Lecture 3 — Kinds of Friendship

Since these objects of love differ from each other in kind, the corresponding love and friendship will also differ in kind. There are, then, three kinds of friendship corresponding to the objects of love. In each of these, a recognized return of love is possible, and those loving can mutually will good according to their love. [1562]

Therefore, of those who love one another for utility, one does not love the other for the other’s sake, but for the good they mutually gain. The same is true of those who love each other for pleasure, for friends like these do not love witty people because of their character, but because they are pleasant companions. Those who love for utility love for the good they get, and those who love for the sake of pleasantness love for the pleasure they enjoy. These do not love a friend because he is a friend, but because he is useful or pleasant. Therefore, these friendships are incidental, for a man is loved not for what he is, but for some advantage or pleasure. [1565]

Since men do not always remain the same, friendships of this kind are easily dissolved; when those who are loved cease to be pleasant or useful, their friends stop loving them. The useful is not permanent, but is one thing now and then another. Consequently, if the reason for friendship no longer exists, the friendship itself is dissolved. [1567]

This friendship seems to exist especially among old men, who do not seek pleasure but utility. [1568]

It is also suitable for adolescents and youths who seek what is to their advantage. Friends of this kind do not associate much with each other, for sometimes they are not even agreeable to each other. So they do not need such companionship unless it is useful, since they are pleasing to one another only insofar as they hope for some good. [1569]

To the same classification some assign the friendship of fellow travelers. [1570]

Young men seem to foster friendship mostly for pleasure, because they live according to the passions and follow what is pleasing to them at the moment. [1571]

As they grow older, however, their pleasures undergo change. They quickly make and quickly forsake friends, for a change of friendship comes at the same time with the change of pleasure, and youthful pleasure is swift to change. [1572]

Moreover, young people are amorous; they love on account of passion and pleasure, and this is conducive to intense love. For this reason, such persons quickly cease to love; oftentimes they fall in and out of love the same day. But they want to remain together all day and live with one another. This is the way their friendship works. [1573]

Perfect friendship, however, is friendship between men who are good and resemble one another according to virtue, for those who are alike in virtue wish one another good inasmuch as they are virtuous, and they are virtuous in themselves. [1574–75]

But people who wish good to friends for their sake are the truest friends; they do this for the friends themselves and not for something incidental. [1576]

Therefore, friendship between such men remains as long as they are virtuous; and virtue is a permanent habit. [1577]

Likewise, each friend is not only good in himself but also to his friend, for the virtuous are good without qualification, and useful and entirely pleasing to one another. This is so because each man’s own actions and the actions of a like nature are pleasing to him. But actions of virtuous men are of this or a similar kind. [1578]

It is reasonable for such friendship to be long-lasting, because absolutely all the qualities necessary for friends are joined together in it. Every friendship is for the sake of good or pleasure, either absolutely or to the one loving and according to a kind of likeness. But all the preceding qualities are found in this friendship essentially; and those who are alike according to this friendship have the remaining goods too, because what is good without qualification is also unreservedly pleasurable. [1579]

These things, then, are most lovable. Hence, love of them should be most intense, and such friendship the noblest. [1580]

Very likely, friendships of this kind are rare, since virtuous men are scarce. [1581]

Besides, time and familiarity are needed. This is so because, according to the proverb, people do not know one another until they eat salt together. But men ought neither take others as friends nor become friends until each appears to the other worthy of love and is trusted by the other. [1582]

However, those who at once offer the services of friendship show that they wish to be friends but in fact are not unless they are lovable to each other and know it. So, then, the wish for friendship is quickly made, but not friendship itself. [1583]

A friendship of this kind is perfect in regard to both duration and the remaining conditions, and in all respects each receives from each the same benefit—as is proper between friends. [1584]

1562. Since these objects of love differ. After the Philosopher has shown the nature of friendship, he now distinguishes the kinds of friendship.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he makes his distinction.

Second, at there are three (1162a34; [1726]), he shows which kinds of friendship give rise to complaints or grumblings.

He treats his first point from two aspects.

First, he distinguishes the kinds of friendship that exist between persons of equal rank.

Second, at there is another (1158b11; [1625]), he distinguishes the kinds of friendship that exist between persons of unequal rank.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he distinguishes the kinds of friendship.

Second, at consequently, the friendships (1158b1; [1621]), he shows that these consist in equality.

He discusses the first point from three aspects.

First, he distinguishes the kinds of friendship.

Second, at just as in the case (1157b5; [1596]), he treats them in relation to their acts.

Third, at but friendship (1158a1; [1607]), he treats them in relation to their subjects.

About the first, he does two things.

On the first point he gives the distinction of the kinds.

Second, at therefore, of those (1156a10; [1565]), he treats the particular kinds.

1563. He says first that there are three kinds of lovable objects, as indicated [1552, 1557], namely, the good as such, the pleasurable, and the useful; these do not differ in kind as three equal species of a genus, but are classified by priority and posteriority. Since acts are diversified according to the difference of objects, the types of love will differ in kind according to these three: thus there is one type of love by which a thing is loved for the good, another for the pleasurable, and a third for the useful. Likewise, because love is an act of friendship, there will be three kinds of friendship equal to the three objects of love. One is friendship for the honorable good or the good as such, another for the pleasurable, and a third for the useful.

1564. In each of these, the definition of friendship just given is fulfilled, for in each of the three, a recognized return of love by someone is possible. Likewise, in these three, people can will good to one another according to their love. For example, if men love for the sake of virtue, they wish one another the virtuous good; but, if for a good based on utility, they wish one another useful goods; and, if for a good based on pleasure, they wish pleasurable goods.

1565. Next, at therefore, of those (1156a10), he treats the kinds of friendship just mentioned that are contained under friendship not according to equality, but according to priority and posteriority.

So he does three things.

First, he treats friendship based on utility and that based on pleasure, which share the nature of friendship by posteriority.

Second, at perfect friendship, however (1156b7; [1574]), he treats friendship based on the honorable, that is, good by itself, to which the notion of friendship primarily and essentially pertains.

Third, at but the friendship (1156b35; [1585]), he compares the other kinds of friendship with this kind.

He discusses the first point from two aspects.

First, he shows just what the different kinds of imperfect friendship are;

second, at this friendship (1156a24; [1568]), to whom they belong.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he shows that useful and pleasurable friendships are friendships in an incidental sense.

Second, at since men (1156a19; [1567]), he shows that they are easily dissolved.

1566. He says first that, of those who love one another for the sake of utility, one does not love the other for the sake of the other, but inasmuch as he receives from the other some good for himself. The same is true of those who love each other on account of pleasantness, for the one does not love the other precisely as witty or virtuous in merriment, but merely as pleasant to himself. So it is obvious that those who love for the sake of utility love for the good they get, and that those who love for the sake of pleasantness love for the pleasure they enjoy. Thus, they do not love their friend for what he is in himself, but for what is incidental to him, his utility or pleasantness. Therefore, friendships of this sort plainly are not friendships essentially, but incidentally, since a person is not loved for what he is, but for utility or pleasure.

1567. Then, at since men (1156a19), he shows that friendships of this kind are easily dissolved. They are for the sake of something that is incidental to the persons loved, and in this men, do not always remain the same. The same man, for instance, is not always pleasant or useful. Therefore, when those who are loved cease to be pleasant or useful, their friends stop loving them. This is very obvious in friendship based on utility, for the same thing is not always useful to a man. It is one thing now, and then another in different times and places. So, a doctor is useful for sickness, a sailor for navigation, and so on. Since, then, friendship was cultivated not for the man himself, but for the utility he afforded, when the cause of the friendship vanishes, the friendship too is consequently dissolved.

1568. At this friendship (1156a24), he shows to whom these friendships may be attributed.

First, he shows to whom useful friendships belong;

second, at young men seem (1156a31; [1571]), to whom pleasurable friendship.

He notes three classes of men who avail themselves of useful friendship.

First, he says that this friendship seems to exist especially among old men, who are not looking for what is pleasurable for the delight of body and sensitive nature, but rather what is useful for help needed for their natural deficiency.

1569. Second, at it is also (1156a26), he says that this is the kind of friendship pursued by adolescents and youths, who seek what is useful. They seem quite incapable of possessing mutual love or even of remaining constant companions, because sometimes they are not agreeable to one another; neither does one need the companionship of another except for utility. Their association with one another is pleasurable to them inasmuch as it holds some hope of good for which this association is useful.

1570. Third, at to the same (1156a30), he says that some reduce even the friendship of fellow travelers to friendship based on utility, since travelers seem to love one another for the advantage that one derives from another on his journey.

1571. Next, at young men seem (1156a31), he shows to whom pleasurable friendship may be attributed.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he explains to whom this friendship may be assigned, saying that friendship based on pleasure belongs most of all to youths. This is so because they live according to the impulses of passion, since they have not been strengthened in rational judgment, by which the passions are regulated. Because all passions terminate at pleasure and pain, as we stated in book 2 [296], youths principally seek what is pleasurable at the present moment. The passions belong to the sensitive part of man, which is chiefly concerned with the present. But to love a present thing because it is productive of future pleasure coincides with the notion of the useful.

1572. Then, at as they grow older (1156a33), he shows that these friendships readily change in two ways.

First, they change on the part of the pleasurable objects, because other things become pleasing to them with the passing of time. It is not in the same thing that children, adolescents, and youths alike find pleasure, and so they easily make friends and easily forsake them, for with the change of pleasure comes a change of friendship. But youthful pleasure is characteristically swift to change, since the nature of youth consists wholly in a state of change.

1573. At moreover, young people (1156b1), he shows the same thing on the part of those who love. He says that young people are volatile—that is, quick and vehement in their love—because they love not from rational choice, but from passion and inasmuch as they are very desirous of pleasure. Therefore, they love passionately and intensely. Since passion vanishes as quickly as it appears, such persons as easily fall in love as they cease to love; many times, they even fall in and out of love the same day. But as long as the friendship endures, these people want to remain together all day long and live in the other’s presence inasmuch as they enjoy the company of each other. This is the way their friendship works.

1574. Next, at **perfect friendship, however **(1156b7), he treats the principal kind of friendship that is for the good of virtue.

First, he points out that this friendship is perfect. He says that the friendship between good men and those alike in virtue is perfect friendship.

1575. Then, at for those who (1156b7), he proves his statement by explaining the qualities of this friendship.

First, he shows that this is friendship essentially and not incidentally.

Second, at likewise, each (1156b12; [1578]), he shows that it lacks nothing.

Third, at very likely (1156b24; [1581]), he shows that it is rare.

He handles the first point in a threefold manner.

First, he shows that the friendship just referred to is friendship essentially and not incidentally. Those who are alike in virtue wish one another good inasmuch as they are virtuous. But they are good in themselves, for virtue is a kind of perfection making man good and his work good. It is clear, then, that such men wish good to one another in themselves. Therefore, they have friendship essentially.

1576. Second, at but people who (1156b9), he concludes from this that friendship of this type is the best friendship; that which is essential is always better than that which is incidental. Since this is friendship essentially and the others incidentally, the virtuous who wish good to friends for their sake and not for the sake of something that may come from them are the highest type of friends.

1577. Third, at therefore, friendship (1156b11), he infers further: from the fact that men of this kind love one another by reason of their goodness, their friendship consequently remains as long as they are good in virtue. But virtue is a permanent habit and does not change easily, as is clear from discussions in book 2 [305]. Therefore, this friendship is lasting.

1578. At likewise, each (1156b12), he shows that this friendship lacks nothing that belongs to the notion of what is perfect, as is evident in Physics 3. (Physics 3.6.207a10; see Aquinas, In III phys., lec. 11, n. 385.)

On the first point, he does three things.

First, he shows that this friendship comprehends those things that are found in other kinds of friendship. He explains that each friend is good not only simply or in himself, but also in relation to his friend, because those who are virtuous are also good without qualification and useful to one another and completely pleasing. This is so because each man takes pleasure in his own actions and in actions similar to his own. Likewise, the actions of virtuous men are those belonging to one man as proper to him and to another as similar to these; for operations that are according to virtue are not contrary to each other, but all are according to right reason. So, then, it is obvious that the friendship of virtuous men comprehends not only good in an unqualified sense, but also pleasure and utility.

1579. Then, at it is reasonable (1156b17), he concludes further that it is reasonable for such friendship to be long-lasting and not readily transient, because it contains absolutely everything necessary for friends. Every friendship is for the sake of good or pleasure: either in itself (for example, when what is loved is in itself good and pleasurable) or in relation to the one loving, which is to be good and pleasurable not in itself and properly, but according to a kind of likeness to what is really and properly good and pleasurable. In fact, all the preceding things are found in this friendship not incidentally but essentially, and those who are alike according to this friendship have the remaining goods too, because what is simply good is also pleasing. Since this friendship has all the requisites of friendship, it is not easily broken up, for only a defective thing is usually set aside.

1580. His third conclusion, at these things, then (1156b23), observes that this friendship is the noblest kind because the state in which all the reasons for loving are united is most lovable. Objects of this kind are honorable goods because they are good without qualification and, at the same time, pleasurable and useful. Hence, love in these cases should be most complete, and such friendship the noblest.

1581. Next, at very likely (1156b24), he shows that this friendship is rare—an indication of its perfection, for perfection in any class is rather unusual.

On this point, he does three things.

First, he explains his intention.

Second, at however, those who (1156b29; [1583]), he excludes an objection.

Third, at a friendship of this kind (1156b33; [1584]), he gives a summary.

He explains his intention by two reasons.

The first is that this friendship exists between virtuous men. But such men are scarce because of the difficulty of attaining the mean, as was pointed out in book 2 [370]. Consequently, it is very likely that such friendships are rare.

1582. Then, at besides, time (1156b25), be gives the second reason. Friendship between men of this kind requires a long time and mutual association, so that they can decide among themselves who are virtuous and their friends. This is so because, according to the proverb, people do not come to know one another before they eat a peck of salt together. But one man ought not to take another as his friend until he appears to the other worthy of being loved and is believed to be so. This rarely occurs. Consequently, such friendships are uncommon.

1583. Second, at however, those who (1156b29), he excludes an objection concerning those who seem to become friends at once. He says that people who quickly offer the services of friendship show that they want to be friends; nevertheless, they are not yet friends until they know that they are lovable to one another. Thus, it is clear that a man acquires a wish for friendship quickly, but not friendship itself.

1584. Third, at a friendship of this kind (1156b33), he concludes with a summary that this friendship is perfect both in regard to duration, because it is lasting, and in regard to the other conditions. It contains everything found in the other kinds of friendship, and friends perform like services for each other—a thing that is necessary for friendship because friends are alike in virtue.