Lecture 6 — Friendship in Relation to its Subject

But friendship among morose and elderly people occurs less frequently, inasmuch as they are more peevish and have little taste for conversations that especially seem to be the marks and cause of friendship. For this reason, youths make friends quickly, but not old people, for they cannot become friends of those whose company they do not enjoy. The same reason holds for austere persons who, nevertheless, entertain kindly feelings toward one another; for they wish each other well and assist one another in their needs. However, they do not really become friends, because they do not live together or take pleasure in one another’s company—activities that are especially characteristic of friendship. [1607]

It is not possible to be a friend of many people by perfect friendship, as neither is it possible to be in love with many persons at the same time. Perfect friendship has a likeness to excess, but it is designed by nature for one object only. [1609]

Then, too, it is difficult for many to be exceedingly pleasing at the same time to the same person. But perhaps this would not be expedient. [1610]

Besides, friendship implies familiarity and experience, which are very difficult. [1611]

In friendships for the sake of utility and pleasure, many may be pleasing to one. The reason is that many can be useful and pleasant, and their services can be rendered in a short time. [1612]

Friendship between such persons, however, seems rather to be for the sake of pleasure, since the same activities may be performed by both: they may find delight in one another and in the same things. The friendships of the young are like this. [1613]

Their friendship seems more generous than friendship for utility, which is for gain. [1614]

But fortunate people have no need of useful friends, although they do need pleasant friends, for they must live with others. People can bear unpleasantness for a time, but no one can continuously endure something unpleasant—not even good itself if it were displeasing. [1615]

For this reason, people look for pleasant friends; even those who are friends for virtue’s sake must also be pleasant and good to one another. Thus, they will have all the requisites for friendship. [1616]

Men in power seem to have different classes of friends, some of whom are useful and others pleasant to them; for, the same persons are not likely to be friends in both ways. [1617]

Nor do the powerful seek pleasant friends who are also virtuous or friends useful for honorable projects, but they desire some who are witty to provide amusement, and others who are industrious in doing whatever they are commanded. Such qualities, however, are rarely found in the same person. [1618]

It has been said, though, that a man can be a pleasant and useful friend at the same time, as in the case of the virtuous person. But a virtuous man does not become a friend of one who is eminent unless the latter is surpassed by the former in virtue. If this does not happen, there is no proportionate equality. But such people (who excel the good man in virtue) are not easy to find. [1619]

Consequently, the friendships discussed consist in equality, for friends both do and wish the same things for one another; or they exchange one thing for another, for instance, pleasure for utility. [1621]

We have explained that these are less perfect and also less enduring friendships. Indeed, according to their similarity or dissimilarity to the same thing, they seem to be or not to be friendships. Inasmuch as they have a likeness to friendship based on virtue, they seem to be friendships, for one kind has pleasure and the other utility. But perfect friendship has both. They differ, however, for perfect friendship is unchanging and permanent, while the others quickly change; on account of this dissimilarity the latter do not seem to be genuine friendships. [1622]

1607. But friendship among morose and elderly people. After the Philosopher has distinguished the different kinds of friendship, he now discusses these friendships in relation to their subject, that is, to friends themselves.

This aspect he treats from three angles.

First, he treats the aptitude and ineptitude of some persons for friendship;

second, at it is not possible (1158a10; [1609]), the number of friends;

third, at men in power (1158a27; [1617]), the differentiation of friends.

He says first that the more peevish they are, the fewer friendships morose and elderly people form because, presuming on themselves, they follow their own way. For that reason, they cannot agree with others: they have little taste for conversation with others, both because they are intent on themselves and because they are suspicious of others. But concord and conversation with friends seem especially to be the works of friendship and its cause.

1608. Consequently youths, who find much pleasure in conversation and readily agree with others, quickly make friends. This does not happen with old people, for they cannot become friends of those whose company and conversation they do not enjoy. The same reason holds for morose persons who are quarrelsome and critical of what others do. But such people—namely, the elderly and the severe—can be benevolent, inasmuch as they affectively wish good to others and even effectively assist them in their needs. However, they do not really become friends, because they neither live with nor take pleasure in the company of their friends—activities that seem to be the special works of friendship.

1609. Then, at it is not possible (1158a10), he treats the number of friends.

He explains this point in a threefold manner.

First, he shows that it is not possible to be a friend to many people by the perfect friendship that exists between virtuous persons.

Second, at in friendships (1158a16; [1612]), he shows that this happens in two other kinds of friendship: those for utility and pleasure.

Third, at friendship between (1158a18; [1613]), he compares the two kinds of friends with one another.

He shows first, by three reasons, that it is not possible for a person to be a friend of many people by perfect friendship built on the good of virtue.

The first is that, since this friendship is perfect and best, it has a likeness to excess in loving—if the extent of love be considered. But if we consider the notion of loving, there cannot be an excess. It is not possible for virtue and a virtuous person to be loved excessively by another virtuous person who regulates his affections by reason. Superabundant love is not designed by nature for many, but for one only. This is evident in sexual love, according to which one man cannot at the same time love many women in an excessive manner. Therefore, the perfect friendship of the virtuous cannot extend to many persons.

1610. He gives the second reason at then, too, it is difficult (1158a13). It is this. In perfect friendship, friends are exceedingly pleasing to one another. But it is not easy for many to be exceedingly pleasing at the same time to the same individual, because few are to be found who do not have something displeasing to a person affected in some way by man’s many defects and conflicting dispositions. Thus, it happens that, while one is very pleasing, another may not be. Perhaps it is fortunate and desirable that many cannot be exceedingly pleasing to one man who, while associating with many, would not be able to care for himself. Therefore, one cannot be a friend to many by perfect friendship.

1611. He gives the third reason at besides, friendship (1158a14). It is this. In perfect friendship, we must become acquainted with a friend by habitual association. But this is very hard and cannot happen with many people. Therefore, one does not have many friends by perfect friendship.

1612. Next, at in friendships (1158a16), he shows that, in the other two kinds of friendship, which are based on utility and pleasure, it is possible for a man to have many friends who are pleasing to him, and this is for two reasons.

The first is that many can be useful and pleasant.

Second, because a long period of trial is not required, it suffices that, for a short time, people provide one another with pleasure, perhaps, or even some utility.

1613. Then, at friendship between such (1158a18), he compares the two kinds of friends.

First, he states his proposition: with those just mentioned, among whom one can have many friends, friendship for pleasure’s sake seems to be more like true friendship; on condition, though, that the same thing is done by both, that each affords pleasure to the other, for in this way, they rejoice in the same things, which is a characteristic of friendship. In fact, this is an indication that there is one pleasure for those who delight in the same things. But the case is different when pleasure is occasioned on the part of one and utility on the part of the other. However, the friendships among youths are such that, on either side, they love each other for the sake of pleasure.

1614. Second, at their friendship (1158a20), he proves his proposition by two reasons.

The first is that, in pleasurable friendship, friends love one another more generously than in useful friendship, in which a profitable return is sought—this friendship seems to be a kind of business affair. Hence, friendship for the sake of pleasure is more powerful, as more resembling perfect friendship, which is most generous, inasmuch as, by it, friends are loved for their own sakes.

1615. He gives the second reason at but fortunate people (1158a22). It is this. Fortunate men, that is, the rich, have no need of useful friends, since they are sufficient unto themselves, but they do have need of pleasant friends, for they must live with others; this is impossible without pleasantness. People can bear unpleasantness for a time. But no man can continuously endure something unpleasant; he could not even stand good itself if it were displeasing. Consequently, men who do not find pleasure in virtuous activities cannot persevere in them. So, then, it is evident that pleasurable friendship is more effectual than useful friendship, as being necessary to a great number and to more generous people.

1616. Third, at for this reason (1158a25), he infers a corollary from the discussions. Since even an honorable good would be intolerable if it were distasteful, it follows that friends for virtue’s sake must be pleasant to one another. They must be not only good in themselves, but also good to one another. Thus, they will have the requisites for friendship.

1617. Next, at men in power (1158a27), he treats the distinction of friends.

On this point, he does three things.

First, he states his proposition, that men situated in positions of power are accustomed to different kinds of friends in such a way that some are useful to them and others pleasant. It is not usual for the same men to be their friends in both ways.

1618. Second, at nor do the powerful (1158a30), he proves his proposition from the fact that these powerful men do not seek the pleasures of virtue—this type of pleasure has utility connected with it. Nor do they seek friends useful in the attainment of honorable good—this utility has a pleasure attached to it. For amusement, they seek witty or entertaining people, like comedians. But, for utility, they desire other friends (dimos), shrewd in executing whatever is commanded, either good or bad. These two qualities—shrewdness and jocularity—are not found in the same person, because skillful people are not given to jesting but to serious matters. Hence, it is evident that the powerful have different kinds of friends.

1619. Third, at it has been said, though (1158a33), he answers an objection. Someone can object that friends of the powerful are at the same time pleasant and useful, for as was explained previously [1585], a good or virtuous person is at the same time pleasant and useful. But Aristotle answers that the virtuous man does not become a friend of one eminent in power or riches unless the virtuous person is surpassed in virtue by the powerful. If this is not the case, the more powerful one who is surpassed in virtue does not make himself proportionately equal—that is, does not give proportionate compensation to the virtuous man; that is to say, as the virtuous person defers to him as the more powerful, so he should defer to the virtuous man as the better.

1620. Usually, to the extent that men excel in power and riches, they think themselves better; and we are not accustomed to find men in power who also excel in virtue or defer to the virtuous as the better.

1621. Then, at consequently, the friendships (1158b1), he shows that the kinds of friendship discussed consist in equality.

He treats this point in a twofold manner.

First, he explains his proposition, concluding from the premises that the kinds of friendship just treated consist in equality. Since this is obvious about friendship for the sake of virtue, he proves the proposition in regard to friendship based on utility and pleasure: either men wish and do the same things for one another, such as returning pleasure for pleasure or utility for utility, or they exchange one for the other, utility for pleasure or vice versa.

1622. Next, at we have explained (1158b4), he shows how the two kinds compare with the definition of friendship. He says that, from the discussions, obviously the kinds of friendship that are less proper are less lasting than the perfect friendship of the virtuous, according to whose likeness or unlikeness friendships seem to be or not to be denominated. Inasmuch as they resemble perfect friendship, they seem to be friendship according as one of them has pleasure and another utility. Perfect friendship has both.

1623. But in respect to other qualities, they are dissimilar according as perfect friendship is unchanging and lasting. The remaining kinds, however, quickly change; they also differ in many other particulars, as is evident from the previous discussions [1594–95]. On account of this dissimilarity they do not seem to be species of true friendship.