Lecture 14 — Complaints in Friendships Between Unequals

Disagreements happen also in friendships between unequals. Here each thinks he deserves more, and when he does not get it, the friendship is broken up. [1744]

For the better person thinks that more is coming to him, since greater benefit is due to a better person. The more useful friend is of a similar mind, arguing that the useless man should not receive an equal share, for we would have a kind of public benefaction and not friendship if the advantages of friendship were not allotted according to the value of the benefits bestowed. In this view, friendship ought to be considered a business partnership: those who invest more should get bigger returns. [1745]

But the needy and the less worthy say the opposite, maintaining it is the part of a good friend to assist those in need. What would be the use, they say, of having a good or powerful friend if nothing is to be gained from him? [1747]

Both seem to estimate correctly what is just. And each ought to get from the friendship something more—not of the same thing though, but the superior should receive greater honor and the inferior greater gain. [1748]

Honor certainly is compensation for acts of virtue and kindness, while gain provides assistance against need. [1749]

It seems to happen this way in civil affairs, for the man who does not contribute any good to the community is not honored. But he who benefits the community receives a common good—honor is just that. A person cannot expect to be honored by the community and simultaneously made rich. Indeed, no one could bear to have the smaller share in everything. But one person losing in wealth receives honor, and another expecting gifts receives riches; thus, each is equated in proportion to merit, and friendship is preserved (as has been explained). Therefore, our friendship with unequals should be so conducted that the friend who benefits us in money or virtue is recompensed in the way that is possible, namely, in honor. [1750]

Friendship indeed asks what is possible, not what is equal in value, for not all benefits can be repaid in honor as is evident in honors due to God and parents. No one can ever repay them what they deserve, although the man who serves them to the best of his ability appears to be virtuous. [1752]

Therefore, a son is not at liberty to disown his father, though a father may disown his son. [1753]

For a debt ought to be paid. But, in discharging it, the son can give nothing equal to the blessings bestowed. Therefore, he will always be in debt. Now, creditors have the power to dismiss their debtors, and a father his son. [1754]

At the same time no one ever seems to disown his son unless he is extremely wicked, for even aside from natural friendship, it is human not to refuse help. But if a son is bad, he will avoid supplying his father’s needs, or at least will not be in a hurry to do so. For the majority are willing to accept benefits but avoid conferring them as something unprofitable. This is the extent of our discussion of these questions. [1755]

1744. Disagreements happen also in friendships. After the Philosopher has shown the manner in which complaints arise in useful friendship between equals, he now shows how complaints occur in friendships between unequals. vbdfcc

He discusses this point under three headings.

First, he states the disagreement usually happening in these friendships.

Second, at for the better person (1163a26; [1745]), he gives the reason for disagreement.

Third, at both seem (1163b1; [1748]), he defines the truth.

He remarks first that some difference and discord among friends exist also in friendships between unequals when each, the superior and the inferior, thinks it right that he should have more. If he does not get it, the friendship is broken up for this reason.

1745. Next, at for the better person (1163a26), he offers the reason for this disagreement.

First, he states the reason motivating the superior parties;

second, at but the needy (1163a32; [1747]), the reason influencing the inferior parties.

He observes first that, in friendship for virtue, the better person thinks it reasonable for him to receive the greater benefit; for if good is due to the good man, then more good is due to the better one. Likewise, in friendship for utility, the more useful person thinks he should receive the greater benefit.

1746. It is not fitting, they contend, that he who is less useful should receive the equal of the more useful partner; for this would be a kind of public benefaction or service and not friendship, if the advantages arising from friendship were not distributed according to the value of works so that the man who does better work would have more. In fact, they think that, as in business enterprises, the bigger investors receive larger returns from the general fund, so also in friendship the person who contributes more to friendship should receive more.

1747. Then, at but the needy (1163a32), he gives the reasons influencing the inferior parties. The needy in useful friendship and the less worthy in virtuous friendship argue to the contrary; they maintain that it is the role of a friend excelling in good to provide adequately for friends in need. In fact, there would not seem to be any advantage for an inferior person to have a virtuous or powerful friend if nothing ought to be received from him.

1748. At both seem (1163b1), he defines the truth.

First, he proposes the truth;

second, at honor certainly (1163b3; [1749]), he explains it;

third, at therefore, a son (1163b18; [1753]), he deduces a corollary from the discussion.

He says first that each, the superior and inferior, seems to estimate correctly what is just, because something more (not, however, of the same thing), ought to be given to each: to the superior, greater honor, but to the needy, greater gain.

1749. Next, at honor certainly (1163b3), he clarifies his statement [1748]:

first, by argument;

second, at it seems to happen (1163b5), by illustration;

third, at friendship indeed (1163b15), he proves an assertion previously made.

He notes first that more honor ought to be given to the superior person because honor is a suitable compensation for acts of virtue and kindness, in which worthy people excel. On the other hand, gain provides assistance against need, which inferior persons suffer.

1750. At it seems to happen (1163b5), he manifests the same point by an example. We see it happen this way in civil affairs, for the man who does not contribute any good to the community is not honored. But he who bestows some benefit on the community is given a common good, honor. It is not easily possible for someone to get riches and honors from the community simultaneously. Indeed, no one could bear to have the smaller share of everything, honor and riches alike. But the person who loses money by the expenses incurred in serving the community is given honor by the state, and the person who expects gifts for his service is given riches.

1751. It was pointed out previously [1693] that the observance and recognition of excellence creates a proportionate equality among friends, and thus preserves friendship. As states confer honors on some and wealth on others according to their excellence, so we must handle unequal friends. We should render honor to one who performs a useful service by bestowing riches or who does virtuous acts. We should do this in such a way that compensation is made—perhaps not in the equivalent, but in that service that is possible.

1752. Then, at friendship indeed (1163b15), he proves that it is sufficient to return what is feasible. The reason is that friendship asks of a friend what is possible, but not always what is equal in value, since this would be absolutely impossible at times. Surely not all benefits can be repaid in adequate honor, as is obvious in honors rendered to God and parents, who can never be worthily recompensed. However, if a man serves God and parents according to his ability, he seems to be just or virtuous.

1753. At therefore, a son (1163b18), he deduces a corollary from the discussion.

First, he concludes that it is not lawful for a son to disown his father, but it is lawful sometimes for a father to disown his son.

1754. Second, at for a debt (1163b20), he clarifies his conclusion by two reasons.

The first is that the son, being indebted to the father for the benefits received, ought to repay. But he is unable to make a repayment that the benefits deserve. Therefore, he will always remain in debt. For this reason, he is not at liberty to disown his father. But creditors have the power to dismiss their debtors, so a father has the power of dismissing his son.

1755. He states the second reason at at the same time no one (1163b22), observing that no son seems to forsake his father and disown him except out of excessive wickedness. Because of the natural friendship between father and son, it is human that no one should thrust out a person who has supported him. Thus, it would be most wicked for a son to expel his father. But if a son is bad, the father ought to put him out, or at least not work hard to provide adequately for him, since the son would thereby increase in wickedness. For the majority are willing to accept benefits but avoid assisting others as something unprofitable.

1756. He concludes by way of summary that he has discussed those questions pertaining only to the kinds of friendship. Thus, he finishes the teaching of book 8.