Lecture 13 — Quarrels and Complaints in Friendship

There are three kinds of friendship, as was noted at the outset. In each of them some men are friends on a basis of equality and others on a basis of superiority. Virtuous people become friends, and a more virtuous person becomes a friend of a less virtuous person; people having the same and different usefulness become friends for pleasure or utility. Equal friends must be equated in affection and in the other aspects of friendship, but unequal friends must bestow something proportionate to superior merits. [1726]

It is to be expected that complaints and quarrels take place solely or especially in friendships for utility. [1728]

But friends by reason of virtue are prompt to help one another, for this is the peculiar characteristic of virtue and friendship. And, when each person is intent on serving his friend, complaints and contentions do not occur. Indeed, no one is going to inflict pain on a person who loves him and acts well toward him, but a grateful recipient does a favor in return. Even the greater benefactor receiving what he desires will not complain of his friend, for each seeks what is good. [1729]

Nor do complaints often occur in friendships for pleasure, for friends have simultaneously what they desire in the enjoyment of each other’s company. And a person will appear ridiculous to complain of another’s unpleasantness, since he can terminate the relationship when he wishes. [1731]

Disputes, however, are frequent in friendships for utility. For, people using one another for advantage always are looking for something, and think they have less than their due. They complain of not receiving as much as they need when they are so deserving. On the other hand, their benefactors say they do not have the sufficiency to give as much as the beneficiaries want. [1732]

As justice is of two kinds—one unwritten, and the other legal—so utility in friendship is of two kinds: one moral and the other legal. And when exchanges are not made according to the same kind of utility, quarrels arise and friendships are broken up. [1734]

Now, legal utility is expressed in agreements. This is either of a commercial type, in hand to hand dealings, or of a liberal type in allowing a period of delay, though the quid pro quo is determined. In the latter case, the debt is clear and unambiguous, yet the postponement indicated a friendly attitude. For this reason, some states do not permit judicial action over such agreements, but assume that people dealing in good faith should honor it. [1735]

Moral utility, however, is not expressed in definite words, but the gift is made to any other as to a friend. But the giver expects something equal or better in return, as if he were not making a gift, but a loan; and when the exchange and repayment do not take place, he will complain. This happens because all or most men approve what is noble but choose what serves their interests. Now, it is noble to confer a benefit without expecting another in return, but it is profitable to receive a benefit. [1736]

But when a person can, he should make a return worthy of what he has received, doing this of his own accord. For a man must not make someone a friend against his will; he makes a mistake in the beginning by accepting a gift from a person from whom he should not have taken it. Indeed, the gift is not from a real friend, nor from someone acting for the sake of a real friend. In this case, the recipient must arrange payment, as is done on fixed terms, and actually repay if he can; if he cannot, he is not expected to do so even by the giver. Therefore, when possible, he should repay; but he should consider at the outset the person from whom he is going to receive a benefit and the kind of benefit offered, so that he may accept or decline the benefit. [1738]

It is uncertain, though, whether repayment should be measured by the utility to the recipient, and made according to it, or by the kindness of the giver. [1740]

For people who receive benefits belittle them; they say they receive such as are insignificant to their benefactors and obtainable from others. Conversely, benefactors maintain that they give the best they have—things not to be had from others—and that they give them in times of danger and great need. [1741]

Therefore, in useful friendship, the measure is the utility to the receiver. For, he needs the help and it is given to him on the assumption of an equal return. Now, the help of the benefactor will be only as much as the recipient gets from it, and he must repay what he received, or even more, for that would be more generous. In friendships of virtue, however, complaints do not arise. Here the intention of the giver has a likeness to a measure, for intention is the essential element in virtue and moral practice. [1742]

1726. There are three kinds of friendship. After the Philosopher has distinguished the kinds of friendships, he now shows how complaints or grumblings arise in friendships.

1727. A friendship for virtue may exist between equally virtuous men or between a more virtuous and a less virtuous man; a friendship for pleasure may be between equally pleasant men or between a more pleasant and a less pleasant man; a friendship for utility may provide advantages in equal measure or in a greater and less measure. If, then, friends would be equal in any kind of friendship, they must be equated both in respect to loving, so that each loves the other equally, and in respect to the other requirements, such as the courtesies of friends. But, if they were unequal, each must bestow something in proportion to his superiority or inferiority.

1728. Then, at it is to be expected (1162b5), he points out the friendships in which quarrels occur.

First, he proposes his intention.

Second, at but friends by reason of (1162b6; [1729]), he explains it.

He observes first that it is reasonable for complaints and quarrels—according as one friend accuses another or complains about him—to take place either solely or especially in friendship for utility.

1729. At but friends by reason of (1162b6), he explains his intention.

First, he shows that complaint or quarreling does not occur in friendship for virtue.

Second, at nor do complaints (1162b13; [1731]), he points out too that it does not happen often in friendship for pleasure.

Third, at disputes, however (1162b16; [1732]), he shows that complaining and quarreling take place frequently in utilitarian friendship.

He remarks first that virtuous friends are prompt to help one another, because doing good for a friend is the proper function of both virtue and friendship. And, when each strives to serve his friend, complaints and contentions cannot possibly arise.

1730. Indeed, no one wants to cause sorrow to a person who loves him and acts well toward him, but if the recipient of a benefit is grateful, he will be anxious to give another benefit in return. Although the person who is supposedly more excellent may not receive as much as he gave, nevertheless—if allotted what he desires—he will not complain of this friend. What both desire is the good, that is, the proper and honorable, and this will be the thing that does not exceed the friend’s means.

Aristotle does this under three headings.

First, he indicates what must be done to avoid quarrels in friendships.

Second, at it is to be expected (1162b5; [1728]), he points out the friendships in which quarrels occur.

Third, at as justice is of two kinds (1162b21; [1734]), he explains the cause of quarreling.

He says first there are three kinds of friendship: for virtue, for pleasure, and for utility. And, in any one of these, men can be friends on terms of equality or of merit. He takes up each kind on this very point.

1731. Next, at nor do complaints (1162b13), he explains how it is with friendship for pleasure. He says that complaints and quarrels, though possible at times, do not arise very often in friendships based on pleasure, for if friends enjoy one another’s company, each has what he desires, namely, pleasure. For that reason there is no place for a quarrel. But, if one person does not find another pleasant, it is ridiculous to complain of him not being pleasant, since the one has it in his power not to stay in the other’s company.

1732. At disputes, however (1162b16), he indicates the case of friendship for utility, observing that this friendship suffers especially from complaints and quarrels. For those who use one another for advantage always want more than is given them and think they receive less than their due. Consequently, they complain of not receiving as much as they need, especially when they are deserving of so much. But, on the other hand, their benefactors say they do not have enough to give what the beneficiaries want.

1733. Then, at as justice is of two kinds (1162b21), he gives the reason for quarreling in friendship for utility:

first, in respect to equals;

second, at disagreements happen (1163a24; [1744]), in respect to unequals.

He handles the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he assigns the cause.

Second, at it is uncertain, though (1163a9; [1740]), he brings out a difficulty.

He discusses the first point from two aspects.

First, he proposes the cause of quarrels in friendship based on utility.

Second, at but when a person (1163a1; [1738]), he tells how to avoid such quarrels.

He treats the first point under two headings.

First, he states the cause.

Second, at now legal utility (1162b25; [1735]), he explains his statement.

He affirms first that justice is of two kinds.

One is unwritten but implanted in reason and is called natural justice by him on a previous occasion [1081].

The other is written in the law and is called legal justice in book 5 [1081].

1734. Likewise, utility properly acquired in friendships is of two kinds.

One is moral, according as a person provides another with help in conformity with moral practice; and this utility answers to what is just, but not written down.

The other is legal utility, according as a person provides another with help in conformity with a statute of law.

Now complaints arise in useful friendships especially when an exchange of utility is not made according to the same standard. One bestows help according to the requirements of law, but the other demands it according to moral practice. And in this way friendship is broken up.

1735. Next, at now, legal utility (1162b25), he clarifies his statement:

first, in regard to legal utility;

second, at moral utility, however (1162b31; [1736]), in regard to moral utility.

He notes first that legal utility is expressed in definite words or pacts entered into by agreement of both parties.

This is twofold.

One is entirely formal—after the manner of buying and selling done from hand to hand—for instance, when someone immediately takes what is promised him for service rendered.

The other is more liberal, allowing a period of delay, although the quid pro quo must necessarily be determined. Thus, the debt is clear and unambiguous, but the postponement of it is a kind of friendly gesture. For this reason, some do not require a judicial exercise of justice, but honor their word in business dealings; and it is thought they should be loved for this.

1736. At moral utility, however (1162b31), he explains what moral utility is. He says it is not expressed in definite words or compacts made by agreement, but without any contract externally declared, a person gives to someone else what is usually given freely to a friend. However, the man who makes a worthy gift intends and expects in return something equal or even better, as if he were not making a gift, but a loan. But when an exchange does not take place in such a way that the recipient restores and pays equal or more, the giver will accuse the recipient and complain of him.

1737. After that he assigns the cause of these actions. He remarks that what he just said—namely, that the person who gives freely seeks a return—happens because all or most people desire or approve what is noble but actually choose what serves their interests. But that a man confer a benefit on another without intending a benefit in return is noble. Consequently, men want to appear to confer benefits in this way in order to be acceptable to others. But it is profitable to receive benefits. Therefore, whatever else they may pretend, men choose what is profitable.

1738. Then, at but when a person (1163a1), he shows how quarreling of this kind is to be avoided. He says the recipient of a benefit, when he can, should make a return worthy of the gifts he has received, and he should do this of his own accord, for a man should not make someone a friend against his will, in the sense of being willing to accept freely from a person who is unwilling to give freely. But the man who accepts a benefit made a mistake at the outset in accepting a favor of a person from whom he should not have taken it. For he does not receive a benefit from a real friend, nor from one who bestowed it for the sake of him to whom it was given, but for an expected advantage. Hence, the recipient of a benefit ought to repay the giver on fixed terms, or compacts made by agreement. And if he can return to the giver the equal of what he received, he ought to insist on making complete repayment. But if he is unable to repay, neither he who bestowed nor he who accepted the benefit thinks it proper to demand this.

1739. We should remark, then, that, when possible, the recipient ought to make repayment to the kind of benefactor who is intent on repayment. But, when a man accepts a benefit, he ought to consider at the beginning the person from whom he is receiving it, whether from a friend freely giving or from one who seeks repayment. Likewise, he ought to consider under what conditions he is accepting the benefit, whether he could make a return or not, so that he may accept or decline the benefit.

1740. Next, at it is uncertain, though (1163a9), he raises a difficulty on the matters discussed.

First, he proposes the difficulty, stating it is doubtful whether the recommended repayment ought to be measured by the utility conferred on the recipient of the benefit, or by the action of the bestower of the benefit.

1741. Second, at for people who receive (1163a12), he gives the reason for the difficulty. Recipients of benefits, in attempting to belittle the favors obtained, say they received what was only a trifle for their benefactors, such as they themselves were able to get from others. On the contrary, though, benefactors wanting to extol their benefits maintain that they gave the best they had, which were such as could not be gotten from others, and that they gave these in times of danger and great need.

1742. Third, at therefore, in useful friendship (1163a16), he solves the difficulty by saying that repayment ought to be measured by the utility accruing to the recipient’s benefit. He is the one who needed the benefit and it is sufficient for him to attempt an equal return. Indeed, the help of the benefactor was only as much as the receiver obtains from it, and if it effects more, it is better. In friendships of virtue, however, complaints do not arise, as has been indicated [1729–30].

1743. Nevertheless, a return must be made in them, and here the intention or will in the giver of the benefit has a likeness to a measure, because a measure in any genus is the principal element in that genus. But the excellence of virtue and moral practice lies in intention. For that reason, in friendship based on virtue, a return ought to be made according to the will of the person who bestowed the benefit, even if someone obtained little or no help from it.