

He says first that equality and proportion, which are considered in the light of one’s excellence, are not found in the same way in justice and friendship. For, as we have noted in book 5 [935] concerning justice, excellence first must be accounted or judged according to proportion, and then an exchange will be made according to equality. But in friendship, on the contrary, an equality between the persons loving one another first must be taken into consideration, and then what is in conformity with excellence must be offered to each.

1632. The reason for this difference is that friendship is a kind of union or association of friends that cannot exist between widely separated persons; but they must approach equality. Hence, it pertains to friendship to use an equality already uniformly established, but it pertains to justice to reduce unequal things to an equality. When equality exists, the work of justice is done. For that reason, equality is the goal of justice and the starting point of friendship.

1633. At this is clearly (1158b33), he clarifies his statement by an indication.

He discusses this point in a threefold way.

First, he states the indication. He says that the declaration [1631–32] of the prime necessity of equality in friendship is obvious from the fact that, if there is a great difference in virtue or vice or any other thing, men do not remain friends; nor is it considered suitable for people to maintain friendship with those who differ considerably from themselves.

1634. Second, at this is evident (1158b36), he gives three examples.

First are beings who greatly surpass men in all good things. Hence, they do not maintain friendship with men so as to converse and live with them. These separated substances Aristotle calls gods, according to pagan custom.

The second example is of kings, whose friendship people in humbler walks of life are not likely to have.

He takes the third example from the best and wisest of men, with whom individuals of little worth do not become friends.

1635. Third, at in such matters (1159a3), he answers an implied question. Someone might ask what barriers friendship can overcome and what barriers it cannot overcome. Aristotle answers that, in such matters, an exact determination is not possible. But it suffices to know in general that many qualities can be absent from one that are present in the other and the friendship still remain. If the persons are far apart, like men from God, then the friendship we are discussing does not survive.

1636. Then, at from this a doubt (1159a5), he solves an incidental doubt.

First, he raises it. He says that, from the discussions, a doubt arises as to whether men can wish their friends the greatest goods, such as that they be gods or kings or most virtuous. It seems not, because then they will no longer have their friends, and in this way, they themselves will lose great benefits, meaning their friends.

1637. Next, at **if it was **(1159a8), he solves this doubt in two ways.

First, when it was explained before [1604] that a man wishes good things to a friend for his sake, we must suppose that the friend himself remains much the same, whatever that may be, after the possession of these goods. A person wishes the most excellent goods to a friend as he is a man, not as he is changed into a god.

1638. He gives the second solution at but perhaps (1159a8). He asserts that a man wishes good to his friend, but not more than to all others, because everyone wishes good to himself most of all. Hence, it is not reasonable that a man should wish a friend those goods by which he will lose that friend who is a great good.